THE ANTI-COERCION INSTRUMENT (ACI) AS A TOOL OF PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17721/apmv.2026.166.1.114-121Abstract
Abstract. The European Union's Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI) is an effective trade weapon that the bloc approved in 2023 but has not yet used. Some have likened this instrument to a "bazooka" and it is designed as a deterrent to any country that uses trade measures to pressure one of the 27 member states of the EU. This instrument specifically allows for restricting imports from a country, limiting their access to certain tenders and public markets, or prohibiting certain investments. The possibility of using this new economic weapon was raised in the dispute between Lithuania and China, as the Baltic country accused Beijing of banning its exports in protest against the establishment of Taiwanese diplomatic representation in Vilnius. This was before Donald Trump returned to power in the United States, making tariffs his preferred tool during his second term. The possibility of resorting to this tool was also raised during 2025 in response to customs duties announced by the US President, but the 27 countries did not activate it, while some European representatives and analysts warned that the deterrence capacity remains weak if this tool is never used. Trump's threats to raise tariffs on eight European countries if they do not facilitate a "full" sale of Greenland to the United States sparked strong reactions within the EU and revived debate about activating the tool. This research reveals the use of the ACI as a preventive diplomatic tool with hard power and not soft power with the aim of limiting the expansionist role of the USA under the administration of President Trump since his return to the White House at the beginning of 2025, and his use of economic pressure by increasing customs duties as well as threatening to acquire Greenland from Denmark along with pressuring Nato member countries (European countries and Canada) to increase their defense spending to no less than 5% of their gross domestic product.
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Received: 25.02.26 / Revised: 06.03.26 / Accepted: 18.03.26 / Published:30.03.26





