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### **РЕДАКЦІЙНА КОЛЕГІЯ ЗБІРНИКА НАУКОВИХ ПРАЦЬ «АКТУАЛЬНІ ПРОБЛЕМИ МІЖНАРОДНИХ ВІДНОСИН»**

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## **ПОЛІТИЧНІ ПРОБЛЕМИ МІЖНАРОДНИХ ВІДНОСИН**

УДК 327(438:477)

### **NATIONAL MEMORY AS AN INDICATOR OF THE STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN UKRAINE AND POLAND**

### **НАЦІОНАЛЬНА ПАМ'ЯТЬ ЯК ІНДИКАТОР СТІЙКОСТІ СТРАТЕГІЧНОГО ПАРТНЕРСТВА УКРАЇНИ ТА ПОЛЬЩІ**

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**Abstract.** *This article is aimed at a comprehensive analysis of the Ukrainian-Polish strategic partnership in the context of national memory and its impact on bilateral relations in the current geopolitical reality. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation on February 24, 2022, became a key challenge for European security, highlighting the need for new forms of cooperation. Ukraine found itself on the front line of defending democracy, while Poland, as a major logistical and military hub, became a key partner in ensuring regional stability. At the same time, Ukrainian-Polish relations remain complex due to shared historical memory. The article analyzes in detail the role of national memory in shaping the contemporary politics of both countries, paying particular attention to interpretations of the Volhynia tragedy of 1943–1944 and its political instrumentalization. Polish and Ukrainian historical narratives differ significantly. These differences create the risk of tension even in the face of a common threat and a high level of cooperation. The article also highlights contemporary institutional and regional formats of cooperation, including the Security Cooperation Agreement (2024), the Three Seas Initiative, and the formation of a trilateral alliance with the United Kingdom in the context of the broader European security architecture. The key conclusion of the article is that the long-term sustainability of the Ukrainian-Polish alliance depends not on attempts to create a single historical narrative, but on the ability of the political elites and citizens of both countries to develop mechanisms for managing historical conflicts.*

**Keywords:** *National memory, Ukrainian-Polish relations, strategic partnership, memory policy, Volhynia tragedy, geopolitics, security.*

**Анотація.** Стаття присвячена комплексному аналізу українсько-польського стратегічного партнерства у контексті національної пам'яті та її впливу на двосторонні відносини у сучасній геополітичній реальності. Повномасштабне вторгнення РФ в Україну 24 лютого 2022 року стало ключовим викликом для безпеки Європи, актуалізуючи потребу в нових формах співпраці. Україна опинилася на передовій захисту демократії, а Польща – як головний логістичний та військовий хаб – стала ключовим партнером у забезпеченні регіональної стабільності. Водночас українсько-польські відносини залишаються складними через спільну історичну пам'ять. Стаття детально розглядає роль національної пам'яті у формуванні сучасної політики обох країн, звертаючи особливу увагу на інтерпретації Волинської трагедії 1943–1944 років та її політичну інструменталізацію. Польський та український історичні наративи значно різняться, що створює ризик напруженості навіть перед обличчям спільної загрози та за високого рівня співпраці. Стаття також висвітлює сучасні інституційні та регіональні формати співпраці, включно з Угодою про співробітництво у сфері безпеки (2024), Ініціативою трьох морів та формуванням тристороннього альянсу з Великою Британією в контексті ширшої архітектури європейської безпеки. Ключовим висновком статті є твердження, що довгострокова стійкість українсько-польського альянсу залежить не від спроб створення єдиного історичного наративу, а від здатності політичних еліт і громадян обох країн виробити механізми управління історичними конфліктами.

**Ключові слова.** *Національна пам'ять, українсько-польські відносини, стратегічне партнерство, політика пам'яті, Волинська трагедія, геополітика, безпека.*

**Introduction.** The full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, was a turning point not only for Ukraine but also for the global system of collective security. Russia's actions fully exposed the vulnerability of international institutions, demonstrated the ineffectiveness of old security paradigm, and forced European states to seek new formats for cooperation. Ukraine, which has become an outpost for the defense of European values, democracy, and sovereignty, found itself in a situation where its own security is directly linked to the security of the entire European continent.

One of the most prominent manifestations of these changes was the deepening of the strategic partnership between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland. Warsaw has become a key military and logistical hub for Ukraine, its main advocate on the international stage, and has provided shelter to the largest number of Ukrainian refugees. This level of solidarity, covering the military, humanitarian, economic, and political spheres, has allowed us to speak of a historic peak in bilateral relations. At the same time, against the backdrop of this rapprochement, a paradoxical situation has arisen – the revival of memory politics and the growing intensity of discussions around the sensitive chapters of the shared past. Issues that have been a source of tension for decades, including the interpretation of the Volhynia tragedy of 1943–1944, have not only remained relevant but have also begun to be actively instrumentalized in political discourse, especially by the Polish side.

This contradiction between a high level of cooperation and constant mentions of historical conflicts forms a key research problem, involving the analysis of the stability of the Ukrainian-Polish partnership, which is undergoing a kind of «stress test» under the influence of two powerful factors – on the one hand, geopolitical necessity, caused by the common threat from Russia, and on the other, conflicting historical memory, which is a source of constant tension. In this context, national memory is not just a cultural and historical phenomenon, but also an important indicator that helps to assess the real state of bilateral relations and potential risks to them. The research objective of this article is to go beyond the traditional description of historical conflicts and try to understand their significance in the context of the new geopolitical reality.

**Literature review.** The issue of national memory holds a significant place in international relations research, particularly within the context of Eastern European studies. It has become especially relevant for post-Soviet countries, which, following the collapse of the communist bloc, faced the task of rebuilding their national identities and overcoming the legacy of totalitarian regimes. While scholars of Ukrainian-Polish relations have made considerable contributions in this area, their work often reflects a one-sided approach to historical events. However, there are almost no joint studies that offer a comprehensive and unbiased analysis.

Among Ukrainian researchers who have made a significant contribution to the study of historical memory in Ukrainian-Polish relations, it is worth noting L. Zashkilnyak, M. Lytvyn, V. Viatrovych, L. Strilchuk, O. Kalishchuk (2013), L. Khakhula, and I. Ilyushyn. Their works cover a wide range of issues related to the historical development of bilateral relations and the interpretation of tragic events. L. Zashkilnyak and M. Lytvyn, in particular, focus on the historical preconditions for conflicts and emphasize the need for a compromise in understanding the Volhynian Tragedy and other traumatic events of the shared past. In his book «Ukrainians and Poles: 1000 Years of (Mis)understanding» (2019), Petro Kraliuk aims to explain why, despite the closeness of the two peoples, their relations remain complex. By analyzing key episodes of their shared past, author highlights events that had a decisive influence on the formation of both modern nations. These works create a factual basis for understanding the depth of historical disagreements. Meanwhile, M. Doroshko and V. Kapiika (2018), as well as N. Nechaieva-Yuriichuk, propose examining Ukrainian-Polish cooperation and its prospects within the context of national memory.

The Polish academic tradition generally demonstrates a somewhat different approach to interpreting the problem of memory. Researchers such as Grzegorz Motyka, K. Jędraszek (2018), Ryszard Torzecki, and Tadeusz A. Olszański offer a more critical and moderate reflection on the difficult pages of the common past, although their works can also hardly be called impartial. However, many Polish authors represent more radical views. Among them are Ewa and Władysław Siemaszko, who are often cited by the Polish Institute of National Remembrance, as well as Władysław Filar, Grzegorz Mazur, and Józef Turowski. They represent the so-called «Kresy» (borderland) societies and treat the Volhynian Tragedy exclusively as genocide, demanding that the actions of the OUN and UPA be recognized as a crime. Thus, Ukrainian and Polish academic circles differ not only in their interpretation of historical events but also in their terminology and their definition of the conflict's nature and key actors. Such discrepancies create significant obstacles to forming a common historical vision and building a strong partnership for the future.

In the context of the importance of Ukrainian-Polish cooperation, it is also essential to mention Zbigniew Brzezinski and his work «The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives». He viewed Ukraine as a geopolitical pivot, whose existence as an independent and strong state fundamentally changes the entire Eurasian geopolitical landscape. He argued that without control over Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire. In this context, Poland acts as Ukraine's most important Western partner, supporting its sovereignty and Euro-Atlantic integration.

**The purpose** of this article is to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the Ukrainian-Polish strategic partnership through the prism of national memory. This analysis aims to determine the role of national memory in bilateral relations within the new geopolitical reality that has emerged since 2022.

**Main results of research.** The historical foundation of Ukrainian-Polish relations is rooted in the formation of two national historical narratives that are, at many historical points, contradictory (Poplavskyi, 2024). Before analyzing them, it is worth mentioning the concept of so-called «historic» and «non-historic» nations, proposed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. According to this concept, «historic» nations are those with a long experience of their own statehood and established political elites. Their memory is often focused on preserving heritage and the greatness

of the past. In contrast, «non-historic» nations are those that were historically deprived of statehood, for whom the struggle to achieve it became the central element of their national idea.

Poland is a clear example of a «historic nation,» as it is considered the heir to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth – a powerful state that played a key role in European politics of its time. The Polish historical narrative is formed around this idea. Its central element, especially in the context of relations with Ukraine, is the myth of the «Kresy Wschodnie» (Eastern Borderlands) (*Bilobrovets, 2017*). This is not just a geographical term but a deeply rooted cultural idea of lost eastern lands, which were perceived as the cradle of Polish culture. This narrative, romanticized in literature and art, explains the emotions with which the loss of these territories and the tragic events that occurred there are perceived in the Polish public consciousness. In this context, the Ukrainian struggle for their own statehood is often interpreted as a «betrayal» or «rebellion» against legitimate authority and cultural dominance.

The Ukrainian historical narrative, on the other hand, is the story of a «non-historic nation»—a people deprived of their own state for centuries and forced to fight for their existence and right to self-determination within several empires, including the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires. Therefore, the central axis of Ukrainian memory is the national liberation struggle. In this narrative, the Polish presence on Ukrainian lands is viewed primarily as an occupation and colonization, accompanied by social, religious, and national oppression. Consequently, armed uprisings against Polish rule are perceived as a just fight for freedom.

This asymmetry in the starting points of national histories leads to completely different interpretations of key events in the shared past. The uprising led by Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1648–1657) is viewed in Polish memory as a rebellion that marked the beginning of the decline of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and was accompanied by mass killings of the nobility, clergy, and Jews. In contrast, for Ukrainian society, it represents the National Liberation War – the apex of Cossack statehood and the struggle against noble oppression – with Khmelnytsky himself regarded in national history as the founding father of the nation (*Poplavskyi, 2024*).

This conflict of interpretations continued into the 20th century. The Polish-Ukrainian War (1918–1919) is seen by Poles as the heroic «defense of Lviv» and a struggle for the integrity of the reborn state, while for Ukrainians it represents a war for the independence of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic, suppressed by Polish aggression. The policy of the Second Polish Republic toward the Ukrainian minority (1921–1939) is presented in the Polish narrative through the lens of state-building and the fight against OUN terrorism. In Ukrainian memory, however, this period is remembered as one of systemic discrimination: violent Polonization, «pacification», colonization, and repression – all of which only radicalized the Ukrainian national movement.

Accumulated historical grievances exploded during the Second World War in the Volhynian Tragedy (1943–1944) – the central and most painful node in the conflict of memory. The Polish position, fixed at the legislative level, unequivocally qualifies these events as genocide (*ludobójstwo*) – a planned action by the OUN and UPA for the mass destruction of the Polish civilian population. The Ukrainian side, using the term «Volhynian Tragedy», views these events within the framework of a wider struggle, emphasizing the conflict's preconditions, the influence of external forces, and the mutuality of violence. Official Kyiv rejects the term «genocide» and proposes a joint study of the events and the formation of a compromise position.

The final act of the tragedy was Operation «Vistula» (1947). In the official historiography of communist Poland, it was presented as a necessary measure to combat the UPA underground. However, in Ukrainian national memory and in modern Polish historiography, Operation «Vistula» is considered ethnic cleansing – a crime of the communist regime that consisted of the forced deportation of about 150,000 Ukrainians from their ethnic lands with the aim of assimilation and the final «solution» to the Ukrainian issue in the country.

Despite the difficult legacy of the past, following 1991, Ukraine and Poland initiated a process of establishing good-neighborly relations that gradually developed into a strategic partnership. Although this process was not without challenges, its dominant trajectory was defined

by pragmatism and driven by common interests in security, economic cooperation, and Euro-Atlantic integration.

A paradigmatic shift in bilateral relations occurred after February 24, 2022, when the declarative partnership was filled with real substance. Russian aggression transformed cooperation from a matter of rational choice into a vital necessity – both for Ukraine's survival and for Poland's security (*Pitney, 2023*). This was reflected in multidimensional support encompassing economic, humanitarian, and military spheres.

However, this unprecedented level of support is not explained solely by altruism or good neighborliness. It is grounded in a profound awareness among Polish political elites and society that their own country's security is directly linked to the existence of an independent and resilient Ukraine. This stance is deeply rooted in Poland's historical memory – the centuries-long struggle against Russian imperialism, the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the experience of Soviet occupation. For Poland, a sovereign and pro-Western Ukraine is not merely a «neighbor,» but a crucial buffer that physically distances the country from the threat posed by the Russian Federation. Thus, aiding Ukraine is a direct investment in its own national security.

This is precisely where the multifaceted role of historical memory reveals itself. On one hand, it is a source of tension in bilateral relations due to the tragic pages of the shared past. Yet, on the other hand, it also acts as the most powerful driver of the strategic partnership, thanks to common anti-imperial and anti-Russian sentiments. Understanding this duality is key to analyzing the stability of the modern alliance.

Unfortunately, the full-scale war did not freeze historical disputes – rather, it turned national memory into a kind of bargaining chip in a larger political game. Instead of setting aside differences in the face of a common threat, some political actors have begun using the past as a tool of pressure and leverage for advancing contemporary political goals. In their rhetoric, historical justice became a precondition for continued strategic support (*Konończuk, 2023*).

The most vivid example of such instrumentalization is the constant appeal to the topic of the Volhynian Tragedy. On July 11, 2023, marking the 80th anniversary of the events, the Polish Sejm unanimously adopted a resolution once again labeling them as genocide and emphasizing that genuine reconciliation must include an acknowledgment of guilt (*Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 2023*). Moreover, several prominent Polish politicians have openly linked this issue to Ukraine's future in the European Union. For instance, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz declared that Ukraine «will have no chance of joining the European Union» unless it recognizes the Volhynia events as genocide (*Karpat.in.ua., 2025*). Similar views were voiced by Polish President Karol Nawrocki, who stated that he could not envision Ukraine in the EU or NATO until «key civilizational issues» – referring to the Volhynia tragedy – are resolved.

In Polish society, the Volhynian Tragedy holds a central place as a symbol of national suffering, and its interpretation is enshrined not only in official documents but also in culture, media, and political discourse. One of the most striking examples is the feature film «Hatred» (directed by Wojciech Smarzowski, 2016), which became a major cultural event in Poland (*Strilchuk, 2022*). The film depicts brutal scenes of mass killings of Poles by Ukrainians, including an episode where Ukrainian peasants burn a boy alive simply for being Polish. This film, hailed by Polish critics as one of the best historical pictures, reinforces the emotional division into victims and aggressors and solidifies this specific interpretation of events in the public consciousness.

In addition to «Hatred» other documentary projects have appeared in the Polish information space, such as the film «Deceptive Genocide» («Лькаве Лудобójstwo»), which is based on Ukrainian and Polish sources, archival documents, and eyewitness testimonies. Its authors aim to provide a more rational response to the harsh position of Polish politicians and the Sejm, who accuse Ukrainians of exterminating Polish settlers in Volhynia (*Strilchuk, 2022*).

The official narrative is also reinforced by the position of Polish state institutions, particularly the Institute of National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, IPN), which



cites a figure of 120,000 Polish victims and likewise insists on classifying the events as «genocide.»

For many Ukrainians, however, the Volhynia tragedy remains a complex and deeply sensitive topic, closely linked to the struggle for independence. In Ukraine, soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), who are symbols of resistance against totalitarian regimes, are currently honored at the official level.

The reaction of Ukrainian society to Poland's politics of national memory is also quite predictable. According to a 2024 survey conducted by the Info Sapiens sociological center for the Mieroszewski Centre, 33% of Ukrainians unconditionally agreed to permit exhumation and reburial of the remains of Poles killed in Volhynia and Galicia between 1943–45. Another 40% were willing to agree to this step on the condition that the list of the buried and the inscription «They fell for a free Ukraine» be restored on the graves of UPA members located on Monastyr Mount in Poland's Podkarpackie Voivodeship (*Juliusz Mieroszewski Centre for Dialogue, 2024*).

The issue of exhuming Polish victims on Ukrainian territory has for years been among the main triggers in bilateral relations (*TVP World, 2024*). Ukraine's recent lifting of the moratorium on search operations can be seen as a step towards de-escalating tensions. However, while it solves a humanitarian problem, it does not cancel out the fundamental disagreements.

A troubling barometer of current bilateral relations is public opinion in Poland and Ukraine. According to data from the Mieroszewski Centre (conducted by Info Sapiens), in November 2024, only 41% of Ukrainians maintained a positive view of Poles (down from 83% in 2022) (*Juliusz Mieroszewski Centre for Dialogue, 2024*). One of the main reasons for this cooling of relations was economic friction, primarily the so-called «grain conflict», where Polish farmers blocked the transit of Ukrainian grain, and accusations and emotional statements intensified in the media of both countries. In Ukraine, this was perceived as undermining support during the war, while in Poland, it was seen as a defense of their own economic interests and a reaction to competition from Ukrainian producers. However, polls show that most Ukrainians are not inclined to blame Poland solely for these problems, the grain crisis led to a shift from euphoria to a more pragmatic, restrained attitude. Nevertheless, sociological data reveal a disturbing trend in the attitude of Polish society towards Ukraine and Ukrainians. The initial burst of solidarity, when 94% of Poles supported accepting refugees in March 2022, has gradually decreased to 53% by September 2024 (*Radio Svoboda, 2024*).

This shift is partly driven by narratives circulating in the media landscape and on social networks. Both the issues of national memory and the economic dimensions related to Ukrainian refugees in Poland have repeatedly become subjects of intense and often negative online debates.

Despite deep disagreements over historical memory, modern Ukrainian-Polish relations are built on a solid foundation of shared security interests. As mentioned earlier, from the first days of the full-scale invasion, Poland became the main logistical and military hub for Ukraine, through which the bulk of international aid flows. This role is critically important not only for Ukraine's defense capabilities but also for the entire European security architecture, as the stability of NATO's eastern flank directly depends on Ukraine's ability to deter Russian aggression (*Kuzio, 2023*). Warsaw was one of the first to provide heavy weaponry, initiate the creation of the «tank coalition,» and deliver combat aircraft.

The strategic partnership was formally institutionalized with the signing of the **Security Cooperation Agreement** in July 2024. This ten-year treaty provides not only for further military aid packages but also for deep integration in the defense sector. Key areas include cooperation in the defense industry, joint training and exercises, and achieving full operational interoperability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with NATO forces, which is the foundation for Ukraine's future membership in the Alliance. Special attention is given to sharing experience in new domains like drone warfare, where Poland is actively adopting Ukraine's unique combat experience to strengthen its own defense capabilities and the security of the entire eastern flank of NATO (*Official website of the President of Ukraine, 2024*).

The Ukrainian-Polish alliance also serves as the core of broader security formats rooted in deep historical and geopolitical traditions. Its long-term significance extends far beyond current military cooperation and is closely linked to the revival of the **Intermarium concept** - the idea of a strategic union of states situated between the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic Seas (*Polegkyi, 2021*). Originally formulated by Józef Piłsudski, this concept placed the Polish-Ukrainian axis at the center of a geopolitical bloc capable of resisting imperial ambitions from both East and West.

In today's world, this idea has found practical expression in the **Three Seas Initiative (3SI)**, which serves as its economic and infrastructural successor. The 3SI focuses on strengthening regional connections along a north-south axis in energy, transport, and digital technology, thereby reducing the historical dependence on the east-west axis. Granting Ukraine the status of a participated partner in the initiative underscores its integral role in this regional project.

A concrete embodiment of this strategy is the large-scale **Via Carpathia** project – a trans-European highway connecting Klaipėda in Lithuania with Thessaloniki in Greece, passing through Poland and other regional countries (*Poręba, 2018*). This corridor carries dual significance, as it not only stimulates economic development in the EU's eastern regions but also significantly enhances military mobility.

In turn, the **British–Polish–Ukrainian Initiative**, launched in 2022, creates a new security axis «London–Warsaw–Kyiv», complementing regional integration with the participation of a powerful non-regional actor. The long-term goals of this format include not only military assistance but also strengthening national resilience, deepening defense-industrial cooperation, and developing infrastructure.

Another important component of the regional security architecture is the **Lublin Triangle** - a trilateral platform of cooperation between Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania designed to foster political dialogue, coordinate defense efforts, and counter hybrid threats. Today, this initiative serves as a key mechanism for coordinating responses to regional security challenges posed by Russia and for advancing Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

One of the most important practical manifestations of sub-regional solidarity in the face of Russian aggression is the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade (LITPOLUKRBRIG), which was established as part of trilateral defense cooperation back in 2014. Initially created for joint exercises and peacekeeping missions under NATO, UN, or EU auspices, the brigade has since adapted to wartime realities, focusing more on training Ukrainian units according to NATO standards. Thus, it also plays an important role in shaping the security architecture in Central and Eastern Europe.

Therefore, security cooperation between Ukraine and Poland, as well as their joint participation in subregional security initiatives, is not merely a response to external threats but a part of a broader process of forming a new geopolitical center of gravity in Europe. Deepening this partnership across economic, security, and political dimensions has the potential to permanently reshape the balance of power on the continent, turning the Polish-Ukrainian tandem into one of the key pillars of the future European security architecture.

However, memory politics serves as a litmus test for the resilience of this alliance. The common threat undoubtedly remains the main driver of cooperation between the two countries, yet whenever new points of tension – economic or social – emerge, historical traumas tend to become tools of political mobilization and pressure. The durability of the strategic partnership, therefore, is measured not only by the scale of military assistance but also by the ability of both nations' political elites to resist the temptation to instrumentalize the past for short-term political gain, as such dynamics create serious risks for bilateral relations.

First and foremost, this leads to the erosion of trust – both at the political and societal levels. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the constant return to the so-called «wars of memory» hampers the implementation of long-term strategic projects. The energy and political capital that could be directed toward deepening integration within sub-regional projects or joint defense initiatives are instead diverted to resolving historical conflicts, thereby shifting the focus from building a shared future to endlessly solving the problems of the past.

The question of a Ukrainian-Polish compromise on national memory becomes particularly acute in the context of the threat of spreading russian influence in Europe. The russian Federation is increasingly resorting to asymmetric methods of warfare, utilizing the information and ideological front for this purpose. The Kremlin's main tool is providing ideological, and sometimes material, support to political actors, primarily from the far-right sector, who often manipulate sensitive political, social, or historical issues to consolidate their electorate and achieve their own domestic political goals.

Examples of such a policy can be seen in Hungary and Slovakia, where the governments of Orbán and Fico demonstrate openly anti-Ukrainian positions and undermine the collective security of the West from within by blocking critical decisions. With the victory of the populist ANO party in the Czech parliamentary elections on October 4, 2025, it is highly likely that the Czech Republic may join this trend, creating the risk of a pro-russian bloc emerging in the very heart of Europe.

At the same time, Poland is also witnessing permanent trends of strengthening influence and popularity of far-right forces, particularly the «Confederation of the Polish Crown» party, which actively instrumentalizes historical issues, especially the Volhynian Tragedy, to form an anti-Ukrainian narrative. Such activities have been quite successful and have already significantly influenced public sentiment (*UACrisis*, 2025). Furthermore, this creates pressure not only on society but also on the ruling circles, forcing them to adopt tougher positions. Given this, it is crucial to prevent historical disputes from escalating into open confrontation. That is why the issue of national memory requires a balanced approach from both states and an understanding of the danger of excessively politicizing such matters. One of the most effective methods to overcome the problem is to mobilize scholars and stimulate joint research that could rationally and critically integrate this topic into the political discourse. This includes, in particular, resuming the work of the Historians' Forum, which was interrupted in 2017 amid rising political tensions.

Therefore, the future of Ukrainian-Polish relations, and with them the stability of NATO's eastern flank, depends on whether both nations can develop a common strategic culture of memory. This certainly does not mean creating a single, artificial narrative that would deny the tragedies of the past. The potential of the Polish-Ukrainian tandem to change the geopolitical landscape of Europe is enormous. However, it can only be realized if the memory of the shared struggle against tyranny always outweighs the memory of mutual grievances.

**Conclusion.** Ukrainian-Polish relations are developing in two dimensions. On the one hand, they represent a powerful strategic alliance founded on pragmatic security interests and a shared awareness of a common threat. On the other, this alliance is constantly influenced by deeply rooted and antagonistic historical narratives that stem from fundamentally different experiences of state-building. This article argues that national memory is not merely a historical backdrop but a dynamic factor capable of both strengthening and significantly weakening bilateral relations.

The analysis of developments after February 24, 2022, shows that while the full-scale war has fostered rapprochement, it has not resolved historical disputes and, moreover, has altered their significance within the political discourse. Issues of the past, especially when combined with economic and social difficulties, remain an effective tool for political manipulation and are capable of eroding public trust, creating a gap between the strategic course of the states and relations at the citizen level.

Thus, the main conclusion is that the long-term resilience of the Ukrainian-Polish partnership depends not on attempts to eliminate or ignore historical conflicts, but on the establishment of mechanisms to manage them. The prospects for further development of bilateral relations and the realization of their geopolitical potential directly depend on the ability of both governments to consciously separate the pragmatism of the present from the traumas of the past, prioritizing shared interests over historical grievances.

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## THE RELEVANCE OF GLOBALISATION AND REGIONALISATION TRENDS IN EUROPE AND THEIR IMPACT ON UKRAINE'S ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS

## АКТУАЛЬНІСТЬ КОНЦЕПЦІЙ ГЛОБАЛІЗАЦІЇ ТА РЕГІОНАЛІЗАЦІЇ В ЄВРОПІ ТА ЇХ ВПЛИВ НА ПЕРЕГОВОРИ ПРО ВСТУП УКРАЇНИ

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**Abstract.** *The article examines the interplay of globalisation and regionalisation trends in Europe as a key factor shaping the geopolitical and economic environment of the European Union and determining Ukraine's prospects in the accession process. The purpose of the study is to identify how constructive regionalisation within the EU, as opposed to alternative integration models in neighbouring regional configurations, influences the dynamics, content and conditions of Ukraine's accession negotiations. The research methodology is based on systemic and institutional approaches, a comparative analysis of regionalisation models, and elements of a case study of the EU enlargement policy and Ukraine–EU relations. The results demonstrate that the EU's model of constructive regionalisation, grounded in legally institutionalised solidarity, multilevel governance and cohesion policy instruments, generates crucial incentives and functional requirements for Ukraine's legal, institutional and regional development adaptation, which, under conditions of consistent implementation, becomes a decisive factor in the success of its integration into the European Union. The scientific novelty is manifested in substantiating the role of the EU's regionalisation model as a structural filter for Ukraine's accession prospects under conditions of intensified geopolitical competition. The practical significance lies in the possibility of using the findings to refine Ukraine's negotiation positions and public policy priorities in the field of regional development and European integration.*

**Keywords:** *globalisation, regionalisation, cohesion policy, structural funds, EU, Ukraine, European integration, accession negotiations, EU regional policy.*

**Анотація.** У статті досліджено взаємозв'язок тенденцій глобалізації та регіоналізації в Європі як ключовий чинник формування геополітичного й економічного середовища Європейського Союзу та визначення перспектив України в процесі приєднання. Метою дослідження є з'ясування того, яким чином конструктивна регіоналізація в межах ЄС, на відміну від альтернативних моделей інтеграції у суміжних регіональних конфігураціях, впливає на динаміку, зміст і умови переговорів про вступ України. Методологічну основу становлять системний та інституційний підходи, порівняльний аналіз моделей регіоналізації, а також елементи case-study політики розширення ЄС та відносин Україна – ЄС. У результаті дослідження встановлено, що модель конструктивної регіоналізації ЄС, заснована на юридично інституціалізованій солідарності, багаторівневого врядуванні та інструментах політики згуртованості, формує ключові стимули та функціональні вимоги до правової, інституційної та регіональної адаптації України, що за умови послідовної реалізації стає визначальним чинником успішної інтеграції до Європейського Союзу. Наукова новизна проявляється в обґрунтуванні ролі моделі регіоналізації ЄС як структурного фільтра перспектив приєднання України в умовах посилення геополітичної конкуренції. Практичне значення полягає у можливості використання отриманих результатів для уточнення переговорних позицій України та пріоритетів державної політики у сфері регіонального розвитку та європейської інтеграції.

**Ключові слова:** глобалізація, регіоналізація, політика згуртованості, структурні фонди, ЄС, Україна, європейська інтеграція, переговори про вступ, регіональна політика ЄС.

**Introduction.** In the modern world, the processes of globalisation and regionalisation are among the most important phenomena shaping international relations, economic development, and cultural interaction. They not only determine the dynamics of global markets and the formation of political alliances, but also deeply influence people's daily lives, values, and identities. Globalisation connects distant regions of the world, accelerating the exchange of goods, information, and technologies, while regionalisation emphasises cooperation and cohesion within specific geographical areas, often as a response to the challenges and risks posed by global integration.

Understanding the historical evolution, theoretical foundations, and practical manifestations of these processes is essential for analysing the current international system. Both globalisation and regionalisation have their own trajectories, benefits, and contradictions: from the growth of trade and cultural exchange to the emergence of inequality, nationalism, and new forms of cooperation. Europe, in particular, provides a striking example of how regional integration can both complement and counterbalance globalisation, offering lessons that are highly relevant in today's turbulent geopolitical environment.

This study seeks to examine the main stages of globalisation, the theoretical approaches to regionalisation, and the interaction between these processes in the European context, with special attention to their significance for Ukraine.

**The purpose of the study is** to analyse the historical evolution, theoretical foundations, and contemporary dynamics of globalisation and regionalisation, with a particular focus on their interaction in the European context. Special attention is given to exploring how these processes shape integration strategies and what lessons they offer for Ukraine's path toward European cohesion and development.

**Recent Literature Review.** Contemporary scholarship traces an evolving interplay between globalisation and regionalisation, building on foundational accounts by Fawcett (1992), who situates regional organisations within the post-Cold War international order, and Zamagni (1995), who links "new regionalism" to development and peace agendas. Within the European case, Molchanov (2005) shows how the EU operationalises regionalism inside a globalising economy, while Kengyel (2008) assesses the added value of EU regional policy in measurable socio-economic outcomes. Molle (2008) further clarifies the meaning and limits of EU cohesion, probing



whether Europe's governance architecture can withstand cyclical shocks, and Janning (2018) reviews a decade of crises to test the Union's political cohesion in practice. Policy and programme instruments are mapped through the European Commission's ERDF/TA framework (EC, n.d.), with implementation pathways illuminated by Interreg Europe (n.d.) and the URBACT network (n.d.), which together emphasise capacity-building, policy learning, and multi-level coordination. Concrete cross-border applications—such as the Euroregion Bug Interreg NEXT initiative on climate-risk prevention (2024)—demonstrate how cohesion goals translate into local resilience and environmental cooperation. Conceptually, World Economic Forum materials provide a synthetic backbone: the explainer on globalisation (2017), the historical arc toward “Globalisation 4.0” (2019), the governance blueprint for the fourth industrial revolution (2019), and scenario planning on the “Four Futures” (2022) that frame risks of fragmentation versus deeper integration. Collectively, these sources converge on three claims: (1) regionalisation in Europe functions as a pragmatic complement to globalisation by buffering shocks and diffusing benefits; (2) cohesion policy's value lies not only in GDP and employment effects but also in institutional learning and territorial solidarity; and (3) future effectiveness will hinge on aligning legal-financial instruments (ERDF/Interreg/URBACT) with systemic challenges identified in the global scenario literature.

### **Main research results.**

#### **Theoretical foundations of globalisation and regionalisation**

Globalisation can be described as an abstract process of shrinking the world, which is reflected not only in the objective aspect - through new models of production, integrated financial sector and cultural homogenisation, but also in the subjective aspect - people's perception of the world (Zamagni, 1995).

Simply put, globalisation is the process by which people, capital and resources of all kinds can easily cross national borders. It is primarily an economic concept: the integration of markets, trade and investment minimises barriers and accelerates the flow of goods and services between countries. Equally important is cultural exchange and integration, the sharing and adoption of ideas and traditions (World Economic Forum, 2017).

Globalisation may seem new, but in fact it has been around for centuries, affecting our lives and presenting both challenges and unique opportunities.

The first incarnation of globalisation is associated with the emergence of long-distance trade routes that connected major civilisational centres. The Silk Roads (1st century BC–5th century AD; 13th–14th century AD) created early trans-Eurasian linkages, enabling the exchange of goods, technologies and ideas between East and West, but remained limited in scale and highly dependent on imperial control and political stability. From the 7th to 15th centuries, Islamic commercial networks by land and sea further integrated the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia, with high-value commodities such as spices driving intensifying, yet still regionally fragmented, forms of connectivity (World Economic Forum, 2019).

The first modern wave of globalisation is associated with the Industrial Revolution in the late 18th and 19th centuries, when technological breakthroughs in the United Kingdom and the expansion of the British Empire stimulated a sharp increase in international trade, supported by the development of railways and steamships. This integration was closely linked to colonial domination and deep social and spatial inequalities and was interrupted by the First World War and subsequent systemic crises, which significantly reduced global trade openness. The second and third waves unfolded after the Second World War under the leadership of the United States and the diffusion of new industrial and financial technologies; initially constrained by the division into competing blocs, they acquired a truly global character after the end of the Cold War, China's accession to the WTO and the spread of digital networks, which intensified cross-border value chains and consolidated trade and capital flows as key drivers of world economic growth (World Economic Forum, 2019).

Globalisation 4.0 has only just begun. However, developments such as the UK's exit from the European Union, changes in US policy under the Trump administration, immigration and data protection issues, China's Belt and Road Initiative, the impact of climate change on pollution and deforestation, multi-speed integration in Europe, and the impact of automation on employment and

economic development, all herald a new era of globalisation. As in previous phases, Globalisation 4.0 will be shaped by governance and technological solutions. The focus on the networked world and the digital economy, including e-commerce, digital services and 3D printing, is transforming healthcare, transport, communications and energy, requiring new policies (*World Economic Forum, 2019*).

At the same time, many people in the world, especially in the West, began to turn away from globalisation because of rising economic inequality and continuing social instability. This has led to the spread of isolationism, trade wars and immigration bans, with the result that world exports have begun to stagnate and the concept of globalism has become increasingly unpopular (*World Economic Forum, 2019*).

Despite recent unfavourable trends in globalisation, analysts outline alternative trajectories for its next phase, ranging from scenarios of deep physical and digital integration that strengthen regional and global alliances, diversify supply chains and enhance labour and data mobility, to models of partial or full fragmentation, in which states prioritise security, technological sovereignty and control over strategic resources, thereby increasing the importance of regional configurations as key frameworks for managing interdependence (*World Economic Forum, 2019*).

This raises the question of which organisational mechanisms and policy concepts of international cooperation can mitigate the negative effects of globalisation and prevent a drift towards rigid nationalist–realist confrontation. To address it, attention is focused on regionalism and regionalisation as key frameworks for adapting to global interdependence. Regionalism and regions are multidimensional and contested categories that combine social, economic, political, cultural and historical forms of cohesion within a given geographic space and at the same time express a political vision of how cooperation in this space should be organised. In this sense, regionalism is often normatively associated with deeper cooperation and improved welfare for participating states.

Regionalisation is understood as a process of increasing integration within a region, driven by trade, investment, mobility of people and ideas, transnational networks and civil society, which may emerge both within and beyond state-led policies. These interactions generate dense interdependence and shared problem-solving frameworks, but can also challenge traditional notions of sovereignty. The objectives of regional integration range from the reduction of trade barriers to the development of common markets and the creation of multi-level institutions with joint security and regulatory competences. For a more systematic understanding of the drivers behind such cooperative arrangements, the analysis further draws on the main theoretical approaches to regional integration (*Fawcett, 1992, pp. 38-40*).

Neorealism interprets regional cooperation as a response to systemic pressures, including the end of the Cold War, decolonisation and shifting power balances, where states seek to consolidate their bargaining power and avoid dependence on stronger actors; however, it pays limited attention to domestic preferences and the autonomous role of supranational institutions. Interdependence and globalisation theory emphasises growing economic and issue-based interdependence, highlighting both the emergence of institutions beyond the regional level and the parallel incentive for states to form regional frameworks to jointly manage cross-border challenges. Neo-functionalism explains European integration through incremental spillovers from technical and sectoral cooperation to broader political integration, stressing the role of supranational institutions in managing complex interdependence, while its critics underline the underestimated role of nation states and exogenous shocks; nevertheless, its core assumption links deepening integration to functional pressures. Neoliberal institutionalism views states as rational actors that create and use institutions to reduce transaction costs, increase transparency and stabilise expectations, thereby facilitating durable regional and international cooperation. Constructivism focuses on the formation of regional identities, norms and solidarities, arguing that stable regional orders rest on shared meanings and mutual recognition, whether through dense societal exchanges or discursive processes that shape interests over time. Taken together, these approaches outline complementary systemic, functional, institutional and ideational logics that inform the analysis of regionalisation and provide a



conceptual basis for assessing the European Union as a model framework for contemporary integration processes. Transition to a new European regionalism (*Fawcett, 1992, pp. 46-66*).

