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## EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

### НОВІ ТЕХНОЛОГІЇ ТА ГЛОБАЛЬНИЙ ПІВДЕНЬ У СУЧАСНИХ МІЖНАРОДНИХ ВІДНОСИНАХ

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**Abstract.** *The spread of artificial intelligence (AI) systems is already reshaping how states interact in an increasingly multipolar international environment. It puts additional pressure on traditional multilateral formats, encourages great powers to rely on narrower, selective coalitions, and creates openings for countries of the Global South to advance their own agendas. For Ukraine, which operates under wartime constraints, this dynamic is directly linked to balancing security needs and external cooperation. The article examines how the diffusion of AI is changing the principles and practical rules that structure interstate behaviour, and what opportunities this creates for coordinated initiatives by Global South countries aimed at supporting political stability in the international order. The study relies on targeted qualitative content analysis of leading policy reports and academic publications from 2024–2025, structured comparison of the positions of major powers and groups of Global South states, and elements of process tracing using examples from AI policy. AI is emerging as an independent driver of rule change in international relations. Instead of slow-moving universal regimes, we increasingly observe a layered architecture: a minimal set of shared global signposts, more detailed regional regulatory solutions, and selective coalitions of states that adopt compatible standards. The Global South does not act as a single bloc, but specific states are able to propose practical standards for transparency, accountability and interoperability with relatively low coordination costs. For Ukraine, an effective approach is a “security–cooperation” strategy: joining focused coalitions in AI-related areas that matter for defence, resilience and productivity, while insisting on transparency, accountability and technical interoperability in order to avoid asymmetric dependencies.*

**Keywords:** *artificial intelligence; international relations; multipolarity; security policy; information policy; economic policy; selective coalitions; Global South; transparency; accountability; interoperability.*

**Анотація.** *Поширення систем штучного інтелекту (ШІ) вже змінює принципи й*

правила взаємодії держав у багатополюсному середовищі. Воно підсилює конкуренцію підходів великих держав, стимулює перехід від універсальної багатосторонності до селективних форматів співпраці та відкриває «вікна можливостей» для країн глобального Півдня. Для України, яка діє в умовах війни, це безпосередньо пов'язано з поєднанням безпеки і зовнішньої кооперації. Метою статті стало з'ясування, як саме поширення ШІ впливає на еволюцію правил і практик міждержавної взаємодії та які можливості це створює для узгоджених ініціатив країн глобального Півдня щодо підтримання політичної стабільності міжнародного порядку. Застосовано спрямований якісний контент-аналіз аналітичних звітів і академічних публікацій 2024–2025 рр., структуроване порівняння позицій великих держав і груп країн глобального Півдня, а також елементи відстеження процесів на прикладах політик ШІ. ШІ стає самостійним драйвером переформатування міжнародних правил: замість повільних універсальних режимів формується багатопшарова архітектура - мінімальні універсальні орієнтири, регіональні регуляторні рішення та селективні коаліції «сумісних» партнерів. Позиції глобального Півдня залишаються фрагментованими, але дають можливість пропонувати прикладні стандарти прозорості, підзвітності та інтероперабельності з низькою вартістю узгодження. Для України оптимальною є стратегія «безпека - співпраця»: участь у вибіркових коаліціях у сфері ШІ за умов дотримання прозорості, підзвітності та технічної сумісності рішень, із мінімізацією асиметричних залежностей.

**Ключові слова:** штучний інтелект; міжнародні відносини; багатополюсність; політика безпеки; інформаційна політика; економічна політика; селективні коаліції; глобальний Південь; прозорість; підзвітність; інтероперабельність.

**Introduction.** In the mid-2020s, it's becoming pretty clear that the international landscape is shifting away from the concept of universal multilateralism. We're seeing a rise in multipolarity, with major powers leaning more towards flexible, ad hoc cooperation formats. Research from top think tanks highlights a competition among various policy approaches and practices, which seems to be sidelining any single "rulebook." This is happening even as the global conversation pushes for a "renewed, fair multilateralism" that could help restore the effectiveness of collective decision-making (*Chatham House, 2025; Munich Security Conference, 2025; United Nations Secretary-General, 2025*). In this context, technology is stepping up as a significant force for change, with the spread of artificial intelligence systems becoming a crucial dividing line in today's security policies and economic coordination (*Robinson, 2025; Zeng, 2025*).

