HYBRID INFLUENCE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN GERMANY DURING THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR (2014-2026): INSTRUMENTS, EVOLUTION, AND COUNTERMEASURES

Abstract

The article provides a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the evolution, main instruments, and effectiveness of the Russian Federation's hybrid influence operations in Germany from 2014 to 2026, as well as the countermeasures developed by Germany and its European Union and NATO partners. Germany, as the largest economy in the EU, a crucial supporter of Ukraine, and a key actor in sanctions policy, is a primary target of Russia's coordinated multi-domain pressure. The study is methodologically based on a combination of chronological, typological, and network analysis, tracing the transition from long-term structural influence (such as energy dependence and political-business contacts before 2022) to highly aggressive, operationally dense hybrid warfare following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The authors identify and classify the main instruments of Russian hybrid activity across the informational, cyber, economic, intelligence, and physical domains. Particular attention is devoted to foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) ecosystems, such as cloned media campaigns (Doppelgänger), pro-Russian media platforms (Voice of Europe), and synthetic deepfake content (Storm 1516), which stoke social polarization, anti-sanctions fatigue, and fear of war escalation. In the cyber and physical spheres, the paper examines high-frequency cyber espionage by APT28, infrastructure sabotage, and the strategic recruitment of low-cost "disposable" agents to disrupt military supply chains. The article concludes with practical policy recommendations, emphasizing the need for robust institutional coordination, auditable public-private data-sharing, mandatory cybersecurity standards for political organizations, and infrastructural surveillance in logistics to protect Germany's democratic resilience and national security.

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Received: 20.03.26 / Revised: 18.04.26 / Accepted: 29.04.26 / Published: 30.06.26