### **Transition to a new European regionalism**

The shift from “old” to “new” European regionalism reflects the move from a bipolar to an increasingly multipolar and interdependent international system (*Zamagni, 1995*). In the period from the 1950s to the end of the Cold War, Western Europe—supported, *inter alia*, by the Marshall Plan—developed from sectoral cooperation into the European Communities and later the European Union, linking economic integration with security concerns, notably the management of German power and the containment of the Soviet threat. This trajectory, consolidated through deepening common policies and successive enlargements, turned the EU into a benchmark of institutionalised regional cooperation based on shared history, geographical proximity and dense economic interdependence, inspiring regional projects in other parts of the world (*Fawcett, 1992, p. 23*). After 1989, the accession aspirations of Central and Eastern European states and the destabilising effects of conflicts such as the Yugoslav wars exposed the limits of the old model and prompted a continuous adaptation of European institutions and policies, as the Union sought to reconcile further enlargement, differentiated integration and identity sensitivities within a more complex regional and global environment (*Fawcett, 1992, p. 32*).

### **Relationships and contrasts between globalisation and regionalisation**

The relationship between globalisation and European integration is ambivalent: the European Union is at once a product of globalising dynamics and a distinct model of regional governance that mitigates their disruptive effects. An integrated Europe is able to internalise external economic and political pressures while preserving regulatory autonomy, combining market openness with social, environmental and cohesion policies that temper unfettered competition and protect cultural diversity within a shared political space. Recent crises – including migration pressures, terrorist attacks, rising xenophobia and populism, demographic and environmental challenges, as well as tensions linked to eastern enlargement – have exposed vulnerabilities of this model and fuelled scepticism regarding the Union’s competitiveness and cohesion in a globalised environment (*Molchanov, 2005*).

At the same time, European integration has generated instruments that operate as a structured regional response to globalisation. The development of supranational institutions such as the European Parliament and the EU judicial mechanisms has strengthened democratic accountability and rights protection beyond the nation state, while common policies – notably cohesion policy, structural funds and the Common Agricultural Policy – have contributed to reducing territorial disparities, supporting vulnerable groups and sustaining rural economies (*Molchanov, 2005*). Taken together, these mechanisms confirm the EU’s role as an advanced form of regionalisation capable of managing interdependence and limiting polarisation between regions and centres.

### **Globalisation and regionalisation in Europe: the Ukrainian context**

In the context of war, Ukraine faces a real risk of radical and extreme forms of nationalism – ethnic extremism and ultra-conservatism – that could fuel tensions between the centre and the regions and trigger destructive regionalisation and political and social fragmentation. Intensified nationalist sentiments and excessive centralisation may undermine national unity and post-war recovery. An alternative path is to avoid such extremes and pursue integration with the Western world through modern European regionalisation, which implies the inclusion of regions in a multilevel system of governance, their active participation in national development, and the implementation of European standards via regional policies and structural funds, creating a favourable framework for cooperation, development and cultural exchange.

To use these instruments effectively, their principles and mechanisms must be analysed in depth with regard to Ukraine’s specific context. EU cohesion policy was developed in response to major economic and social disparities between territories, further accentuated by enlargements, and aims at real convergence of less developed regions with the EU average through faster growth of incomes, employment and opportunities, coordinated with national programmes (*Molle, 2008, pp. 282–284*). Its objectives include supporting lagging regions, promoting research, technological

development and innovation, improving ICT, fostering SMEs, enabling the transition to a low-carbon and climate-resilient economy, enhancing environmental protection and sustainable transport, creating quality jobs and labour mobility, advancing social inclusion and anti-poverty measures, investing in education and lifelong learning, and strengthening public administration (*Europe: Is the System Broken, 2019, p. 20*). The main financial instrument is the system of Structural Funds based on co-financing, whereby poorer regions receive a higher share of EU support.

As an EU candidate state, Ukraine does not yet have direct access to these funds, but should already internalise their logic and use available external financial instruments to mobilise resources, ease pressure on the state budget, support employment and local resilience, and prepare institutions and communities for future use of structural funds or ad hoc access if political conditions allow. Participation in such programmes facilitates exchange of experience with European partners in governance, economic development and environmental standards, increases investment attractiveness, and builds capacity for successful cohesion policy implementation. Therefore, it is essential not only to take part in these initiatives, but also to maximise their effectiveness as a foundation for broader access to EU funding and assistance after accession.

### **Where to start?**

To understand this, we must look at the main programmes and forms of funding available. One example is the European Region (Euroregion), a cross-border association of municipalities and administrative units from neighbouring countries, created to promote economic, social, cultural and environmental co-operation. Ukraine has participated in such structures since 1993 as a member of Euroregions such as Carpathians, Bug, Lower Danube, Upper Prut and others. However, several of these Euroregions have faced limited effectiveness: the Carpathian Euroregion's territory proved too extensive and many planned initiatives were not implemented due to differing management approaches and lack of coordination, while Upper Prut temporarily suspended its activities during the political upheavals of the Orange Revolution. By contrast, the Dniester and Bug Euroregions have continued cooperation and launched new initiatives even during the war. This raises the question of which instruments and programmes are available to Euroregions and other cross-border groupings to obtain sustainable funding for their activities (Lepik, 2009).

A common and understandable answer to this question is the grant system. One example is the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Technical Assistance Programme (ERDF-TA), implemented on the Interreg model. The Technical Assistance Programme for Cross-Border Cooperation between Ukraine and Moldova aims to strengthen the administrative capacity of local authorities and NGOs through joint micro-projects. Its main tasks include establishing a steering committee for project selection and financing, providing technical support to applicants, assisting in the preparation of grant applications, monitoring implementation and organising training and methodological support. The programme covers the border areas of Ukraine and Moldova and finances projects up to €10,000, and in exceptional cases up to €50,000. As with most EU initiatives, it promotes social, territorial and economic cohesion, supports local communities and helps to address urgent challenges while creating conditions for sustainable regional development (*European Commission, 2025*).

The financial support provided by Cross-Border Cooperation Programmes is not only an important tool for regional development, but also a symbol of solidarity and trust from European partners. This assistance strengthens relations with the EU and confirms that the European community recognises Ukraine's prospects for membership. At the same time, such programmes link short-term aid with long-term cooperation, laying the foundations for sustainable partnerships capable of transforming entire regions. By turning the idea of support into a practical partnership, they open up new formats of interaction between Ukraine and the EU. One model that reflects these principles is Interreg.

The Interreg programme is one of the EU's key instruments for promoting cooperation between regions and countries and plays an important role in cohesion policy by supporting

regional development, reducing economic disparities and strengthening social cohesion. With a budget of around €10 billion for 2021–2027, it focuses on challenges such as climate change, digital transformation and social inclusion and supports projects that cross internal EU borders and involve neighbouring countries. Since its launch in 1990 as a €1 billion initiative, Interreg has evolved into a framework for cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation, with broader transnational formats opening new opportunities for Ukrainian regions. While security risks complicate large-scale projects in border areas, cooperation in fields such as environmental protection, education, research, energy and digital technologies remains realistic and effective even under current conditions (*Interreg Europe, 2025*).

Cooperation between Ukraine and Poland illustrates how neighbouring countries can jointly address global challenges such as climate change at the local level. The project “Volunteer fire brigades for environmental protection” provides for training of firefighters, purchase of specialised equipment and development of coordinated procedures for responding to emergencies in the border region, thereby strengthening security and demonstrating the practical benefits of cross-border cooperation in the Bug Euroregion (*Euroregion Bug, 2024*). Such successful examples create a solid basis for revitalising lagging regions, improving infrastructure and generating replicable models of recovery and socio-economic development (*European Commission, 2025*).

In addition to physical cooperation through programmes, an important dimension is the exchange of experience and knowledge between regions and cities, which helps to develop effective policies and refine shared approaches. For this purpose, the Interreg platform facilitates continuous learning for policymakers and local stakeholders, providing access to a database of good practices, thematic events and expert support in addressing specific regional challenges. In this way, it strengthens regional cooperation and improves the effectiveness of development policies in the European space.

URBACT offers further opportunities for Ukrainian cities. The displacement of millions of people to western cities has increased pressure on local infrastructure, but also highlighted the need for long-term, sustainable urban planning. Within URBACT, Ukrainian cities can join European networks, access expertise and innovative tools, and develop integrated solutions tailored to their specific needs, including reconstruction, environmental sustainability, economic recovery and social cohesion. Support within the programme can be directed both to infrastructure improvements and to social initiatives, while participation in URBACT networks enables Ukrainian municipalities to share their own experience, accelerate recovery and move towards more inclusive, resilient and modern urban spaces (*URBACT, 2025*).

#### **A panacea or a proven tool?**

Structural funds and support programmes are not a comprehensive solution to all of Ukraine's problems. Experience of the Member States shows that even high levels of EU funding cannot replace effective economic policy and can only complement it. Without a sound institutional and legal framework, a significant share of funds risks being inefficiently used, limiting their real impact to formal or symbolic results. Countries have adopted different fund management models: some, like the Baltic States, use a centralised system with ministries as both paying and managing authorities, while others rely on more decentralised structures with specialised agencies. Despite institutional differences, examples such as Slovenia and Poland show that improved coordination and clear frameworks enhance effectiveness, indicating that Ukraine, given its unique integration context, should develop its own coherent strategy for managing EU-related instruments, tailored to national challenges and needs (*Crescenzi & Giua, 2019*).

A modernised approach would support strategic regional development planning, ensure more predictable financing and help fill budget gaps, especially for major infrastructure projects. At the same time, many effects of cohesion policy are difficult to measure solely through GDP or employment, as its added value also lies in strengthening networks, governance quality and participation of local actors in European initiatives, which enhances their visibility and influence at the European level (*World Economic Forum, 2022*).

Equally important is the link between structural and individual cohesion. Individual cohesion reflects citizens' sense of belonging to the European community, openness to cooperation and participation in joint initiatives. Such experiences increase Ukraine's attractiveness as a future member and can help demonstrate to existing EU societies that Ukrainians already share European norms and practices, thereby softening perceptions of "us" and "them". Conversely, low individual cohesion complicates implementation of EU policies, as citizens may not understand or accept the territorial distribution of support (*Janning, 2018*).

Successful implementation of cohesion policy in Ukraine would generate positive effects for both Ukraine and the EU: it would support democratic governance, increase the legitimacy of EU instruments and help counter Eurosceptic and anti-integration narratives. Against the background of growing support for nationalist and populist forces in Europe, visible success of Ukraine's cohesion-oriented reforms and projects would serve as a powerful argument in favour of pan-European solidarity and shared responsibility for stability and development. Thus, cohesion policy should be seen not only as a financial tool, but also as an integral element of Ukraine's integration path, strengthening socio-political unity, facilitating adaptation to EU standards, reducing regional disparities and reinforcing public confidence in the European future of the country.

**Conclusion.** In this paper we have explored the complex interrelationships between globalisation and regionalisation, in particular their impact on European integration and Ukraine's prospects for European integration. The EU has demonstrated how to combine the preservation of national identity with active integration into the global economic system. Thanks to the EU's regional policy mechanisms, socio-economic disparities between regions are gradually being reduced, thus contributing to the stability and integrity of the EU. At the same time, the EU actively protects cultural diversity as an important element of European identity. This has enabled Member States to preserve their distinctive traditions and customs while integrating into a common economic and political space. This approach contributes to the formation of a common European identity, which is an important factor in the successful integration of new members such as Ukraine into the EU. The successful implementation of Ukraine's cohesion policy can serve as an example for other countries seeking European integration and show that the preservation of national identity and active participation in a globalised world can go hand in hand.

For Ukraine, the EU's cohesion policy is not only a means of economic support, but also an important factor in the integration process. Successful implementation of the policy will enable Ukraine to adapt to European standards, develop its regions and overcome socio-economic disparities. It will increase the confidence of Ukrainian society in the European integration process and consolidate the foundations of democracy.

In order to effectively use the opportunities offered by EU grants and programmes, Ukraine should:

- 1. Actively participate in cross-border cooperation programmes:** for example, the Interreg programme promotes cooperation between EU regions and countries. Ukrainian regions can participate in projects aimed at solving common problems (e.g. environmental issues or infrastructure development). It is important to build partnerships with neighbouring countries to address cross-border issues. This could include joint projects to modernise transport networks, improve water quality or develop tourism infrastructure. In addition, participation in such programmes allows for the exchange of best practices and innovative solutions, thus increasing the efficiency of local administration. Active participation in cross-border co-operation schemes also helps to build trust between municipalities and contributes to a common European identity.
- 2. Strengthening the administrative capacity of local authorities:** this can be achieved through participation in technical assistance programmes such as ERDF-TA. It is important to set up steering committees responsible for selecting and funding projects, providing technical assistance to applicants and organising educational activities.
- 3. Ensure exchange of experience and knowledge between regions and municipalities:** platforms such as Interreg and URBACT provide lifelong learning opportunities for policy makers and local community representatives, helping to cross-check existing policy solutions

against databases of good practice and seek expert advice on how to address specific regional challenges.

**4. Creating a new institutional framework for the management of EU funds:** The experience of other countries shows that effective management of funds requires sound institutional and legal frameworks. Ukraine needs to develop its own management strategy based on the specific challenges and needs of the country.

**5. Supporting the cohesion of individual citizens:** Involving citizens in joint European initiatives could increase Ukraine's attractiveness as a potential EU member. It would also make existing EU members feel that Ukrainians are already part of the European community.

Successful implementation of cohesion policy in Ukraine would have a very positive impact not only on Ukraine itself, but also on the EU as a whole. It would be an important sign of strengthening democratic values, increase the legitimacy of EU initiatives among member states, and help reduce Euroscepticism in Europe.

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## COMMUNICATION TOOLS FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (THE EXPERIENCE OF UKRAINE AND TAIWAN)

## КОМУНІКАЦІЙНІ ІНСТРУМЕНТИ УПРАВЛІННЯ КРИЗАМИ В КОНТЕКСТІ СТАЛОГО РОЗВИТКУ (ДОСВІД УКРАЇНИ ТА ТАЙВАНЮ)

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**Abstract.** *This article examines how communication technologies support progress toward sustainable development in crisis contexts, using Ukraine and Taiwan as case studies. It explores the transformation of the sustainability paradigm and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) agenda, outlining the application practices observed in the countries in question. Particular attention is given to a set of geopolitical constraints, including Russian invasion of Ukraine and "One China" policy, which restricts Taiwan's international participation. Despite these challenges, both countries continue to contribute to the achievement of the SDGs, with a focus on the employment of communication technologies. The study analyzes the strategies of states, international organizations, companies aimed at achieving social equality, economic stability and environmental balance. It emphasizes that communication technologies serve as a key factor in raising public awareness and strengthening international cooperation. The experience of Ukraine and Taiwan demonstrates that sustainable development remains not only possible but essential for ensuring human welfare, especially during crises.*

**Keywords:** *communication technologies, global challenges, sustainable development, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), crisis situations, Ukraine, Taiwan, communication platforms, international cooperation, communication facilitation for projects.*

**Анотація.** *У статті досліджується роль комунікаційних інструментів у забезпеченні сталого розвитку на прикладі України та Тайваню. Розглянуто історію трансформації*

*парадигми стійкого розвитку та програму Цілей сталого розвитку (ЦСР) ООН, а також специфіку їх адаптації в зазначених країнах. Особлива увага приділяється впливу зовнішніх загроз у вигляді повномасштабної війни Росії проти України та політики «одного Китаю», яка обмежує міжнародну участь Тайваню. Показано, що попри ці виклики обидві країни продовжують робити внесок у досягнення ЦСР, зокрема завдяки використанню сучасних комунікаційних технологій. Аналізується діяльність держав, міжнародних організацій, компаній, спрямованих на досягнення соціальної рівності, економічної стабільності та екологічної збалансованості. Наголошується, що комунікаційні технології виступають ключовим чинником у підвищенні обізнаності суспільства та посиленні міжнародної співпраці. Досвід України та Тайваню демонструє, що навіть у кризових умовах сталий розвиток залишається не лише можливим, а й необхідним для забезпечення добробуту людства.*

**Ключові слова:** *комунікаційні технології, глобальні виклики, сталий розвиток, Цілі сталого розвитку (ЦСР), кризові ситуації, Україна, Тайвань, комунікаційні платформи, міжнародне співробітництво, комунікаційний супровід проєктів.*

**Introduction.** The realities of the information world demonstrate that sustainable development is impossible without the effective use of communication technologies, which serve as a key instrument for ensuring interaction between states, international institutions, businesses and society. In times of crisis – such as wars, natural disasters, economic instability or deliberate obstruction of one state's development by another – the significance of communication increases exponentially. Through digital platforms and innovative tools, it becomes possible to inform and coordinate international assistance, enhance public resilience and maintain a strategic focus on achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Ukraine and Taiwan offer a striking illustration. Both states operate under complex security conditions caused by the aggressive actions of authoritarian neighbors, yet they continue to pursue their respective sustainable development strategies. Even amidst the ongoing full-scale war Ukraine employs communication technologies to disseminate information about its green and innovative projects, while also drawing global attention to Russia's deliberate creation of environmental disasters, systematic violations of international law and human rights, which undermine the fundamental principles of the SDGs and have repercussions far beyond Ukraine's borders.

Taiwan, for its part, faces continuous pressure from China which poses unique challenges to its security and international recognition. Nevertheless, through the active use of communication technologies Taiwan has managed to develop an effective model of sustainable development that integrates digital innovation with environmental policy and social responsibility. These instruments are applied to promote projects in climate policy, gender equality, emissions monitoring and renewable energy development. This approach strengthens Taiwan's resilience and simultaneously reinforces its position on the international stage, despite the limitations imposed by its political status quo.

Thus, the experiences of Ukraine and Taiwan demonstrate that the advancement and strategic use of communication technologies not only facilitate adaptation to crisis conditions but also foster tangible progress toward the SDGs. This dimension has global relevance as both Ukraine and Taiwan exemplify how open and democratic societies can withstand external threats while remaining committed to sustainable development.

**The purpose of the article** is to examine how Ukraine, which remains in a state of war, and Taiwan, which is subjected to continuous pressure under the "One China" policy, employ communication technologies to promote the Sustainable Development Goals.

**Literature review.** The use of communication tools in crisis contexts and their role in promoting sustainable development have been the focus of numerous Ukrainian and international studies. Among Ukrainian scholars who have explored the impact of communication technologies,



the role of social media, crisis communication, the digitalization of communication processes, and the communicative dimensions of global challenges are O. Kuchmii, N. Pipchenko, O. Frolova, H. Pocheptsov, A. Husiev, N. Dovhan, O. Ivachevska, N. Malieieva, I. Petrenko, H. Marchuk, T. Pliekhanova, O. Marukhovska-Kartunova. At the international level, significant contributions have been made by scholars such as M. Castells, D. Bell, K. Samashonok and M. Ishoraité, M. R. Mashkyo, A. Spada, M. Fiore and K. N. Hampton. The significance of communication technologies for supporting sustainable development, particularly under conditions of instability and conflict, is also reflected in reports and publications by the United Nations, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, the National Institute for Strategic Studies of Ukraine and the Global Taiwan Institute.

**Main results of research.** The accelerated development of humankind, economic growth, increasing societal demands and natural disasters – all these and many other factors influence the global environment and, consequently, the relations among states. The international community has recognized that the absence of a guiding framework encouraging responsible production and consumption would lead to the disintegration of international order and even the potential demise of humanity itself. For this reason, it was necessary to design a concept capable of structuring the multitude of challenges any state faces and the possible approaches to solve them. This gave rise to the sustainable development concept that implies addressing current needs in a way that safeguards future generations' ability to address their own. It is grounded in the three main aspects: economic stability, social equality and environmental balance. Officially endorsed by the United Nations, the concept aims to harmonize human activity with the natural environment and to ensure long-term well-being for all.

Furthermore, in 2015, the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were adopted, identifying key directions intended to guide the world along a path of resilient and inclusive development. These 17 Global Goals have been integrated into the strategies of states and corporations alike, and their principles are increasingly embraced by ordinary citizens who can act as responsible consumers in their daily lives. Modern businesses are gradually abandoning corporate egoism in favor of the “three Ps” approach – people, planet, profit, which promotes the achievement of social (people), environmental (planet) and economic (profit) sustainability.

The document “Transforming our world: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” (A/RES/70/1) by the UN General Assembly highlights current global challenges related to inequality, gaps in opportunities, unemployment, and health risks. In addition, increasingly frequent and severe natural disasters, the proliferation of conflicts, terrorism and humanitarian crises continue to undermine the achievements of many nations. Climate change, biodiversity loss and the depletion of natural resources aggravate these problems. However, the document emphasizes that the progress already achieved by countries can become an effective instrument for overcoming the outlined challenges. As noted therein, the expansion of information and communication technologies and global interconnectedness open up vast opportunities to enhance human development, narrow the digital gap and support knowledge-based societies (UN, 2015).

Nevertheless, crises of local, regional and global scale pose serious obstacles to ensuring sustainable development by governments, organizations, the corporate sector and societies at large. Communication technologies serve not only as a tool that enables rapid and high-quality results across the areas identified in the UN Sustainable Development Goals, but also allow states, organizations and companies regain control over processes disrupted by natural disasters or conflicts. The examples of Ukraine and Taiwan clearly illustrate how two democratic nations strive to uphold the progressive agenda set by the international community for the benefit of humankind despite the fact that Russia, on one hand, seeks to nullify Ukraine's achievements and threatens global well-being, while China, on the other, actively obstructs Taiwan's participation in international cooperation, limiting its ability to share valuable experience and thereby hindering global progress toward sustainable development.

Therefore, it is crucial that the contributions of Ukraine and Taiwan be recognized and amplified through international media platforms. Before proceeding to the analysis of the

mentioned cases, it is necessary to examine how Ukraine and Taiwan define their national courses toward achieving SDGs at the state level.

Ukraine has been involved in the UN sustainable development agenda from the very beginning. In order to guide the country's development by 2030, an inclusive process of adapting the Sustainable Development Goals was launched in line with the principle of "Leaving no one behind" (*Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine, 2017*).

The Presidential Decree of Ukraine No. 722/2019 "On the Sustainable Development Goals of Ukraine for the period up to 2030" provides that the implementation and achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals of Ukraine shall be pursued with regard to the national context and specific conditions (*President of Ukraine, 2019*). Thus, at the national level, the SDGs have been defined as benchmarks to direct the development of strategic and policy instruments.

Pursuant to the *Sustainable Development Report 2025*, Ukraine ranks 42nd out of 167 countries in the global SDG progress index. The study indicates that Ukraine has achieved full success in SDG 10: Reduced Inequality (*Sachs et al., 2025*). However, significant challenges are observed in almost all Goals, primarily due to the full-scale invasion, the consequences of which include heavy casualties, widespread destruction and severe pollution of air, soil and water. Furthermore, Russia deliberately triggered an environmental catastrophe by destroying the Kakhovka Dam, affecting over 100,000 people and flooding more than 620 square kilometers of territory. This tragedy led to massive population displacement, humanitarian and ecological crisis, extensive damage to natural habitats and heightened health risks (*United Nations Ukraine, 2025*).

An analysis of Taiwan reveals the following. Based on the United Nations Earth Summit of 1992, the Executive Yuan, Taiwan's highest executive authority, established the National Council for Sustainable Development (NCSDD) in August 1997 with a view to aligning state's efforts with global sustainable development standards. Based on the UN Sustainable Development Goals, the Council introduced 18 national sustainability goals, namely: 1. strengthening social protection and economic security for the underprivileged; 2. ensuring food security, eradicating hunger, and promoting sustainable agriculture; 3. promoting healthy lifestyles and well-being for all people regardless of age; 4. ensuring inclusive and equitable quality education and promoting lifelong learning opportunities for all; 5. achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls; 6. ensuring environmental quality and sustainable management of natural resources; 7. ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all; 8. promoting sustained, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment, and decent work for all; 9. developing accessible, safe, environmentally friendly and sustainable transport systems; 10. reducing inequality within and among countries; 11. making cities and human settlements inclusive, safe and sustainable; 12. ensuring sustainable consumption and production patterns; 13. taking urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts; 14. conserving and sustainably using marine ecosystems and preventing marine degradation; 15. conserving and sustainably managing terrestrial ecosystems to preserve biodiversity and prevent land degradation; 16. promoting peaceful and inclusive societies, ensuring access to justice for all and building effective, accountable and transparent institutions; 17. establishing diversified partnerships and working jointly to advance the vision of sustainable development; 18. building a nuclear-free state (*National Council for Sustainable Development & Executive Yuan, 2022*).

Taiwan does not hold UN membership and therefore is not included in the Sustainable Development Report 2025, which evaluates the progress of 193 UN Member States in implementing all 17 SDGs. The state remains excluded from official events, mechanisms and meetings under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), not being a party to it. However, each year the Environmental Protection Administration under the Executive Yuan sends a delegation to the summit comprising government officials, academic and research experts and members of the business community. According to Taiwanese analyst P. Gao, Taiwanese non-governmental organizations have secured participation in these events (*Gao, 2019*). The preservation of national security and the maintenance of sovereign authority constitute fundamental pillars of Taiwan's foreign policy, underpinning its persistent efforts to attain representation in

international organizations. Both in general terms and regarding progress toward the SDGs, a key political factor can be observed, stemming from the People's Republic of China (PRC) and its "One China" policy. In our view, this policy undermines Taiwan's prospects for peaceful development and, by extension, affects other states, since the potential threat of a negative reaction from China restricts their capacity to cooperate and share experiences with Taipei.

Despite these limitations, the Taiwanese government reviews and assesses the country's performance in achieving sustainable development objectives. Furthermore, a more comprehensive evaluation is conducted every four years to track progress toward the SDGs achieved during the specified period.

In Ukraine and Taiwan, the institutional framework for pursuing the SDGs ensures that both countries implement targeted strategies that align with global sustainability objectives.

Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine remains the main obstacle hindering the country's progress toward establishing a coherent sustainable development framework. Researchers H. Kapinos and K. Larionova aptly noted that the outbreak of full-scale war on February 24, 2022, prompted a reassessment of strategies by the international community of the Sustainable Development Goals. Before the invasion, most developed countries tended to address environmental problems. However, the war in Ukraine revealed that the SDGs cannot be pursued without foundational pillars such as peace, economic development, justice and human rights protection (*Kapinos & Larionova, 2023*).

Despite these immense pressures, Ukraine continues to demonstrate that even in the midst of a full-scale invasion it seeks to uphold the principles shared by democratic states that prioritize prosperity and the well-being of the whole world.

Meanwhile, for Taiwan a persistent challenge has long been its status quo, particularly its unresolved position regarding participation in international organizations. After the Chinese Civil War of the 1940s between the ruling Kuomintang and the Communist Party on the mainland, Chiang Kai-shek's administration, having retreated to Taiwan and retained the official name Republic of China, asserted its legitimacy over all of China. Moreover, Taiwan retained its seat on the United Nations Security Council until 1971. However, during the Cold War diplomatic recognition gradually shifted away from Taipei, as states opted to engage officially with Beijing instead. Consequently, Taiwan was left out of various international organizations, especially those overseeing economic and trade cooperation (*Kuo, 2022*). For this reason, the country lacks the full ability to move freely and independently toward achieving its Sustainable Development Goals, with the People's Republic of China discrediting international support and framing it as interference in China's internal affairs and the deliberate provocation of conflict.

The cases of both Ukraine and Taiwan illustrate how the actions of Russia and China directly undermine global peace and sustainable progress, intensifying the division between democracies and authoritarian regimes. Communication instruments play a crucial role in raising awareness about how these countries advance sustainable development, ensuring progress even in crisis situations and fostering cooperation with other international actors.

O. Kuchmii notes that the advancement and broad employment of modern ICT, bio- and nanotechnologies have strengthened the ICT infrastructure, facilitating integration processes and international collaboration at different levels (*Kuchmii, 2019*).

Lithuanian researchers K. Samašonok and M. Išoraitė have explored the significance of communication technologies toward meeting the SDGs, emphasizing that the pervasive integration of individuals into social networks and modern technologies has established the Internet, alongside traditional channels, as a pivotal instrument for bringing attention to relevant matters (*Samašonok & Išoraitė, 2023*). In contemporary conditions, this enables the effective engagement of broader audiences, drawing its attention to societal, economic and ecological challenges, influencing collective perceptions, and fostering commitment to sustainability-oriented principles.

An illustrative example from Ukraine demonstrating the employment of communication tools in this sphere includes the open SDG Platform in Ukraine, found by the State Statistics Service of Ukraine together with UNDP within the UN program "Supporting Strategic Planning and

Financing for Sustainable Development in Ukraine at the National and Regional Levels,” funded by the Joint SDG Fund. This platform enables the monitoring and analysis of Ukraine’s progress toward all Sustainable Development Goals (*State Statistics Service of Ukraine & UNDP, 2025*).

Furthermore, Ukraine has initiated work on a domestically developed large language model (LLM), implemented by the WINWIN AI Center of Excellence within the Ministry of Digital Transformation in partnership with the telecommunications operator Kyivstar. Innovative products will be introduced on this basis, including AI tools integrated into the educational platform *Mriia* and the *Diia.Osvita* service. As stated on the official website of the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine, artificial intelligence facilitates the automatic selection of educational series, simulation modules and test assignments based on user requests (*Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine, 2025*). Such innovations will promote the achievement of SDG 4: Quality Education and reinforce Ukraine’s role on the global stage as a country that successfully combines digital transformation with the principles of sustainable development.

Considering the communication dimension, Ukraine thus appears to be an example of how a country, despite enduring military aggression, strives to ensure sustainable development in contrast to Russia, which systematically violates the principles and aims of the SDGs across various domains (*Mazur, 2025*).

In addition, the active role of the corporate sector, exemplified by the participation of the telecommunication company Kyivstar, aligns with SDG 17, which calls for partnerships between public institutions, business entities, civil society and other actors to strengthen economic prosperity, social well-being and ecological sustainability. A. Miguel and S. Miranda in their article “The Role of Digital Platforms in Promoting Pro-Sustainable Behavior and Conscious Consumption by Brands” emphasize that modern brands – that is, the corporate sector – actively use online tools to communicate their sustainability initiatives, disseminating information about environmental issues and offering concrete actions that consumers can apply in their everyday lives (*Miguel & Miranda, 2023*).

M. Castells identifies the transformation of communication as the defining feature of the network society, including its media dimension. He notes that through “blogs, vlogs, podcasts, streaming and other media, individuals are now able to interact directly independently of institutions that formerly controlled socialized communication” (*Castells, 2006*).

An important example of communication practices supporting the SDGs is the international campaign “16 Days of Activism Against Gender-Based Violence,” held each year on November 25 under the auspices of the United Nations in Ukraine. Under martial law, such communication platforms and information campaigns have gained particular importance in countering gender-based violence, including its manifestations in online spaces across digital platforms (*UN Ukraine, 2025a*). This campaign exemplifies a meaningful communication practice that bridges global experience and local challenges, as audiences are encouraged to engage in online dialogue from anywhere in the world. It contributes to raising social awareness and fostering sensitivity to the issue, which is directly relevant to building inclusive and resilient communities.

Another notable example of information practice is the Ukrainian-German cooperation initiative IKI in Ukraine on climate change mitigation, adaptation and biodiversity conservation. The initiative’s website provides access to analyses of projects supporting sustainable development, such as “IKI Interface: Supporting Ukraine towards Ambitious and Integrated Climate Policy (GreenUkraine).” The project, implemented in 2023, aimed to enhance Ukraine’s biodiversity monitoring system for collecting, assessing and tracking data concerning natural resources in real time (*IKI Ukraine, 2023*).

One more illustrative case is the charitable foundation “Angels of Salvation”. In 2023, the foundation joined a pilot initiative of the Ukraine Humanitarian Fund (UHF). After successfully implementing its project and passing the UN OCHA assessment, Angels of Salvation became a direct recipient of funding by the end of the year (*UN Ukraine, 2025b*). The foundation’s activities demonstrate that, amid wartime conditions, communication tools have become a key component of the effective functioning of humanitarian initiatives: modern digital platforms – including official

websites and social networking services – have enabled rapid dissemination of information to local populations about available aid and access points. These communication technologies have strengthened the social resilience of communities, directly contributing to SDG 3: Good Health and Well-being and SDG 11: Sustainable Cities and Communities. Foundation officials emphasize that they actively use online platforms to notify about their projects, raise awareness and increase public engagement.

Through communication technologies Taiwan likewise demonstrates its stance and actions in support of the SDGs, which allows the state to enhance its international image, improve cooperation with other actors in global relations and strengthen its alliances – a particularly important objective given the ongoing threat of military conflict with China. As noted, the country's annual National Sustainable Development Reports are published on the official website of the National Council for Sustainable Development. The Council emphasizes that the publication and dissemination of such documents help the global community and the general public gain a clearer understanding of the Republic of China's achievements and progress in sustainable development (*National Council for Sustainable Development, 2025*). Sharing this information enhances global awareness and interest in Taiwan, facilitating its access to the experience of advanced countries in the field of sustainable development and promoting its accomplishments on the international stage.

The Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) represents another significant instrument in the realm of communication technologies. This independent, non-profit organization aims to expand the country's cooperation with international actors by conducting policy research and implementing initiatives designed to promote a deeper global understanding of Taiwan and its citizens. The office was established in Washington, D.C. in 2015 (*Global Taiwan Institute, 2025*). It serves as an open platform to exchange insights and foster dialogue among scholars, activists and civil society representatives from both the United States and Taiwan. The Institute and its website constitute vital sources of information about Taiwan for governmental and non-governmental organizations, the media and the research community. Moreover, GTI publishes *The Global Taiwan Brief*, a biweekly publication providing analytical reporting on latest developments regarding Taiwan (*Global Taiwan Brief, 2025*).

In one of its editions, GTI analyst M. Pararaman, referencing Taiwan's 2023 National Sustainable Development Report, observed the country's ongoing efforts to implement measures for climate change mitigation across three key dimensions: legal frameworks, educational initiatives and the enhancement of adaptive capacity. Furthermore, on February 15, 2023, the Executive Yuan approved a presidential order transforming the Greenhouse Gas Reduction and Management Act into the Climate Change Response Act. Concurrently, the Ministry of Environment revised and updated six regulatory acts governing greenhouse gas outputs, contributing to the robust operation of national climate governance system. The Ministry of Education also organized and supported events and workshops focused on improving climate change literacy in alignment with the UN's Education for Sustainable Development (ESD) program (*Pararaman, 2025*). Pararaman also referenced a major initiative – the Taiwan Climate Partnership (TCP) – launched in 2022 by eight leading companies in Taiwan's information and communication technology sector. The founding members include Acer, ASUSTeK Computer, AUO, Delta Electronics, LITEON, Microsoft Taiwan, Pegatron and the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) (*Taiwan Climate Partnership, 2025*). The goal of this partnership is to promote the national framework to attain carbon neutrality throughout supply chains.

It is particularly relevant to consider how the corporate sector contributes to sustainable development and communicates its progress to the international community. The previously mentioned Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), a global leader in contract semiconductor production, plays a crucial role not only on the world economic stage but also in drawing international attention to Taiwan itself. The company actively employs digital platforms and communication technologies to ensure transparency and disseminate information about its achievements in corporate social responsibility (CSR). TSMC releases its Sustainability Reports and Responsible Supply Chain Reports annually, making them freely accessible in both PDF and

interactive online formats, thus fostering open information exchange (TSMC, 2024). This practice aligns with SDG 16: Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions, as it promotes corporate accountability.

Moreover, TSMC places strong emphasis on fostering sustainability-oriented mindset within its supplier network, fostering continuous progress in related areas. In pursuit of this objective, in 2021 the company launched the TSMC Supplier Sustainability Academy, a unique educational platform for Taiwan's semiconductor industry implemented through the Supply Online 360 system that supports SDG 12: Responsible Consumption and Production. The Academy covers seven key areas: occupational health and safety, labor rights, environmental protection, operational efficiency management, sustainable supply chain governance, information security and quality control. Open access to materials allows both suppliers and interested parties benefit from them. A distinctive feature of the platform lies in its integration of interactive and multimedia content, which enhances learning efficiency through animated visuals, interactive tasks and embedded assessment tools. As of 2024, the Academy offered 90 training courses, attracting over 3.1 million visits – evidence of a high level of engagement and the relevance of this initiative (See *et al.*, 2021).

When analyzing communication technologies that contribute to raising global awareness of Taiwan's sustainable development efforts, particular attention shall be paid to the Taiwan Digital Diplomacy Association (TDDA), a prominent non-profit organization. Aimed at strengthening Taipei's cooperative relations with other countries, the Association develops and disseminates digital content featuring Taiwan's numerous projects and organizes real-life events that invite Taiwanese youth to engage in new public diplomacy opportunities. Through these initiatives, the TDDA promotes innovation in online communication within governmental and non- governmental entities.