Artificial intelligence is transforming three interconnected areas all at once. First up is the security domain: the dual-use nature of AI technologies, along with concerns about algorithmic transparency and risk governance, brings about new demands for responsible-use principles in the military and political realms (*Zeng, 2025*). Next, we have the information and media landscape: automated data-processing systems, generative models, and the rapid pace of information cycles are shaping agenda-setting, resilience against manipulation, and public trust in institutions. This is pushing states to refine their rules of engagement in the global information space (*Robinson, 2025; United Nations General Assembly, 2024*). Lastly, there's economic policy: the dynamics of productivity, investments in "clean" technologies, and supply-chain management are becoming increasingly linked to data analytics and automated decision-making, which in turn alters the real incentives for cooperation between countries (*Hart, 2024*). When you look at all these factors together, they amplify the imbalances of influence and speed up the reconfiguration of the principles that guide interactions among states (*Munich Security Conference, 2025*).

The Global South is carving out its own unique space in the world. You can really see its growing influence as it tries to push forward its own policies on how to use and regulate AI (*Mampilly, 2025*). However, the lack of a unified stance means these efforts often end up scattered and inconsistent. For Ukraine, the situation is quite urgent: with the ongoing war and limited resources, the focus is on aligning security goals while still leaving room for collaboration. This means steering policy towards selective ways of engaging with major powers (*Kapitonenko, 2025; Perepelytsia, 2024*). Another layer of complexity comes from the strengthening ties between Moscow and Beijing, which shifts the balance of power and affects external support - key elements to consider when

looking at the political stability of regional alliances (*Kuzio, 2024*). Ukrainian scholars also point out that some of China's views on multipolarity could limit the political independence of middle powers, making it essential to examine these ideas closely, especially in terms of fair interaction principles (*Stafiyshuk, Matviienko, & Matviienko, 2024*).

Bringing all these observations together, the main question this article seeks to answer is: how does the rise of artificial intelligence change the principles and rules governing interactions between countries in a multipolar world? Additionally, what opportunities does it create for countries in the Global South to work together in maintaining the political stability of the international order?

**The purpose of the study.** The goal of this study is to explore how the rise of artificial intelligence technologies influences the development of principles and rules that guide interactions between countries in a multipolar world. It also aims to evaluate how countries in the Global South can work together to create initiatives that balance the strategies of major powers while promoting political stability in the international system.

**Literature review.** In recent comparative studies conducted by prominent think tanks, it's clear that major powers are shifting their focus from universal institutions to more flexible, situation-based forms of cooperation. Chatham House points out a move towards selective engagement mechanisms, while the Munich Security Report 2025 highlights a growing multipolarity and a rivalry of policy approaches that are now influencing how countries interact with one another (*Chatham House, 2025; Munich Security Conference, 2025*). A special discussion in International Affairs raises important questions about transparency and accountability in the use of AI systems, emphasizing the need to avoid the militarization of this technology and the imbalances of power it can create (*Robinson, 2025; Zeng, 2025*). Additionally, policy analysis emphasizes a transition from mere rhetoric to tangible actions, establishing practical guidelines for developing shared rules and procedures in related areas of public policy (*Hart, 2024*).

Ukrainian scholarship aligns closely with these insights, placing them within a security-political framework. Political scientist Mykola Kapytonenko highlights how resource limitations among key players lead to selective coalitions and a fresh look at multilateral engagement strategies (*Kapitonenko, 2025*). Meanwhile, Professor Hryhorii Perepelytsia provides a solid analytical framework for evaluating the political resilience of Ukraine's foreign policy in a fragmented landscape, where having clear principles and decision-making processes becomes even more crucial (*Perepelytsia, 2024*). Additionally, Professor Taras Kuzio illustrates how the growing strategic partnership between Moscow and Beijing is shifting the balance of opportunities and risks, which in turn impacts cooperation with major powers and the dynamics of external support (*Kuzio, 2024*).

