MISTAKEN AND ACCIDENTAL WARS: RATIONALITY, UNCERTAINTY, AND STRATEGIC CHOICE IN THE ONSET OF ARMED CONFLICT

Abstract

Abstract. Wars are frequently characterized as accidents, mistakes, or unintended consequences of miscalculation. Such interpretations are deeply embedded in both popular discourse and classical reflections on war, where armed conflict is often portrayed as a breakdown of diplomacy or rational control. At the same time, much of contemporary international relations theory rests on the assumption that states and their leaders are broadly rational actors who seek to maximize expected utility under constraints. This creates a persistent puzzle: if war is costly, risky, and widely recognized as destructive, why do rational decision-makers repeatedly choose it?

This article argues that the opposition between “accidental” and “deliberate” war is analytically misleading. Rather than being the product of sheer error or irrationality, most wars emerge from strategic interaction under conditions of uncertainty, incomplete information, and political constraint. What are often described ex post as “mistaken” wars are more accurately understood as high-risk strategies whose unfavourable outcomes materialized de-facto. Conversely, wars that achieve immediate objectives may still constitute strategic errors if decision-makers systematically underestimated costs or overestimated benefits.

The article develops this argument by integrating rationalist bargaining theory with insights from political psychology, escalation theory, and domestic politics. It conceptualizes war as a gamble under uncertainty, where probabilities are endogenous and shaped by interaction with adaptive adversaries. It further distinguishes between mistaken wars and accidental wars, emphasizing escalation dynamics, brinkmanship, and loss of control. Finally, it examines how cognitive biases, group decision-making processes, and domestic political incentives condition leaders’ willingness to accept risk. Taken together, the analysis challenges outcome-based judgments of war and offers a more nuanced framework for understanding why wars occur despite their recognized costs.

References:

Arreguín-Toft, I. (2005). How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Badie, D. (2010). Groupthink, Iraq, and the War on Terror: Explaining US Policy Shift toward Iraq. Foreign Policy Analysis, 6(4), 277-296.

Beckley, M.  (2018). The Power of Nations: Measuring What Matters. International Security, 43(2), 7-44.

Bilmes, L., Stiglitz, J. (2008). The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict. New York: W.W.Norton&Company.

Blair, B. (1993). The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution.

Coe A., Vaynman J. (2020). Why Arms Control Is So Rare. American Political Science Review, 114(2), 342-355.

Davis J., McDermott R. (2021). The Past, Present, and Future of Behavioral IR. International Organization, 75(1), 147-177.

Fearon, J. (1994). Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. American Political Science Review, 88(3), 577–592.

Fearon, J. (1995). Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization, 49(3), 379–414.

Fearon, J. (2018). Cooperation, Conflict and the Costs of Anarchy. International Organization, 72(3), 523-559.

Janis, I. (1982). Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Jervis, R. (1997). System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Johnson, D. (2004). Overconfidence and War: The Havoc and Glory of Positive Illusions. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Kahneman, D., Tversky A. (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263–291.

Khong, Y. (1992). Analogies at War. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Levy, J. (1997). Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations. International Studies Quarterly, 41(1), 87–112.

Morgenthau, H. (2005). Politics Among Nations. Columbus: McGraw-Hill Education.

Powell, R. (2006). War as a Commitment Problem. International Organization, 60(1), 169–203.

Renshon J., Yarhi-Milo K., Kertzer J. (2023). Democratic Reputations in Crises and War. The Journal of Politics, 85(1), 1-18.

Schelling, T. (1981). The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Siverson, R., Bueno de Mesquita, B.  (2017, June 28). The Selectorate Theory and International Politics. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Retrieved 8 Jan. 2026, from https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-293

Theiler, T. (2017). The Microfoundations of Diversionary Conflict. Security Studies, 27(2), 318-343.

Waltz, K. (2010). Theory of International Politics. Long Grove: Waveland Press.

Received: 20.01.26 / Revised: 03.02.26 / Accepted: 18.03.26 / Published:30.03.26