The organization maintains an active presence on LinkedIn (*Taiwan Digital Diplomacy Association*, 2025). For example, to commemorate International Women's Day on March 8, 2024, officials from Taiwan's government and the Foundation for Women's Rights Promotion and Development organized a week-long series of events held in conjunction with the 68th session of the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women (CSW68). The Taiwan Gender Equality Week featured two key events, Taiwan Main Stage and Taiwan Cultural Night, which took place at the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in New York. Attendees included Hank Huang, President of the Taiwan Academy of Banking and Finance, who emphasized the importance of achieving gender equality through financial resilience and inclusion, together with Kelley Currie, former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women's Issues. Taiwan's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joseph Wu, emphasized that the purpose was to showcase Taiwan's achievements in expanding women's economic empowerment through education and public policy (*TW Digital Diplomacy Digest*, 2024). The event also received coverage on the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan), which released four short videos titled "Taiwan for Her," "Gender Equality," "Equality Taiwan" and "Women Power." These videos were designed to present the accomplishments of Taiwanese women in advancing economic empowerment and gender equality (*Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China*, 2024).

**Conclusion.** Thus, Ukraine and Taiwan offer examples of how communication technologies can safeguard the values of sustainable development even under crisis conditions, when Russia and China, two powerful authoritarian regimes, strive to hinder their progress and undermine domestic development. Russia resorts to direct destruction and murders, while simultaneously attempting to discredit Ukraine's achievements before the international community through propagandistic narratives. China, in turn, exerts political, economic and psychological pressure, including large-scale military exercises around Taiwan. However, by employing communication tools, it becomes possible to engage audiences across the globe, enabling Ukraine and Taiwan to effectively articulate their domestic accomplishments while concurrently consolidating their international presence, strengthening cooperation with other actors, and securing reliable allies under challenging circumstances. Moreover, communication technologies serve as powerful platforms for global dialogue, resource mobilization and the promotion of democratic values, freedom and human rights. They unite not only states in addressing common challenges but also engage a diverse array of

parties involved – governmental and non-governmental institutions, corporate entities, educational and research communities, and ordinary citizens. This demonstrates that effective communication can counter destructive influences and create a space for innovative approaches to crisis management. The experiences of Ukraine and Taiwan therefore constitute a valuable example for other nations facing similar circumstances, confirming that sustainable development can – and must – remain achievable even amid global challenges.

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## FOREIGN POLICY OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AS A FACTOR IN SHAPING A NEW GEOPOLITICAL REALITY

## ЗОВНІШНЯ ПОЛІТИКА КРАЇН ЄВРОПИ ЯК ЧИННИК ФОРМУВАННЯ НОВОЇ ГЕОПОЛІТИЧНОЇ РЕАЛЬНОСТІ

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**Abstract.** *The article examines the foreign policy of European countries as a key factor in shaping a new geopolitical reality amid the war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. It reveals the transformation of European states' approaches to security, defense, integration, and international cooperation after 2014, when the annexation of Crimea began, and especially following the full-scale invasion in 2022. It is noted that the initial caution and selectivity of actions were gradually replaced by a consolidated position aimed at supporting Ukraine, strengthening sanctions against the aggressor, expanding military assistance, and intensifying diplomatic initiatives within the EU and NATO. Based on the analysis of political decisions, official documents, sociological studies, and statistical data, it is shown that European policy has gradually acquired a strategic character focused on ensuring regional stability, strengthening the system of collective security, and protecting democratic values. The article emphasizes the significant role of public support in EU countries, which enhances the legitimacy of government decisions and contributes to strengthening international solidarity with Ukraine. It has been proven that the interaction between state institutions, civil society, and international organizations forms a new model of European security, in which Ukraine occupies a central place as a partner and guarantor of stability on Europe's eastern flank. It is determined that modern European foreign policy combines instruments of diplomacy, sanctions pressure, humanitarian support, and military assistance, creating the prerequisites for a long-term transformation of the European security space. The results of the study have scientific and practical significance for developing recommendations on Ukraine's further integration into European structures, increasing the effectiveness of international partnerships, and improving the state's foreign policy strategy in the context of current global security challenges.*

**Keywords:** foreign policy, European countries, geopolitics, international relations, security, integration processes, new geopolitical reality

**Анотація.** У статті досліджено зовнішню політику європейських країн як ключовий чинник формування нової геополітичної реальності в умовах війни російської федерації проти України. Розкрито трансформацію підходів держав Європи до питань безпеки, оборони, інтеграції та міжнародної співпраці після 2014 року, коли почалася анексія Криму, і особливо після повномасштабного вторгнення у 2022 році. Зазначено, що початкову обережність і вибірковість дій поступово замінила консолідована позиція, спрямована на підтримку України, посилення санкцій проти агресора, розширення військової допомоги та активізацію дипломатичних ініціатив у межах ЄС і НАТО. На основі аналізу політичних рішень, офіційних документів, соціологічних досліджень та статистичних даних показано, що європейська політика поступово набула стратегічного характеру, орієнтованого на забезпечення регіональної стабільності, зміцнення системи колективної безпеки та захист демократичних цінностей. Підкреслено значну роль суспільної підтримки в країнах ЄС, що підвищує легітимність урядових рішень і сприяє зміцненню міжнародної солідарності з Україною. Доведено, що взаємодія між державними інституціями, громадянським суспільством і міжнародними організаціями формує нову модель європейської безпеки, у якій Україна посідає центральне місце як партнер і гарант стабільності на східному фланзі Європи. Визначено, що сучасна зовнішня політика Європи поєднує інструменти дипломатії, санкційного тиску, гуманітарної підтримки та воєнної допомоги, що створює передумови для довгострокової трансформації європейського безпекового простору. Результати дослідження мають науково-практичне значення для розроблення рекомендацій щодо подальшої інтеграції України до європейських структур, підвищення ефективності міжнародного партнерства та вдосконалення зовнішньополітичної стратегії держави в контексті сучасних викликів глобальної безпеки.

**Ключові слова:** зовнішня політика, європейські країни, геополітика, міжнародні відносини, безпека, інтеграційні процеси, нова геополітична реальність.

**Introduction.** The war in Ukraine, which began with the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014 and escalated into a full-scale invasion in 2022, has triggered a prolonged transformation of the international relations system and created a new geopolitical reality in Europe and worldwide. At the initial stage, European countries adopted a cautious stance, limiting themselves to diplomatic statements, economic sanctions in response to the occupation of Crimea, and partial support for Ukraine. This restraint was explained by the need to assess risks, economic and energy dependencies on Russia, as well as the desire to avoid direct military escalation on the continent.

From 2014 to 2021, support for Ukraine remained predominantly political and economic, whereas in 2022, following the full-scale invasion, European countries significantly intensified their actions. Europe's response manifested in the implementation of comprehensive sanctions against Russia, the provision of military, economic, and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, the strengthening of strategic alliances within NATO and the EU, as well as the coordination of joint measures to enhance regional security. This gradual evolution of foreign policy demonstrates that Europe combines caution in the early stages with a subsequent consolidated and active response strategy aimed at protecting Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The study of the foreign policy priorities and actions of European states allows not only an assessment of their contribution to supporting Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity but also the identification of trends in the formation of a new balance of power in Europe. Analyzing the impact of European policies on global security, economic processes, and international law makes it

possible to understand how the foreign policy decisions of specific states can contribute to regional stabilization or, conversely, create new challenges for the international community.

The relevance of this topic is reinforced by the need to develop scientifically grounded recommendations for shaping an effective Ukrainian state policy in the field of international relations, particularly regarding integration into European security and economic mechanisms, strengthening diplomatic positions, and engaging international partners in the process of restoring peace and stability. Thus, the study of European countries' foreign policies as a factor in shaping the new geopolitical reality is highly pertinent for assessing contemporary transformations of the global order and determining Ukraine's development prospects in the context of war.

**The purpose of the study.** The objective of this study is to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the foreign policies of European countries and their impact on the formation of a new geopolitical reality in the context of the war in Ukraine, as well as to determine the role of European states in supporting Ukraine's sovereignty, stabilizing the region, and transforming the international security system.

**The methods.** The study employs a combination of theoretical and empirical methods. An analysis of scientific and normative literature was conducted to synthesize contemporary approaches to the study of European countries' foreign policies and geopolitical processes. The comparative method was used to juxtapose the foreign policy strategies of different states in the context of the war in Ukraine, while the systems method allowed for a comprehensive examination of the impact of foreign policy on the formation of a new geopolitical reality. To assess the effectiveness of European countries' actions, the expert evaluation method was applied. Additionally, a content analysis of official documents, publications, and strategic declarations of the European Union, NATO, and individual European states was conducted.

**Main results of the research.** This study is grounded in contemporary theories of international relations, particularly the neorealist and liberal approaches, as well as theories of geopolitics and concepts of global security. Special attention is paid to the works of Ukrainian scholars analyzing the foreign policies of European countries, mechanisms for alliance formation, integration processes, and the impact of state decisions on international stability. For instance, I. Hrytsiak examines the common foreign, security, and defense policy of the EU and its significance for establishing resilient strategic priorities (Hrytsiak, I., 2023). I. Zaitseva-Kalaur and I. Onyshchuk focus on the transformation of EU security policy in the context of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, emphasizing the role of solidarity and integration processes in countering external threats (Zaitseva-Kalaur, I., Onyshchuk, I., 2024). L. Hubytskyi and H. Melnyk investigate Poland's military assistance to Ukraine, reflecting the pragmatic aspect of interstate support and its influence on regional security (Hubytskyi, L., Melnyk, H., 2024).

All these scholarly works allow for the identification of key factors shaping the foreign policies of European countries, including security priorities, strategic alliances, and humanitarian aspects, as well as the assessment of their impact on the formation of a new geopolitical reality under contemporary conditions. However, despite significant interest and attention from scholars, Russia's military aggression against Ukraine has radically altered the geopolitical landscape of Europe and created new challenges for the international relations system, highlighting the need for further in-depth study of this issue. European countries, both EU members and non-aligned states, have been compelled to adapt traditional approaches in foreign policy to the conditions of the new security and humanitarian reality. In this context, the European Union serves as a key integrative actor, coordinating the common foreign policy of member states and implementing collective security mechanisms, while, as noted by I. Zaitseva-Kalaur and I. Onyshchuk, Russia's full-scale invasion acted as a catalyst for revising the EU's foreign and security policy (Zaitseva-Kalaur, I., Onyshchuk, I., 2024). Studying these processes holds significant practical value for Ukraine, as it enables the identification of effective strategies for foreign policy and security interaction with European countries in the context of contemporary challenges.

Contemporary foreign policy of European countries demonstrates that their actions go beyond mere responses to crises and actively shape a new geopolitical reality on the continent. State

decisions regarding the provision of military, economic, and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, the implementation of sanctions against Russia, the strengthening of strategic alliances within NATO and the EU, as well as the intensification of diplomatic efforts, together constitute a comprehensive mechanism influencing the regional security balance. At the same time, public support for these measures among European citizens enhances the legitimacy of state policies and provides feedback that facilitates the adaptation of strategies to changing international circumstances. Thus, the foreign policy of European countries in the context of the war in Ukraine serves as a key factor in shaping the new geopolitical reality, combining institutional state decisions, collective actions within integrative structures, and active participation of civil society in supporting Ukraine. This creates a foundation for stabilizing regional security, strengthening international alliances, and defining Europe's strategic priorities in the twenty-first century.

Russian aggression has demonstrated the need for more consolidated measures and joint strategic decisions both by the EU and individual European states. As I. Hrytsiak notes, «Russia's armed attack on the sovereign state of Ukraine has created new challenges and threats to European security and acted as a catalyst for revising the EU's foreign and defense policy» (Hrytsiak, I., 2023). This situation has shown that effective counteraction to aggression requires close coordination among member states, strengthening mechanisms of collective security, and rethinking strategic approaches to ensuring peace on the continent.

In this context, a particularly notable development was the adoption by the European Union in October 2025 of the 19th package of sanctions against the Russian Federation and organizations cooperating with it, including in India and China (European Union, 2025). As of 2025, their measures include the imposition of economic sanctions, provision of military and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, activation of integrated security mechanisms within the EU and NATO, and the development of diplomatic strategies to create a unified front against the aggressor. Following the onset of Russia's full-scale aggression in 2022, European countries have significantly intensified political, military, and financial efforts to support Ukraine. The most visible indicator of this intensification has been the sharp increase in defense spending: while in 2022 the average level of EU countries' expenditures was 1.3% of GDP, by 2024 it reached 1.9%, and in 2025 it is expected to rise to 2.1% of GDP. Poland has become the leader among NATO countries in terms of defense spending, approximately 4.1% of GDP in 2024, with plans to increase it to 4.7% in 2025. Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania also demonstrate growth dynamics (from 2.7% to 3.5% of GDP), while Germany established a special fund of €100 billion for the modernization of the Bundeswehr, following constitutional amendments adopted in 2025. In total, 23 of 32 NATO countries have already reached or exceeded the 2% of GDP benchmark, indicating a revision of Europe's security paradigm (Council of the European Union, n.d.; European Commission, 2024/2025).

A key platform for coordinating international military assistance has become the «Ramstein Initiative» (Ukraine Defense Contact Group), which has brought together over 50 countries worldwide. During its operation, more than 30 meetings have been held, resulting in Ukraine receiving support totaling over USD 145 billion. This format has effectively established a new mechanism of collective security outside the traditional NATO structures (European Commission, 2023).

In addition to collective decisions, individual leadership of certain state leaders has been notable. The Baltic countries and Poland have consistently demonstrated a «hawkish» policy, advocating for maximal support to Ukraine. Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk have provided a moral and political benchmark for other states. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, by initiating the «Zeitenwende» political course, launched a review of Germany's defense policy and large-scale deliveries of air defense systems, while French President Emmanuel Macron has evolved from cautious dialogue to a more resolute position against the aggressor, stimulating discussion on broader allied participation (Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, NAS of Ukraine, 2023).

An important component of support has been the issue of using frozen Russian assets. Approximately €210 billion of the Russian Central Bank's assets have been immobilized in EU

countries. The European Commission has already initiated the process of transferring to Ukraine the revenues from these assets, primarily held in the Belgian Euroclear depository, to finance defense and reconstruction. Simultaneously, the EU and G7 countries are developing a mechanism to lend Ukraine up to €140 billion under guarantees from future earnings of these assets. Norway plays an active role in this process, implementing the five-year “Nansen Support Programme” (2023–2027) with NOK 75 billion and considering the possibility of providing guarantees for a pan-European loan to Ukraine (European Parliament, 2024).

Another notable aspect is the changed level of public readiness among Europeans to defend their countries. Sociological surveys reveal a significant gap between Eastern and Western European countries. Ukrainians exhibit the highest willingness to fight—over 60%—whereas in Western European countries this indicator ranges between 15% and 30%. The Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, and the Baltic countries show relatively high levels, which correlates with their geographical proximity to the conflict zone and historical experience of threat. Thus, the defense potential of Ukraine and Central-Eastern European countries is shaped not only by state decisions but also by the high motivation of civil society, which is of key importance for regional security resilience (Razumkov Centre, 2022).

The research shows that the foreign policy of European countries serves not only as a tool for responding to crises but also as a factor in shaping a new geopolitical reality, in which the balance of power in the region and global strategic orientations are determined by collective decisions. Contemporary approaches to international cooperation, sanctions policy, and support for Ukraine’s state sovereignty can be systematized and visually presented in a table demonstrating the scale of assistance and the activity of European countries. According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, against the backdrop of a slight increase in assistance from the United States (0.42%) in the first half of 2025, it was European countries that showed the greatest dynamics in increasing support for Ukraine (Kiel Institute for the World Economy, 2025), as reflected in Table 1.

Table 1. Dynamics of Military and Total Support to Ukraine by European Countries (2024 – First Half of 2025)

Country / Institution	2024	2025 (First Half)	Change, %
European Union (EU Institutions)	€48.9 bn	€63.2 bn	+29 %
France	€4.89 bn	€7.56 bn	+54.6 %
Belgium	€1.87 bn	€3.20 bn	+71.1 %
Sweden	€5.41 bn	€7.60 bn	+40.5 %
Finland	€2.71 bn	€3.27 bn	+20.7 %
Norway	€3.35 bn	€6.49 bn	+93.7 %
Estonia	€0.76 bn	€0.91 bn	+19.7 %
Lithuania	€1.11 bn	€1.26 bn	+13.5 %
Ireland	€0.18 bn	€0.29 bn	+61.1 %
Luxembourg	€0.27 bn	€0.29 bn	+7.4 %
Portugal	€0.23 bn	€0.30 bn	+30.4 %
Spain	€1.46 bn	€1.47 bn	+0.68 %
Austria (neutral)	€0.81 bn	€0.82 bn	+1.2 %
Iceland	€0.04 bn	€0.07 bn	+75 %
Military support of the EU and member states			~ €63.2 bn
Total support (military + economic)			~ €177.5 bn

*Source: (Slovo i Dilo, 2025; European Commission, 2024).*

As shown in Table 1, European countries have provided Ukraine with substantial military and financial support, indicating the active use of foreign policy as a tool to influence regional security and the balance of power in Europe. Specifically, Germany supplied modern artillery, air defense

systems, and financial assistance to stabilize Ukraine's economy (Embassy of Germany in Ukraine, n.d.), while France provided armored vehicles, military equipment, and actively coordinated sanctions against Russia (Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, NAS of Ukraine, 2023). Poland ensured logistical support for ammunition supplies, reception of refugees, and training of Ukrainian military personnel (Hubytskyi, L., Melnyk, H., 2024), and the Baltic countries — Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia — facilitated the integration of NATO defense standards and trained Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel (Tsentr stratehichnykh komunikatsii, 2023). Sweden and Finland provided heavy equipment, financial grants, and humanitarian aid (Holos Ameryky, 2024), while Italy and Spain supplied armored vehicles and supported the civilian population. The integration of these actions into a pan-European context demonstrates that assistance to Ukraine is not only a collective EU initiative but also the result of strategic decisions by individual member states, reinforced by public support and awareness of security risks.

Such detailed analysis allows for a clear assessment of how the foreign policy of the EU and its member states is combined with concrete practical actions to support Ukraine, forming a comprehensive system of security, diplomatic solidarity, and integration processes in the region. To provide a more visual understanding of how Europe's foreign policy shapes the new geopolitical reality and influences integration processes, it is appropriate to refer to a schematic representation of these interconnections in Figure 1. The figure illustrates how the combination of military, economic, and diplomatic support impacts regional stabilization, the balance of power, and the prospects for Ukraine's further integration into the European security and economic space.




Figure 1. Diagram of the Impact of European Countries' Foreign Policy on the Formation of a New Geopolitical Reality

*Source: compiled by the author*

As shown in Figure 1, the foreign policy of European countries, including EU member states, is aimed at strengthening regional security and supporting Ukraine in the war with the Russian Federation. Additionally, according to the Razumkov Centre, the perception of Ukraine in European countries has significantly changed since the onset of the full-scale invasion in February 2022. Public opinion surveys have shown that the majority of Europeans support providing military and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, approve of sanctions policy against Russia, and highly value Ukraine's efforts to integrate into European structures. These sociological data confirm that public support for Ukraine directly influences the foreign policy decisions of European countries and the EU, reinforcing collective actions and a consolidated strategy to counter the aggressor (see Table 2). Integrating these indicators together with Table 1 and Figure 1 provides a comprehensive picture of how political, economic, and social factors shape the new geopolitical reality in Europe.

Table 2. Attitudes of Citizens of European Countries towards Ukraine and Support for Its War Against Russia (2022, % of Respondents)

Indicator	% of Citizen Support
Support for providing military assistance to Ukraine	68 %
Support for providing humanitarian assistance to Ukraine	82 %
Approval of sanctions against Russia	74 %
Positive attitude towards Ukraine's integration into the EU	61 %
Willingness to personally support Ukraine (donations, volunteering)	45 %

*Source: (Razumkov Centre, 2022)*

Thus, the presented data highlight that Europe's foreign policy is shaped not only by state institutions and alliances but also under the influence of public opinion. High public support for Ukraine reinforces the legitimacy of decisions regarding assistance, sanctions, and integration processes, creating the prerequisites for the effective implementation of joint foreign policy by the EU and individual European countries (European Commission, 2023). Such a level of public support becomes a significant resource for state actors, who can justify their foreign policy decisions to voters and international partners. In turn, this creates a feedback mechanism: policy responds to public opinion, while public opinion reacts to policy and international dynamics. Table 3 below demonstrates specific indicators of public support in EU member states regarding assistance to Ukraine and its integration into the European Union.

Table 3. Public Support for Assistance to Ukraine and Its European Integration among Citizens of EU Member States (%)

Indicator	Percentage
Support for providing humanitarian assistance to Ukraine	89 %
Support for receiving Ukrainian refugees within the EU	84 %
Support for financial assistance to Ukraine	72 %
Support for economic sanctions against Russia	72 %
Support for granting Ukraine EU candidate status	61 %
Support for supplying Ukraine with military equipment	60 %

*Source: (European Commission, 2023/2024; European Parliament, 2024)*

Analysis of Eurobarometer data and other sociological studies demonstrates a high level of support for Ukraine among citizens of European countries. The majority of respondents approve of providing humanitarian and financial assistance, supporting refugees, imposing sanctions against Russia, and supplying military aid. Such public support creates an important foundation for implementing the joint foreign policy of the EU and individual European countries, enhancing the legitimacy of their decisions on the international stage. This confirms that public opinion is not only a social factor but also an active element in shaping the new geopolitical reality in Europe.

A comparison of contemporary support for Ukraine with other military conflicts demonstrates the evolution of Europe's foreign policy. For instance, during the conflicts in Yugoslavia in the 1990s and in Georgia in 2008, European countries acted much more cautiously, primarily limiting themselves to diplomatic initiatives and partial economic support. In the case of Syria (2011–2015), the EU's response was more comprehensive, including humanitarian aid and the reception of refugees, but without significant military supplies or large-scale sanctions.

At the same time, there has been a noticeable transformation in the rhetoric and scope of support for Ukraine from most European countries compared to the early stages of the full-scale war. Initially, the response of states was more emotional and demonstrative: countries actively supplied weapons, financial resources, and humanitarian aid, and their statements emphasized solidarity and moral support for Ukraine. Recently, despite the continued substantial assistance, the rhetoric has shifted to place greater emphasis on strategic and political priorities, while the pace and

volume of new supplies have somewhat decreased. This change is associated with economic and domestic political challenges in donor countries, as well as the need to balance support for Ukraine with national interests. This evolution demonstrates that the foreign policy of the EU and individual states remains dynamic, shaped by international obligations, public support, and domestic political circumstances. This experience helps explain why contemporary support for Ukraine is unprecedented — combining economic sanctions, extensive military and humanitarian aid, and active diplomatic efforts, thus establishing a new standard for the EU and its member states' response to external threats.

The high level of support for Ukraine among EU citizens simultaneously serves as an incentive for active engagement of states in integration and security processes. Such interaction creates a feedback loop, within which state actors adjust their foreign policy strategies according to public expectations, while citizens perceive their influence on the EU's international actions (Serhiienko, T., 2023). The comprehensive interplay of political, economic, and social factors establishes a new geopolitical reality in Europe, where solidarity with Ukraine becomes not only a moral imperative but also a key element of the region's strategic security (Optengegel, U., Andor, L., 2025).

Thus, the collective actions of the EU and individual states, combined with the active participation of civil society, contribute to strengthening international mechanisms for supporting Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The current situation confirms that contemporary European foreign policy is characterized by a high level of coordination, responsiveness, and comprehensiveness, making it an effective instrument for shaping the security balance and integration processes in the region. In addition to direct economic and military measures, the effectiveness of foreign policy largely depends on diplomatic efforts and information engagement. Shaping a positive image of Ukraine on the international stage, promoting its European integration, and coordinating actions with international organizations have become integral components of Europe's strategic influence on regional stabilization.

Thus, it can be argued that contemporary foreign policy of European countries is based on the interaction of three key components: state decisions, economic and military support, and public backing, which together create a comprehensive mechanism for shaping the security and political balance in Europe. The next logical step in the analysis is to examine the concrete outcomes of these actions in the context of integration processes and Ukraine's prospects for membership in European structures. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 significantly accelerated Ukraine's integration processes within the EU. Under the influence of the war, a number of key steps were taken: granting Ukraine candidate status for EU accession in June 2022 (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 2022), initiating the negotiation process to align legislation and standards with European norms, and intensifying bilateral and multilateral cooperation programs in the fields of security, energy, and economy. The promotion of Ukraine's integration has received additional support from the public in European countries, reinforcing the legitimacy of political decisions and stimulating the acceleration of reforms in the country. Thanks to comprehensive assistance and the consolidated efforts of the EU and its member states, Ukraine's integration process has become not only a symbolic demonstration of European solidarity but also a practical mechanism for strengthening regional security and stability. The war has acted as a catalyst for reinforcing Ukraine's ties with European institutions and has elevated the priority of its European path on the EU's agenda.

The analysis of contemporary approaches to European foreign policy and the high level of public support for Ukraine allows for outlining the key directions for the further development of regional security and integration processes. In particular, the collective stance of the EU and individual member states creates preconditions for strengthening Ukraine's integration into European economic, political, and security structures. An important factor here is not only granting candidate status for EU accession but also implementing practical cooperation mechanisms, including the alignment of defense, energy, and public finance standards with European norms. At the same time, active support for Ukraine influences the formation of a new balance of power in



Europe. The solidarity of member states and their citizens strengthens collective security mechanisms, enhances the effectiveness of sanctions policy, and contributes to regional stabilization. In this context, integration processes become not only an economic or political project but also a means of ensuring Europe's strategic security, with Ukraine serving as a key partner in countering aggression and establishing resilient international alliances. Thus, the further development of the EU's foreign policy and that of individual European countries will be directly linked to supporting Ukraine's integration, strengthening security mechanisms, and engaging civil society in the implementation of shared strategic objectives. This creates a foundation for shaping a new European agenda, in which political solidarity, economic cooperation, and public support function as interconnected elements ensuring stability and security on the continent.

**Conclusions.** The conducted research allows us to assert that the foreign policy of European countries during the period of Russia's war against Ukraine has become a decisive factor in shaping a new geopolitical reality on the continent. European states have demonstrated the capacity to consolidate efforts, reconsider security approaches, and move away from traditional policies of restraint in favor of active support for Ukraine. The unity of government positions, EU and NATO institutions, as well as strong public support for integration and security initiatives, has created preconditions for the transformation of the European political and security space. It has been revealed that contemporary European foreign policy is based on a combination of diplomatic, economic, sanctions, and humanitarian instruments aimed at strengthening regional stability and countering Russia's aggressive actions. Civil society also plays an important role, as through mechanisms of public support it enhances the legitimacy of governmental decisions and contributes to reinforcing international solidarity.

Ukraine, having become the epicenter of European security, has transformed into a key partner of the EU in the process of shaping a new architecture of international relations. The results of the research confirm that the foreign policy of European states is increasingly acquiring a strategic and systemic character, aimed at ensuring long-term stability, democratic development, and the integration of Ukraine into the European political, economic, and security space.

Regarding further scientific research, it is advisable to focus on studying the evolution of the EU's common foreign and security policy, the mechanisms of Ukraine's adaptation to European standards of defense cooperation, as well as the analysis of the influence of public opinion in European countries on the formation of political decisions in the field of international security.

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## VISUAL ANALYTICS OF ACCESSORIES AND JEWELRY IN IMAGE BUILDING (PART 2)

### ВІЗУАЛЬНА АНАЛІТИКА АКСЕСУАРІВ ТА ЮВЕЛІРНИХ ПРИКРАС У ФОРМУВАННІ ІМІДЖУ (ЧАСТИНА 2)

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**Abstract.** *The purpose of the article is to build a conceptual scheme for interpreting the color and sign-symbolic component of individual accessories and jewelry and to demonstrate this scheme using individual illustrative examples. Accessories and decorations visualize identities that are shadowed, suppressed, rejected by the cultural and social environment, which cannot, due to the circumstances of their discrepancy with the value consciousness and/or the societal unconscious, be fully internalized and openly manifested. Nevertheless, such identities do not disappear anywhere, and their manifestation in the construction of the image becomes archaic, i.e. acquires features of excess, primitiveness, brutal sharpness (polarization) or allusiveness, perversity, metaphorical hyperbolization. Anticipation of such symbolic interactions allows the use of appropriate accessories or decorations with different target settings: a) tuning and adaptive (for conscious control of impressions of the environment, including self-perception); b) provocative-activating (to evoke various emotional reactions of the environment and test its attitude to certain identities); c) imitation-simulation (to visualize non-existent identities that are internalized on the basis of imitation and in the absence of internal correspondence to the cultural, social, mental characteristics of the subject).*

**Keywords:** *visual analytics, accessories, jewelry, imagebuilding.*

**Анотація.** Метою статті є побудова концептуальної схеми інтерпретації колірної та знаково-символічної складової окремих аксесуарів та ювелірних виробів та демонстрація цієї схеми на окремих ілюстративних прикладах. Аксесуари та декорації візуалізують ідентичності, що затьмарюються, пригнічуються, відкидаються культурним та соціальним середовищем, які не можуть, через обставини їхньої невідповідності ціннісній свідомості та/або суспільному несвідомому, бути повністю інтерналізованими та відкрито проявлені. Проте, такі ідентичності нікуди не зникають, а їх прояв у побудові образу стає архаїчним, тобто набуває рис надмірності, примітивності, бруталної різкості (поляризації) або алюзивності, перверсії, метафоричної гіперболізації. Передбачення таких символічних взаємодій дозволяє використовувати відповідні аксесуари чи декорації з різними цільовими установками: а) налаштовуваними та адаптивними (для свідомого контролю вражень від оточення, включаючи самосприйняття); б) провокаційно-

активуючими (для викликання різних емоційних реакцій оточення та перевірки його ставлення до певних ідентичностей); в) імітаційно-симуляційними (для візуалізації неіснуючих ідентичностей, що інтерналізуються на основі наслідування та за відсутності внутрішньої відповідності культурним, соціальним, ментальним характеристикам суб'єкта).

**Ключові слова:** візуальна аналітика, аксесуари, ювелірні вироби, іміджбілдінг.

**Introduction.** This article is a continuation of the first part of the article with the same name, published in the collection "Actual Problems of International Relations". In it, the author continues the visual-analytical study of accessories that are worn on the neck, hands and belt.

**The purpose of the article** is to build a conceptual scheme for interpreting the color and sign-symbolic component of individual accessories and jewelry and to demonstrate this scheme using individual illustrative examples.

**Literature review.** In building a conceptual scheme for analyzing accessories and jewelry, the author relies on the synthesis of several theories presented in a number of collective monographs. This synthesis allows us to apply classical structural functionalism and (neo)functionalism of T. Parsons and N. Luhmann, structuralist semiotics of R. Barthes and W. Eco, symbolic interactionism of J.-G. Mead, orthodox psychoanalysis of Z. Freud and archetypal psychology (Jungian psychoanalysis) of K.-G. Jung. This tetrad of theories allows, firstly, to define the highest cultural and social identities that correspond with social characters and control the habitualization of the latter in the visual images of accessories and decorations (structural functionalism and neofunctionalism). Secondly, to determine the structures of the formation of non-verbal messages derived from identities and visualizing the latter through certain compositions of accessories and decorations (symbolic interactionism). Thirdly, to implement an analytical decomposition of the unconscious meanings and significances of the individual and social-group level presented in visual images (orthodox psychoanalysis and analytical psychology) (Blumer, 1969; Goffman, 1956; Eco, 1976; Freud, 1914; Gage, 1993, 175-193; Jewitt & Van Leeuwen, 2010; Jung, 1960; Knox, 2001, 613-635; Kress, & Van Leeuwen, 1996; Ledin, & Machin, 2018; Lowen, 1958; Leong & Clark, 2003, 48-58; Luhmann, 2002; Mead, 1932, 1-31; Parsons, 1966). The reference and empirical sources for the author of the article are a part of scientific articles devoted to accessories and tattoos of cultural, social and sociological, semiotic content, including articles and monographs previously published by the author (Романенко, Яковенко, 2008; Романенко, Яковенко, Огаренко, 2009; Романенко Скідін, 2011; Романенко, Святненко, Зінченко, 2014; Етнічні ідентичності, 2015; Этническая идентичность, 2016; Романенко, 2017; Романенко, 2019) as well as publicistic posts and articles in the public domain. In this part of the article, the author will continue the study of accessories and jewelry that both politicians and ordinary people wear both on themselves and with them.

**The main results of the study.** An important place among the accessories that people wear is occupied by various "neck pendants" (necklaces, necklaces, chains), bracelets, rings and signet rings. "Neck pendants" can also include a group of objects that have a hybrid affiliation, since they belong both to accessories and to items of clothing. It hardly makes sense to go into a discussion about whether scarves, shawls, neckerchiefs belong to accessories or to items of clothing or jewelry. Here everything depends on both their functional and aesthetic purpose. However, both the first and the second have little effect on their semantics and correspondence to certain sectors of cultural, social and mental semiotics. In the structure of the psyche, revised by the author of this article on the basis of orthodox and Jungian psychoanalysis, the constant "building block" is, as is known, censorship (Super-Ego). Freud defines this building block as "parental images", "conscience", i.e. in terms of social morality and internalized cultural control of personal origin. The author of this article prefers to consider censorship as a unity of centering, verticalizing and horizontalizing-materializing sublevels.

In other words, censorship has a higher, centering sublevel, on which the centralizer, mission and set of identities are located; a middle sublevel, on which the worldview (image of the world), direction, hierarchy of values and the corresponding status-role hierarchy are located (as a rule, its fragment in the form of an implicit social-status niche, also called *habitus*); a lower sublevel, on which the character, dispositional-behavioral repertoires (character scripts) and norms as patterns of behavior are located. In the considered body scheme of A. Lowen, all accessories and decorations located in the neck and shoulder area are topologically correlated with the sectors of middle and lower censorship.

In the logic of our research, "neck pendants" (necklaces, necklaces, chains), scarves, shawls, neckerchiefs act as markers of the shadow components of middle censorship, i.e. unmanifested, unrealized, peripheralized contents (cultural, social, mental) of worldview, orientation, hierarchy of values, fragments of status-role hierarchies. In the shadow of the image of the world (worldview) there are usually centering contents that can be concealed, not realized, remain undeveloped (archaic) or cut off at the exit by one or another defense.

In any case, the shadow image of the world expresses itself in a roundabout way, visualizing in the color, material-physical and symbolic-geometric features of accessories and tattoos. The same applies to the direction and hierarchy of values. Since the direction as a structure of average censorship depends on the image of the world as a cartography of reality, accessories and decorations visualize it as a desired but unrealized vector of the subject's movement and the sequence of this movement in time.

Considering that sets of identities "rise" above the worldview, direction and hierarchy of values, fragments of status-role hierarchies, unrealized identities emerge from the shadow of the unconscious, striving to integrate into consciousness and internalize at the level of censorship. But, being suppressed, peripheralized, archaized, they are rejected, distorted, repressed by society and culture.

*Illustrative example 1. A middle-aged woman wears a silver chain around her neck with a pendant in the form of a circle on which is a relief image of the sun. Both the material (silver) and the geometric composition (the sun in a circle) are subject to analytical study. The semantic field of the sun as a symbol contains a wide range of meanings associated primarily with the highest manifestations of spirituality (rational thinking as a function of consciousness), since solarly corresponds to manifestations of spiritual perfection and the image of the world in which, most likely, the subject experiences a state of deficiency of his own spirituality. Deficiency of spirituality presupposes the shadowing (non-realization) of higher value identities, which marks both the corresponding interest of a woman in the higher spheres of value consciousness (religion, philosophy, art), and the deficiency or absence of its realization. The corresponding focus is also "knocked down", which means that the cultural environment necessary for the realization of interest is missing, as well as the time needed for the corresponding activities. The thinking function is generally shadowed, since the preference for silver as a gray metal correlates with maturity/rationality. The analytical hypotheses described above can be verified or falsified through the analysis of visual features at other levels of identification or using other diagnostic technologies (test or experimental).*

*Illustrative example 2. One of Kanye West's favorite pendants is a pendant with a sparkling image of Jesus Christ. The image of Christ on the pendant itself does not look as ascetic as usual, but demonstratively theatrical. In other jewelry – gold and silver chains – one can see the disaggregation and massiveness. Analytical hypotheses may concern, firstly, the declared Christian worldview, orientation and hierarchy of values, which for West are most likely simply part of a public image, but not an internalized faith. This circumstance refers to a partially, rather than fully, internalized, and therefore demonstrative Christian identity.*

*In keeping with the religious subtext of the song "Jesus Walks", the action of the first video takes place mainly in a church. Scenes of a cheerful choir and Mr. West dressed as a preacher are combined with images of urban decay: cracked sidewalks, abandoned buildings, oppressed city*

dwellers. "God, show me the way, 'cause the devil is trying to break me," Mr. West raps, standing behind the pulpit.

Later in the song, he rhymes: "I'm not here to argue about his features/Or to convert atheists to believers. / I'm just trying to say that school needs teachers / Like Kathie Lee needed Regis / So y'all need Jesus." By the end of the video, sinners (a prostitute, a drug dealer, and a drunk) seeking repentance find their way back to the house of the Lord.

Mr. West refused to call himself religious. "Religion just means you do something over and over again," he said. "I will say that I'm spiritual. I accepted Jesus as my Savior. And I will say that I fail every day." (*A Trinity of Videos for One Religious Rap*).

Secondly, the massive gold and silver chains, attracting attention with their size, indicate the unformedness rather than the formation of the average censorship, that is, the obscurity rather than the clarity for the subject himself of the image of the world, the direction and the hierarchy of values.