The work of Professor Viktor Matviienko delves into this same area of concern. A collaborative examination of China's vision for a multipolar world reveals possible limitations on the political independence of middle powers and outlines the risks that arise from differing approaches to rules and interaction practices (*Stafiyshuk, Matviienko, & Matviienko, 2024*). Previous analyses of NATO-Russia relations offer a historical and conceptual framework that helps us understand how straying from established institutions can lead to more unpredictable and situational forms of cooperation - an insight that remains crucial in light of today's technology-driven changes (*Matviienko & Yakovenko, 2020*).

To sum it up, international reviews set the stage for rethinking political rules in this fast-paced era of technological change - especially in the realm of artificial intelligence (*Chatham House, 2025; European Union, 2024; Munich Security Conference, 2025; Robinson, 2025; United Nations General Assembly, 2024; Zeng, 2025*). Meanwhile, Ukrainian studies provide practical analytical tools to evaluate resilience and potential strategies when engaging with major powers (*Kapitonenko, 2025; Kuzio, 2024; Matviienko & Yakovenko, 2020; Perepelytsia, 2024; Stafiyshuk, Matviienko, & Matviienko, 2024*). This blend allows us to connect a global perspective with a national one, using comparative insights to fuel further empirical research on AI as a crucial force shaping contemporary international relations.

There are two key research gaps that emerge from this discussion. First, the swift rise of AI systems hasn't been thoroughly examined as a factor that could lead to a reevaluation of the principles and rules guiding interstate relations in a multipolar world (*Munich Security Conference, 2025; Robinson, 2025; Zeng, 2025*). Second, even though Global South states are gaining more institutional

influence, it's still unclear how effectively they can coordinate their responses to the competing political strategies of the great powers (*Chatham House, 2025; Mampilly, 2025*).

**Main results of the research.** A thorough look at international reviews and expert publications reveals that the rise of artificial intelligence systems is one of the key forces transforming how countries interact in today's multipolar world. As different policy strategies compete, major powers are increasingly leaning towards more flexible and situational forms of cooperation. At the same time, the demand for agreed-upon "minimum frameworks" is outpacing what institutions can provide (*Chatham House, 2025; Munich Security Conference, 2025*). This study highlights three significant areas of change that are influencing state behaviour: security policy, the information and media landscape, and economic policy.

In the realm of security, the dual nature of AI brings about new demands for transparency and accountability. The same algorithms that improve targeting precision or battlefield assessments can also lower the bar for using force or make it harder to manage escalation. The ongoing discussion around "militarized AI" indicates that differing views on risk and what level of automation is acceptable often shape policy decisions more than the actual technical details of the systems. Consequently, the focus shifts from the "hardware" to the processes involved: ensuring responsible use is evaluated through data management, training oversight, model validation, output reviews, and protocols for shutting down autonomous functions in sensitive situations. Practically speaking, this translates to a need for clear transparency regarding goals, testing phases, and incidents, along with specific agreements among like-minded partners that can be quickly updated without lengthy global negotiations (*Zeng, 2025*).

The landscape of information and media is undergoing a significant transformation, largely due to the dramatic decrease in costs and the rapid pace of content creation made possible by generative models. While there are undeniable advantages, the potential for manipulation is also increasing, which threatens to undermine trust in institutions and complicate elections and crisis communications. In response to these challenges, we're starting to see a push for greater transparency and accountability: initiatives that call for documenting the origins of data, labeling AI-generated content, and implementing quick debunking strategies in critical situations. Both academic efforts focused on defining "responsible AI" and high-level political actions are playing a role here. For instance, the UN General Assembly Resolution 78/265 establishes a framework for what constitutes "safe, secure, and trustworthy" systems, providing a common language for nations aiming to reduce risks in civilian areas, including the information ecosystem. In practice, this is leading to a shared understanding of expectations around model transparency, guidelines for how public authorities should engage with platforms, and technical standards for identifying misleading audio and video content (*Robinson, 2025; United Nations General Assembly, 2024*).