Bracelets, rings and signet rings mark the shadow features of the contact zone, i.e. the communicative style and/or communicative dispositions. Accordingly, the installation on not-wearing jewelry in the corresponding zone indicates the absence of the need to complete the sphere of communication with certain features. In most cases, the shadowed components of the communicative style or communicative dispositions are manifested in accentuated emotions or affective complexes found in public communication. When analyzing the corresponding jewelry, it is necessary to take into account the material of manufacture, geometric shapes and visual symbols, as well as the fingers on which the jewelry is worn.

*Illustrative example 3. Valentina Matvienko prefers rings with blue and white inserts of pearls and precious stones, which is clearly visible in the selection of photographs. Abstracting from the semiotics of stones and focusing on color semantics, we can put forward an analytical hypothesis about the shadowing of the politician's identities of the value level and, in part, the function of theoretical thinking. The above may manifest itself in the form of a tendency to withdraw/distance from communication related to value or theoretical topics, for example, religion, ideology, philosophy, etc. It is clear that we are not simply talking about avoiding the relevant topics, but also about emotional reactions that indicate rejection rather than acceptance of value or abstract-theoretical subjects of communication. In such cases, we may be talking about confusion, irritation, doubt, etc. The above corresponds more to the lack of formation than to the formation of the corresponding value identities (religious, philosophical, ideological). The lack of formation itself is transmitted through the deliberate disaggregation of decorations, which further emphasizes the unconscious desire to increase and strengthen the visual visibility of their significance. (Женщина в политике и в моде).*

Taking into account geometric shapes and visual symbols, it is possible not only to refine analytical hypotheses on the subject of shadowed/peripheralized qualities of communicative style, but also to designate certain requests for the image of the mirror self, as well as to clarify communicative dispositions.

*Illustrative example 4. Male politician A wears a silver ring with the inscription veni vidi vici (I came, I saw, I conquered). Since this expression is attributed to Julius Caesar in connection with the event of a quick victory near the city of Zile over Pharnaces, the king of the Bosporan Kingdom, and the expression itself is associated with achieving quick victories, the analytical hypothesis will concern the shadow (underdeveloped) predisposition to quick and effective communications. The above may concern a number of accentuated behavioral patterns. Firstly, various communicative procrastinations, secondly, the features of the communicative style (slow speech, absent-mindedness, weak reactivity, etc.), thirdly, the inability to withstand communication at a high level of pace and intensity, for example, with several communication partners, etc. Illustrative example 5. Male politician B. wears a silver ring with a geometric composition in the form of vertical straight lines. The emphasis on directness and verticality indicates, in the logic of contradiction, a deficit (non-manifestation or weak manifestation) of these qualities in the communicative style and/or the shadowing of the communicative disposition*

*towards directness, spontaneity, openness, transparency, honesty, etc. Most likely, we are talking about either cultural and social repression of such qualities by the environment, which can manifest itself in cultural and social expectations of polite hypocrisy and a preference for restraint, hints, resort to indirect communication, secrecy, opacity, and, in general, mendacity. Hypotheses may also concern the subject's use of defensive honesty strategies, which may be an indicator of an obsessive-compulsive or paranoid nature. In this case, directness can be realized in picky meticulousness, attention to detail, suspiciousness and irritability, intolerance of concealment, and sometimes pathological suspiciousness.*

It is worth paying attention to the fact that in comparison of two types of jewelry - worn on the fingers and on the wrists (if we are talking about bracelets), the shadowed cultural, social and mental features of the communicative style and communicative dispositions that correspond to the visual features of jewelry on the fingers are usually more pronounced than those that correspond to jewelry on the wrists. Semiotically, bracelets and/or pendants on the wrists correspond to greater shadowing, peripheralization, archaization and marginalization of certain cultural, social, mental features.

*Illustrative example 6. A middle-aged female politician wears a snake-shaped bracelet made of copper on her right hand. Analytical hypotheses can be put forward, firstly, in connection with the material of which the bracelet is made (copper), and secondly, in connection with the semantics of the visual image of the snake. Copper as a material is a metal predisposed to oxidation. The oxidation process itself can culturally, socially and mentally correspond to a predisposition to instability, which is shadowed, marginalized and peripheralized in the psyche of the female politician. This hypothesis is supplemented by a second hypothesis related to the semantics of the snake symbol. If we abstract from a number of religious, cultural and ethno-specific meanings of the symbol itself, paying attention to the ethology of snakes, then their most pronounced qualities are flexibility, plasticity, elusiveness, mobility, as well as the "cunning" and dangerous toxicity attributed to snakes by everyday consciousness and common sense.*

*In the communicative style of a female politician, the described qualities may either not be expressed, or expressed weakly, or impulsively and excessively, which corresponds to the manifestations of the shadow. This is due to the fact that all shadowed mental functions, processes or features manifest themselves archaically, that is, brutally, excessively, affectively-impulsively and / or distorted, inverted. This is due both to their lack of development (lack of culture, unsocialized), and to their instinctiveness, which in its pure form is overloading and, rather, unacceptable than accepted. Illustrative example 7. The head of the OP of Ukraine Andriy Yermak wears a rosary on his left hand, consisting of alternating rows of brown (made of wood), blueberry (dark blue), light blue and green colors. The rosary in the cultural and religious sense is associated with ritual-compulsive semantics, their intended purpose is to maintain self-discipline and concentration. When wearing jewelry, the attention and volitional qualities (direction, concentration) are most likely shadowed and archaic. Hypothetically, the emotions opposite to thinking and will*

*Such a hypothesis can also be verified by the color features of the rosary, in which two rows of brown color, marking bodily-organic sensations, are located closer to the wrist than the row of blueberry (dark blue), light blue and green colors. The most developed of the functions is the function of organic sensations of the vital-material spectrum. We are talking about sensations associated with physiological, social, material needs, to which the disciplinary-volitional and thought processes located further from the comma are subordinated. The corresponding functions (will and thinking) are to a greater extent archaic in comparison with sensations (Ермак засветил любимое украшение турецких мачо).*

The belt area contains accessories such as belts. Their visual-symbolic and textural features can be informative for understanding gender and/or sexual identities and the associated features of psychosexual censorship. In the context of this study, the author interprets gender identity as a set of internalized ideas about masculinity and femininity as basic groups of polar cultural, social and mental features and their derivative combinations. Gender identity is much

more complex in content than any instinctual dichotomies due to its combinatorial nature and complexity. Nevertheless, basic gender identities (masculine and feminine) are derived from primary-primitive (instinctive) features associated with active-intrusive and aggressive-initiating or passive-adaptive and executive-receiving features of the instinctual sphere. Boundary formation, as well as the violation of boundaries in the cultural, social and psychological sense, is related to masculinity. Since masculinity in the most general sense is derived from the formation of boundaries in space (both mental and physical), masculine subjects are predisposed not only to form their own boundaries, but also to test the strength of the boundaries of other subjects, allowing for natural transgressions. Feminine subjects allow for the diffusion (blurring) of their own boundaries in relation to the space they occupy, which allows for both the assumption of violations of such boundaries from the outside and the instability of the latter. Both the texture and color characteristics, as well as the figurative and symbolic components of the "body" of the belt and buckle, have analytical significance for putting forward hypotheses.

*Illustrative example 8. A male MP wears a cummerbund with a business suit as a permanent accessory when attending parliamentary sessions. When putting forward hypotheses, it is necessary to take into account the cultural context of the origin of the cummerbund and its reception as an accessory among representatives of the financial and political elites of Europe and America. In particular, this concerns, firstly, the peculiarities of gender and/or sexual identities and the associated peculiarities of censorship of the psychosexual sphere in Hinduism.*

*We are talking, on the one hand, about a despotic quasi-patriarchy, on the one hand, and the blurring of the boundaries between male and female in the sexual sphere, on the other hand. The corresponding references may not necessarily be a subject for independent familiarization for a male MP, as well as a basis for the formation of censorship of his psychosexual sphere.*

*The cummerbund as an accessory could become an image for borrowing when attending public events with high-status speakers. Thus, the second hypothesis may concern the deputy's unconscious imitation of representatives of elite groups, whose image is built using such an accessory. Adjustment to their social identities and the creation of a visual simulacrum of belonging to the top segment of business and politics is motivated by the discrepancy between real belonging to the designated circles and the claims of such belonging. At the same time, the implicit visual meanings of the accessory itself, associated with gender and psychosexual identities, still become part of both the expression and self-programming of the psyche and image-building. The pronounced softness of the cummerbund texture indicates the blurring of the boundaries between male and female, and therefore gives grounds for putting forward hypotheses about gender and/or psychosexual splits/diffusions, diagnostically corresponding to bisexuality/androgyny and/or gender egalitarianism (ideology of equality) in the sphere of gender consciousness. The corresponding identities in the analyzed example can be suppressed (shadowed).*

**Conclusions.** Accessories and decorations visualize identities that are shadowed, suppressed, rejected by the cultural and social environment, which cannot, due to the circumstances of their discrepancy with the value consciousness and/or the societal unconscious, be fully internalized and openly manifested. Nevertheless, such identities do not disappear anywhere, and their manifestation in the construction of the image becomes archaic, i.e. acquires features of excess, primitiveness, brutal sharpness (polarization) or allusiveness, perversity, metaphorical hyperbolization. Accessories and decorations can correspond to both simulated and real identities, but their connection with unrealized meanings and the cultural, social, mental potentials behind them is more likely. In political image building, some accessories are used conventionally, that is, taking into account cultural and social expectations, while others visualize the subjective and mental characteristics of politicians. In both aspects, the use of accessories represents a symbolic interaction with the environment, which consciously or unconsciously reads shadowed identities and responds to them by forming conscious and/or unconscious reactions. Anticipation of such symbolic interactions allows the use of appropriate accessories or decorations with different target settings: a) tuning and adaptive (for conscious control of impressions of the



environment, including self-perception); b) provocative-activating (to evoke various emotional reactions of the environment and test its attitude to certain identities); c) imitation-simulation (to visualize non-existent identities that are internalized on the basis of imitation and in the absence of internal correspondence to the cultural, social, mental characteristics of the subject).

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## ФАКТОРИ ЕФЕКТИВНОСТІ ІНОЗЕМНОЇ ДОПОМОГИ У ПРОЦЕСАХ ДЕМОКРАТИЗАЦІЇ: МОТИВАЦІЯ ДОНОРІВ ТА ПІДХОДИ ДО НАДАННЯ ДОПОМОГИ

## FACTORS OF FOREIGN AID EFFECTIVENESS IN DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESSES: DONOR MOTIVATION AND APPROACHES TO AID PROVISION

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**Abstract.** *The article provides a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of external assistance in promoting democratization processes, taking into account donor motivations, their ideological orientations, and the characteristics of recipient countries. It reveals how normative, strategic, and economic factors shape donor behavior and determine their approaches to providing aid. Two dominant approaches to supporting democracy are identified: the “political” approach, focused on the development of civil society, independent media, and transparent electoral processes, and the “developmental” approach, which emphasizes strengthening state institutions, transparency, accountability, and the rule of law, reflected in the concept of good governance. The study shows that the first approach produces notable effects in the electoral and participatory spheres, whereas the second contributes to enhancing institutional capacity. The analysis demonstrates that external assistance is least effective in strengthening the rule of law, judicial independence, and oversight of the executive branch due to resistance from political elites, for whom institutional constraints pose a direct threat to maintaining power and access to resources.*

**Keywords:** *Foreign aid, democratization, donor motivation, democracy assistance, aid effectiveness, political conditionality, good governance, civil society.*

**Анотація.** *У статті здійснено комплексний аналіз ефективності зовнішньої допомоги у сприянні процесам демократизації з урахуванням мотивацій донорів, їхніх ідеологічних орієнтацій та характеристик країн-отримувачів. Розкрито, як нормативні,*

*стратегічні та економічні чинники визначають поведінку донорів і формують підходи до надання допомоги. Виокремлено два домінуючі підходи до підтримки демократії: «політичний», зорієнтований на розвиток громадянського суспільства, незалежних медіа та прозорих виборчих процесів, і «розвитковий», що фокусується на зміцненні державних інститутів, прозорості, підзвітності та верховенстві права, що позначається концепцією належного врядування. Показано, що перший підхід має відчутні ефекти у виборчій і партисипативній сферах, тоді як другий сприяє підвищенню інституційної спроможності. Аналіз показав, що зовнішня допомога найменш ефективна у зміцненні верховенства права, незалежності судів і контролю над виконавчою владою через опір політичних еліт, для яких інституційні обмеження становлять безпосередню загрозу збереженню влади та доступу до ресурсів.*

**Ключові слова.** *Іноземна допомога, демократизація, мотивація донорів, допомога демократії, ефективність допомоги, політична обумовленість, належне врядування, громадянське суспільство.*

**Introduction.** The paradox of contemporary international development is striking: while resources allocated to democracy assistance have increased substantially - from \$4.1 billion in 2002 to \$16.3 billion in 2019 - global democracy indicators demonstrate opposite trends (*OECD DAC*). The V-Dem Institute documented that by 2020, 68% of the world's population lived in autocracies, and the level of democracy enjoyed by the average global citizen in 2022 had declined to 1986 levels, erasing over 35 years of democratic gains. This contradiction raises fundamental questions about the effectiveness of foreign aid as an instrument of democratization and the factors that determine its success or failure.

The relationship between foreign aid and democracy has been extensively debated in academic literature, with scholars offering divergent assessments. Some argue that aid can serve as an effective catalyst for democratic transitions by providing resources and expertise to reform-minded actors. Others contend that aid may undermine democracy by reducing government accountability to citizens, strengthening authoritarian regimes, or serving primarily as an instrument of donor foreign policy rather than genuine democracy promotion. This theoretical disagreement reflects the complexity of the aid-democracy relationship and suggests that effectiveness may be highly contextual.

This article addresses a critical gap in existing research by systematically analyzing how donor motivations and approaches to aid provision influence democratization outcomes. While previous studies have examined either donor motivations or aid effectiveness separately, few have explored their interaction and its implications for democracy promotion strategies. The research question guiding this analysis is: under what conditions and through what mechanisms does foreign aid contribute to democratization, and how do donor characteristics - particularly their motivations and ideological approaches - shape these outcomes?

The article proceeds in four sections. First, it examines the spectrum of donor motivations, from normative commitments to geopolitical and economic interests, analyzing how these shape aid allocation patterns. Second, it explores contrasting approaches to democracy assistance and their relationship to donor ideology. Finally, it discusses the challenges of using aid to promote good governance in recipient countries.

**Literature review.** The issue of foreign aid and democratization has attracted significant scholarly attention since the end of the Cold War, when democracy promotion became a central component of development assistance. Early optimism was reflected in the works of Thomas Carothers, who in his book “Aiding Democracy Abroad” (1999) argued that foreign assistance could effectively support democratic transitions. However, later research presented a more complex picture, emphasizing that aid’s impact on democratization is far from uniform.

Theoretical frameworks explaining aid effectiveness have developed within broader democratization theories. Scholars such as Seymour Martin Lipset and Adam Przeworski

highlighted the structural dimension of democratization, rooted in modernization theory. They argued that economic development - often facilitated by foreign aid - creates social conditions favorable to democracy, including the rise of educated middle classes and pluralistic societies. In contrast, institutional theorists like Staffan Lindberg emphasized the role of aid in strengthening formal democratic institutions - parliaments, electoral systems, judiciaries, and civil society organizations - thereby fostering sustainable democratization. From another perspective, Terry Karl and other proponents of agent-oriented theories focused on how aid empowers domestic reformers and pro-democratic actors who drive political change.

Empirical studies have yielded mixed results. The large-scale analysis conducted by Steven Finkel and colleagues (2007) demonstrated that targeted U.S. democracy assistance produced measurable positive effects on democratic indicators such as Freedom House and Polity scores during 1990-2003. However, meta-analytical studies by Zakir Askarov and Hristos Doucouliagos (2013) revealed that, across broader samples, the average effect of aid on democracy was close to zero or even negative. Later researchers, including Sam Jones and Finn Tarp (2016), suggested that these discrepancies stem from variations in donor types, aid modalities, recipient contexts, and the specific time periods examined.

A crucial insight from contemporary literature is the role of donor motivations. According to Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, foreign aid allocation reflects not only humanitarian or developmental intentions but also donors' geopolitical and commercial interests. Similarly, Anke Hoefler and Veronica Outram emphasized that these overlapping motives lead to what scholars describe as "selectivity problems," when aid flows to strategically important countries regardless of their governance quality. Eric Neumayer demonstrated that such practices undermine the credibility and effectiveness of democracy conditionality, as they erode the link between aid and political reform.

Differences between donor approaches have also been widely discussed. Thomas Carothers, in his later work (2009), distinguished between "political" and "developmental" approaches to democracy assistance. The political approach prioritizes rapid political change through support for elections and civil society, while the developmental approach focuses on gradual institutional reform and state-building. Building on this, Milja Kurki (2013) argued that these contrasting strategies reflect deeper ideological divides regarding the relationship between democracy and development.

Despite the substantial scholarly attention devoted to the topic, significant research gaps remain. First, as several authors note, there is still limited understanding of how the interaction between donor motivations and recipient characteristics shapes democratization outcomes. Second, little attention has been paid to how donors' ideological orientations affect not only aid allocation but also implementation strategies and their long-term effectiveness.

**The purpose** of this article is to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of foreign aid in promoting democratization, with particular attention to how donor motivations, ideological orientations, and recipient country characteristics shape aid allocation patterns and outcomes. The study seeks to identify the mechanisms through which different donor approaches affect various dimensions of democracy, and to determine the key factors that enhance or constrain the transformative potential of foreign aid within contemporary global conditions of democratic backsliding.

**Main results of research.** The relationship between foreign aid and democratization emerges from a complex interplay of donor motivations, ideological approaches, and recipient country characteristics. To understand why democracy assistance produces such varying results across different contexts - and why, despite substantially increased resources, global democratic indicators continue to decline - requires examining how these factors interact and shape both the allocation and impact of aid.

Donor motivations represent far more than a technical question of resource allocation - they reveal the often contradictory purposes that democracy assistance serves in international relations. While donors rhetorically emphasize democracy and human rights as guiding principles, the

actual patterns of aid distribution tell a more complicated story. Geopolitical and security interests frequently override democratic objectives, creating a fundamental tension between stated principles and operational reality. This contradiction matters profoundly because it undermines the credibility of conditionality and weakens the link between aid flows and genuine political reform. When recipients observe that strategically important countries receive substantial aid regardless of their democratic performance, while less strategically valuable countries face strict conditions, the message is clear: democracy matters less than geopolitical alignment.

The empirical evidence for this pattern is overwhelming and appears across multiple dimensions of aid allocation. Countries receive substantially more aid when they serve on the UN Security Council - a finding that strongly suggests donors use aid to “buy votes” in international forums (*Dreher et al., 2009*). The effect is not subtle: countries receive 59% more US aid during their tenure on the Security Council, and this increase concentrates specifically on countries that vote with the US (*Kuziemko & Werker, 2006*). Former colonial relationships continue to predict current aid flows decades after independence, indicating that historical ties shape contemporary assistance patterns independently of need or merit. Military alliances and voting alignment in the UN General Assembly similarly correlate positively with aid receipts. These patterns reveal that aid serves multiple purposes simultaneously - as a foreign policy tool for maintaining influence, as a development instrument for reducing poverty, and as a means of rewarding political alignment. The challenge for democracy promotion is that these purposes often conflict, and when they do, strategic considerations typically prevail.

Regional disparities in aid allocation make this dynamic starkly visible. In the Middle East and North Africa, the US allocated \$7.7 billion to security assistance but only \$250 million to democracy programs in fiscal year 2024 - a ratio of 30:1 that speaks volumes about actual priorities (*Middle East Democracy Center, 2024*). No other region received more than 41% of its funding devoted to security assistance, highlighting how strategic interests in this particular region overwhelm democracy promotion objectives. Egypt provides perhaps the clearest illustration: the country continues receiving \$1.3 billion in annual military aid despite persistent human rights violations and authoritarian governance, because its strategic importance - maintaining peace with Israel, controlling the Suez Canal, cooperating on counterterrorism - trumps democratic concerns (*U.S. Department of State, 2024*). When confronted with this contradiction, policymakers typically acknowledge it but argue that maintaining strategic relationships serves broader stability objectives. The result, however, is that democracy conditionality loses credibility when applied selectively.

At the same time, it would be inaccurate to suggest that donor motivations are purely cynical or strategic. Economic development and poverty reduction genuinely influence aid allocation, and donors generally provide more aid to poorer countries. However, even this ostensibly needs-based allocation falls far short of optimal distribution. Aid could lift nearly twice as many people out of poverty if distributed purely according to need (*Collier & Dollar, 2002*), suggesting that other factors substantially dilute the poverty-reduction focus. Multilateral donors demonstrate stronger commitment to poverty-focused allocation than bilateral donors, likely because they face less pressure to serve national strategic interests. Within bilateral donors, significant variation exists - Scandinavian countries allocate aid more consistently according to need and governance quality, while major powers like the US, France, and China show stronger strategic influences.

The question of merit-based allocation - rewarding good governance and democratic progress - emerged prominently after the Cold War as donors sought to distance themselves from the cynical realpolitik of the previous era. The principle that aid should flow preferentially to countries demonstrating commitment to democracy and good governance gained widespread rhetorical acceptance. Implementation, however, remains inconsistent and selective. Donors increasingly provide more aid to countries with better policies and institutions (*Dollar & Pritchett, 1998*), suggesting some genuine shift toward merit-based allocation. Yet the picture regarding human rights reveals persistent ambiguities. Most donors consider civil-political rights when

selecting which countries receive aid, but they pay little attention to personal integrity rights like freedom from torture and extrajudicial killing. More troublingly, many donors actually provide more aid to countries with poor human rights records after the initial selection stage (*Neumayer, 2003*), suggesting that strategic considerations override human rights concerns once the decision to engage has been made. Germany stands out as showing more consistent responsiveness to human rights across all allocation stages than other major donors, indicating that domestic political culture influences how donors balance competing objectives.

Corruption control presents similarly mixed patterns. Scandinavian donors reward better corruption control with increased aid, reflecting their domestic political cultures that place high value on transparency and accountability. Other donors show weaker or inconsistent responses to corruption. Interestingly, less corrupt donors respond more sensitively to corruption in recipient countries, suggesting that donor domestic governance norms influence aid allocation behavior. However, interpreting these correlations requires caution. Some of the relationship between aid and weak governance may reflect strategic decisions to engage with “fragile states” despite their governance challenges, using alternative channels like NGOs to bypass corrupt governments (*Dietrich, 2013*). Donors face a genuine dilemma: should they withhold aid from the most poorly governed countries, punishing populations for their governments' failures, or should they engage despite governance challenges, accepting the risks of corruption and diversion? Different donors resolve this dilemma differently based on their institutional mandates, domestic political pressures, and philosophical orientations.

Commercial interests add another layer of complexity to aid allocation. All major donors provide more aid to their trade partners, and bilateral trade volumes correlate with aid flows for the US, China, and DAC donors collectively. This pattern reflects both benign and self-interested dynamics. On one hand, countries naturally develop closer relationships with their trading partners, gaining better information about their circumstances and stronger diplomatic ties that facilitate aid cooperation. On the other hand, donors clearly use aid strategically to strengthen economic relationships, open markets, and support their own commercial interests. The line between development cooperation and commercial diplomacy often blurs, particularly for emerging donors like China whose aid programs explicitly aim to facilitate access to resources and markets.

These allocation patterns have profound implications for aid effectiveness that extend beyond simple questions of resource adequacy. Who gives aid matters as much as how much they give. Aid from democratic donors appears more effective at promoting democracy than aid from authoritarian donors, likely because democratic donors bring expertise grounded in their own democratic experiences and genuinely seek democratic outcomes rather than authoritarian stability. Aid delivered through multilateral channels shows stronger effects than bilateral aid, probably because multilateral institutions face less pressure to serve narrow national interests and can maintain more consistent merit-based allocation. Aid targeted to specific sectors with clear objectives produces better results than general budget support, which can be diverted to non-reform purposes or strengthen government without improving governance. These findings suggest that debates about aid effectiveness must consider not only quantity but also the quality, credibility, and consistency of aid delivery.

The divergence between what can be termed “political” and “developmental” approaches to democracy assistance reflects deeper ideological differences about democracy's relationship to economic development and the proper role of the state. These are not merely technical disagreements about implementation modalities - they represent fundamentally different theories of how democratization occurs and what external actors can most effectively support. Understanding these ideological foundations illuminates why different donors adopt such different strategies and why they often talk past each other in debates about effectiveness.

The political approach, predominantly associated with US democracy assistance, emerged from neoliberal political economy thinking that gained ascendancy during the Reagan era and shaped post-Cold War democracy promotion. This approach views economic and political

freedom as mutually reinforcing and prerequisite to development. Markets work best when political systems are pluralistic and competitive; democracy flourishes when economic power is dispersed through market competition rather than concentrated in state hands. This ideological orientation emphasizes bottom-up democratization through support for civil society, independent media, competitive elections, and political parties. The underlying theory of change assumes that empowering democratic actors and creating competitive political institutions will catalyze broader systemic transformation. Once civil society organizations gain strength, media becomes independent, and electoral competition becomes genuine, authoritarian regimes face mounting pressure to liberalize or risk being swept away by democratic mobilization.

Reagan articulated this vision clearly at his 1982 Westminster speech launching the National Endowment for Democracy: “History teaches us about the danger of government that overreaches: political control that takes precedence over free economic growth, the secret police, the cumbersome bureaucracy - all stifle individual talents and personal freedom.” This worldview treats government power as inherently suspect and sees democracy emerging from limiting state authority while expanding space for autonomous social and economic actors. The state is not the solution to underdevelopment but often its primary cause; therefore, democratization requires strengthening society vis-à-vis the state rather than building state capacity per se.

This ideological orientation translated into specific organizational structures that embody its core assumptions. The US created NED as a separate institution from USAID specifically for democracy promotion, designed to work “from the bottom up through grants” and respond to “local needs.” NED operates with far greater flexibility than USAID, providing grants directly to civil society organizations without requiring host government approval - a crucial feature that allows it to support opposition movements and independent actors whom governments oppose. This institutional design embodies the belief that political change requires engaging with political actors and processes directly, supporting those who challenge incumbent power rather than working primarily through official channels to improve governance incrementally.

The developmental approach, more closely associated with European donors, maintains a statist political economy orientation that emphasizes the state's central role in socioeconomic development. This perspective has deep roots in European state-building experiences where effective, capable states preceded democratization. Democracy, in this view, emerges from gradual institutional development and socioeconomic transformation rather than rapid political change driven by civil society mobilization. Without capable state institutions that can deliver public goods, maintain order, and implement policy effectively, democratic forms may become mere facades masking chaos or predatory rule. The approach therefore focuses on building state capacity, improving governance quality, strengthening rule of law, and supporting long-term institutional reforms across multiple sectors. It is less willing to bypass governments and more oriented toward working through official channels and international organizations, reflecting both practical considerations about sustainability and normative commitments to strengthening rather than undermining state authority.

This represents a fundamentally different theory of how democratization occurs and what external actors can most effectively support. Rather than empowering opposition actors to challenge incumbent governments, the developmental approach seeks to transform state institutions themselves, making them more capable, accountable, and responsive. The assumption is that better-functioning states gradually become more democratic as educated middle classes expand, economic development creates stakeholders in stability, and improved institutions make governance more predictable and less personalistic. Democracy emerges as a byproduct of successful development rather than as its precondition. This approach worries that premature political liberalization without adequate institutional capacity may produce instability, state collapse, or populist authoritarianism rather than sustainable democracy.

These ideological differences shaped not only rhetoric but concrete programming priorities in ways that can be empirically documented. Democracy aid allocation between 2014-2020 reveals striking divergences reflecting these different approaches. Neoliberal donors like the US



and Sweden allocated substantially higher proportions of their aid to civil society support and electoral processes - precisely the areas the political approach emphasizes. Sweden directed 80% of its democracy assistance to civil society and human rights in 2015, exemplifying the political approach's commitment to strengthening autonomous social actors (*Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 2016*). Meanwhile, statist donors like Japan and Germany focused more on governance capacity and public administration reform - the institutional development the developmental approach prioritizes. Japan allocated less than 5% of foreign aid to democracy support, with most going to infrastructure and institutional capacity building (*Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2018*). These allocation patterns are not random or arbitrary - they reflect coherent but competing visions of how democratization occurs.

The relationship between donor ideology and aid modality reinforces these distinctions in ways that affect how aid functions on the ground. Neoliberal donors progressively reduced their bilateral aid agency staff and increasingly channel aid through NGOs and private contractors, reflecting beliefs about limited government and private sector efficiency. This shift means that implementation increasingly occurs through organizations outside the donor government bureaucracy, selected through competitive processes and managed through contracts emphasizing measurable results. Statist donors maintained larger bilateral agency staffs capable of direct implementation and developed closer working relationships with recipient governments. These operational choices are not merely technical - they embody different assumptions about the proper role of the state and the mechanisms through which democracy develops. Channeling aid through NGOs allows supporting actors governments oppose but reduces coordination with government development plans. Working through government strengthens state capacity but may bolster authoritarian incumbents.

The crucial question is whether these different approaches produce different results, and the evidence suggests they do - though perhaps not in the ways their proponents expect. Aid from neoliberal donors shows stronger positive correlation with participatory and electoral democracy indicators, reflecting their focus on civil society and electoral processes. When US or Swedish aid supports civil society organizations, independent media, and election monitoring, measurable improvements in citizen participation and electoral quality often follow. Aid from developmental approach donors shows stronger, though still limited, effects on governance quality and public administration effectiveness. German or Japanese aid that supports institutional reform, civil service training, and administrative systems can improve bureaucratic performance and policy implementation capacity. However - and this is perhaps the most important finding - neither approach demonstrates a strong impact on liberal democracy dimensions measuring rule of law and constraints on executive power. Whether donors work through civil society empowerment or state capacity building, they struggle equally to transform the deeply entrenched power structures that protect elite interests and enable authoritarian control.

This pattern suggests fundamental limitations in aid's ability to transform power structures regardless of ideological approach or implementation strategy. The aspects of authoritarian governance most threatening to incumbent elites - independent judiciaries that can overturn government decisions, effective constraints on executive power, enforceable property rights that limit arbitrary intervention, corruption controls that disrupt patronage networks - prove resistant to external influence whether that influence works through empowering opposition or improving governance. Both approaches can support important dimensions of democratization, but neither can force powerful domestic actors to accept institutional constraints on their own power. This represents not a failure of either approach per se, but a recognition of the inherent limits of external influence in fundamentally political processes.

These findings have important implications for understanding debates about democracy aid effectiveness that often generate more heat than light. Disagreements may partly reflect underlying differences about what democracy entails and how democratization occurs rather than genuine disagreement about empirical evidence. Evaluations using electoral democracy measures may overestimate neoliberal donor effectiveness while underestimating developmental donor

contributions to governance improvements that don't immediately register in electoral indicators. Conversely, focusing exclusively on governance indicators may miss important civil society strengthening that creates long-term foundations for democracy even without immediate institutional changes. A comprehensive assessment requires examining multiple democracy dimensions simultaneously and recognizing that different approaches may strengthen different aspects of democratic governance. The real question is not which approach is "better" in some abstract sense, but rather which approach works better in which contexts for which aspects of democratization.

When we turn to systematic empirical evidence on aid effectiveness, the picture that emerges is one of modest positive effects that vary significantly across different dimensions of democracy. The most robust quantitative evidence comes from Finkel et al.'s (2007) comprehensive study of US democracy assistance from 1990-2003, covering 165 countries and representing one of the most ambitious efforts to measure aid impact rigorously. The findings demonstrate measurable positive effects: each \$10 million in additional US democracy aid increased Freedom House scores by 0.25 points and Polity IV scores by 0.4 points. To contextualize these magnitudes, \$1 million (in constant 1995 dollars, equivalent to \$1.2 million in 2004) produced 50% more democracy improvement than otherwise expected in an average recipient country in any given year. These effects persisted for 2-3 years rather than dissipating immediately, indicating cumulative impact potential rather than merely temporary improvements that vanish once aid stops.

The follow-up study covering 2001-2014 confirmed these sustained positive effects, lending confidence that the earlier findings were not artifacts of the particular time period or methodology. However, the magnitude of impact remained decidedly limited relative to resources invested. Democracy assistance resources increased over 500% between 1990 and 2003 - a massive expansion reflecting the post-Cold War consensus that democracy promotion should be a central goal of development cooperation (*Finkel et al., 2007*). Yet despite this enormous increase, the aggregate impact on global democracy levels was bounded and modest. If a larger share of USAID's portfolio were devoted to democracy rather than economic development, health, or humanitarian assistance, the cumulative impact could be significantly greater. But even then, the effects would remain gradual and incremental rather than transformative.

Subsequent research using alternative methodologies has corroborated these findings while revealing important nuances about when and how aid works. Carnegie and Marinov (2017) exploited random variation in EU aid allocation created by the EU Council presidency rotation to address a thorny methodological problem: countries that receive more democracy aid may differ systematically from those receiving less, making it difficult to isolate aid's causal effect. Their quasi-experimental design found that a one log-point increase in EU aid raised the CIRI human rights index by 1.88 points and the Polity index by 2.03 points - somewhat larger effects than previous studies, though still modest in absolute terms. This methodological innovation strengthens confidence in causal inference by addressing endogeneity concerns that plague observational studies. One additional democracy donor in a recipient country raises democracy levels by 0.9 points on a 0-100 scale (*Ziaja, 2020*), suggesting that donor pluralism creates beneficial competition and learning as recipients can compare approaches and donors can observe each other's strategies.

Sectoral allocation matters significantly for understanding these aggregate effects. Not all democracy aid categories produce equal results. Aid for elections and political processes shows stronger immediate impact than governance capacity building, though the latter may have longer-term effects that short-term evaluations miss (*Kalyvitis & Vlachaki, 2010*). This makes intuitive sense: supporting election observation, voter education, and poll worker training produces visible, measurable improvements in electoral quality relatively quickly. Building judicial capacity, reforming civil service systems, and strengthening parliamentary oversight requires longer time horizons before effects become apparent. The challenge is that political systems and donor

bureaucracies favor interventions with visible short-term results, potentially underinvesting in the slower institutional development that may be more important for sustainable democratization.

The picture becomes considerably more complex - and more troubling for democracy promotion - when examining aid effects across different democracy dimensions. Using V-Dem's multidimensional democracy indicators, which distinguish between electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian democracy, reveals that aid's impact is highly uneven. EU democracy aid positively correlates with improvements in participatory democracy (+0.005 units), electoral democracy (+0.009 units), and egalitarian democracy (+0.004 units), but shows zero effect on liberal democracy (*Hackenesch et al., 2021*). This pattern is not random or inexplicable - it reflects the fundamental political economy of reform. Liberal democracy measures rule of law, judicial independence, and constraints on executive power - precisely the elements most threatening to incumbent elites who control access to state resources and political power.

This finding reveals a fundamental constraint that explains much of the limited effectiveness of democracy assistance. While donors can support electoral processes and civil society mobilization, they cannot compel political elites to accept institutional constraints on their power. Aid flows through government channels or operates with government permission in most contexts, giving elites effective veto power over the most transformative reforms. Governments may tolerate or even welcome aid that supports election administration, civil society training, and media development because these can be managed, co-opted, or tolerated as releasing political pressure without fundamentally threatening power structures. But aid that seeks to establish independent judiciaries that can overturn government decisions, create effective anti-corruption mechanisms that disrupt patronage networks, or impose genuine constraints on executive discretion threatens the core interests of those who control the state. Elites can simply refuse such reforms, and donors have few effective means of imposing them against determined resistance.

The effectiveness of democracy aid depends critically on recipient country characteristics and contextual factors in ways that further limit its transformative potential. Aid demonstrates positive effects primarily in countries with some prior level of democracy - those in the "middle range" of authoritarianism where political openings exist and some space for civil society, opposition, and independent media persists (*Jones & Tarp, 2016*). In highly authoritarian regimes like China, Saudi Arabia, or Turkmenistan, where governments maintain comprehensive control over society, restrict foreign funding to civil society, and brook no opposition, democracy aid faces severe constraints. Even when donors provide it, recipients can prevent it from reaching intended beneficiaries or force it into channels that serve regime interests. In consolidated democracies, marginal returns to democracy aid diminish because basic democratic institutions already function reasonably well - the problems these countries face involve deepening and improving democratic quality rather than establishing democracy's fundamentals.

This curvilinear relationship suggests democracy aid works best for democratic consolidation and deepening rather than initiating transitions from highly authoritarian rule. The implication is sobering: aid is most effective precisely where it is least needed and least effective where it is most needed. Countries in democratic transition where reformers have achieved initial openings but face resistance from entrenched interests can benefit substantially from external support - resources for civil society, expertise in institutional design, election monitoring that deters fraud, and international legitimation that strengthens reformers. But the hardest cases - where authoritarianism is most deeply entrenched and democratic prospects most uncertain - are exactly where aid struggles most to gain traction.

Temporal context also matters profoundly for understanding aid effectiveness. Democracy aid showed negative or zero average effects during the Cold War when geopolitically motivated aid to authoritarian allies predominated (*Dunning, 2004*). During this period, donors provided massive aid to countries like Zaire, Indonesia, and Pakistan specifically because they were anti-communist allies, explicitly subordinating democratic concerns to strategic objectives. This aid often strengthened authoritarian regimes by providing resources they could use to co-opt

opposition, build security forces, and maintain patronage networks. Effects became positive after 1990 as democracy genuinely became a higher priority and aid allocation began reflecting merit-based criteria more consistently. However, the recent wave of democratic backsliding since 2010 raises troubling questions about whether earlier effectiveness estimates remain valid in the current more challenging environment. As authoritarian governments develop more sophisticated tools for resisting external pressure - learning from each other how to manage civil society, control information flows, and neutralize opposition while maintaining facades of electoral competition - the pathways through which aid previously supported democratization may become blocked.