In the realm of economic policy, AI is now a litmus test for the authenticity of state strategies. External partners and investors are increasingly scrutinizing political statements, assessing them through the lens of tangible actions and budgetary decisions. Consequently, performance metrics now encompass real capital investments in digital infrastructure and computing power, as well as the necessary safeguards for AI usage in public procurement, the ability to adjust supply chains, and commitments to workforce training. The competition for establishing sensitive segments of technology value chains - and securing access to dependable energy sources - promotes selective agreements that can be quickly negotiated and modified. This practical approach - evaluating policy based on actions rather than mere words - helps to alleviate uncertainty for businesses, simplifies cross-country policy comparisons, and fosters a common ground for coordination in both multilateral and bilateral settings (*Hart, 2024*).

In a nutshell, AI is pushing countries to clearly define their principles of transparency and accountability while also encouraging them to work together flexibly, especially when it comes to reaching universal agreements that can be tricky. It's right at this crossroads - between "minimum frameworks" and selective formats - where we see real chances for positive initiatives from Global South nations. These are practical solutions that require little coordination and help avoid adding to the political instability in the broader context (*Chatham House, 2025; Hart, 2024; Munich Security Conference, 2025; Robinson, 2025; United Nations General Assembly, 2024*).

The rise of multipolarity, along with the swift advancement of artificial intelligence, is

prompting major powers to rethink their usual ways of interacting. In the past, global institutions were the go-to places for aligning strategies, but now we're witnessing a noticeable shift towards more flexible formats with a smaller group of participants. These settings allow for quicker decision-making and more adaptable agreements in response to rapid technological changes (*Chatham House, 2025; Munich Security Conference, 2025*). This doesn't mean we're abandoning the universal level; rather, it's about layering "fast tracks" on top of a shared foundation of rules, which helps cut down coordination costs in areas where the relevant timelines are measured in months instead of years.

The key factor driving this change is the security aspect of AI. Different views on the risks associated with autonomy - and how adversaries might act - lead to uneven expectations regarding transparency, limitations, and oversight. This situation erodes trust in large multilateral agreements and pushes countries toward forming tighter, like-minded coalitions. These groups can more readily come to consensus on testing principles, agree to avoid certain functions in sensitive situations, and establish procedures for sharing incident information (*Zeng, 2025*). In simpler terms, the focus is shifting from rigid, universal frameworks to adaptable shared practices and protocols that can be quickly updated as new technical risks arise.

One important aspect to consider is the relationship between information and media. Generative models have made it cheaper to produce content and have sped up how quickly it spreads, which opens up new avenues for manipulation and can undermine trust in institutions. On a global scale, countries have only managed to establish a basic level of shared understanding, as seen in the UN General Assembly Resolution 78/265, which addresses safe, secure, and trustworthy AI systems. However, the nitty-gritty details - like how to label synthetic content, what transparency requirements models should have, or how to engage with platforms - are often worked out in more exclusive settings and bilateral agreements. This is where differences in political systems and regulatory capabilities can be taken into account (*Robinson, 2025; United Nations General Assembly, 2024*). The outcome is what we might call a "mosaic of compatibility," where small groups create technical standards and processes that are then partially adapted for broader use.

The third dimension focuses on economic policy. Nowadays, external partners and investors are increasingly evaluating a state's approach to AI based on real actions: investments in infrastructure, public procurement rules that ensure the safe use of algorithms, workforce training programs, and the ability to adapt supply chains. This practical perspective creates a demand for specific cooperation tools - ranging from thematic partnerships to limited mutual recognition agreements on model assessment procedures - which are generally easier to establish and quicker to implement than broad, universal agreements (*Hart, 2024*). It also limits the room for empty promises, as effective coordination is closely linked to budgets, productivity metrics, and specific standards.

The result is a complex structure made up of various rules and practices. At the "lower" level, there's a universal baseline of shared signposts that guide us, providing direction and broad value frameworks for civilian AI applications (*United Nations General Assembly, 2024*). Moving up to the "middle" layer, we find regional mechanisms that establish binding requirements for large economic areas. These mechanisms have proven effective in outlining risk tiers, system categories, and oversight procedures, becoming essential points of political compatibility for neighbouring countries and partners (*European Union, 2024*). Finally, at the "upper" level, we see selective coalitions at work - small groups of states that pilot common interaction standards in specific areas and quickly expand successful practices through bilateral relationships or "plus" mechanisms.