Aid targeted at civil society support and media development consistently shows clearer positive effects than aid for government capacity building or anti-corruption programs. This pattern likely reflects both selection effects and genuine impact. Civil society aid can proceed even when governments resist because donors can channel it through international NGOs or opposition groups rather than requiring government cooperation. It also produces genuine impact by empowering citizens, creating networks of activists who can mobilize for accountability, and building organizational capacity that persists beyond particular aid projects. Government capacity building requires working with the very institutions donors seek to reform, giving those institutions opportunities to divert, co-opt, or undermine reforms. Anti-corruption programs face the fundamental challenge that those who benefit from corruption control the institutions supposedly implementing anti-corruption measures - asking foxes to guard henhouses rarely succeeds.

One notable finding from Finkel et al. deserves careful interpretation because it illustrates how measurement challenges complicate evaluation. Aid for human rights showed correlation with increased reports of human rights violations - a finding that superficially suggests aid worsens human rights. However, this likely reflects improved monitoring and reporting rather than actual deterioration in practices. When donors fund human rights NGOs, these organizations develop greater capacity to document violations, face less risk because international support provides protection, and gain platforms to publicize findings. This "inspires them to report or publicize the extent of human rights problems to a greater degree" (*Finkel et al., 2007*). Better information about violations indicates progress in accountability mechanisms and transparency rather than democratic regression. The distinction between measuring improved outcomes versus improved transparency about problems is crucial but frequently overlooked in aid evaluation. Apparent worsening may actually indicate progress in creating the monitoring infrastructure necessary for eventual improvement.

The relationship between foreign aid and good governance - particularly its political, administrative, and judicial dimensions - crystallizes why democracy aid demonstrates limited impact on liberal democracy despite measurable successes in electoral and participatory dimensions. This "good governance challenge" represents perhaps the most significant obstacle to effective democracy promotion through foreign assistance, and understanding it requires examining why certain reforms prove so much more difficult than others.

The political dimension of governance encompasses protection of civil rights, institutional checks and balances, press freedom, ability to change government through elections, and political stability - the fundamental architecture of democratic accountability. Here aid shows decidedly mixed effects that depend heavily on donor intentions and recipient contexts. Large aid volumes can potentially undermine domestic political accountability by reducing government dependence on citizens and parliaments through what scholars term the "political resource curse" (*Djankov et al., 2008*). When governments derive substantial revenue from external sources rather than domestic taxation, they face weaker incentives to be responsive to citizen demands or accountable to domestic constituencies. A government funded primarily by oil revenues, foreign aid, or geopolitical rents can ignore public opinion in ways that governments dependent on tax revenue cannot. Citizens who pay substantial taxes develop strong interests in how the government spends them and demand accountability; citizens whose government is externally funded have weaker leverage.

However, this negative effect appeared strongest during the Cold War period when donors explicitly supported authoritarian allies for strategic reasons, providing them with resources to maintain power regardless of democratic performance. Post-Cold War evidence suggests aid increasingly supports rather than undermines political governance, even accounting for the fact that donors continue providing substantial aid to strategically important countries with poor democratic records. The crucial difference is donor intentions. Aid specifically targeted at democracy and governance objectives, and aid from democratic donors who genuinely value democracy, shows positive effects on political governance. These donors design programs to support accountability mechanisms, strengthen opposition and civil society, and condition aid on reform progress. Aid from authoritarian donors may have opposite effects, potentially strengthening authoritarian institutions, teaching surveillance and control techniques, and providing resources that help authoritarian governments maintain power. China's aid and investment in Africa increasingly includes technology for monitoring citizens, controlling internet access, and managing dissent - tools that directly undermine rather than support democratic governance.

The number of democracy aid donors in a recipient country positively predicts democratization, suggesting that donor pluralism creates beneficial competition and learning. When multiple donors support democracy, governments face more consistent pressure, reformers can access multiple sources of support, and donors can learn from each other's successes and failures. A government that successfully co-opts or evades one donor's accountability requirements faces pressure from others. Civil society organizations that lose funding from one donor can seek support elsewhere. This competitive dynamic makes aid more effective than when a single dominant donor can be managed or manipulated. However, it also creates coordination challenges and can overwhelm limited recipient administrative capacity.

Aid conditioned on democratic reforms and tied to institutional changes demonstrates stronger effects than unconditional aid, but only when conditionality is credible - when donors actually withhold or reduce aid from non-reforming countries rather than merely threatening to do so. The challenge is that donors face multiple competing objectives that often override democratic conditions. Strategic allies continue receiving aid despite backsliding; donors fear that cutting aid will harm vulnerable populations or cede influence to competitors; domestic constituencies pressure donors to maintain programs that benefit their own contractors and NGOs. The result is that conditionality often lacks credibility, with donors publicly announcing conditions but privately making exceptions so frequently that recipients learn to disregard them.

The administrative dimension concerns government capacity to formulate and implement policy effectively - what public administration scholars call "bureaucratic quality" and what development practitioners increasingly term "state capacity." Here aid faces a different set of challenges rooted in the complexity of institutional development and the fragmentation of donor support. Numerous donors with different requirements, reporting formats, procurement procedures, and implementation cycles can overwhelm limited administrative capacity in recipient countries. Qualified civil servants spend their time managing donor projects rather than implementing government priorities, creating parallel systems that undermine rather than strengthen state institutions (*Knack & Rahman, 2007*). Donors hire away the most capable government employees to work on aid projects at salaries government cannot match, draining the civil service of talent. Strategic planning becomes impossible when line ministries must respond to dozens of donors with different priorities and timelines.

This negative effect concentrates in countries with the lowest initial administrative capacity, where the burden of managing multiple donors creates crushing transaction costs. A competent, well-resourced bureaucracy can manage donor fragmentation by creating coordination mechanisms and insisting donors align with government systems. A weak bureaucracy simply drowns under the administrative weight. However, post-1990s evidence suggests these concerns may be somewhat overstated as donor coordination improved following the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and subsequent Accra and Busan agreements. These initiatives

committed donors to harmonizing procedures, using recipient country systems, and coordinating programs - though implementation remains incomplete and uneven. Some donors, particularly multilaterals and Scandinavian bilaterals, have made genuine progress toward coordination. Others, particularly emerging donors like China, operate largely outside these frameworks.

Aid can strengthen administrative capacity when properly designed and implemented, particularly through long-term institutional support and technical assistance delivered in coordination with recipient country systems rather than parallel to them. Supporting civil service reform, strengthening budgeting and planning capacity, improving public financial management, and training mid-level professionals can produce substantial improvements over time. The key is patience and commitment to working through rather than around government systems. Unfortunately, political and administrative incentives often push donors toward creating parallel implementation units that can show visible results quickly, even though these undermine the very institutions aid ostensibly seeks to strengthen.

The judicial dimension encompasses respect for institutions governing economic and social relations - laws, property rights, and judicial systems - measured through “rule of law,” “law and order,” and “corruption control” indicators. This dimension presents the greatest challenge for democracy aid effectiveness and reveals most starkly why external assistance faces inherent limits. While aid shows some positive correlation with corruption control improvements, particularly aid from less corrupt donors and multilateral institutions with genuine expertise in judicial reform, the effects are weak and inconsistent (*Alesina & Weder, 2002*). Large aid volumes may even facilitate corruption through the “greed effect” - creating opportunities for rent-seeking and disproportionate increases in inefficient resource redistribution as elites compete to capture aid flows. Some studies find initially positive effects on governance that diminish and even reverse with higher aid volumes, suggesting decreasing and eventually negative returns as the perverse incentives created by large aid flows overwhelm reform efforts.

The fundamental obstacle is political elite resistance to reforms threatening their power and rent-seeking opportunities. Rule of law reforms, independent judiciaries, and corruption controls directly threaten the political and economic advantages incumbents derive from discretionary power. An independent judiciary can overturn government decisions, protect opposition figures from politically motivated prosecutions, and enforce property rights against powerful actors who want to expropriate private assets. Strong anti-corruption measures disrupt the patronage networks through which many political systems operate - networks that provide elites with both personal enrichment and the means to maintain political coalitions. Robust property rights and contract enforcement reduce opportunities for arbitrary intervention and extraction that allow politically connected elites to dominate business. Transparent procurement threatens the corrupt relationships between politicians and contractors that provide funding for political campaigns while enriching both parties.

These reforms strike at the core of how power operates in many political systems, particularly neopatrimonial regimes where the boundary between public office and private benefit remains blurred and political authority depends on distributing resources to supporters. Unlike electoral reforms or civil society support, which elites may tolerate because they release political pressure, provide legitimacy, or can be managed through co-optation, rule of law reforms fundamentally redistribute power from incumbents to institutions. External actors can provide resources, expertise, training for judges, new legal codes, and incentives for reform, but they cannot force powerful domestic actors to accept limits on their own power. When push comes to shove, elites who face genuine threats from judicial independence or corruption controls will resist, undermine, or reverse reforms regardless of external pressure.

This explains the striking empirical pattern observed in V-Dem data where EU democracy aid shows zero effect on liberal democracy despite positive effects on electoral and participatory dimensions. The EU provides substantial technical assistance for judicial reform, anti-corruption programs, and rule of law strengthening, employing experts with deep knowledge of European legal systems and extensive experience in institution-building. Yet these well-designed, expertly

implemented programs consistently fail to produce measurable improvements in liberal democracy indicators. Donors can fund election monitoring because governments often view it as legitimating or can manage it through fraud techniques that evade detection. Donors can support civil society training because governments can tolerate or co-opt civil society as long as it doesn't fundamentally threaten power. But transforming judicial independence, constraining executive power, and establishing rule of law requires elite acceptance of institutional constraints on themselves - something aid cannot purchase, impose, or bypass.

Democracy aid cannot also substitute for domestic political will - it can resource and empower reform-minded actors but cannot create demand for reform where it doesn't exist. Aid provides tools, expertise, and financial resources, but these inputs only translate into democratic progress when domestic actors genuinely want reform and possess sufficient political power to implement it against resistance. The most sophisticated aid programs, the most experienced advisors, and the most generous funding cannot overcome the opposition of entrenched elites who control state institutions and benefit from the status quo. This suggests that aid works as a catalyst rather than a cause - it can accelerate and deepen reform processes that domestic actors initiate, but it cannot substitute for domestic political dynamics.

The same intervention succeeds where reformers hold power and fails where elites resist, explaining why aid effectiveness varies so dramatically across recipients that aggregate statistics often mislead. Studies showing positive average effects may mask the reality that aid works well in a subset of favorable cases while having negligible or even negative effects elsewhere. This heterogeneity matters enormously for policy: rather than asking whether aid works on average, donors should ask when and where it works, directing resources toward contexts where they can make a difference rather than spreading them across all recipients regardless of reform prospects. Conditionality and selectivity prove crucial - aid works best when tied to genuine reform progress and directed toward reform-oriented recipients. However, implementing genuine selectivity requires donors to accept that they will provide less aid to some countries, potentially ceding influence to less scrupulous donors, and this political challenge often proves insurmountable.

The good governance challenge also reveals important temporal dimensions that conventional evaluations consistently miss and that create serious problems for sustaining political support for democracy assistance. Institution-building requires decades, not years, for consolidation. Legal reforms must be implemented, tested in practice, refined through experience, and gradually become embedded in professional norms and public expectations. Training judges and lawyers produces results only after those individuals rise through institutional hierarchies into positions of influence. New administrative procedures require years to move from formal adoption to routine practice as organizational cultures adapt. Democratic deepening unfolds across generations as citizens internalize democratic values and develop habits of participation.

Aid effects measured annually through standard indicators may therefore miss gradual institutional accumulation that only bears fruit over extended periods. Projects initiated in 2014-2020 may only show full effects in 2030-2040, long after evaluators have moved on and donors have shifted to new priorities. A judicial reform program that trains lawyers, supports legal education reform, and promotes judicial independence may show minimal impact in Freedom House or V-Dem scores for years while legal professionals absorb new approaches and gradually change institutional cultures. Only after a decade or more might these investments produce measurable improvements in judicial independence and rule of law as trained judges reach senior positions, legal reforms become embedded in practice, and professional norms shift toward greater independence.

This temporal lag creates multiple challenges that systematically undermine aid effectiveness. Evaluation systems emphasize short-term, measurable results because donors need to demonstrate impact to domestic constituencies and because annual budget cycles demand annual results. This pushes aid toward interventions with quick, visible impacts - election observation that can be photographed, training workshops that produce concrete outputs, civil society grants that generate immediate activity - rather than deeper institutional engagement that

takes decades to mature. Domestic political constituencies in donor countries and international audiences expect visible results relatively quickly, creating pressure to show success even when genuine democratization requires patience. Politicians funding democracy programs must defend them to skeptical publics who question why resources flow abroad when domestic needs remain unmet; they need tangible achievements to justify continued support.

The mismatch between institutional timescales and political timescales creates perverse incentives throughout the aid system. Program designers favor interventions that can show results within project cycles of 3-5 years even when the most important changes require 15-20 years. Evaluators emphasize quantifiable short-term indicators even when the most significant impacts are qualitative and long-term. Implementing organizations focus on activities that generate measurable outputs - workshops held, people trained, grants disbursed - rather than harder-to-measure institutional changes. The entire system systematically biases aid toward short-term, visible interventions that may produce quick wins but contribute less to sustainable democratization than patient, long-term institutional engagement that shows few immediate results.

Moreover, sustained engagement over decades faces political obstacles in donor countries where governments change, priorities shift, and public attention moves on. A program initiated with great fanfare and strong political support may find itself orphaned a few years later when new leaders pursue different priorities. Recipient countries experience similar discontinuities as governments change and new administrations abandon predecessors' reforms or redirect aid to different purposes. The result is that democracy assistance often operates in fits and starts, with programs launched and then abandoned before they can mature, institutional relationships developed and then severed, and reforms initiated but never consolidated because sustained support evaporates.

The challenge, then, is not simply that aid is ineffective, but that the political and institutional environment in which aid operates systematically undermines its effectiveness. Donors face pressures that push them toward short-term, visible interventions rather than long-term institutional engagement. They must balance democracy promotion against competing objectives - security, commercial interests, humanitarian needs - that often override democratic concerns. They operate in recipient contexts where elites resist reforms threatening their interests and where institutional development takes decades that exceed political attention spans. They confront measurement challenges where the most important changes are hardest to quantify and where apparent progress may reflect better monitoring rather than genuine improvement.

Under these circumstances, the modest positive effects documented in empirical research represent perhaps the best that can reasonably be expected given structural constraints. Aid has helped consolidate democratic transitions in Central Europe, supported civil society resilience in hostile environments, improved electoral quality in numerous countries, and strengthened democratic actors facing authoritarian pressure. These achievements, while limited and uneven, matter enormously for the individuals and societies involved. At the same time, aid has proven unable to initiate democratic transitions in highly authoritarian contexts, overcome determined elite resistance to reform, or reliably strengthen the rule of law dimensions of democracy that most threaten incumbent power. Recognizing both these successes and these limitations provides a more realistic foundation for thinking about democracy assistance than either celebratory narratives of transformation or cynical dismissals of ineffectiveness.

The implications for policy extend beyond simply increasing aid volumes or improving technical design. Effective democracy promotion requires rethinking fundamental assumptions about what external assistance can achieve and how it should be structured. Donors should focus resources on countries where reform constituencies exist and political opportunities are opening rather than spreading aid thinly across all recipients. They should invest in long-term institutional relationships that can weather political changes rather than short-term projects that end before producing sustainable impact. They should support domestic reformers and civil society rather than attempting to impose reforms through government channels when governments resist. They



should coordinate more effectively with other donors to reduce fragmentation and increase collective leverage while accepting that coordination requires sacrificing some flexibility and control.

Most fundamentally, donors must accept that aid's impact will always remain conditional, uneven, and constrained by domestic political dynamics that external actors cannot control. Democracy promotion through foreign assistance represents not a formula for transformation but a contribution to domestic struggles whose outcomes depend primarily on local actors, circumstances, and contingencies. Understanding this reality - accepting both aid's potential and its limits - provides the foundation for more effective and sustainable democracy assistance in an era of democratic backsliding where the need has never been greater but the challenges have never been more formidable.

**Conclusion.** The relationship between foreign aid and democratization reveals a fundamental paradox: while democracy assistance has expanded dramatically over the past three decades and demonstrates measurable positive effects in specific contexts, its overall impact remains modest and highly conditional. This article's comprehensive analysis of donor motivations, ideological approaches, and empirical evidence demonstrates that aid effectiveness depends not simply on resource volumes or technical design, but fundamentally on the interaction between donor intentions, implementation strategies, and recipient political dynamics. The persistent gap between aid inputs and democratic outputs reflects not merely implementation failures but structural constraints inherent in using external resources to influence fundamentally domestic political processes.

The analysis reveals that donor motivations remain decisively mixed, with geopolitical and economic interests frequently overriding democratic objectives despite rhetorical commitments to democracy promotion. This contradiction undermines conditionality credibility and weakens the link between aid and reform. Moreover, ideological differences between political and developmental approaches produce distinct effects across democracy dimensions - neoliberal donors strengthen electoral and participatory democracy through civil society support, while statist donors improve governance capacity through institutional development. However, neither approach effectively addresses the liberal democracy dimensions of rule of law and executive constraints, because transforming these power structures requires elite acceptance of institutional limits on their own authority - something external assistance cannot impose or purchase regardless of approach.

The central conclusion is that democracy aid functions as a catalyst rather than a cause of democratization. It can resource and empower reform-minded actors, accelerate existing reform processes, and sustain democratic resistance under authoritarian pressure. However, it cannot substitute for domestic political will or overcome determined elite resistance to reform. Effective democracy promotion therefore requires not only increased resources and improved technical design, but fundamental rethinking of aid strategies toward greater selectivity, longer time horizons, stronger coordination, and realistic acceptance of external assistance's inherent limitations. In an era of global democratic backsliding, understanding both aid's potential and its constraints provides the foundation for more effective support to those domestic actors whose struggles will ultimately determine democracy's future.

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## **TURKEY'S SECURITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION**

## **СТРАТЕГІЯ БЕЗПЕКИ ТУРЕЧЧИНИ В РЕГІОНІ ПЕРСЬКОЇ ЗАТОКИ**

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**Abstract.** *This article examines Turkey's security strategy in the Persian Gulf region, whose relevance stems from the growing geopolitical significance of this subregional space and Ankara's increasing ambition to establish itself as a key actor in regional security following the Arab Spring of 2011. The study identifies the distinct features of Turkey's approach, which combines economic pragmatism with instruments of both soft and hard power and reflects Ankara's adaptation to strategic shifts driven by the declining role of the United States and the rising threats posed by Iran, terrorism, and regional instability. Methodologically, the research is based on systemic and political science approaches and employs qualitative methods, including case studies, content analysis, discourse analysis, as well as comparative and politico-systemic analysis. The findings demonstrate that Turkey perceives the Persian Gulf as an integrated subregional system and develops a corresponding security strategy that often goes beyond bilateral formats, aiming to shape a new security architecture through resource complementarity, enhanced cooperation with GCC states, and the pursuit of strategic autonomy. The study concludes that Turkey's policy in the Persian Gulf not only strengthens its regional influence but also contributes to the emergence of a more inclusive and multi-layered security system grounded in economic interdependence, diplomatic engagement, and collective responses to destabilizing factors.*

**Keywords:** *security strategy, foreign policy, Turkey, Persian Gulf, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iran, Israel, Palestine, Yemen, Houthis.*

**Анотація.** *Стаття присвячена аналізу безпекової стратегії Туреччини в регіоні Перської затоки, актуальність якої зумовлена зростанням геополітичної ваги цього субрегіону та посиленням прагнення Анкари закріпитися як ключовий актор регіональної безпеки після подій Арабської весни 2011 року. Автори визначають специфіку турецького підходу, що базується на поєднанні економічної прагматики, інструментів «м'якої» та*

*«твердої сили» й адаптації до стратегічних змін, пов'язаних зі скороченням ролі США та посиленням загроз з боку Ірану, тероризму та регіональної нестабільності. Методологічно дослідження ґрунтується на системному та політологічному підходах із застосуванням якісних методів — кейс-стаді, контент-аналізу, дискурс-аналізу, а також компаративного та політико-системного аналізу. Результати роботи демонструють, що Туреччина сприймає простір Перської затоки як цілісну субрегіональну систему та вибудовує відповідну безпекову стратегію, яка нерідко виходить за межі двосторонніх форматів і спрямована на формування нової архітектури безпеки через взаємодоповнюваність ресурсів, розвиток партнерства з державами РСАДПЗ та посилення власної стратегічної автономії. Доведено, що політика Туреччини в Перській затоці не лише сприяє зміцненню її впливу, а й стає важливим елементом формування більш інклюзивної та багатошарової системи регіональної безпеки, яка базується на економічній взаємозалежності, дипломатичній співпраці та спільному реагуванні на дестабілізуючі фактори.*

**Ключові слова:** безпекова стратегія, зовнішня політика, Туреччина, Перська затока, Королівство Саудівська Аравія (КСА), Катар, Об'єднані Арабські Емірати (ОАЕ), Іран, Ізраїль, Палестина, Ємен, хусити.

**Introduction.** The Persian Gulf region occupies a special place in Turkey's foreign policy strategy, underscoring its exceptional importance as a distinct subregion of the Middle East. Unlike Ankara's broader Middle Eastern policy, a specific set of instruments is applied toward the Gulf states, shaped by their economic potential and geopolitical weight. This approach reflects Turkey's aspiration to adapt its security strategy to the unique challenges and opportunities presented by the countries of the Persian Gulf.

Turkey has been actively expanding its influence in the Persian Gulf area, positioning itself as a new actor in regional and subregional security following the Arab Spring of 2011. Security policy issues are of key importance to Turkey, as any crises in the Middle East have direct or indirect implications for its national interests—particularly in the context of neighboring states with significant Kurdish populations. In its effort to expand regional influence, Turkey plays a crucial role in shaping and sustaining the emerging security architecture of the Persian Gulf region, which constitutes an essential dimension of its overall security strategy.

**Purpose of the Study.** The purpose of this article is to identify the objectives and instruments for implementing Turkey's security strategy in the Persian Gulf region as an important dimension of its Middle Eastern policy, aimed at ensuring the effective planning and execution of its security agenda. Special attention is given to analyzing the transformation of Turkey's policy toward the countries of the region, which has had a significant impact on the overall security environment of the Persian Gulf.

**Literature Review.** The topic of Turkey's foreign policy and its relations with the Persian Gulf countries has been the subject of numerous academic studies covering the geopolitical, economic, and security aspects of regional interaction. Among the key works is the article by Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Hakan Fidan, "*Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition to the 'Century of Türkiye': Challenges, Vision, Goals, and Transformation*" (*Belirsizlikler çağında kararlı ve güçlü Türk dış politikası*, 2025), in which the author outlines the main principles of Turkey's foreign policy, emphasizing its priorities toward regional partners, including the Gulf states. This work highlights the transformation of Turkish diplomacy in the context of global challenges but does not delve deeply into the specific mechanisms for constructing a regional security architecture.

A significant contribution to the analysis of threats and challenges in the Middle East, as well as the complexities in Turkey's relations with regional actors, was made by İlhan Uzgel in the monograph "*Turkish Foreign Policy after the Presidential Order*" (Ilhan Uzgel, Turkish Foreign Policy after the Presidential Order), which examines the dynamics and evolution of Turkey's

security strategy. However, as in many other studies, the role of Turkey in constructing the Persian Gulf security architecture remains insufficiently explored.

Other relevant works focus on the reboot of Turkish policy in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa). In particular, the collective monograph edited by Valeria Talbot, “Türkiye in the MENA Region: A Foreign Policy Reset” (2022), analyzes the process of normalizing Turkey’s relations with the Gulf states following periods of tension, including economic and diplomatic aspects. Galit Dalay, in the articles “Turkey’s Middle East Reset: A Precursor for Re-escalation?” (*Middle East Council on Global Affairs*, 2022) and “A Turning Point in Turkish-Saudi Ties” (*Institute for International Political Studies*, 2022), examines geopolitical shifts such as normalization with Saudi Arabia and the UAE as a prelude to potential escalations, but focuses primarily on economic motives, largely overlooking the security dimension.

Research on regional dynamics also covers specific events, such as the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Turkey and economic embargoes. For example, Ragıp Soylu, in the article ““Secret Embargo”: Saudi Arabia Stops Turkish Exports from Entering Kingdom” (*Middle East Eye*, 2019), examines the undeclared Saudi embargo on Turkey, which worsened bilateral relations. Similarly, Ali Küçükgöçmen, in “Turkish Court Halts Khashoggi Trial, Transfers It to Saudi Arabia” (*Reuters*, 2022), analyzes the legal repercussions of Khashoggi’s murder for Turkish-Saudi relations. These studies focus on the period of confrontation but do not address the subsequent transformation toward a shared security architecture.

The broader context of the Middle East’s “Great Reset” is discussed in the article by Galip Dalay and Tarik Yousef, “Making Sense of the Middle East’s ‘Great Reset’” (*The National Interest*, 2022), which examines regional normalization, including Turkey’s role in the dynamics of the Middle Eastern regional landscape after the Arab Spring. Neil Quilliam, in “Is the New Arab Alliance Too Good to Be True?” (*Chatham House*, 2021), analyzes the formation of new alliances in the Gulf but does not focus on Turkey’s contribution to regional security.

More recent aspects, such as Turkey’s response to events following October 7, 2023, and the potential collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, are examined in the analytical article “*Turkey’s Repositioning in the Middle East’s Emerging Order*” (*Arab Center Washington DC*, 2025), which highlights Turkey’s reorientation toward cooperation with Gulf countries to stabilize the region. Additionally, President Erdoğan’s statement describing Netanyahu as “the greatest threat to Middle East security” (*Indeksonline.net*, 2025) and the Turkish National Security Council’s resolution on counterterrorism and calls for action regarding Gaza (*TRT World*, 2025) illustrate Ankara’s current stance, emphasizing a focus on regional stability.

Overall, the existing literature addresses the evolution of Turkey’s foreign policy and its relations with the Persian Gulf states, covering economic, ideological, and geopolitical aspects (for example, Erdoğan’s visit to the UAE, *Al Jazeera*, 2022; joint statement following the meeting with the Saudi Crown Prince, *Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye*, 2022). However, a notable gap remains in adequately addressing Turkey’s security strategy in the Persian Gulf, its role in shaping the region’s security architecture, and the policy transformation processes in Ankara that influence the overall security environment of the Gulf. This study seeks to fill this gap by analyzing key events and Turkey’s strategies in the context of regional developments.

### **Methods.**

To analyze the theoretical, conceptual, and practical-political foundations of Turkey’s security strategy in the Persian Gulf region, a political science approach is applied. The use of a systemic approach made it possible to demonstrate that qualitative changes within the subregional space of the Persian Gulf ensured both its perception as a coherent entity by extraregional powers, including Turkey, and the need to develop a security strategy for this consolidated space—often replacing policies toward individual Gulf states.

For the study of Turkey’s policy toward Gulf countries, particularly the KSA, UAE, and Qatar, a comparative method was employed, while a political-system method was used to identify the specific features of implementing Turkey’s security strategy toward the Gulf states. The

authors adopt a qualitative approach, incorporating case studies, content analysis, comparative methods, and discourse analysis.

### **Main Findings of the Study.**

The Arab Spring, which began in Tunisia in 2011 and spread across most countries in the Middle East and North Africa, fundamentally altered the region's geopolitical landscape. The Gulf monarchies, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman, as well as Egypt which experienced a military coup in 2013 responded negatively to these transformative processes. In contrast, Turkey viewed the Arab Spring as an opportunity to strengthen its influence, shifting from a "soft power" policy to a more active Middle Eastern strategy, both in North African countries such as Libya and Egypt, and in Syria and the Persian Gulf region.

Turkey has been actively expanding its influence in the Persian Gulf region, positioning itself as a new player in regional security following the Arab Spring. Its security strategy aims to ensure strategic autonomy, fill the vacuum created by the declining role of the United States, and counter threats from Iran, terrorism, and regional instability (*Birol, B. 2023*). Ankara implements a "forward defense" policy, which involves proactive actions abroad to neutralize hybrid threats (*International Affairs. 2025*). A key element of this strategy is military presence.

Between 2014 and 2015, Turkey established its first base in Qatar, later expanded into the full-scale Khalid Bin Al Walid military camp in 2019, hosting thousands of troops for joint exercises and threat mitigation (*Middle East Eye. 2023*). During the 2017 Gulf Cooperation Council crisis, Turkey increased its contingent in Qatar to prevent escalation and protect its ally from the blockade imposed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE (*Birol, B. 2023*). Ankara also proposed establishing bases in Saudi Arabia (2015) and Kuwait (2023), and explored possibilities in Oman, although not all initiatives were implemented (*Middle East Eye. 2023*). This military presence is intended to secure maritime routes and contribute to regional stability.

Partnerships with the GCC countries represent another important aspect. Turkey has concluded defense agreements with Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman, and following the normalization of relations in 2021 (Al-Ula Agreement), with Saudi Arabia and the UAE (*International Affairs. 2025*). Turkish arms exports including Bayraktar TB2 drones, tanks, and "Steel Dome" air defense systems have risen from \$248 million in 2002 to over \$4 billion in 2022, positioning Turkey as an alternative to traditional suppliers such as the United States or Russia (*Birol, B. 2023*). These partnerships allow GCC countries to diversify their dependence on the West amid the U.S. "pivot" to Asia and ongoing regional conflicts, such as the Israel-Hamas war (*V. Talbot, 2023*).

The main challenges for Turkey include tensions with Iran, which perceives its presence as provocative, and domestic economic constraints (*Middle East Eye. 2023*). Nevertheless, with the evolution of its policy from "soft power" to "hard power" after 2011, Turkey seeks to position itself as a security guarantor for the GCC, complementing the United States, particularly in the context of potential shifts in Washington's regional policy (*Birol, B. 2023*).

One of the key episodes that intensified regional tensions was the 2017 Gulf crisis, known as the Qatar blockade. The Saudi-Emirati bloc, supported by several other countries, accused Qatar of supporting Islamist movements and demanded that Turkey join the blockade and sever its alliance with Qatar, including closing its military base in Doha. Turkey's refusal to comply with these demands was driven by the strategic importance of the base for maintaining its regional influence.

Turkey's relations with Saudi Arabia deteriorated further following the 2018 murder of opposition journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. The Turkish authorities accused Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of orchestrating the crime, which led to an effective, undeclared economic embargo by Saudi Arabia. Trade between the two countries sharply declined, and bilateral relations came close to breaking down.

Turkey's relations with the UAE also experienced a deep rift, driven by ideological, geopolitical, and personal disputes. Divergent approaches to political Islam and reactions to the Arab Spring highlighted an ideological conflict, while confrontations in regional crises



particularly in Qatar, Libya, Sudan, and Syria intensified geopolitical rivalry. An information war and accusations against the UAE of involvement in the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey added a personal dimension to this confrontation. While Turkey's criticism of Saudi Arabia prior to Khashoggi's murder remained relatively restrained, its stance toward the UAE was more open and outspoken.

Amid these developments, Turkey and the Saudi-Emirati bloc faced new challenges in the Middle East, including the strengthening of the Houthis and the blockade of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, adding further complexity to the formation of the Persian Gulf security architecture.

Since 2021, Turkey's foreign policy has undergone significant changes driven by both domestic and regional factors. Key events influencing this shift include the signing of the Abraham Accords (2020), which paved the way for the normalization of relations between Israel and several Arab states, as well as the Al-Ula Declaration (2021), which ended the blockade of Qatar (Dalay, G.; Yousef, T., 2022). Additionally, the normalization of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia created a new context for regional interaction (Quilliam, N., 2021). For Turkey, these developments coincided with a domestic economic crisis marked by high inflation, current account deficits, lira depreciation, and depleted foreign exchange reserves. These constraints made it impossible to continue the aggressive policies that had previously led to Ankara's isolation in the Eastern Mediterranean, including its exclusion from regional initiatives such as the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (Arab Center Washington DC, 2025).

Recognizing these challenges, Turkey returned to the "zero problems with neighbors" policy that had been successful in the early 2000s. This approach involved normalizing relations with countries with which it previously had tense relations, including Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and even Syria (V. Talbot, 2023). Economic necessity became the main driver of this strategic pivot. A prominent example of this policy was President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visits to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE in 2023 following his reelection. These trips culminated in the signing of economic agreements, including investment deals with the UAE worth over \$50 billion, representing an important step in strengthening bilateral economic ties (Al Jazeera, 2022).

Foreign policy factors have also played a key role in the transformation of Turkey's strategy. The reduction of American presence in the region following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan enabled Iran to increase support for non-state actors, such as the Yemeni Houthis and Lebanese Hezbollah. The Houthis intensified attacks on commercial vessels in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, while Hezbollah became more active in southern Lebanon, creating additional security challenges (Arab Center Washington DC, 2025).

However, Turkey does not consider Iran the main destabilizing factor in the region. Ankara attributes this role to Israel, particularly after the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent war in Gaza, which involved the destruction of civilian infrastructure and accusations against Israel of war crimes (Arab Center Washington DC, 2025). Turkey's position on Israel as the primary regional destabilizer was clearly articulated by President Erdoğan, who described Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as "the greatest threat to Middle East security" (Indeksonline.net, 2025). This stance partially aligns with the perspectives of Gulf countries, which seek economic stability and regional leadership.

Another important aspect is the shared position of Turkey and the Gulf countries regarding Syria following the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in December 2024. Both sides advocate for a stable Syria that limits Iranian influence and supports Sunni governance in Damascus. Turkey, leveraging its military experience in the Syrian conflict, provides technical expertise, while Saudi Arabia offers financial support for reconstruction and state-building. This complementary cooperation was confirmed by the first official visit of Syria's interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, to Saudi Arabia, coordinated with Turkey. Saudi Arabia also played a key diplomatic role by arranging a meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and al-Sharaa, which led to the lifting of sanctions on Syria (Arab Center Washington DC, 2025).

Turkey, in turn, has assumed a supportive role, reflecting its limited capacity to influence global processes compared to the financial resources of the Gulf states.



Turkey actively supports the creation of a new security architecture through regional platforms, notably the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). President Erdoğan has emphasized the need to prevent a new “Sykes-Picot agreement” and called for unity among Muslim countries in countering Israel’s destabilizing actions (*Indeksonline.net*, 2025). Syria’s reintegration into the OIC marked an important step in this direction, highlighting Turkey’s commitment to consolidating regional efforts to ensure stability.

Thus, Turkey plays an important, albeit not leading, role in shaping the new security architecture of the Persian Gulf. Its strategy is grounded in economic pragmatism, cooperation with Gulf states, and countering destabilizing actors, particularly Israel and Iran, allowing Ankara to strengthen its regional influence while adapting to new geopolitical challenges.

### **Conclusions.**

The contemporary geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East, marked by new security challenges and a desire to de-escalate protracted conflicts, create the conditions for the formation of a new security architecture in the Persian Gulf region. This emerging model, resulting from synergy between regional states such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, and extraregional actors, notably Turkey, emphasizes economic interdependence, diplomatic cooperation, and joint efforts to counter destabilizing factors. It not only aligns with the strategic interests of the participating countries but also holds the potential to reshape the broader regional order, promoting stability, integration, and sustainable development across the Middle East and North Africa.

Turkey, positioning itself as a strategic partner in this process, demonstrates an innovative approach that combines pragmatic adaptation to economic constraints with the utilization of its unique geopolitical potential. Its involvement in stabilizing post-Assad Syria, active participation in regional platforms such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and efforts to attract investments from Gulf countries reflect *a shift from ambitions of regional hegemony to a role as coordinator and mediator*. This transition underscores Ankara’s deeper understanding of the necessity for cooperation within a multipolar regional order, where economic stability and security cooperation emerge as key priorities.

The new approach of this study lies in conceptualizing Turkey’s role as a supportive yet indispensable element of the new security architecture, based on the principle of complementarity of resources and shared strategic objectives. Unlike previous models, which often relied on confrontation or unilateral dominance, this architecture proposes an inclusive approach that integrates economic, political, and security dimensions. However, its resilience will depend on the participants’ ability to counter external destabilizing factors, particularly aggressive actions by Israel, and on the institutionalization of cooperation through regional mechanisms. Future research should focus on analyzing the long-term viability of this model, assessing its stability amid domestic political transformations in the participating countries, as well as its capacity to adapt to new geopolitical challenges, such as the escalation of the Iran-Israel confrontation or shifts in the global role of the United States.