When it comes to politics, this multilayering really ramps up the competition between different approaches while also opening doors for collaboration. On one side, we have various models of AI governance - ranging from those that prioritize innovation to those focused on security or human rights - which present different sets of rules and can lead to fragmentation (*Chatham House, 2025; Munich Security Conference, 2025; Robinson, 2025*). On the flip side, the rise of strong regional hubs and club-like arrangements makes it easier to cooperate when universal processes hit a snag, gradually improving the compatibility of policies across states (*European Union, 2024; United Nations General Assembly, 2024*). In practical terms, this means we're seeing the development of shared protocols for testing and certifying systems, agreement on basic data governance requirements, the establishment of quick channels for sharing information about incidents and "model failures," and the growth of joint research and workforce training programs (*Robinson, 2025*).

One notable effect is the selective inclusion of partners beyond just the main great powers. To strike “fast” deals, you need reliable implementers and compatible regulatory practices. As a result, major powers create parallel offers tailored for various groups of Global South countries - ranging from technical assistance to market access - in exchange for adhering to specific transparency and accountability standards in AI deployment (*Chatham House, 2025; Mampilly, 2025*). This is where “windows of opportunity” emerge: states that are ready to adopt clear and replicable rules can tap into resources and projects, while the great powers find new avenues to promote their preferred strategies.

When you look at it all together, the move from universal institutions to more selective cooperation isn’t just a passing trend; it’s a smart reaction to the fast pace of technology and the unpredictability of politics. This shift doesn’t eliminate the universal level; instead, it flips the order around: smaller, more focused arrangements pop up first to test out the rules and procedures, and only after that do certain elements start to form the foundation for wider collaboration. For countries wanting to keep their options open when dealing with major players - Ukraine being one of them - this setup allows them to join practical coalitions without losing sight of their national priorities. Plus, it helps build a kind of “compatibility capital” that makes it easier to coordinate on broader, universal platforms later on (*European Union, 2024; Kapitonenko, 2025; Kuzio, 2024; Perepelytsia, 2024; United Nations General Assembly, 2024*).

The impact of AI on the rules governing interstate interactions is quite evident in the policies of countries in the Global South, though these changes manifest in various ways. A common thread among them is the desire to merge access to technology with the need to maintain political independence; however, their priorities differ. For some governments, the focus is on development goals like digitalizing public services, boosting productivity, and promoting inclusion. In contrast, others prioritize controlling the information landscape and minimizing susceptibility to outside influences. As contemporary scholars point out, the term “Global South” primarily represents a political assertion to define one’s own strategies rather than a shared geographical identity, which explains the natural diversity of viewpoints and the lack of a unified set of rules that everyone can agree on (*Mampilly, 2025*).

In real-world scenarios, we can see three main paths taking shape. First, groups tend to come together around specific issues - like ensuring transparency in how AI is used in public services - and they establish baseline standards for data quality, auditing, and accountability. Next, partnerships based on shared capabilities - such as having access to data centers, skilled workers, and a local market - quickly kick off joint pilot projects and create templates for others to follow. Lastly, we have “bridges” that connect different regional groups, where countries of varying influence agree on fundamental compatibility principles while leaving the finer details to smaller discussions. Each of these paths creates “windows of opportunity”: nations that are ready to provide clear, replicable guidelines for AI usage in key sectors can tap into resources and expertise, while more capable partners find reliable platforms for testing and scaling their practices (*Mampilly, 2025*).