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## COMMUNICATIONS AS A TOOL FOR HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE BASED ON THE CASE OF YEMEN

## КОМУНІКАЦІЇ ЯК ІНСТРУМЕНТ ГУМАНІТАРНОГО РЕАГУВАННЯ НА ПРИКЛАДІ ЄМЕНУ

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**Abstract.** *This article explores how communication functions as a strategic tool within the operations of international organizations during the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Yemen. The authors explore how modern communication tools – digital technologies, artificial intelligence, and fact-checking platforms – enhance the effectiveness of humanitarian operations, foster coordination among donors, governments, and local communities, and influence public trust in international aid. Particular focus is given to the ethical dimensions of humanitarian communication, including information transparency, data protection, and the “do no harm” principle. Using the case of Yemen, the study demonstrates how information asymmetry, political fragmentation, and digital inequality complicate access to affected populations and undermine humanitarian neutrality. The research underscores the need to establish new standards of humanitarian ethics in the digital age, where the boundaries between reliable information and manipulation have become increasingly blurred. It concludes that effective communication functions not only as an operational tool of humanitarian response, but also as a crucial element for maintaining trust, legitimacy, and resilience across the humanitarian system.*

**Keywords:** *humanitarian communication; Yemen; artificial intelligence; ethical standards; disinformation; humanitarian diplomacy.*

**Анотація.** *Стаття присвячена аналізу ролі комунікацій у діяльності міжнародних організацій в умовах затяжної гуманітарної кризи в Ємені. Автори досліджують, як сучасні комунікаційні інструменти – цифрові технології, штучний інтелект і фактчекінгові*

платформи – підвищують ефективність гуманітарних операцій, сприяють координації між донорами, урядами та місцевими громадами, а також впливають на рівень довіри до міжнародної допомоги. Особливу увагу приділено етичним аспектам гуманітарних комунікацій, включно з прозорістю інформаційних потоків, захистом даних і принципом «do no harm». На прикладі Ємену показано, як інформаційна асиметрія, політична фрагментація та цифрова нерівність ускладнюють доступ до постраждалих і підривають гуманітарну нейтральність. Дослідження окреслює необхідність формування нових стандартів гуманітарної етики у цифрову добу, де межі між достовірною інформацією та маніпуляцією дедалі більше розмиваються. Зроблено висновок, що ефективні комунікації є не лише технічним інструментом реагування, а й важливим чинником підтримки довіри, легітимності та стійкості гуманітарної системи.

**Ключові слова:** гуманітарна комунікація; Ємен; штучний інтелект; етичні стандарти; дезінформація; гуманітарна дипломатія.

**Introduction.** In modern crisis settings, the work of international organizations is increasingly shaped by the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and interconnected digital media. These instruments facilitate swift information flow, real-time coordination, and more effective resource allocation; however, they also introduce significant challenges, including the circulation of disinformation, information overload, the politicization of humanitarian assistance, digital divides, and limited access for the very populations in need. As Nick Couldry and Andreas Hepp observe, modern communication practices in humanitarian contexts go far beyond the simple transfer of information; they shape the social relations that influence how crises are understood and how responses to them are formed (*Couldry & Hepp, 2013*).

These challenges are inherently multidimensional, encompassing technical issues (infrastructure, data management, cybersecurity), ethical dilemmas (privacy, representation of affected populations, politicization of aid), and regulatory concerns (accountability of digital sphere and the preservation of humanitarian space). In Yemen, these problems acquire particular urgency given that a high level of fragmentation, political polarization, and limited access to independent sources of information are inherent to the country's information ecosystem (*ACAPS, 2024*).

Globally, the urgency of this issue is driven by the rapid expansion of humanitarian needs coupled with a contraction of available resources. By 2025, the number of forcibly displaced people worldwide had surpassed 122 million, and rising geopolitical instability continued to undermine both the funding base and the overall effectiveness of humanitarian operations (*UNHCR, 2025*). In Yemen, these global dynamics are amplified. Following the Houthi takeover of Sana'a in 2014 and the outbreak of large-scale hostilities in 2015, the country descended into one of the deepest humanitarian crises of the modern era (*Council on Foreign Relations, 2025*). The destruction of infrastructure, mass displacement, and chronic food and health insecurity have become defining features of the humanitarian landscape.

Today, Yemen is described as the epicenter of the world's most severe humanitarian catastrophe. Approximately 24.1 million people – around 80% of the population – are in need of assistance and protection, around 4.5 million have been internally displaced, and the risk of famine remains critical. According to United Nations data, an estimated 233,000 people have died since the onset of the war, more than half of them due to indirect causes such as hunger, lack of medical care, and the collapse of essential infrastructure (*United Nations in Yemen, 2024; USA for UNHCR, 2024*). Under such conditions, effective communication becomes a decisive factor in ensuring access to affected populations, coordinating actions among donors, governments, and humanitarian actors, and sustaining public trust in international aid efforts.

**The purpose of the article** is to analyze the role of communication in the activities of international organizations as an instrument of humanitarian response amid the protracted crisis in Yemen. The study seeks to examine how contemporary communication instruments – including

digital technologies, artificial intelligence, and fact-checking platforms – affect the efficiency of humanitarian interventions, the transparency of information flows, and the establishment of ethical standards in crisis settings. Particular attention is given to countering disinformation, managing digital ecosystems, and exploring the role of humanitarian diplomacy in fostering trust among international organizations, donors, and crisis-affected communities.

**Literature review.** In contemporary studies on humanitarian response, communication is increasingly understood as a strategic instrument that builds trust among stakeholders, legitimizes the activities of international organizations, and enables effective access to crisis-affected populations. It shapes humanitarian management – both informational and ethical dimensions of response.

The notion of information lies at the core of any understanding of communication processes. Information can be viewed as a structured reflection of reality – messages about the nature, society, human thought – employed in processes of cognition, communication, governance, production, and education. In modern society, the function of information has expanded dramatically, as rapid technological change continues to transform how it is produced, processed, and applied (*Makarenko et al., 2022*).

Classical models conceptualize communication primarily as the transmission and interpretation of messages. However, J. Carey offers a broader understanding of communication – as a symbolic process of creating and sustaining a shared reality (*Carey, 2002*). Within humanitarian operations, this perspective implies that effective communication goes well beyond the mere dissemination of information; it involves constructing a shared framework of meaning between international organizations and local communities, thereby fostering trust, solidarity, and social responsibility.

European researchers Nathaniel Raymond, Brittany Card, and Ziad al-Achkar, in their work “What is Humanitarian Communication?” define humanitarian communication as using information and communication technologies to preserve the lives and dignity of affected populations in line with the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence. They identify three key criteria – Population, Principles, and Purpose – which determine who communicates, on what basis, and and to what end. The authors emphasize that access to reliable information becomes as essential as access to food or water, enabling individuals to navigate uncertainty, seek assistance, and make informed choices. Yet, the growing digitalization within the humanitarian sector brings forward new risks, ranging from cyberattacks and privacy breaches to data manipulation (*Raymond et.al., 2015*).

Daniel Gilman, an expert with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, suggests the notion of “humanitarian cyberspace” – a novel informational domain that warrants protection equivalent to that afforded to traditional humanitarian areas. He emphasizes the necessity to develop global regulations that would prohibit cyberattacks on humanitarian infrastructure, ensure the secure circulation of data, and protect affected populations from digital exploitation (*Gilman, 2020*).

Ukrainian scholars O. Kuchmii and O. Frolova have also contributed to the theoretical foundations of the field by examining how humanitarian cooperation is evolving under hybrid threats. They argue that, in response to these challenges, international humanitarian collaboration necessitates new coordination mechanisms among states, international organizations, and civil society actors to prevent conflicts and uphold international stability. Trust within the humanitarian system is undermined by information asymmetries, reliance on donors, and competition between international and local actors (*Kuchmii&Frolova, 2018*). Under such conditions, ethical, transparent, and locally sensitive communication acquires particular importance, as it reinforces trust and enhances the cultural relevance of humanitarian initiatives.

It should be noted that the effectiveness of international initiatives relies primarily on public trust and awareness. Much like in the field of climate communications, humanitarian organizations must remain proactive in countering disinformation, ensuring transparency, and sustaining open dialogue with affected communities (*Shevchenko, 2023*).

The study by Danish researchers Gry Høngsmark Knudsen and Domen Bajde illustrates how social media are reshaping the models of humanitarian engagement. Drawing on the concept of the mediatization of humanitarian action, the authors show that online activity can generate tangible offline outcomes, creating new opportunities for resource mobilization while simultaneously introducing complex ethical dilemmas. Social networks construct a “quasi-public space” in which the boundaries between the real and the digital become increasingly blurred, thereby transforming the very notion of social responsibility. Media thus cease to function merely as channels for message transmission and instead become active participants in the social processes that shape institutional logic, communicative strategies, and public perceptions of humanitarian assistance (*Høngsmark&Bajde, 2016*).

In “The Crucial Role of Humanitarian Communication in the Fake News and Infoglut Era” L.Gosp-Server analyzes the challenges faced by humanitarian communication amid disinformation and infoglut. The author notes that “humanitarian organisations must adopt strategic and principled communication measures to safeguard their credibility and mission”. The author also observes that humanitarian organizations are currently confronting such problems as declining public trust, shrinking financial support, and reduced public engagement. The study proposes multilevel communication strategies that include enhancing staff competencies, fostering collaboration with local communities, utilizing emerging media platforms (such as TikTok, Threads, and WhatsApp), and employing storytelling and visual communication practices that preserve the human involvement and uphold ethical standards (*Gosp-Server, 2025*).

The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into humanitarian operations has increasingly attracted scholarly attention. David Miliband identifies AI as a transformative means to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian response – from forecasting natural disasters to providing personalized education for children in crisis zones. He also emphasizes the necessity of upholding ethical standards and transparency, which aligns closely with the concept of integrated humanitarian communications (*Miliband, 2024*).

The ethical dimension of digital humanitarian activity is comprehensively outlined in the “Guidance Note: Humanitarian Data Ethics”. The document defines the key principles of security, fairness, transparency, privacy protection, and the “do no harm” standard, emphasizing the necessity of conducting an ethical audit prior to the implementation of any information campaign (*OCHA, 2020*).

**Main results of research.** Yemen remains the epicenter of one of the world’s most severe and protracted humanitarian crises. The ongoing conflict and the collapse of state institutions have deepened structural vulnerabilities that long predated the 2014 escalation, when Yemen was already among the poorest nations in the Arab world, characterized by low human development indicators and chronic food insecurity. The economic situation has deteriorated dramatically due to trade blockades, currency devaluation, and soaring inflation, forcing households to adopt harmful coping strategies – ranging from child marriage and human trafficking to precarious and unsafe forms of labor, particularly among children, including recruitment into armed groups. Food and medical insecurity persist as major challenges, with rising prices of essential goods, the deterioration of healthcare services, and restricted educational opportunities exacerbating the humanitarian crisis (*The World Bank in Yemen, 2024; USAID, 2024; UNICEF Yemen, 2024*). In addition, gender inequality, limited access to education and employment for women, widespread gender-based violence, and prevalence of early marriage increase the vulnerability and significantly hinder prospects for national recovery (*OCHA, 2024; UN Women, 2024*).

Within the conditions of armed conflict and restricted territorial access, humanitarian organizations take on a central role in collecting, validating, and interpreting information. With the decline of state institutions and independent monitoring becoming nearly impossible, humanitarian personnel remain among the limited trustworthy sources of information regarding the impacts of warfare, large-scale displacement, and associated crises. Their work includes conducting needs assessments, facilitating focus-group discussions, gathering testimonies from affected communities, and documenting living conditions in areas that are difficult to reach. Humanitarian organizations in

Yemen coordinate information flows, systematically track key indicators, and adjust their interventions in response to the dynamics of the crisis. Nevertheless, the impact of such communication is limited due to censorship, control over digital platforms, restricted access to independent information, and algorithmic filtering. Key terms and narratives are often suppressed when they contradict official policies, reducing the visibility of pressing humanitarian concerns. This particularly affects reporting on gender-related and climate-sensitive dimensions of the crisis – both essential for effective response planning and vulnerability assessment. A telling example of Yemen's restricted digital environment occurred in September 2023, when the state telecommunications company YemenNet, controlled by the Houthis (Ansar Allah), blocked access to communication platforms such as Zoom, Google Meet, and Signal, resulting in the detention of peaceful demonstrators. Such restrictions undermine humanitarian initiatives – especially programs supporting women and combating gender-based violence – and delaying the dissemination of life-saving information about urgent population needs (*Article 19, 2024; Amnesty International, 2024*).

Alongside censorship and control over the digital environment, the spread of fake news has severely undermined the efficiency of humanitarian communication. Disinformation campaigns deliberately distort the realities faced by affected populations and misrepresent the operational purpose of humanitarian institutions. Increasingly, these organizations themselves have become targets of coordinated disinformation attacks. For instance, in September 2023, humanitarian workers in Yemen were subjected to social media campaigns and public incitement to distrust and hostility: during Friday sermons, clerics spread messages eroding confidence in aid workers, while online campaigns created an atmosphere of fear among humanitarian personnel (*The Media Line, 2023*). In the post-truth era, disinformation shapes a distorted perception of humanitarian realities, militarizes public communication, and undermines the neutrality of humanitarian organizations. This phenomenon became especially evident in 2024, when the Houthis circulated manipulated videos depicting alleged attacks on ships in the Red Sea, discrediting international efforts and eroding the perceived impartiality of humanitarian actors (*IJNet, 2024*).

Fake news fosters a hostile environment toward humanitarian workers and increases security risks for both aid providers and recipients, compelling organizations to adapt their operational strategies. These adaptations include stricter planning of aid distribution and a shift toward cash-based assistance to mitigate risks. In 2025, the United Nations was compelled to halt its operations in Saada Province following the detention of eight staff members, resulting in the suspension of essential humanitarian aid in the areas most acutely impacted by the crisis (*AP News, 2025*).

As the contemporary humanitarian landscape demonstrates, the combined effects of declining funding and rampant disinformation erode public trust in humanitarian aid and shift political priorities from international assistance toward domestic agendas. In 2023, the United Nations appealed for \$4.3 billion to support humanitarian operations in Yemen, yet only \$1.2 billion was pledged at the donor conference – far below the required amount. The shortfall coincided with the disinformation surge that eroded trust in humanitarian organizations, leading to severe consequences for aid operations. By 2025, the situation in Yemen's western coastal regions, particularly Hodeidah, had reached catastrophic levels, with child malnutrition rates rising to 33%. Reduced assistance from the United States and other donors, combined with inefficient food distribution throughout 2024, deepened the crisis. UNICEF reports that one in two children under the age of five, along with approximately 1.4 million pregnant and breastfeeding women, are affected by malnutrition. Years of ongoing conflict have pushed more than half of the country's population into reliance on humanitarian support. Meanwhile, the deepening malnutrition emergency and shrinking financial resources have made the provision of aid increasingly challenging (*Reuters, 2025*).

In contemporary humanitarian contexts, the efficiency of communication is largely determined by organizations' ability to counter disinformation and maintain transparency. Humanitarian workers must invest in communication competencies, clearly define communication objectives, select appropriate tools, identify target audiences, and craft key messages, all while adhering to established "red lines" and the principles of neutrality. Designing a strategic

communication policy enables organizations to balance the timely dissemination of public information with adherence to humanitarian standards (*Gosp-Server, 2025*).

This prioritization is particularly significant within the framework of the “Humanitarian Reset” initiative launched by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) to enhance the effectiveness and legitimacy of the humanitarian system. The initiative aims to optimize crisis response, reform internal processes, decentralize decision-making, and empower affected communities to participate directly in decision-making. These measures enable humanitarian organizations to better coordinate operations in complex environments and respond more effectively to the local needs. The implementation of the Humanitarian Reset principles is aligned with the “Grand Bargain” reforms, which emphasize decentralized coordination, data democratization, and the prioritization of local and national actors in both funding and decision-making (*ICVA, 2025*). Integrating these approaches within communication strategies allows humanitarian organizations to maintain relevance in the public sphere, counter disinformation and infoglut (information overload), and enhance community participation in grassroots and collective initiatives. Ultimately, these efforts strengthen the overall effectiveness of humanitarian responses and reinforce public trust in humanitarian actors. In this context, in 2025, responding to reduced funding and growing humanitarian needs, Yemen launched the first phase of standard funding through the Yemen Humanitarian Fund (YHF) amounting to USD 20.6 million. This reflects a commitment to more efficient, localized humanitarian action – particularly through enhancing assistance to local and national organizations (*ReliefWeb, 2025*).

A principal step in tackling state control over the digital space, disinformation, and fake news has been the establishment of fact-checking platforms such as Hakikah, which verify the authenticity of materials and debunk disinformation, including through the analysis of images and videos. Launched in 2021, the platform employs a three-step methodology: identifying the original sources of information, collecting details about the roots of fabricated materials, and verifying authenticity using tools such as YouTube DataViewer, Fake News Debunker by InVID, and WeVerify. In August 2024, several Yemeni accounts on the social media platform X posted claims that the U.S. aircraft carrier *Eisenhower*, previously stationed in the Red Sea, had been targeted by a Yemeni missile strike. However, Hakikah traced official U.S. Navy press releases, which clarified that the *Eisenhower* had actually left the Red Sea in June. Similarly, in October, Yemeni news sites and social media accounts circulated photographs allegedly showing U.S. and British fighter jets striking the Yemeni capital, Sana’a. Using Google Reverse Image Search, Hakikah determined that the image in question actually depicted an Israeli airstrike on Beirut, Lebanon (*IJNet, 2024*).

When integrated with external communications and advocacy, humanitarian diplomacy enables organizations to influence political decision-making and secure access to affected populations in crisis areas, even when online discourse and public politicization complicate response efforts (*Gosp-Server, 2025*). In Yemen, the practical dimension of humanitarian diplomacy includes negotiations over access and staff security (for instance, the UN’s diplomatic efforts following the 2025 detention of humanitarian workers in Saada Province), advocacy with donors through public appeals and reports on the effects of reduced funding for food security, and the application of localized financing mechanisms, including the Yemen Humanitarian Fund (YHF), to ensure rapid and community-driven responses. This dual strategy, combining public advocacy with confidential negotiations, aligns with OCHA’s conceptualization of humanitarian diplomacy as a balance between high-level lobbying and ensuring operational access to affected populations (*OCHA, 2023*).

In contemporary humanitarian operations, artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly employed to forecast food security trends and enhance the efficiency of communication processes. A study published in December 2023 introduced a methodology for predicting food consumption levels up to 60 days in advance at the subnational level in Yemen, utilizing Reservoir Computing machine learning models to analyze time-series data. This approach enables a faster response of humanitarian organizations to famine risks, optimize resource allocation, and prevent disruptions in humanitarian supply chains (*Zavalishin et.al., 2023*).



AI technologies are also being scaled to protect communities affected by extreme weather events. The Flood Hub platform, developed by Google in partnership with the UN and NGOs, forecasts floods in over 80 countries, including parts of Yemen, and provides online mapping tools for use by humanitarian organizations and local populations (*Haridy, 2024*). To enhance coordination and real-time data analysis, platforms such as DEEP (Data Entry and Exploration Platform) are employed. They allow for the semi-automated processing of extensive textual datasets and provide rapid access to information needed for humanitarian decision-making. This functionality is applied, in particular, within Yemen's Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) and Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) processes (*The DEEP, 2023*).

The integration of artificial intelligence in humanitarian operations requires adherence to high ethical standards. According to the Alan Turing Institute, AI ethics is defined as “a set of values, principles, and techniques that employ widely accepted standards of right and wrong to guide moral conduct in the development and use of AI technologies” (*HDSEG, 2020*). Key considerations include informed consent from aid recipients, algorithmic transparency, digital inclusivity, and accountability. This is particularly critical in crisis contexts such as Yemen, where limited access to electricity and the Internet requires the combination of digital tools with traditional communication channels – including radio broadcasting, the work of field personnel, and direct engagement with local communities. The insufficient involvement of local humanitarian organizations in global discussions on AI ethics may further exacerbate existing imbalances within the humanitarian system, particularly in terms of resource distribution and access to information.

The topic of ethical communication becomes particularly acute in situations where political decisions directly affect humanitarian response. In March 2025, Amnesty International published a report documenting the consequences of a sharp reduction in humanitarian aid by the U.S. government. Following a decision by Donald Trump's administration, most programs run by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) – including food assistance, medical services, shelters for survivors of gender-based violence, and child protection initiatives – were suspended. The communication dimension of this process revealed a profound ethical crisis: humanitarian organizations received contradictory or incomplete messages from government structures, leading to the chaotic termination of projects. As one international organization staff member noted: “...We were forced to make decisions that literally determined who would live and who would die, with minimal information” (*Amnesty International, 2025*).

This case demonstrates how the absence of transparent communication and incoherence between political decisions and humanitarian structures can erode trust within the international aid system. The political rhetoric accompanying the announcement of funding cuts also affected the public perception of humanitarian organizations, placing them in a position of forced political alignment, which contradicts the principle of neutrality in humanitarian diplomacy. Amnesty International reports that the consequences were most severe for women and girls: the suspension of funding led to the closure of dozens of support centers for survivors of gender-based violence. Consequently, the ethical dilemma between “donor transparency” and “accountability to beneficiaries” acquired a tangible dimension – a communication gap that placed human lives at risk. A Yemeni human rights defender emphasized that “funding cuts do not just end projects, funding cuts silence victims' voices and weaken justice in Yemen” (*Amnesty International, 2025*).

Moreover, the U.S. decision to label Ansar Allah (the Houthis) as a terrorist group further complicated the communication environment: because the associated legal procedures became too complex to manage, humanitarian organizations were forced to halt their operations in the northern regions, where the majority of the population in need resides. This demonstrates that the absence of effective communication between political and humanitarian actors severely impedes access to affected populations and ultimately erodes fundamental humanitarian norms, including humanity, impartiality, and neutrality.

Ultimately, the ethics of humanitarian communication extend beyond accuracy and transparency to encompass the responsible use of communication as a tool for protecting life rather than advancing political agendas. The failure to uphold these principles – through opacity, delays,

or politicization – immediate and devastating consequences for millions. Yemen has become a striking example of how the ethical degradation of communication exacerbates a humanitarian catastrophe, undermining trust in the international aid system.

**Conclusion.** The findings confirm that communication serves not merely as a technical tool of humanitarian response, but as a pivotal factor in building trust, upholding ethical standards, and strengthening the effectiveness of international operations in crisis environments. The case of Yemen demonstrates that information exchange between international organizations, donors, government institutions, and local communities occurs under conditions of profound political fragmentation, digital inequality, and pervasive information manipulation.

The challenge of balancing humanitarian neutrality with the imperative to publicly counter disinformation remains a subject of continued discussion. Proactive communication is indispensable for safeguarding the legitimacy and credibility of humanitarian missions. However, excessive public engagement risks being interpreted as political alignment, thereby undermining the foundational principle of neutrality. This highlights the need to develop new standards of the ethics of humanitarian action in a digital environment, where the boundary between information and manipulation is becoming increasingly blurred.

Humanitarian diplomacy, when integrated with public advocacy, continues to serve as a vital instrument for securing access to affected populations and mediating between political and humanitarian objectives. Within this context, the Humanitarian Reset initiative represents a paradigm shift from centralized to localized humanitarian governance, positioning communication as a central mechanism for promoting local participation and democratizing decision-making processes.

The application of artificial intelligence in humanitarian operations opens new possibilities for crisis forecasting, data monitoring, and communication efficiency. However, it simultaneously raises critical ethical concerns regarding algorithmic transparency, data protection, and the inclusion of local communities in decision-making. Without adequate safeguards, technological innovation risks reinforcing existing asymmetries of power and information between global and local actors.

In conclusion, humanitarian communication in Yemen operates both as a mechanism for delivering aid and as a contested sphere for the shaping of narratives. It represents a multidimensional space where ethics, technology, and diplomacy intersect. The ongoing development of these communicative practices will critically influence the efficacy of crisis management, as well as the credibility and ethical legitimacy of international humanitarian assistance in the twenty-first century.

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## ГЕОПОЛІТИЧНІ Й ІСТОРИЧНІ ПІДСТАВИ ПОЛІТИКИ РОСІЙСЬКОЇ ФЕДЕРАЦІЇ ЩОДО САМОПРОГОЛОШЕНИХ ДЕРЖАВНИХ УТВОРЕНЬ В ГРУЗІЇ

## GEOPOLITICAL AND HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S POLICY TOWARD SELF-PROCLAIMED STATE ENTITIES IN GEORGIA

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**Abstract.** *The purpose of the study is to analyze the historical prerequisites and geopolitical background of Russia's policy towards provoking and pretending to settle the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-South Ossetian ethnopolitical conflicts in the territory of post-Soviet Georgia. The research methodology is based on the principles of historicism, systematicity, authorial objectivity, the use of general scientific (analysis, synthesis, generalization) and special historical (historical-genetic, historical-typological, historical-systemic) methods. The scientific novelty lies in clarifying the historical prerequisites for the proclamation of the self-proclaimed Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgian autonomous entities within the USSR, whose "independence" was supported first by the Soviet and later by the Russian leadership. In this way, the Russian Federation sought to weaken independent Georgia, depriving it of the right to pursue an independent foreign policy. Also, on the example of Georgia, one can see how Russia occupies territories, creates a controlled government there and thus influences the internal politics of its neighbors. The Russian Federation's policy towards self-proclaimed state formations in Georgia is part of the Russian strategy of restoring the Soviet empire with its center in Moscow. To this end, the Russian Federation uses the usual tools for empires: provoking ethnopolitical conflicts, managing them by introducing "peacekeeping forces" into the confrontation zone, encouraging the population of the rebellious republics to obtain Russian citizenship, providing economic and financial support to separatist regimes, and conducting an external disinformation campaign regarding the Russian Federation's right to the so-called historical territories of the former USSR. All these means are aimed at legitimizing the Russian presence in post-Soviet countries, such as Georgia, and thus at making it impossible for official Tbilisi to ensure the implementation of the foreign policy course towards Georgia's European and Euro-Atlantic integration. This Russian policy currently makes it impossible for Georgia to leave the sphere of Russian imperial geopolitical influence.*

**Keywords:** *Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Georgia, ethnopolitical conflict, Russian Federation policy, restoration of the Soviet Union, Russian-Georgian war, geopolitical influence.*

**Анотація.** *Метою дослідження є аналіз історичних передумов і геополітичного підґрунтя політики Росії щодо провокування і удаваного врегулювання грузино-абхазького і*



грузино-південноосетинського етнополітичних конфліктів на терені пострадянської Грузії. Методологія дослідження заснована на принципах історизму, системності, авторської об'єктивності, використанні загальнонаукових (аналіз, синтез, узагальнення) та спеціально-історичних (історико-генетичний, історико-типологічний, історико-системний) методів. Наукова новизна полягає у з'ясуванні історичних передумов проголошення у складі СРСР самопроголошених Абхазії і Південної Осетії, грузинських автономних утворень, чия «самостійність» була підтримана спочатку радянським, а згодом російським керівництвом. В такий спосіб Російська Федерація прагнула послабити незалежну Грузію, позбавивши її права проводити незалежну зовнішню політику. Також на прикладі Грузії можна побачити як Росія окупує території, створює там підконтрольну владу і таким чином впливає на внутрішню політику своїх сусідів. Політика РФ щодо самопроголошених державних утворень в Грузії є складовою російської стратегії відновлення радянської імперії з центром в Москві. Задля цього влада РФ використовує звичний для імперій інструментарій: провокування етнополітичних конфліктів, управління ними за допомогою введення в зону протистояння «миротворчих сил», заохочення населення бунтівних республік до отримання російського громадянства, економічну та фінансову підтримку сепаратистських режимів, зовнішню дезінформаційну кампанію щодо права РФ на так звані історичні території колишнього СРСР. Усі ці засоби спрямовані на легітимацію російської присутності в пострадянських країнах, на кшталт Грузії, відтак на неможливість для офіційного Тбілісі забезпечити реалізацію зовнішньополітичного курсу на європейську і євроатлантичну інтеграцію Грузії. Ця російська політика наразі унеможливорює вихід Грузії із сфери російського імперського геополітичного впливу.

**Ключові слова:** Абхазія, Південна Осетія, Грузія, етнополітичний конфлікт, політика Російської Федерації, відновлення Радянського Союзу, російсько-грузинська війна, геополітичний вплив.

**Introduction.** More than thirty years ago, amid the disintegration of the USSR and the rise of national liberation movements among peoples oppressed by the Soviet communist empire, the Abkhazian and South Ossetian Soviet republics were proclaimed within the Georgian SSR as components of the Soviet Union. Despite the collapse of the USSR, these entities did not become fully-fledged subjects of international law. Nevertheless, their existence posed a threat to the territorial integrity of independent Georgia and became an issue of geopolitical contention among major global political actors, thus transforming into a pressing international problem. What is the essence of this problem? Since the answer lies in historical and geopolitical dimensions, this article attempts to identify the causes and consequences of Russia's imperial policy in Abkhazia and Georgia's Tskhinvali region.

**The purpose of the study** is to analyze the historical prerequisites and geopolitical background of Russia's policy towards provoking and pretending to resolve the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-South Ossetian ethnopolitical conflicts in the territory of post-Soviet Georgia.

**Literature review.** The historical and political prerequisites of ethnopolitical conflicts in Georgia, the causes and consequences of the Georgian-Russian war of 2008 were covered in sufficient detail by Ukrainian researchers (Bebeshko, 2010; Doroshko, 2008, 2011; Doroshko, Aliksiejchenko, 2025; Korniychuk, Lazhnik, 2010; Kyrydon, Troyan, 2009; Kulyk, 2009; Perepelitsa, 2003; Shelest, 2009), and foreign authors (Baev, 1996; Herzig, 1999; Lynch, 2000; Zdravomyslov, 1999), however, they are not fully able to explain the origins of the interethnic confrontation in Georgia and the motivation for the participation of the Russian Federation in its settlement.

**Main results of research.** However, these studies do not fully clarify the deeper roots of interethnic confrontation. The causes of most interethnic conflicts in the post-Soviet space should

be sought not in inherent hostility between neighboring peoples but in the period when Russian Bolshevism - the imperial successor of Russian tsarism - imposed the Soviet form of governance on the peoples of the former national peripheries of the Russian Empire against their will, concealing behind it the dictatorship of the Bolshevik Party.

Acting on the principle of “divide and rule,” previously cohesive ethnic groups were divided among several national-state formations. Such was the fate of the Ossetians, who today live compactly in the Kabardino-Balkarian and North Ossetian republics of the Russian Federation and in the Tskhinvali region of Georgia. This North Caucasian people came under Russian control after Russia annulled the 1783 Treaty of Georgievsk in 1801, which had established a Russian protectorate over eastern Georgia. Following the creation of the Tiflis Governorate in 1843, which included the historical Georgian region of Shida Kartli, the Russian authorities established the Ossetian District. In 1859, however, it was abolished and incorporated into Gori County of Georgia (Doroshko, Aliksiejchenko, 2025, p. 113).

After the Bolshevik coup in Russia in October 1917, the territory of contemporary South Ossetia came under the control of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. Between 1918 and 1920, three anti-government uprisings orchestrated by the Bolsheviks broke out in South Ossetia, intending to establish Soviet rule and join the region to the RSFSR. All of them were suppressed. Nevertheless, after the Red Army overthrew the government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, the Bolshevik leadership created the South Ossetian Autonomous Region in April 1922, disregarding historical realities. The region incorporated not only the mountainous areas of the Caucasus range populated predominantly by Ossetians but also foothills and lowlands inhabited largely by Georgians. Initially, the autonomous region became part of the Transcaucasian Federation, and from 1936 it belonged to the Georgian SSR (Doroshko, Aliksiejchenko, 2025, p. 113).

The Georgian - Abkhaz conflict also stems from the arbitrary treatment of the history of Georgian - Abkhaz relations by Soviet authorities. When constructing national-state entities in the Caucasus in the early 1920s, the Bolshevik leadership in Moscow did not consider, for example, that Abkhazia had detached from the Georgian kingdom as early as the beginning of the 15th century. Between the late 15th and 18th centuries, Abkhaz territory was under Ottoman control, and from the early 19th century it became part of the Russian Empire. In 1917, the Abkhaz joined the Union of United Mountaineers of the Caucasus, which in 1918 proclaimed the Mountainous Republic composed of Dagestan, Checheno-Ingushetia, Ossetia, Karachay-Balkaria, Kabarda, Adygea, and Abkhazia. On 31 March 1921, the Abkhaz Soviet Socialist Republic was proclaimed; by December 1921 it became part of Soviet Georgia as the Abkhaz Soviet Republic under treaty status, and in 1931 it was transformed into the Abkhaz ASSR, which became part of the Georgian SSR in 1936 (Doroshko, Aliksiejchenko, 2025, p. 101).

Thus, by disregarding historical realities, the Bolsheviks deliberately laid the foundation for future Georgian - Ossetian and Georgian - Abkhaz confrontation, which erupted during the final years of the USSR. Having lost the ability to control the situation in the union republics, the Kremlin deliberately provoked interethnic conflicts in these territories in order to maintain geopolitical influence and justify the presence of troops in the form of “peacekeeping forces” (Doroshko, 2008, p. 20). In Georgia, such territories became Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The conflict between the Abkhaz autonomy and official Tbilisi is considered to have begun on 18 March 1989 with an Abkhaz gathering in the village of Lykhny, attended by 30,000 people, including party and government leaders of Abkhazia and representatives of the Armenian, Greek, and Russian communities. The gathering adopted a “Resolution of the Representatives of the Abkhaz People” and an “Appeal to M. S. Gorbachev,” calling for the restoration of “political, economic, and cultural sovereignty” of Abkhazia within Lenin’s idea of a federation (Doroshko, Aliksiejchenko, 2025, p. 102).

In response, between 1989 and 1990, the Supreme Council of the Georgian SSR adopted legislative acts annulling all agreements of the Georgian Soviet government from the 1920s that formed the legal basis for Georgian autonomies - Adjara, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia - and

passed an election law barring regional parties from participating in parliamentary elections. On 25 August 1990, the Abkhaz majority in the Supreme Council of the Abkhaz ASSR, supported by the Soviet central authorities in Moscow who viewed Abkhaz separatism as a counterweight to Tbilisi, adopted a Declaration of State Sovereignty of Abkhazia (later annulled by the Georgian Supreme Council). Later, at the Congress of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, the Abkhaz delegation announced its intention to withdraw Abkhazia from Georgia (Doroshko, Aliksiejchenko, 2025, p. 102).

The parliament of Abkhazia, headed by Vladislav Ardzinba, adopted a course toward open confrontation with official Tbilisi after the victory of Zviad Gamsakhurdia's bloc in the parliamentary elections in Georgia in October 1990. When, on 17 March 1991, a referendum on restoring the state independence of the republic was held in Georgia, the Abkhazians participated instead in the all-Union referendum, with 98.4% voting in favor of preserving the USSR (Doroshko, Aliksiejchenko, 2025, p. 102 - 103).

In July 1992, the Supreme Council of Abkhazia adopted a decision to restore the 1921 Constitution of Georgia, suspend the Soviet Georgian Constitution of 1978, and reinstate the Abkhaz Constitution of 1925, thereby nullifying the legal framework that placed Abkhazia within Georgia. This decision by the Abkhaz parliament effectively destroyed the contractual and legal basis (including the 1991 Georgian - Abkhaz agreement) for resolving contradictions between Sukhumi and Tbilisi by peaceful means and elevated military force to the primary instrument for pursuing the interests of both sides.

The decision of the Abkhaz parliament shifted the conflict into a phase of military-political crisis. Escalation of the Georgian - Abkhaz conflict occurred in the summer of 1992, when the new Georgian leadership under Eduard Shevardnadze, attempting to correct the mistakes of the country's first president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia - whose course toward building a unitary state had, in effect, contributed to Georgia's fragmentation - sent troops into Abkhazia in order to establish control over its territory.

The stage of open armed confrontation between Sukhumi and Tbilisi was marked by several particular features. These features stemmed from the multidimensional, heterogeneous, and divergent political goals of the conflict's actors.

Among the main actors on the Abkhaz side were the Abkhaz political elite and the Abkhaz population of the autonomous republic. For the Abkhaz elite, the military conflict served as a means of gaining independence from Georgia and constructing their own monoethnic state entity. For the Abkhaz population, the war became a chance for the survival of their ethnic group. For those who supported the Abkhazians without belonging to the Abkhaz ethnicity, the war became a means of personal enrichment.

Despite these differing interests, they were united by a common goal: to free themselves from Tbilisi's dominance over Sukhumi and from a Georgian statehood that excluded equal participation of Abkhazians in governance. The actors and participants representing the Abkhaz side were united not only by this shared goal but also by a shared path toward achieving it.

As for the goals and intentions of the Georgian side, these too were diverse. The then-state leader of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, did not desire a war with Abkhazia. His primary concern at the time was victory in the civil war against supporters of former president Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Nevertheless, Shevardnadze did not rule out the possibility of a military conflict with Abkhazia. However, he viewed the purpose of such a conflict not so much as military victory, but as ending the future war on terms that would be more or less acceptable for Tbilisi (Doroshko, Aliksiejchenko, 2025, p. 105). Moreover, Shevardnadze feared that successes by Georgian military formations would significantly strengthen the position of the ultra-nationalist military leadership within Georgia's political power structure, thereby weakening his own position. Thus, Shevardnadze regarded the war with Abkhazia primarily in the context of "domestic political" contradictions among competing power groups struggling for influence in Tbilisi. Given these considerations, Shevardnadze himself did not seek either victory or defeat in this war. Maintaining such a position ultimately led to Georgia's complete defeat in the military conflict with Abkhazia.



Because of his ambiguous attitude toward the war, Shevardnadze failed to organize mobilization of the population and resources necessary for effective military operations. At that time, Georgia did not possess a regular army, although in July 1992 the Russian military command agreed to transfer part of the Soviet Army's legacy to Georgia - 220 tanks, 250 armored vehicles, 285 artillery pieces, 100 combat aircraft, and 50 helicopters - on the condition that this equipment would not be used in internal conflicts (Baev, 1996, p. 117).