At the same time, there are significant risks to consider: gaps in infrastructure and human resources, differing opinions on how much the state should intervene in the information landscape, and the fierce competition among major powers to establish their own standards in specific regions. For many governments, the best approach seems to be a mix of universal guidelines along with targeted bilateral or minilateral agreements, where coordination is easier and the results can be seen more quickly. (*Mampilly, 2025*)

For Ukraine, navigating through heightened security threats and limited resources, the most sensible approach is to “work together where it boosts our resilience, while keeping options open where agreement is hard to find.” The “security or peace” perspective put forth in Ukrainian academic circles emphasizes the importance of prioritizing security when selecting tools and partners - not as a substitute for collaboration, but as a prerequisite for its success (*Perepelytsia, 2024*). Additionally, the resource limitations pointed out in foreign-policy research push policy towards more selective forms of engagement: streamlined partnerships in AI sectors that directly impact defense capabilities, information resilience, and economic productivity allow for quicker alignment and clearer responsibility distribution (*Kapitonenko, 2025*).

When we look at the geopolitical landscape, it’s crucial to consider how the growing partnership

between Moscow and Beijing is changing the game. This alignment increases the chances that practices - both technical and political - that clash with our values of transparency and accountability could seep into our environment (Kuzio, 2024). We also face the risk of becoming overly dependent on certain technology suppliers. Meanwhile, Ukrainian experts caution that if we embrace seemingly appealing “package” solutions without solid safeguards, we might limit our ability to make independent policy decisions in the long run (Stafiychuk, Matviienko, & Matviienko, 2024).

From this, we can derive a set of practical guidelines. First off, it's essential to align AI projects with fundamental principles like transparency, accountability, and reproducibility in processes. Next, we should broaden participation in selective coalitions that uphold these values and adhere to compatible standards for model auditing and data governance. Additionally, we need to minimize infrastructural and contractual lock-in by diversifying our suppliers and ensuring that we have requirements in place for data portability and solution interoperability. This approach allows us to prioritize security, enhance our capacity for collaborative action with partners, and mitigate the risks that often come with politically unstable environments (Kapitonenko, 2025; Perepelytsia, 2024; Stafiychuk, Matviienko, & Matviienko, 2024; Kuzio, 2024).

Taking a closer look at our findings alongside previous expectations and the global media landscape reveals that the changes we've identified align well with international reviews and academic literature, while also fine-tuning the mechanisms at play. Global reports indicate a shift from a one-size-fits-all approach to multilateralism towards more adaptable forms of interaction among major powers. This shift is attributed to competing policy strategies and the increasing coordination costs associated with large-scale agreements in a diverse environment (Chatham House, 2025; Munich Security Conference, 2025). Our findings support this conclusion and introduce a technological angle: the spread of AI systems is speeding up the transition to selective agreements that can be swiftly updated to address emerging risks and practical needs. Research on international security and AI policy highlights those differences in how risks are perceived, acceptable levels of automation, and expectations around transparency and accountability have become key dividing lines among nations (Robinson, 2025; Zeng, 2025). Thus, the global conversation about the structure of order intertwines with discussions on technology use principles. When institutional frameworks lag behind, we see the emergence of “micro-architectures” of rules in club and bilateral formats that gradually spread outward. Additionally, our analysis sheds light on the role of countries in the Global South: rather than forming a single “camp,” what we observe are situational coalitions where states propose targeted, practical solutions in specific sectors, effectively reducing the coordination costs for broader collaborations.

The emergence of new policy tools in the AI sector highlights a growing trend towards convergence at various levels. On a global scale, the UN General Assembly Resolution 78/265 points us in the direction of “safe, secure, and trustworthy” AI systems, providing countries with a common language of fundamental principles, expectations for transparency, and norms for risk management in civilian uses. At the regional level, we see more detailed regulations: the EU Artificial Intelligence Act introduces a risk-based framework that outlines requirements for data governance, assessment, oversight, and accountability, along with an executive structure to enforce these rules (European Union, 2024). Together, these tools serve two main purposes. First, they help to lessen the “uncertainty gradient” across different jurisdictions: despite varying political systems, a shared understanding of transparency, safety, and accountability begins to take shape. Second, they offer practical “points of contact” for both major powers and Global South nations: countries can adopt specific sets of rules or procedures (like those for high-risk models or content labelling) without having to wait for the lengthy process of universal negotiations to conclude (European Union, 2024; United Nations General Assembly, 2024). Our findings indicate that it's this blend of universal guidelines with more specific regional solutions that lays the groundwork for gradual alignment, paving the way for broader agreements to emerge (Chatham House, 2025; Munich Security Conference, 2025).

When it comes to Ukraine, there are some practical takeaways that stem from the need for both “security and cooperation.” First off, any engagement with major powers and integration groups should be built on a foundation of transparency, accountability, and clear procedures for AI projects. In real terms, partnerships need to include guidelines for data governance, model audits, thorough

documentation of training and testing, and systems to disable autonomous functions in sensitive situations. This strategy not only helps minimize the chances of errors and incidents but also fosters mutual trust - something that's crucial because without it, selective coalitions can quickly turn into short-lived plans that lack any real impact (*Perepelytsia, 2024*). Secondly, it's important to focus on "actions, not just words": joint initiatives with key partners should come with budgets, specific performance metrics, and commitments to develop infrastructure and workforce. This approach helps reduce political uncertainty, makes things more predictable for investors, and speeds up the adoption of successful practices. Lastly, it's vital to reduce risks of asymmetry in our partnerships. The growing alignment between Moscow and Beijing brings its own set of challenges, such as becoming overly reliant on certain technology suppliers and pushing for bundled solutions that might clash with our goals for transparency and accountability. Let's talk about the importance of diversification: it's all about bringing in multiple suppliers and ensuring that we have hard-coded requirements for things like interoperability, standardized data export, and clear audit conditions. Looking back at the history of NATO-Russia relations, as discussed in previous studies, serves as a reminder that watering down institutional guarantees and swapping them for "informal" agreements without proper verification can lead to instability. Even in selective formats, having clear control and feedback mechanisms is crucial. So, what do we take away from this? Here are three practical recommendations for foreign policy: (1) adopt rule-modules and procedures that promote transparency and accountability; (2) form selective coalitions focused on projects with measurable outcomes, like security, informational resilience, and productivity; (3) make sure to include interoperability requirements in all agreements to prevent technological lock-in and political dependence (*Kuzio, 2024; Perepelytsia, 2024*).

The limitations of this study arise from both the type of data we have access to and the rapid changes happening in the AI field. To start, many official stances from major powers and groups in the Global South are still being developed, which limits our ability to verify things quantitatively and forces us to rely on qualitative policy indicators and short-term trend analysis. Additionally, global and regional frameworks often use different definitions and metrics (like risk categories and transparency standards), making direct comparisons tricky and necessitating careful normalization. Lastly, we chose not to use empirical data from field interviews or restricted documents, opting instead for open sources and public policies. While this choice may lessen the depth of our institutional analysis, it enhances the reproducibility and transparency of our approach.

The next steps for research naturally flow from our findings. To start, we should create a comparative panel of joint AI initiatives involving Ukraine and its partners. This panel should include measurable indicators that go beyond just formal agreements, such as coordination costs, transparency metrics, the speed of scaling, and their impacts on security and productivity. Next, we need to dive into the "trust chain" in transnational data exchange: figuring out how to blend privacy-preserving principles, security needs, and interoperability in projects that cross various jurisdictions. Then, we should evaluate how the Global South can participate in rule-making through selective mechanisms: identifying which combinations of universal guidelines and club-style arrangements can reduce coordination costs while boosting the chances of sustainable implementation (*Mampilly, 2025*). Lastly, let's enrich the Ukrainian perspective with real-world evidence: conducting surveys among public authorities, businesses, and research institutions to identify barriers and incentives for integrating transparency and accountability practices in AI projects. Over time, this approach could help shift from a purely analytical model to actionable policy roadmaps that align security priorities with the needs for innovation and collaboration.

**Conclusions.** The rise of artificial intelligence isn't just adding another topic to the international relations discussion; it's reshaping how we create and apply principles and rules for interaction. The blend of universal guidelines and selective cooperation methods isn't just a temporary fix; it's a smart way to ensure policy alignment in a politically shaky landscape. For Ukraine, this framework offers a chance to combine a security-focused approach with involvement in initiatives that boost productivity and resilience - so long as transparency, accountability, and interoperability remain fundamental principles of collaboration.

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