The forces that constituted the numerical composition of Georgian military formations participating in the war were those that most consistently supported Shevardnadze and official Tbilisi. These included the defenders of Sukhumi and the National Guard of the State Council, headed by Tengiz Kitovani and Gia Karkarashvili. Attempts to form a national guard and military units based on regular conscription yielded no significant results. The personnel of Georgian military formations consisted mainly of volunteers guided by patriotic and romantic sentiments, as well as by interests of personal gain. Such a composition lacked unity of purpose, discipline, and a high level of professional combat training. A relatively independent force consisted of the Mkhedrioni armed detachments of Jaba Ioseliani, formed from various strata of the population, including criminal elements. Finally, the majority of the Georgian forces consisted of militia units from the local Georgian population of Abkhazia - Svans, Mingrelians, and others. However, they were supporters of Gamsakhurdia and therefore distrusted Shevardnadze and were reluctant to fight on his side. Consequently, the Georgian leadership placed little hope in them and even hesitated to arm them. The Georgian militia in Abkhazia, as well as the two-thousand-man unit of Loti Kobalia - a staunch supporter of the former president - pursued two goals in the armed struggle against Abkhazia: first, to restore Georgian authority over Abkhazia, and second, to use the difficulties of war to overthrow Shevardnadze. The latter goal was the more important (Perepelitsia, 2003, p. 181).

Thus, although the Georgian side possessed a significant advantage over Abkhazia in human and material resources, the forces fighting on its behalf were not capable of carrying out the military orders of official Tbilisi. In contrast, the Abkhaz side had almost no internal human or material resources. Of the 90,000 Abkhaz population of the autonomous republic, no more than two thousand were capable of fighting. Therefore, in the war against official Tbilisi, Ardzinba relied mainly on external resources. In search of such support, he turned to Russian military personnel and representatives of the reactionary party nomenklatura within federal institutions of Russia, as well as to the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus. Both provided assistance.

Ardzinba's hopes were reinforced by the actions of the Russian military, who at the beginning of the war began forming assault units in Gudauta, where the Abkhaz leadership was later based. At the onset of the Georgian - Abkhaz conflict, ten battalions of Russia's internal troops, the Vladikavkaz Cossack regiment, and elements of the Dzerzhinsky Division were deployed to the North Caucasus. For his part, Ardzinba repeatedly emphasized the Abkhazians' desire to live within a unified state with Russia and supported the presence of Russian troops in Abkhazia. Having secured external military assistance, the Abkhaz government relied on professional military personnel represented by units of the Russian armed forces stationed in the republic, Abkhaz militia groups who viewed the war as a struggle for their physical survival, and mafia-type criminal mercenary formations (Perepelitsia, 2003, p. 184).

The war with Abkhazia began with the introduction of Georgian armed forces into its territory on August 14, 1992, under the pretext of releasing high-ranking representatives of the Georgian government who had been captured by the Zviadists in the village of Kohori, Gali district, among whom was the Deputy Prime Minister of Georgia A. Kavsadze. Another goal of this operation was to control the railway connection in the territory of Abkhazia and Western Georgia. But the actions of the Georgian troops, despite the relevant agreement between V. Ardzinba and E. Shevardnadze, were perceived by the Abkhazian side as aggression. The Abkhazian leadership announced a general mobilization. The opposition to the Georgian government troops by the local Abkhazian guard units was planned in advance (Zdravomyslov, 1999, p. 59).

Encountering resistance, the Georgian command began suppressing its pockets. The political objective of such actions was to overthrow the power of the Abkhaz ultranationalists led by V. Ardzinba and to restore comprehensive control over the autonomy by official Tbilisi.

The local Abkhaz guard and the small units of the Abkhaz militia were unable to mount serious resistance to the advance of Georgian armed formations, which rather easily took control of most of the territory of the autonomy. On 18 August, four days after the start of the military operation, fighting erupted for the capital - Sukhumi. On the same day, the building of the Abkhaz government was seized and the Georgian flag was raised on its roof. On 19 August 1992, Sukhumi came under full control of Georgian forces.

The Abkhaz government left Sukhumi and sought refuge at the location of the Russian military garrison in Gudauta. The pursuit of the Abkhaz government by Georgian troops ended on the outskirts of Gudauta. The command of the Russian garrison warned T. Kitovani that if Georgian units entered the city, they would be destroyed (Doroshko, Aliksiejchenko, 2025, p. 108). Moreover, E. Shevardnadze was categorically opposed to Georgian troops taking Gudauta.

After the fall of Sukhumi and the blockade of Gudauta, pockets of Abkhaz resistance remained only in the Ochamchire district. On 25 August 1992, the commander of Georgian forces, G. Karkarashvili, delivered an ultimatum to Abkhaz partisans: within 24 hours they were to cease armed resistance throughout the territory of Abkhazia (Karasar Hasan Ali, 2008). For the Abkhaz, the situation became critical. They were essentially facing military capitulation. Under these circumstances, the most important tasks for V. Ardzinba's government became, first, securing a temporary ceasefire, and second, mobilizing forces and obtaining external assistance. V. Ardzinba therefore appealed to the government of the Russian Federation to act as a mediator in negotiations, and to the Russian military and the Confederation of Mountain Peoples for military assistance.

Thus, with the intervention in the Georgian - Abkhaz conflict by the mountain peoples of the Caucasus (traditional allies of Abkhazia) and by units of the Russian Armed Forces (today the so-called peacekeeping contingent), the fate of the confrontation was decided in favor of Sukhumi. In this way, the Abkhaz side won the war, primarily thanks to the covert support provided to official Sukhumi by the personnel of the three Russian military bases stationed in the autonomy.

Since then, Abkhazia's position in the conflict - marked by extreme radicalism - has not changed. Most of its population does not believe in the possibility of parity-based negotiations, primarily because of the rigid stance of the Georgian leadership on its main demands: the inclusion of Abkhazia within Georgia and the return of 300,000 refugees - three times the population of Abkhazia itself. Under such conditions, the parties to the conflict face not only a divergence of interests but also a divergence of interpretations of events, as the population of Abkhazia perceives the legitimate (from the standpoint of international practice) demands of the Georgian side as unjustified pressure and an attempt to reclaim territories they believe do not belong to Georgia. At the same time, every subsequent attempt by Tbilisi to defend its interests, promoting the idea of uniting all peoples of Georgia into a single state - using both historical and political precedents - meets outrage and leads to further escalation. Despite the most acceptable autonomy provisions possible, the Abkhaz do not consider these proposals justified, which deepens the crisis.

The conflict in Abkhazia became a source of instability in the entire Caucasus region, as it touched the interests of numerous ethnic and political groups. Directly or indirectly, Georgia, Abkhazia, Russia and its North Caucasian republics, Armenia, and Turkey became involved in the confrontation. An attempt at resolution came in mid-July 2006, when the Georgian parliament adopted a resolution demanding the withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping forces from Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In response, the Abkhaz parliament called on the international community "to begin immediately the process of official recognition of the independence of the Republic of Abkhazia," and decided to appeal to the UN, OSCE, and other international organizations to "halt the militaristic plans of the Georgian leadership".

At the end of April 2008, an unmanned reconnaissance aircraft that had entered from Georgian territory was shot down over Abkhazia. The incident triggered a serious international scandal. Georgia accused Russia of shooting down the aircraft and demanded that the issue be reviewed by the UN Security Council. However, the UNSC failed to reach a unified position regarding the situation in Abkhazia. On both questions - regarding the strengthening of Russia's ties with the unrecognized republics and the flight of the Georgian UAV - Council members merely listened to Russia's position.

Following these events, the situation in the Georgian–Abkhaz conflict zone sharply escalated. Moscow deployed additional peacekeeping forces to Abkhazia. Tbilisi interpreted this step as military aggression. Meanwhile, the Abkhaz leadership decided to take advantage of the war in South Ossetia in August 2008 to achieve final withdrawal from the jurisdiction of official Tbilisi and obtain international recognition of its statehood.

The Georgian–Ossetian conflict during the collapse of the USSR was provoked by the decision of the South Ossetian regional council to transform the region into an autonomous republic within Georgia on 10 November 1989. The next day, the Georgian parliament annulled the decision, and on 23 November 1989, about 20,000 citizens of Georgia marched toward the administrative center of the autonomous region, Tskhinvali - the march organized by the leader of the national-patriotic forces, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, and the First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, Givi Gumbaridze, to “protect the Georgian population” of the autonomy. The marchers were stopped by Soviet Interior Ministry troops and blood was shed.

In autumn 1990, relying on the USSR law of 26 April 1990, which expanded the rights of autonomous entities, the South Ossetian regional council proclaimed the region the South Ossetian Soviet Democratic Republic and appealed to Moscow to recognize it as a subject of the Soviet federation independent of Georgia. In response, official Tbilisi abolished the South Ossetian autonomous region in December 1990 and began a blockade of the area that lasted until July 1992.

The economic blockade was accompanied by armed confrontation, which became particularly fierce after a referendum held by the South Ossetian leadership on 19 January 1992, in which 90% of participants supported joining Russia. The fighting, which continued with interruptions until July 1992, was halted through Russian mediation, and Russian peacekeepers were deployed in South Ossetia. The consequences of the 1992 Georgian - Ossetian conflict were tragic: 93 villages burned, more than a thousand killed, and 40,000 - 100,000 refugees (Doroshko, 2011, p.119).

In the years following the conflict, Russia consistently armed and strengthened the South Ossetian separatist regime, openly supporting the region's separation. Russia also actively granted local residents Russian citizenship (more than 90% of the population of the Tskhinvali region, according to unofficial data), which became one of the “legal” pretexts for Russia's military operation of “coercion to peace” against sovereign Georgia on the territory of South Ossetia in August 2008.

The international consequences of this operation are well known: Georgia's final loss of jurisdiction over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and the recognition of these self-proclaimed state entities by Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and the Republic of Nauru.

Georgia effectively lost Abkhazia back in 1992, not least because the Abkhaz, having only conditional autonomy during Soviet times, preserved their national identity and largely “nationalized” local power structures. Most key positions in the Abkhaz ASSR administration were held by ethnic Abkhaz, and it was they who, amid the national revival, raised the question of granting Abkhazia the status of a union republic. In this they received significant support from Moscow, which feared the secession of Georgia - whose de facto leader became former dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia - from the USSR. Also contributing to Abkhazia's separation from Georgia was the rapprochement between the Abkhaz leadership and the command of Soviet military units stationed in the autonomy, whose intervention in the Georgian - bkhaz conflict on the latter's side became a decisive factor in Abkhazia's military victory.

The fighting in the Tskhinvali region stopped in August 2008, but Russia's aggression against Georgia did not end there. Moscow continued the so-called "borderization", that is, the creeping annexation of Georgian territory, pressure, propaganda and other hybrid methods of intervention.

As a result of the war, Russia occupied Abkhazia and South Ossetia and recognized their "independence", which means the actual destruction of the Helsinki Accords, which are based on the recognition of the inviolability of borders in Europe. This is evidenced by the well-known position of the OSCE – an institution created during the Helsinki process – according to which both sides are found guilty of the Russian-Georgian confrontation in South Ossetia. This means that Realpolitik has once again won, its victim this time being not only the brutal violation of the Helsinki Accords in general, but also the state sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia, in particular. However, in January 2021, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled on Georgia's claim against Russia for the 2008 war. The ECHR judges satisfied almost all of Georgia's claims and recognized that it was the Russian Federation that occupied the regions of Georgia. The 2008 war showed that Russia is ready to do anything to restore and maintain control over the post-Soviet region (13 years after the war... <https://babel.ua/texts/61110-cherez-13-rokiv-pislya-viyni-gruziya-zmogla-dovesti-fakt-rosiyskoji-agresiji-v-sudi-chomu-abhaziya-ta-pivdenna-oseitiya-konfliktuvali-z-gruzinami-ta-yak-rosiya-mayzhe-unikla-pokarannya>).

**Conclusions.** So, on the example of the Russian war in Georgia, we can see how Russia occupies territories, creates a controlled government there and thus influences the internal politics of its neighbors. Such actions of the Russian Federation are a continuation of the Kremlin's policy of restoring the Soviet empire with its center in Moscow. To this end, the Russian government uses the usual tools for empires: provoking ethnopolitical conflicts, managing them by introducing "peacekeeping forces" into the confrontation zone, encouraging the population of the rebellious republics to obtain Russian citizenship, economic and financial support for separatist regimes, an external disinformation campaign regarding the right of the Russian Federation to the so-called historical territories of the former USSR. All these means are aimed at legitimizing the Russian presence in post-Soviet countries, such as Georgia, and therefore at the impossibility for official Tbilisi to ensure the implementation of the foreign policy course for the European and Euro-Atlantic integration of Georgia. Such a policy of the Russian Federation currently makes it impossible for Georgia to leave the sphere of Russian imperial geopolitical influence.

Thus, the analysis of the causes of the 2008 Russian-Georgian war in South Ossetia once again confirmed the axiomatic statement that interethnic conflicts are often provoked by external forces of the imperial type and acquire extraordinary proportions as a result of their intervention in local disputes. These forces have their own interests and are interested in deepening conflict situations according to the "divide and rule!" scheme. The settlement of spontaneous interethnic disputes is more painless under the conditions of the appropriate operation of international security mechanisms and mutual tolerance of the parties. The dominance of only one state in the region can only provoke various conflicts, while real stability is formed rather in a situation of balance of various geopolitical forces.

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## **MECHANISMS OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF PRO-ISRAEL INTEREST GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES**

## **МЕХАНІЗМИ ПОЛІТИЧНОГО ВПЛИВУ ПРОІЗРАЇЛЬСЬКИХ ГРУП ІНТЕРЕСІВ У США**

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**Abstract.** *The article analyses the historical origins of the Israeli lobby in the United States of America and outlines the peculiarities of the legal strategies of pro-Israeli interest groups aimed at avoiding registration under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), despite maintaining close coordination with Israeli interests. Significant financial activity during the 2024 election campaign indicates the growing concern of these structures about the possible loss of bipartisan consensus and a noticeable change in public sentiment, especially among young people and the progressive wing of the Democratic Party. Uncovering of hidden disinformation operations, in particular, the Stoic Project, funded by the Israeli Ministry of Diaspora Affairs, and the use of fake accounts on social media to discredit American lawmakers, indicates a shift from legitimate mechanisms of political influence to practices that can be considered manipulative interference. Such instruments of hybrid information activity significantly change the nature of political influence.*

**Keywords:** *Lobbying, pro-Israel lobby, American Israel Public Affairs Committee, FARA, LDA.*

**Анотація.** У статті проаналізовано історичні витоки ізраїльського лобі у Сполучених Штатах Америки та окреслено особливості правових стратегій проізраїльських груп інтересів, спрямованих на уникнення реєстрації за Законом про реєстрацію іноземних агентів (FARA), попри збереження тісної координації з інтересами Ізраїлю. Значна фінансова активність під час передвиборчої кампанії 2024 року свідчить про зростаюче занепокоєння цих структур можливою втратою двопартійного консенсусу та помітною зміною громадських настроїв, особливо серед молоді та прогресивного крила

Демократичної партії. Викриття прихованих дезінформаційних операцій, зокрема показовим є «Проект Stoic», що фінансуються Міністерством у справах діаспори Ізраїлю та використання фейкових акаунтів в соціальних мережах для дискредитації американських законодавців, свідчить про перехід від законних механізмів політичного впливу до практик, що можуть розцінюватися як маніпулятивне втручання. Такі інструменти гібридної інформаційної діяльності суттєво змінюють характер політичного впливу.

**Ключові слова:** Лобіювання, проізраїльське лобі, Американський Ізраїльський Комітет зі зв'язків з громадськістю, FARA, LDA.

**Introduction.** The pro-Israel lobby is one of the most influential and resourceful lobbying structures in the United States, with an unprecedented impact on the formation of US foreign policy in the Middle East. Its institutionalisation began in 1954 with the founding of the American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs (AZCPA), later renamed AIPAC, and was a response to the Israeli-American crisis caused by the Kibya massacre in 1953. This event stimulated the consolidation of the American Jewish community and its mobilisation in defence of Israel.

It is important to note that the lobby was formed not only to protect the interests of American Jews, but also through intensive transnational contacts with Israeli leaders, who actively intervened in the affairs of the American Jewish community to build support for Israel.

Lobbying activities in the United States are governed by two key acts: the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) and the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). Despite its significant influence on US foreign policy, the key organisation, AIPAC, avoids registration under FARA, which requires detailed disclosure from those acting on behalf of foreign governments. Instead, AIPAC functions as a domestic non-profit organisation, claiming to represent American citizens and not take instructions from any foreign person or government.

**Recent literature review.** Contemporary research, particularly the works of John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, emphasises that Israel's leading role in US Middle East policy is primarily due to the activities of the pro-Israel lobby, rather than solely strategic interests. Researchers argue that these groups deliberately influence the formation of American foreign policy, directing it towards support for Israel.

**The purpose of research.** The purpose of this research is to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the mechanisms, strategies, and institutional factors that ensure the stable and effective influence of the pro-Israel lobby in the United States of America.

**Main research results.** The institutionalisation of the pro-Israel lobby in the United States dates back to 1954 and was a response to the Israeli-American crisis caused by the Kibya massacre in October 1953, when the actions of Israeli soldiers were widely condemned internationally.

These events were an important factor in the consolidation of the American Jewish community and the establishment in 1954 of the American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs (AZCPA), which was later renamed the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). The creation of AZCPA/AIPAC became a central element in the institutionalisation of the lobby. Thus, broad support was secured by uniting both Zionist and 'non-Zionist' groups. This gave impetus to the consolidation and mobilisation of the American Jewish community in defence of Israel in new, institutionalised forms.

It should be noted that the Israeli lobby was formed not only to protect the interests of American Jews, but also through intensive transnational contacts with Israeli leaders who actively intervened in American Jewish affairs to build support for Israel (*Edge of the Abyss*, 2018).

Thus, the lobby was formed out of both American and Israeli needs, laying the foundation for its unprecedented influence on US foreign policy.

Lobbying activities in the United States are governed by two key acts: the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) and the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) (*Congress USA (n.d.)*).



Thus, according to FARA, since 1938, ‘foreign agents’ — individuals or organisations that engage in lobbying or advocacy on behalf of foreign governments, organisations or individuals (‘foreign principals’) — are required to register with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and disclose their relationships, activities and related financial compensation. FARA is therefore the primary legal instrument aimed at ensuring transparency of foreign influence (*Department of Justice (n.d.)*).

Despite its significant influence on US foreign policy, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) avoids registration under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), which requires detailed disclosure from those who act on behalf of foreign entities, in particular those promoting the interests of other countries within the United States. Instead, AIPAC functions as a domestic non-profit organisation under the US Internal Revenue Code, claiming to represent millions of American citizens and not to take instructions from any foreign person or government. Guided by the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA), AIPAC regularly submits quarterly activity reports (Form LD-2) to the US Congress. An analysis of the reports shows that lobbying issues in areas such as defence, international relations and appropriations, specific bills (e.g., on military and economic aid to Israel), authorities contacted (House of Representatives, Senate, State Department), and an estimate of total lobbying expenses are provided. Thus, the transparency of AIPAC's activities is ensured through the LDA, which indicates the absence of foreign interest (*AIPAC Public Reports (n.d.)*).

This allows the organisation to avoid registering under FARA and to operate under the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA), a less burdensome regulatory act governing lobbying activities at the federal level in the United States.

The strategic use of legal mechanisms to avoid FARA is one of the main factors in the political effectiveness of the lobby. By avoiding FARA, AIPAC is not required to disclose its ties to Israeli officials or sources of funding in detail, which allows it to exert powerful influence while enjoying the privileges of a domestic lobby. AIPAC's ability to consistently promote policies that are fully in line with the interests of a foreign government while maintaining its status as a domestic lobbyist, demonstrates the deep integration of lobbying goals into the American political landscape, ensuring maximum political effectiveness with minimal transparency regarding the ultimate beneficiary of the policy (*The Forward 2025*).

It should be noted that the pro-Israel lobby in the United States is not a monolithic structure, but rather a coalition of various organisations covering a broad ideological and religious spectrum. With significant financial resources and a developed organisational structure, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) remains the most influential pro-Israel lobbying organisation in the United States. According to Open Secrets, the total amount spent by leading pro-Israel lobby groups in the US from 2021 to 2022 was approximately \$35,280,906. AIPAC alone spent \$20,846,098 during this period, accounting for 59% of the total spending by leading pro-Israel lobbying groups. Interestingly, of the \$20,846,098, approximately \$7,807,707 was given to Democrats, \$8,500,000 to independents, and \$4,533,391 to Republicans. In addition, J Street spent \$5,879,332 during the same period, of which its contribution to Democrats amounted to approximately \$5,253,435 (*Pro-Israel Lobby, 2023*).

These statistics demonstrate the scale of AIPAC's institutional potential, which enables it to actively influence US political and strategic decisions regarding Israel. The organisation officially defines its mission as working with Congress and the executive branch to support stable and bipartisan US-Israel relations. In 2021, with the assistance of AIPAC, the Political Action Committee (AIPAC PAC) and the Super PAC — United Democracy Project (UDP) were established. According to Matthew Sanderson, a lawyer at Caplin & Drysdale, AIPAC, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, is an influential pro-Israel lobbying group whose interests often coincide with those of the Israeli government. ‘But because it does not receive money from the Israeli government and does not have Israeli government officials on its board of directors, it is not legally a foreign agent,’ Sanderson said (*The Forward, 2025*).



Thus, PAC is considered the largest pro-Israel committee in America, which has invested the most resources directly in candidates' election campaigns. UDP is actively used to support pro-Israel candidates and, more importantly, to target progressive candidates whom the lobby considers hostile to Israel's interests. For example, in 2022, the UDP directed its lobbying campaign to oust Israel critics Marie Newman and Andy Levin.

The strategic communication of these electoral tools is key: the UDP positions itself as an organisation that supports 'democracies around the world' and strategically avoids mentioning Israel in its advertising campaigns, despite direct funding from AIPAC.

Christians United for Israel (CUFI) occupies a key position among pro-Israel lobbying structures and brings together approximately 10 million evangelical Christians, making it the largest pro-Israel organisation in the United States. CUFI's primary mission is based on the theological belief that unwavering support for Israel is a biblical requirement linked to end-time prophecies. Their lobbying efforts focus on securing US military aid for Israel. Thanks to powerful lobbying efforts, support was secured for key political decisions, including the historic relocation of the US embassy to Jerusalem. After the attacks on 7 October 2023, CUFI intensified its lobbying for accelerated arms deliveries to Israel and tougher sanctions against Iran (*AIPAC & Zionist Lobby Groups, n.d.*).

J Street represents the liberal wing of the lobby, positioning itself as a hub for 'pro-Israel, pro-peace' Americans. The organisation advocates a two-state solution as a necessary condition for Israel's survival as a Jewish democracy. Unlike AIPAC, J Street publicly criticises Israeli settlements and takes a more moderate stance on borders and aid to the Palestinians. Although J Street has much in common with AIPAC on Israel's security, their priorities and methods differ, leading to open political struggle (*InfluenceWatch, n.d.*).

The structure of the pro-Israel lobby, consisting of three heterogeneous but functional blocks (institutional AIPAC/UDP, theological CUFI, and liberal-critical J Street), ensures the stability of its influence. This fragmentation allows the lobby to cover the entire political spectrum in the United States – from ultra-conservative Christians to centrist Democrats. As a result, support for Israel has different ideological and electoral 'anchors,' making it truly bipartisan and resistant to significant internal political shifts.

The financial power of the pro-Israel lobby allows it to exert direct political influence on legislators, especially through its political committees.

Since the establishment of the Super PAC United Democracy Project in 2021, lobbying expenditures have increased significantly. The financial resources involved in shaping the party landscape are compelling evidence of the extraordinary activity of pro-Israel PACs. In 2022, the six candidates who accumulated the largest amounts of funding represented the centrist wing of the Democratic Party and competed with candidates from the left wing in the party's primary elections. Collectively, they received about \$25 million, which accounted for approximately 42% of all donor spending (*Perkins, 2024*).

In 2024, pro-Israel organisations announced their intention to invest more than \$100 million in the political race. According to analysts, the scale of this unprecedented spending was aimed at limiting the influence of pro-Palestinian positions in Congress and maintaining the current political status quo. Such funding is a decisive tool of political selection. In 2024, 96% of candidates supported by AIPAC won their elections (*Beckett, L., 2024*).

This high success rate confirms that financial investments effectively determine the composition of Congress. The main mechanism of influence is the use of Super PACs to target progressive candidates, especially members of the 'Squad' who openly criticise Israel's military actions in Gaza. Super PACs, unlike traditional PACs, can receive and spend unlimited funds, allowing the lobby to direct huge sums to defeat specific opponents (*Marcetic, 2024*).

An important element of pro-Israel groups' activities is the bipartisan nature of their funding. AIPAC PAC and UDP provide funds to both Republicans (Michelle Steel, Young Kim, Ken Calvert) and Democrats (Nancy Pelosi, Eric Swalwell, Jimmy Panetta), ensuring that support for Israel is politically safe for lawmakers regardless of their party affiliation (*Perkins, 2024*).

The use of Super PACs' financial resources as a tool for political pressure sends a clear political signal and effectively turns financial support for candidates into a means of influence. Such structures are capable of investing significant resources in promoting the desired politicians, and those who do not demonstrate consistent support for Israel risk facing a well-organised and financially secure campaign by their opponents. As a result, many lawmakers refrain from making public statements or avoid difficult topics in order to avoid additional political pressure. The lobby has been highly successful in shaping US foreign policy through key legislation and diplomatic instruments that ensure long-term support for Israel.

The cornerstone of US-Israeli relations is long-term military aid, which has been institutionalised through a series of ten-year Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs). The current MOU, in effect from 2019 to 2028, sets a minimum annual funding level of \$3.3 billion under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programme. \$500 million is allocated for joint missile defence programmes.

In total, this guarantees Israel at least \$3.8 billion in annual aid.<sup>18</sup> Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of US foreign aid, having received over \$150 billion as of February 2022 (*Rosen, n.d.*).

AIPAC's key lobbying priorities include ensuring full legislative funding of MOU commitments, expanding joint innovation, and ensuring Israel's continued 'Qualitative Military Edge' (QME). <sup>19</sup> QME is a legislative principle that obliges the US to provide Israel with access to the most advanced military technologies (such as the F-35 Lightning) to ensure its military dominance in the region.<sup>18</sup>

According to the US State Department, lobbyists have demonstrated their ability to quickly mobilise Congress to approve additional, unscheduled appropriations. A notable example was the allocation of \$1 billion to strengthen the Iron Dome missile defence system. This additional funding, approved within a single year, exceeded the amount provided to the system over the previous decade and was in addition to the already guaranteed \$3.8 billion in annual military aid (*Nichols, 2021*).

The institutionalisation of US foreign policy at the MOU level is the highest achievement of lobbying. It transfers military aid from an annual discretionary budget item to a long-term, quasi-contractual format, minimising the political vulnerability of aid to short-term changes in administrations or fluctuations in public opinion. In this way, the lobby secures US strategic commitments until 2028, which are highly likely to be extended.

The lobby also successfully influences US domestic legislation, particularly through its fight against the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement.

Pro-Israel groups have pushed for the passage of laws aimed at punishing those who participate in boycotts of Israel or its affiliated organisations. As of 2025, thirty-eight US states have already implemented anti-BDS laws. However, opponents view these laws as 'lawfare' that violates the right to freedom of speech, which protects boycotts as a form of political expression. Under a number of US regulations, government contractors, companies, and even individuals may be prohibited from entering into contracts with government agencies if they participate in the boycott of Israel (*Moskowitz, 2025*).

At the federal level, the lobby supports bipartisan initiatives such as the Countering Hate Against Israel by Federal Contractors Act, which aims to prohibit the federal government from contracting with organisations that support BDS. Proponents of these laws often argue that the BDS movement is a form of anti-Semitism (*U.S. Congress, 2025*).

The success in passing anti-BDS laws demonstrates the lobby's deep integration into local and federal legislative processes. The lobby is effectively exporting Israel's internal conflict to the United States, using American legal and financial mechanisms to punish political activism in American society.

U.S. political support in the international arena plays a key role in securing Israel's interests, largely thanks to the influence of lobbying structures. The United States provides Israel with

comprehensive diplomatic support, the most notable manifestation of which is the regular use of its veto power in the UN Security Council.

The United States has imposed its veto 42 times on resolutions condemning Israel. Between 1991 and 2011, 15 of the 24 vetoes imposed by the US were used to protect Israel. These vetoes blocked resolutions condemning violence against protesters, illegal Israeli settlements, or calling for investigations into military actions.<sup>2</sup> This unwavering diplomatic support provides Israel with immunity from international pressure and condemnation (*Newton, 2021*).

In recent years, there has been a noticeable shift in lobbying efforts towards the digital space. This process encompasses both open, albeit legally controversial, campaigns involving influencers and completely covert state disinformation operations.

The Israeli government, through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has begun to directly fund communication campaigns in the United States. Firms such as Genesis and Consulting have been hired for 'strategic communication support, content creation and influencer outreach.' In particular, Bridges Partners managed the 'Project Esther' campaign, in which 14–18 influencers were paid up to \$7,000 to post pro-Israel content on social media (*Cleveland-Stout, 2025*).

This activity raised concerns about FARA compliance. Although Bridges Partners registered, none of the influencers who received direct compensation from a foreign principal publicly registered as foreign agents as required by law. Organisations such as the Quincy Institute and Public Citizen filed a formal complaint with the Department of Justice, demanding that Bridges Partners disclose the identities and contracts of these influencers. If influencers knowingly accept money from the Israeli government to create content that is viewed by millions of their American followers, it is unclear why they should not be required to register under FARA (*Public Citizen, 2024*).

The most significant and alarming development is the discovery of covert influence campaigns funded directly by the Israeli government. Israel's Ministry of Diaspora Affairs allocated \$2 million to the Israeli firm Stoic to conduct a digital communications campaign targeting American lawmakers.

This information campaign aimed to shape public opinion and influence African-American Democratic Party lawmakers Hakim Jeffries and Raphael Warnock in order to secure funding for the Israeli army. The influence network included hundreds of fake accounts on X, Instagram, and Facebook (*Lyons, 2024*).

The exposure of the direct involvement of Israeli government agencies in covert operations targeting American lawmakers represents a qualitatively new stage in influence strategies. It goes beyond traditional lobbying, as it involves manipulation and disinformation using methods typically associated with hostile or illiberal states. This approach reflects the Israeli government's growing concern about losing public support in the US, especially among young people. Legal lobbying tools (AIPAC) are now complemented by a state apparatus of covert influence.

The specific targeting of Democrats underscores that Israel's political opposition is growing within this progressive coalition. The Stoic campaign was designed to create internal conflicts within the Democratic Party's key coalition in order to insulate centrist political providers from pressure from the progressive base, ensuring political stability of support.

The revolving door phenomenon is a key mechanism ensuring the long-term integration of pro-Israel priorities into the US policy-making process. This phenomenon involves former high-ranking government officials, diplomats, and military officials moving to work for private lobbying firms or think tanks associated with the lobby (*Fisman et al., 2025*).

Think tanks that promote pro-Israel foreign policy interests play a central role in this process. One key example is the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA). JINSA's mission is to promote US national security interests in the Middle East, primarily by positioning Israel as 'the most capable and critical security partner of the United States in the 21st century.' JINSA conducts educational programmes and in-depth research to influence US policy. The organisation actively involves former high-ranking officials in its advisory councils and expert groups. For example, Elliot Abrams, who previously served as Deputy National Security

Advisor, is involved in key JINSA projects, including initiatives on Iran policy and the Task Force on the Future of Gaza. Such structures effectively create a platform for officials who supported pro-Israel policies during their government service to continue to exert influence after leaving office. This allows their approaches and analytical frameworks to be preserved within the US military-political elite. (*JINSA, n.d.*).

The phenomenon of the 'revolving door' is an important element of political influence mechanisms. The transition of former high-ranking officials, especially from the defence and foreign policy sectors, to think tanks that support Israeli interests creates conditions for influencing policy formation at the stage of its development, and not only during its consideration in Congress. The professional experience and access that such experts possess give pro-Israel initiatives additional legitimacy and 'strategic depth,' strengthening their position in the American political process.

Therefore, key provisions, such as maintaining Israel's qualitative military edge (QME) and the policy of containing Iran, are not political slogans, but deeply rooted and conceptually sound elements of American strategy, backed by think tanks. Academic assessments, particularly those of John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, argue that Israel's central place in US Middle East policy is primarily due to lobbying rather than hard strategic interests, and that these groups are actively working to shift US foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction. (*Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007*).

### **Conclusions**

The pro-Israel lobby in the United States influences policy through a combination of different approaches, including the open activities of organisations such as AIPAC and CUFI, as well as active participation in election campaigns through significant financial contributions to Super PACs. Separately, it is worth noting reports of possible covert disinformation operations linked to foreign actors.

The influence of pro-Israel interest groups at the federal level is evidenced by long-term commitments in the area of military aid and the adoption of laws restricting criticism of Israel. Another important factor is that these structures avoid registration under FARA, which allows them to maintain a high level of influence without extensive disclosure requirements.

Significant financial contributions to the 2024 election campaign (over \$100 million) demonstrate concern about the loss of bipartisan consensus on support for Israel, especially among young people and the progressive wing of the Democratic Party. That is why resources are being directed towards maintaining political influence and curbing internal opposition.

Reports of alleged covert information operations targeting American politicians may indicate a shift from traditional forms of lobbying to practices that are seen as interference in US domestic politics.

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**СУЧАСНА СИСТЕМА МІЖНАРОДНОГО ПРАВА**

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**APPROACHES TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS OF LEGAL REGIMES IN THE PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS DURING ARMED CONFLICTS**

**ПІДХОДИ ДО ВРЕГУЛЮВАННЯ КОНФЛІКТУ ПРАВОВИХ РЕЖИМІВ ПРИ ЗАХИСТІ ІНВЕСТИЦІЙ У ПЕРІОД ЗБРОЙНИХ КОНФЛІКТІВ**

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**Abstract.** *The article examines the interaction between international investment law and international humanitarian law in the context of armed conflicts. It analyses the concept of lex specialis within both legal regimes and considers different approaches to determining their priority of application, namely international humanitarian law, international investment law, and the contextual approach. Particular attention is paid to the practical application of bilateral investment treaties in situations of military occupation of territory and to issues of state responsibility in such circumstances. The study highlights the challenges of protecting investments in contexts of occupation and frozen conflicts, as well as approaches to determining the legal status of investment assets (civilian or military), especially where the activities of an investment object are directed towards the production of dual-use goods. The article further examines arbitral decisions and scholarly opinions concerning the impact of armed conflicts on the operation of bilateral investment treaties. It emphasizes that an international armed conflict may be interpreted differently under the two regimes: as a regular normative condition in international humanitarian law, and as a circumstance of force majeure in international investment law. The necessity of adopting a flexible, contextual approach is underlined, one that simultaneously takes into account the objectives of both regimes (safeguarding investors' rights under international investment law and ensuring compliance with states' humanitarian obligations under international humanitarian law).*

**Keywords:** *international humanitarian law; investment protection; armed conflict; legal regimes; conflict of norms; international investment arbitration; jurisdiction.*

**Анотація.** У статті досліджується взаємодія міжнародного інвестиційного права та міжнародного гуманітарного права в умовах збройних конфліктів. Проаналізовано концепції *lex specialis* у контексті обох правових режимів. Розглянуто різні підходи до визначення пріоритетності їх застосування, а саме міжнародного гуманітарного права, міжнародного інвестиційного та застосування контекстуального підходів. Здійснено аналіз особливостей практичного застосування Двосторонніх інвестиційних договорів у контексті воєнної окупації території та відповідальності держав у такому контексті. Особливу увагу приділено проблемам захисту інвестицій в умовах окупації та заморожених конфліктів, а також підходи до визначення статусу інвестиційних об'єктів (цивільні чи військові), зокрема, коли діяльність інвестиційного об'єкту спрямована на виготовлення товарів подвійного призначення. Проаналізовано рішення інвестиційних арбітражів та позиції науковців, які стосуються впливу збройних конфліктів на дію двосторонніх інвестиційних договорів. Наголошено на тому, що міжнародний збройний конфлікт може тлумачитися по-різному у межах двох правових режимів: як регулярний нормативний стан у міжнародному гуманітарному праві та як обставина непереборної сили в міжнародному інвестиційному. Підкреслено необхідність застосування гнучкого, контекстуального підходу, який буде враховувати одночасно цілі обох галузей: забезпечення захисту прав інвесторів в міжнародному інвестиційному праві та дотримання гуманітарних зобов'язань держав за міжнародним гуманітарним правом.

**Ключові слова:** міжнародне гуманітарне право; захист інвестицій; збройний конфлікт; правові режими; колізія норм; міжнародний інвестиційний арбітраж; юрисдикція.

**Introduction.** The interaction between international humanitarian law and international investment law is gaining increasing relevance due to the growing number of armed conflicts accompanied by significant economic and legal consequences. On the one hand, international humanitarian law establishes the rules of warfare and ensures the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure. On the other hand, international investment law is designed to guarantee security and stability for foreign investors by safeguarding them against expropriation and discriminatory actions by states. However, in situations where investments are located in territories affected by international or non-international armed conflicts, conflicts of norms and jurisdictional issues arise, requiring comprehensive legal analysis.

**Literature review.** A substantial body of scientific research has been devoted to the study of international investment law, in particular to issues of investment protection and the interpretation of investment standards, including the works of Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), Schreuer (2009), and Yannaca-Small (2008). An equally significant number of works focus on international humanitarian law, especially regarding the regulation of military operations and permissible restrictions on property rights during armed conflicts, as addressed by Sassòli (2019), Cerone (2006), Roberts (2008), Bothe (2013), and Milanovic (2011).

Moreover, most scholarly works address the resolution of conflicts of norms in peacetime, while the specificities of periods of armed conflict remain underexplored. Only a few researchers emphasize the necessity of harmonizing legal regimes and developing approaches for their coordinated application, including McLachlan (2005), Kriebaum (2010), Dolzer (2011), Brower (2010), Schill (2011), Happold (2009), and Roe (2013). Thus, in the academic discourse, there arises a need for a detailed research of the conflict between this law regims.

**The purpose of the study.** The purpose of the article is to analyze the interaction between international humanitarian law and international investment law within the framework of armed conflict.

**Main results of the research.** The main goal of international investment law is the protection of investors' rights and assets. It provides guarantees, as enshrined in investment

treaties (the primary instruments governing investors' activities), such as protection against unlawful expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, as well as effective mechanisms for resolving disputes between investors and states. International humanitarian law seeks to establish standards of protection for the civilian population and civilian objects during armed conflicts. Such civilian objects may include investments, particularly those located in areas of hostilities and, accordingly, in need of protection.

However, international humanitarian law contains certain exceptions that allow for the restriction or even destruction of private property when justified by military necessity. This implies that, in situations of armed conflict, investment assets may be endangered as a result of actions directed toward achieving military objectives, which stands in contrast to the general principles of investment protection applicable in peacetime.

It should be noted that conflicts between different branches of international law, particularly between the norms of international investment law and international humanitarian law, may be resolved by analogy with another branches. For example, between international humanitarian law and international human rights law. In science discourse on the interaction between international human rights law and international humanitarian law during armed conflicts, three key positions have emerged, reflecting different approaches to the application of these legal regimes:

The first approach is the recognition of the primacy of international human rights law even in times of war. In the paper of Cerone, during armed conflicts international human rights law not only remains in force but may, in certain cases, take precedence (Cerone, 2006). In his view, international human rights judicial bodies, including the European Court of Human Rights, have repeatedly affirmed states' jurisdiction and their obligations under international human rights law even during periods of hostilities, particularly with respect to the right to life, the prohibition of torture, and access to justice.

The second approach is the prioritization of international humanitarian law. For instance, Droege (Droege, 2007), in her research, asserts that in situations of armed conflict, international humanitarian law should take precedence. She emphasizes that the provisions of international humanitarian law constitute special norms (*lex specialis*) that replace or limit the application of general norms of international human rights law during armed conflict. According to the International Court of Justice's ruling in the case of "Armed Activities in the Congo," the application of international human rights law may be restricted in circumstances where the relevant aspects of the conflict are already comprehensively regulated by international humanitarian law (International Court of Justice, 2000).

Similar approach was proposed by Frey Baetens, who argues that the norms of international humanitarian law should be considered *lex specialis*, supporting her view with the reasoning that during conflicts states may derogate from certain fundamental human rights (International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2011). A similar approach is observed in practice; for example, Ukraine has temporarily suspended certain fundamental rights in connection with the full-scale invasion of its territory by the Russian Federation [5].

The third approach is the contextual approach, which holds that the applicable legal regime depends on the specific circumstances. For example, Hathaway and all emphasize that neither legal regime holds automatic precedence (Hathaway et al., 2012). The application of international human rights law or international humanitarian law depends on the concrete context, the type of armed conflict (international or non-international), the status of individuals (civilians, combatants, detainees, etc.), as well as territorial factors. They propose a dynamic approach to determining which norm should prevail, taking into account legal gaps, protective potential, and the objectives of both branches of law.

The contextual approach appears to be the most reasoned and flexible framework in the contemporary conditions of armed conflicts. Unlike approaches that prioritize one branch of law over the other, the contextual model allows for consideration of the specificities of each situation without creating an artificial hierarchy of norms. Accordingly, no legal regime is universally dominant, and the effective protection of human rights during wartime requires a flexible and



purposive application of legal instruments. This approach better reflects the complexity of modern conflicts, where the boundaries between combat zones, the status of individuals, and forms of violence are often blurred. Consequently, a dynamic combination of norms from both branches, adapted to the specific circumstances, provides the most comprehensive and responsive mechanism for safeguarding human dignity in times of war.

Similarly to the contextual approach in the interaction between international humanitarian law and human rights, the norms of international investment law must also be capable of adapting to the realities of armed conflict. This means that investment law should not remain isolated from the wartime context, but must take into account the requirements of humanitarian law, particularly the restrictions imposed on the state to protect the civilian population, ensure security, or carry out other critical functions during armed conflict (Gazzini, Brabandere, & Nijhoff, 2021; Baetens, 2020).

In peacetime, the norms of international investment law would generally be considered *lex specialis*. However, during armed conflict, we hold that the determination of which norms constitute *lex specialis* depends on the specific circumstances and the nature of the situation. For instance, depending on whether the issue concerns the protection of an investment as a civilian object or its involvement in military operations, the applicable *lex specialis* may vary, taking into account the relative priority of humanitarian or investment norms in the given context.

This approach allows for a more comprehensive and equitable protection of investments. On one hand, it recognizes investors' right to safeguard their economic interests. On the other, it does not disregard the state's obligations under international humanitarian law, which governs conduct during armed conflicts. For example, in a situation where a state is compelled to destroy infrastructure to prevent a threat to the civilian population or to repel an attack, such an action may be justified under humanitarian law, even if it affects foreign investments (Bell, 2021; Padin, 2020).

Therefore, in the context of armed conflict, the determination of *lex specialis* is situational and depends on the circumstances of each case. For instance, if an investment asset that has no military function is damaged in a manner contrary to the rules of international humanitarian law (e.g., due to indiscriminate shelling), humanitarian law may take precedence as the *lex specialis*. Conversely, in cases involving the protection of investor rights such as restrictions on access to the asset or discriminatory actions by the host state priority may be accorded to the norms of international investment law.

Another key issue is the determination of which international agreement on the promotion and protection of investments applies in cases where an investment was made in territory that subsequently came under the occupation of a third state.

For example, an investor who holds the nationality of State A made a capital investment in State B. After some time, an international armed conflict erupted between State B and State C, resulting in part of the territory of State B—specifically the region where the investment project was implemented—coming under the effective control of State C. Under the rules of international humanitarian law, namely Article 43 of the Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention I(V)) (International Humanitarian Law Databases, 1907) and Article 43 of the Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949, the occupying power is obliged to take all possible measures to ensure public order and safety in the occupied territory, “while respecting, as far as possible, the laws in force in the country (International Humanitarian Law Databases, 1949). Such laws are understood to include both the domestic law of State B and the international treaties it has ratified, including investment promotion and protection agreements that were in force prior to the outbreak of the conflict.

Thus, even in the event of a *de facto* change of control over territory, the relevant investment promotion and protection agreement between State A and State B does not cease to be in force *ex proprio vigore* and continues to apply to investments located in the occupied territory. Accordingly, the occupying state—in our example, State C—is obliged to ensure compliance with the provisions of the IPA, including guarantees of investment protection, non-discriminatory

treatment, fair and equitable treatment, and protection against expropriation without adequate compensation. At the same time, the limitation formulated in Article 43 “except where absolutely impossible” must be taken into account, creating room for interpretation and potential disputes regarding the scope of the occupying state’s responsibility.

A more complex legal configuration arises in situations where an investor, while formally remaining a domestic subject, effectively acquires the status of a foreign investor as a result of territorial occupation. For instance, if an investor from State A made an investment in territory belonging to the same state, but part of this territory subsequently came under the effective control of State C due to an international armed conflict, and the stability and duration of such control are established, the question may arise as to whether the investor should be regarded as “foreign” vis-à-vis State C. In other words, without changing citizenship or residence, the investor effectively interacts with a new sovereign jurisdiction that is not the investor’s state of origin. In such a case, the investor may have grounds to claim protection of their rights under applicable international investment standards, if these standards are in force for the occupying state or can be applied by analogy under the doctrine of effective control.

Hence, in situations of occupation, a layered legal scenario arises in which the application of an investment agreement between the investor and the state that de jure retains sovereignty over the relevant territory may be justified, provided that the treaty forms part of the domestic legal order. At the same time, the occupying state, while exercising de facto public authority, is obliged to respect these legal obligations unless circumstances render their fulfillment objectively impossible.

Another critical issue concerns the determination of the status of an investment object during armed conflict? specifically, whether the asset is considered civilian or a legitimate military target. As a general rule, investments, like enterprises engaged in the civilian economy, are treated as civilian objects, meaning they do not take a direct part in hostilities. Accordingly, they are protected under international humanitarian law, and their destruction or damage, if they do not constitute a military objective, constitutes a violation of the laws of war.

However, in practice, situations may arise in which an investment object loses its civilian status and may be considered a lawful military target. This occurs, for example, if an investor allocates funds to the production of weapons, military equipment, or other means of warfare. In such cases, the enterprise directly or indirectly contributes to the military efforts of the state and may therefore be recognized as a target permissible under the rules of international humanitarian law.

States involved in armed conflict are often interested in locating such production facilities within their own territories, due to logistical convenience, control, possibility of testing of military products (when product concerns means of warfare), and stable government procurement. Accordingly, these states may create favorable conditions for investors in the military or related sectors. For example, states can provide special tax incentives or simplified permitting procedures.

A specific example concerns investments in the production of goods of dual-use products that can be used for both civilian and military purposes. This may include GPS navigation systems, software for unmanned aerial vehicles, communication equipment, radar devices, and similar technologies. Even if the investor’s primary aim is commercial, in times of war such products may be redirected for military use.

If there is evidence or a reasonable presumption that an asset is linked to the production of military equipment, infrastructure, or other facilities directly used in armed conflict, the adversary has the right, under international humanitarian law, to treat that asset as a legitimate military target. This means that its targeting (for example, by a missile strike) may be considered justified on the grounds of military necessity, provided that the principles of distinction, proportionality, and necessity are observed.

Thus, during armed conflict, even foreign investments may lose their protection if they are associated with objects performing a military function. This creates additional risks for both the investor and the host state. It is therefore crucial to clearly distinguish between civilian and

military objects and to consider the potential consequences of involving investors in defense-related production.

Another important aspect in the research of the interaction between legal regimes is the understanding of the term «international armed conflict» as a force majeure case in the context of international investment law.

In international law, the concept of force majeure carries different meanings depending on the branch of law. From the perspective of international humanitarian law, an armed conflict is not considered an extraordinary circumstance justifying non-compliance with obligations. On the contrary, it is a normatively regulated situation (one of the possible states) during which states are required to adhere to clearly defined rules, including ensuring the protection of civilians, civilian infrastructure, property, and maintaining public order (Schreuer, 1996). In other words, humanitarian law treats armed conflict as a situation that requires legal preparedness rather than as a circumstance that automatically relieves a state of responsibility.

At the same time, international investment law often treats armed conflict as a force majeure event, an occurrence beyond the state's control that makes the performance of certain obligations impossible. If a state can demonstrate that the loss of investments, damage to property, or suspension of economic activity resulted from hostilities or related events, it may potentially avoid liability for non-performance of its obligations to the investor (Sornarajah, 2017; Dolzer & Schreuer, 2012). This is particularly relevant in cases, when the state's actions were neither arbitrary nor discriminatory but were necessitated by the need to respond to a military threat or to ensure national security.

Thus, the same situation, namely, an armed conflict, is interpreted differently in the two branches of international law. For international humanitarian law, it constitutes a regular legal regime; for international investment law, it may serve as a basis for exemption from liability if circumstances of force majeure can be established (Reinisch, 2007).

This confirms that the determination of which norm constitutes *lex specialis* is not automatic and depends on the nature of the legal relationship, the type of violation, the parties to the dispute, and the circumstances of the case (International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2011). In situations where the state's actions fall under both humanitarian and investment law, context becomes crucial, because it allows for establishing the limits of state responsibility, the investor's entitlement to compensation, and the priority of one legal regime over another. In certain cases, investors may even seek protection not only under investment arbitration but also under the norms of international humanitarian law, particularly when violations affect their property as a civilian object (Cerone, 2007; D'Aspremont, 2009).

Another important issue concerns frozen conflicts. International armed conflicts sometimes don't end with a definitive settlement between states but instead enter a phase commonly referred to as a "frozen conflict." In such cases, the parties may formally declare a ceasefire, yet key aspects of the conflict remain unresolved. This situation is characteristic, for example, of Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Crimea. In these circumstances, a range of complex legal questions arise, including the protection of foreign investors' rights in disputed or occupied territories.

Frozen conflicts often generate prolonged territorial and legal uncertainty. This can lead to a legal vacuum or a conflict of norms between the legal systems of the parties involved, the state that has lost effective control over the territory and the occupying state or *de facto* authority exercising control. Consequently, ensuring investment protection in such conditions becomes significantly more challenging. Investment treaties typically do not contain provisions that directly address situations related to frozen conflicts or prolonged occupations. As Shoileva notes, "international legal instruments designed to protect investors are often incapable of adapting to the specificities of situations arising in areas of unrecognized or temporary control."

Particular attention should be paid to cases where self-proclaimed or unrecognized entities emerge in conflict-affected territories, seeking to conclude investment agreements and attract capital, yet lacking international legal personality. Such circumstances create additional risks for

investors, who cannot be assured of protection of their rights under international investment arbitration or through state-to-state responsibility mechanisms. As Dolzer notes, in these cases there is a significant risk that investments will be deprived of effective legal protection, since “the status of the territory and the entity controlling it may not meet the legitimacy requirements under investment law.”

In addition to legal uncertainty, investors also face the risk of expropriation of their assets or their use without proper compensation by one of the parties to the conflict. In the absence of effective control by the state party to the investment treaty, the investor effectively loses the protection provided under that treaty. In some instances, even international institutions are limited in their jurisdiction due to the political sensitivity of the disputed territory’s status. As Reinisch observes, “the legal nature of territorial control is crucial for determining the jurisdiction of investment tribunals (Reinisch, 2004).

Thus, frozen conflicts create numerous and systemic risks for foreign investors, including legal uncertainty, lack of guarantees against unlawful expropriation, restricted access to international protection mechanisms, and potential loss of control over assets. This underscores the need to reconsider approaches to concluding investment agreements and to develop specialized mechanisms for protecting investments made in areas with an unstable legal status.

**Conclusions.** Thus, the interaction between international humanitarian law and international investment law in the context of armed conflicts reveals complex and multilayered legal challenges. The collision between states’ humanitarian obligations and their investment commitments requires a flexible approach based on the analysis of the specific circumstances of each case. The priority of one legal regime over another is determined not only by the formal status of the norms but also by the context, the nature of the violation, the character of the legal relations, and the degree of impact on investors’ rights.

Armed conflicts, including frozen ones, create an environment of heightened legal uncertainty in which foreign investors face risks of expropriation, loss of control over assets, and limited access to international protection mechanisms.

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## **LEGAL REGULATION OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY OF BUILDINGS WITH A GOAL OF ACHIEVING CLIMATE NEUTRALITY IN THE EU**

## **ПРАВОВЕ РЕГУЛЮВАННЯ ЕНЕРГОЕФЕКТИВНОСТІ БУДІВЕЛЬ З МЕТОЮ ДОСЯГНЕННЯ КЛІМАТИЧНОЇ НЕЙТРАЛЬНОСТІ В ЄС**

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**Abstract.** *The article examines the role of legal regulation of the buildings sector in the implementation of the climate policy of the European Union. It is shown that it is through legal mechanisms that the EU forms a comprehensive approach to reducing energy consumption and emissions in buildings, combining technical standards, financial instruments, strategic planning and behavioral measures. The purpose of the study is to determine the place of the buildings sector in the structure of EU climate law and to analyze how the EU's directives and regulations translate the Union's international obligations into concrete national actions of the Member States. The methodological basis is a systematic, comparative legal and institutional analysis of EU norms and the practice of their implementation. The scientific novelty lies in the comprehensive coverage of buildings as a legal tool of EU's climate policy, combining energy efficiency, decarbonization and behavioral influences.*

**Key words:** *climate change, Paris Agreement, EU climate law, energy efficiency of buildings, "Fit for 55", climate neutrality.*

**Анотація.** *У статті досліджено роль правового регулювання будівельного сектору в реалізації кліматичної політики Європейського Союзу. Показано, що саме через правові механізми ЄС формує комплексний підхід до скорочення енергоспоживання та викидів у будівлях, поєднуючи технічні стандарти, фінансові інструменти, стратегічне планування та поведінкові заходи. Метою дослідження є визначення місця будівельного сектору в структурі кліматичного права ЄС та аналіз того, як директиви й регламенти ЄС перетворюють міжнародні зобов'язання Союзу на конкретні національні дії держав-членів. Методологічною основою є системний, порівняльно-правовий і інституційний аналіз норм ЄС та практики їх імплементції. Наукова новизна полягає у комплексному висвітленні будівель як правової категорії кліматичної політики ЄС, що поєднує енергоефективність, декарбонізацію та поведінкові засоби впливу.*

**Ключові слова:** *боротьба зі зміною клімату, Паризька угода, кліматичне право ЄС, енергоефективність будівель, "Fit for 55", кліматична нейтральність.*

**Introduction.** The relevance of examining the buildings sector within the climate policy of the European Union stems from the fact that it is through law that the EU shapes systematic mechanisms for influencing energy consumption, emissions, and the broader transformation of its

energy model. Buildings constitute a domain in which legal regulation not only establishes technical performance standards but also directly affects social behaviour, market incentives, and the strategic planning obligations of Member States.

EU law on buildings has acquired particular importance in the context of the European Green Deal and the Union's commitments under the Paris Agreement, as legally binding norms, ranging from energy-performance requirements to long-term renovation strategies, serve as the primary vehicles for achieving measurable emission reductions and enhancing energy security. At the same time, the multi-layered nature of this legal framework, which integrates normative, financial, behavioural, and strategic instruments, makes the buildings sector a central component of both the implementation of the EU's international climate obligations and the internal operationalisation of climate law across the daily practices of Member States.

**The purpose of the research** is to analyse the legal framework governing the buildings sector within the EU's climate policy and to determine how European law transforms climate commitments into binding national actions.

**Recent literature review.** The analysis draws on EU's legislative acts governing energy efficiency and building decarbonisation, including Directive 93/76/EEC, Directive 2002/91/EC, Directive 2010/31/EU and its amendment Directive 2018/844/EU, Directive (EU) 2023/1791, Directive (EU) 2023/2413, and Regulation (EU) 2023/956. It also incorporates strategic documents of the European Commission such as COM (2020) 662 ("Renovation Wave") and COM (2021) 550 ("Fit for 55"). Sectoral assessments by the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2023) are used alongside analytical outputs of the European Parliament, the EPRS Briefing (2024) and the study on behavioural approaches to energy efficiency (EP Study 2022). Additional reviewed materials include Finnish national and media reports documenting public energy-saving campaigns (Republic 2022; Xinhua 2022; YLE 2022; Vantaan Energia 2023).

The academic literature reviewed includes studies on the evolution of EU climate policy and its governance instruments (Dupont et al., 2024), analyses of EU climate leadership and implementation dynamics (Oberthür & Dupont, 2021; Gheuens & Oberthür, 2021), and a comprehensive review of life-cycle-based building stock assessment models relevant to EU policymaking (Rödger et al., 2021). Empirical descriptions of behavioural and energy-saving practices in Finland, drawn from media and organisational sources (Republic 2022; Xinhua 2022; YLE 2022; Vantaan Energia 2023), complement the academic publications.

**Main research results.** According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), buildings account for about 30% of global final energy consumption and account for approximately 26% of energy CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, including both direct emissions from the use of fuels in buildings and indirect emissions from the production of electricity and heat consumed in the sector (IEA, Buildings – Energy System, 2023).

The buildings sector in the European Union has historically been one of the most energy-intensive, accounting for approximately 40% of final energy consumption and 36% of energy CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (European Commission, 2020). This makes the sector a key area of fulfillment of the EU's international obligations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992) and the Paris Agreement (2015), which require parties to keep global temperature rise within 1.5°C and achieve climate neutrality in the second half of the XXI century. The modernization of buildings is critically important on the way to achieving climate neutrality in the EU by 20250, as well as a strategic legal and political tool for fulfilling international obligations in the fight against climate change.

The researchers emphasize that the legal regulation of buildings sector is one of the key tools for decarbonization in the EU, as the transition to nearly zero-energy and zero-emission buildings generates market signals and accelerates the modernization of the building stock (Dupont et al., 2024). According to the researchers such as Johannes Rödger, Alice Passer, Stéphane Lasvaux and Robert Crawford, in the context of climate policy, it is extremely important for the EU buildings sector to assess environmental impact of buildings, taking into account all stages of the life cycle and all relevant categories of impact (Rödger, Passer, Lasvaux, & Crawford, 2021). This



approach avoids the transfer of emissions or other forms of environmental burden between materials, technologies or stages of operation, which is critical for the formation of credible climate strategies and effective planning for the decarbonization of the building stock.

The EU's policy in the buildings' sector has been formed in stages. The first measures appeared back in the 1990s within the framework of Directive 93/76/EEC, which provided an initial framework for national energy efficiency programs. In 2002, the first Directive on the Energy Performance of Buildings (EPBD 2002/91/EC) was adopted. It introduced minimum energy efficiency standards, energy certification of buildings and mandatory inspections of heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems. In 2010, the EU updated the rules for buildings: the requirement that all new buildings must consume almost no energy (NZEB) was introduced. Directive 2010/31/EU updated the requirements of EPBD 2002/91/EC and set clear deadlines, when exactly all new private and public buildings should meet this standard (European Parliament & Council, 2010). Subsequently, in 2018, Directive (EU) 2018/844 amended the EPBD and linked building policy to digitalization, smart management systems and long-term national renovation strategies (LTRS), also provided for in Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 on the governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action (European Parliament & Council, 2018).

To ensure coherence in the transition to NZEB and, subsequently, to zero-emission buildings, the EU has established an integrated energy and climate planning system, enshrined in Regulation (EU) 2018/1999, which sets out the obligation of Member States to prepare National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) covering the period up to 2030, as well as Long-Term Renovation Strategies (LTRS) aimed at achieving a highly efficient and decarbonised building stock by 2050.

LTRS play the role of a "long trajectory" for the decarbonisation of the construction sector: in them, Member States describe how the existing building stock will be modernised, what financial and regulatory instruments are applied, how energy efficiency standards will increase and when buildings will reach NZEB and zero-emission levels. Thus, LTRS serve as a mechanism for the practical implementation of the objectives set by Directive 2010/31/EU and provide a link between regulatory technical standards and the EU's overall path towards climate neutrality.

Within the framework of the Governance Regulation, NECPs and LTRS together form an integrated reporting and control system, through which the European Commission monitors the implementation of the NDC and the consistency of national actions with the EU climate neutrality strategy. The introduction of NZEB standards, the development of long-term renovation strategies and the implementation of the requirements of Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 form an interconnected legal mechanism within which the EU's international obligations under the NDC are transformed into internal energy and climate planning (NECP and LTRS) and specified through technical standards for energy efficiency and decarbonization of buildings (NZEB/zero-emission buildings).

A new stage has begun with the "Fit for 55" package (European Commission, 2021). The policy of the EU has moved from the NZEB requirement to more radical goals such as zero-emission buildings (ZEB). In 2024, the finally agreed recast EPBD provides: (1) zero emissions for all new buildings from 2030; (2) minimum energy efficiency standards for existing buildings; (3) mandatory national plans for the renovation of the building fund; (4) large-scale deployment of solar technology and heat pumps.

An important element was the reform of the Energy Efficiency Directive (Directive (EU) 2023/1791), which enshrined a mandatory energy saving of 11.7% by 2030 and strengthened the responsibility of member states to reduce consumption in the public sector (European Parliament & Council, 2023).

In parallel, the buildings sector has been included in the new ETS2 emissions trading system (Regulation (EU) 2023/956), which creates economic incentives to move away from fossil heating and accelerate renovation (European Parliament & Council, 2023). In addition, the Renewable Energy Directive RED III (EU 2023/2413) was adopted, which provides for the integration of solar panels into buildings and simplifies the procedures for permits for RES (European Parliament & Council, 2023).



Thus, the energy efficiency of buildings becomes a systemic tool for meeting the EU's international climate commitments, part of the Energy Union and a reference point of a climate-neutral economy by 2050. The scientific papers emphasize that the effectiveness of policies in this sector is determined by the EU's ability to combine technical standards with long-term strategic planning, enshrined in directives and regulations that oblige Member States to renovate and integrate RES (Oberthür & Dupont, 2021). Other scholars point to the need to accelerate the pace of renovation, as it is buildings that have the greatest potential to rapidly reduce emissions, provided that the right legal and investment environment is created (Gheuens & Oberthür, 2021).

At the same time, information campaigns are increasingly seen in the European Union as an effective tool for changing behavior in the building sector, especially in the context of the energy crisis. According to the International Energy Agency, targeted communication measures can effectively disseminate knowledge about energy conservation and motivate households to take low-cost actions — such as optimally adjusting thermostats or reducing consumption during peak hours (IEA, 2023).

During the 2022 energy crisis due to Russian armed aggression, this approach was widely used in EU member states. One of the most illustrative examples was Finland, where the national campaign “Down a Degree” called on citizens to reduce the temperature in their homes and reconsider their daily energy consumption habits (Republic, 2022). According to surveys, more than 80% of households reported real savings measures, which indicates the high performance of behavioral tools combined with technical requirements for energy efficiency (YLE News, 2022; Finland has also implemented a regular annual Energy Saving Week initiative aimed at raising awareness of the role of household solutions in reducing energy consumption. That is why Finland is among the leaders in the EU in terms of the pace of achieving climate neutrality, having legislated carbon neutrality goals by 2035, which is well ahead of the EU's 2050 target (European Parliament, 2024). This practice demonstrates that long-term information programs can stabilize useful behavioral patterns and complement structural reforms in the building sector (Vantaan Energia, 2023).

The information campaigns in the EU on energy consumption have gained importance in most EU countries. A study prepared for the European Parliament confirms that Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, Cyprus and other states have actively used communication and education campaigns as part of national energy efficiency measures, especially in 2022 (European Parliament, 2022). At the same time, such information campaigns in the EU perform a dual function: they support short-term response to crisis situations and at the same time contribute to long-term behavioural change necessary to achieve climate neutrality in the buildings sector.

**Conclusions.** The analysis of the EU's legal framework governing the buildings sector demonstrates that a set of interlinked directives and regulations, including the EPBD, the EED, RED III, Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 and the new ETS2 system, establishes a coherent foundation for the decarbonisation of the building stock. These instruments introduce the transition toward nearly zero-energy and zero-emission buildings, set binding renovation and energy-performance requirements, reinforce the integration of renewable energy technologies and define mechanisms for national planning, monitoring and compliance.

Taken together, these legal acts create stable regulatory conditions that encourage long-term investment in building renovation and low-carbon technologies. Behavioural and communication tools, which proved effective during the 2022 energy crisis, complement the normative framework by influencing household energy use and supporting the implementation of legal obligations.

Overall, the combination of regulatory standards, strategic planning instruments, economic incentives and behavioural measures constitutes an integrated governance model that enables the European Union to progressively reduce energy demand, lower emissions and translate its international climate commitments into concrete actions across the buildings sector.

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## ANTI-CRISIS INSTRUMENTS OF THE EU'S CLIMATE LAW IN RESPONSE TO THE WAR IN UKRAINE

## АНТИКРИЗОВІ ІНСТРУМЕНТИ КЛІМАТИЧНОГО ПРАВА ЄС У ВІДПОВІДЬ НА ВІЙНУ В УКРАЇНІ

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**Abstract.** *The relevance of the study is due to the transformation of the EU's climate policy in the context of the war in Ukraine and the energy security crisis caused by the geopolitical conditions. The methodology is based on a systematic and comparative analysis of EU acts, acts such as Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 and the integrated energy plan REPowerEU, which are functionally aligned with the "Fit for 55" package.*

*The main results show that after 2022, the updated National Energy and Climate Plans play a key role, integrating the increased climate ambitions of "Fit for 55" and the energy security measures envisaged by REPowerEU. Of particular importance was the acceleration of the introduction of renewable energy, in particular offshore wind energy, as well as the reform of permitting procedures and the modernization of energy infrastructure. Among the EU member states, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and France occupy leading positions in the development of offshore wind energy, which is due to their experience in implementing large-scale offshore projects. At the same time, there are transitional contradictory solutions in the EU, including the temporary use of gas and nuclear technologies, reflected in the Taxonomy of Sustainable Finance.*

**Keywords:** *international environmental law, Paris Agreement, EU law, climate policy, climate neutrality, "Fit for 55", REPowerEU, Regulation 2018/1999, NECP.*

**Анотація.** *Актуальність дослідження зумовлена трансформацією кліматичної політики ЄС в умовах війни в Україні та спричиненої нею енергетичної безпекової кризи. Російська збройна агресія призвела до переосмислення підходів до енергетичної стійкості, пришвидшивши застосування антикризових механізмів у рамках чинної інституційної моделі врядування. Метою дослідження є аналіз інструментів ЄС, спрямованих на забезпечення енергетичної безпеки та виконання кліматичних зобов'язань у нових геополітичних умовах. Методологія ґрунтується на системному та порівняльно-правовому аналізі актів ЄС, таких актів, як Регламент (ЄС) 2018/1999 та інтегрований енергетичний план REPowerEU, які функціонально узгоджуються з пакетом "Fit for 55".*

*Основні результати свідчать, що після 2022 року ключову роль відіграють оновлені Національні енергетичні та кліматичні плани (NECPs), які інтегрують підвищені кліматичні амбіції "Fit for 55" та заходи енергетичної безпеки, передбачені REPowerEU. Особливого значення набуло прискорення впровадження відновлюваної енергетики, зокрема*

офшорної вітроенергетики, а також реформування дозвільних процедур і модернізація енергетичної інфраструктури. Серед держав-членів ЄС лідерські позиції у розвитку офшорної вітроенергетики посідають Німеччина, Данія, Нідерланди та Франція, що зумовлено їхнім досвідом реалізації масштабних офшорних проєктів. Разом з тим, в ЄС спостерігаються перехідні суперечливі рішення, включаючи тимчасове використання газових та атомних технологій, відображене у Таксономії сталих фінансів.

**Ключові слова:** міжнародне право навколишнього середовища, Паризька угода, право ЄС, кліматична політика, кліматична нейтральність, “Fit for 55”, REPowerEU, Регламент 2018/1999, NECP.

**Introduction.** The war in Ukraine has caused the largest energy security crisis in the EU in decades, which has jeopardized the stability of energy supplies, the functioning of the internal market and the fulfillment of climate commitments under the Paris Agreement. planning models for the application of complex anti-crisis measures integrated into the current governance system. In this context, the study of anti-crisis instruments of the EU's energy and climate policy is of particular importance, as it allows assessing the effectiveness of regulatory mechanisms, the Union's ability to ensure resilience in crisis conditions and the impact of the war on the strategic priorities of the European energy transition.

**The purpose of the research** is to analyse the institutional framework and crisis-response instruments of the EU's energy and climate policy adopted in the context of the war in Ukraine, as well as to assess their impact on the Union's energy security and decarbonisation trajectory.

**Recent literature review.** This paper is grounded in both EU legal documents and academic analyses that collectively elucidate the evolution of energy sector like a part of the climate governance after 2022. The Governance Regulation (EU) 2018/1999, the Commission's 2022 NECP Guidance, the REPowerEU Plan and the accelerated permitting measures form the institutional core of the policy framework, while the EU Offshore Renewable Energy Strategy, the 2022 NSEC Declaration and reports by WindEurope, WWF, CSD and the EBRD provide insight into the development of offshore renewables. The broader decarbonisation context is shaped by the “Fit for 55” package and recent studies on the EU Taxonomy.

Parallel to these policy sources, academic literature offers a conceptual foundation for interpreting current trends. Hedberg and Šipka (2022) emphasise the importance of coherent EU-level regulation for advancing the green transition; Medvedieva and Smirnova (2019) examine the centrality of the energy sector in enabling a low-carbon transition; Olesen and Vikkelsø (2024) identify the underuse of sufficiency measures in NECPs; Pfeifenberger et al. (2024) highlight the strategic significance of coordinated offshore planning; Klein et al. (2024) critically assess the inclusion of nuclear energy in the EU Taxonomy; and Medvedieva et al. (2024) demonstrate how the EU is adapting its legal instruments under geopolitical pressure.

**Main research results.** According to Annika Hedberg and Stefan Šipka, effectively responding to the growing climate challenges in the EU requires a consistent and well-aligned legislative framework that can ensure comparable standards across Member States. They emphasise that the EU's accumulated regulatory capacity and political weight position it as an influential actor capable of shaping climate governance both within Europe and internationally (Hedberg & Šipka, 2022).

Maryna Medvedieva and Kseniia Smyrnova argue that the energy sector represents both a major source of greenhouse gas emissions and a key avenue for addressing climate change through the expansion of renewable energy and improved energy efficiency. They emphasise that meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement requires a profound energy transition toward a low-carbon economic model (Medvedieva & Smyrnova, 2019).

In the aftermath of the energy crisis caused by Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine in 2022, the European Union has built a multi-level response system centered on the interaction of Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 on the governance of the Energy Union and climate

action, the REPowerEU anti-crisis plan and the Fit for 55 structural package. This sequence reflects the logic of European energy and climate governance: first the institutional framework, then emergency measures and, finally, long-term structural reforms.

Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 on the governance of the Energy Union and climate action establishes the institutional architecture according to which the requirements for the development of National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) are established. This EU act brings together the previous disparate climate and energy planning obligations, according to which Member States are obliged to prepare and regularly update national and energy plans lasting 10 years (Art.3) (European Union, 2018).

NECPs should include measures on decarbonization, energy efficiency, energy security, the internal energy market, as well as research and innovation, in particular national contributions to the achievement of the EU's overall renewable energy (RES) and energy efficiency targets. The list of mandatory sections of the NECP is defined in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2018/1999.

The Regulation also establishes the requirement of early and effective consultation with the public (Art. 10) and regional coordination with other Member States (Art. 12), which must be reported to the NECP itself (Art. 3(2)). The procedure involves the submission of a draft plan, its evaluation by the European Commission and finalization. NECP updates are submitted in the middle of the ten-year cycle. The first plans were submitted in 2018-2019, and the updated ones were submitted in 2023-2024.

The European Commission provided important comments on the draft updated NECPs taking into account the new energy and security situation that has developed after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In the 2022 guidelines, the Commission stressed that in accordance with the requirements of Regulation (EU) 2018/1999, Member States should strengthen regional cooperation, as it has become a key condition for energy resilience during the crisis (European Commission, 2022). Policy coordination, market integration, joint infrastructure planning and harmonization of energy security measures are seen by the Commission as necessary to ensure that Member States' plans are in line with the new realities.

According to Gunnar Boye Olesen and Ann Vikkelsø, "the overall conclusion is that although sufficiency measures are already present in the NECPs, but their potential remains largely unused; most policies influence consumption patterns rather than reduce consumption itself". The authors emphasise that this gap reveals substantial untapped opportunities to strengthen national climate strategies and enhance the effectiveness of EU-level climate action (Olesen & Vikkelsø, 2024).

Offshore wind energy is an important tool for the implementation of Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 on the governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action. The Regulation obliges countries to regional coordination in the preparation and updating of National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs), especially for projects that are transboundary in nature (Art.10–12).

This applies to offshore wind projects, which require the harmonization of maritime spatial planning, joint development of network infrastructure, underwater interconnectors and environmental impact assessment procedures, which requires effective interstate cooperation is necessary. In practice, these requirements are implemented in particular through the North Sea Energy Cooperation, within which states such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and others coordinate offshore planning, auctions and network projects (NSEC, 2022). Similar mechanisms have been established in the Baltic Sea, where member states agree on offshore capacity development, wind potential studies and environmental procedures (European Commission, 2023).

Joint "hybrid" projects, such as "Kriegers Flak" between Denmark and Germany, demonstrate the implementation of the requirements of the Regulation on the Development of Integrated Offshore Infrastructure (European Commission, 2020). They simultaneously serve as production wind zones and cross-border interconnectors, which allows for the optimization of investments and strengthens the integration of the EU internal energy market. These mechanisms

contribute to the formation of an integrated European energy space and the EU's progress towards climate neutrality.

According to the 2022 guidelines, the European Commission stressed that the key challenges remain the infrastructural integration of sea basins, the deficit of allocated maritime space, as well as too slow permitting procedures in a number of Member States. Therefore, after 2022, the priority shifted from the formulation of goals to the actual implementation and synchronization of national legislation.

Some Member States, in particular Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, France, have made adjustments to the Maritime Spatial Plans, increasing the area for offshore wind farms, identifying new “acceleration zones” and adapting environmental impact assessment procedures to the requirements of REPowerEU. For some Member States, this process has become a key institutional challenge, as the existing marine plans have proven incompatible with the EU's ambitions for 2030 and 2040 (WWF, 2023).

Regional cooperation in the field of offshore wind energy in the Black Sea and the Adriatic has intensified since 2022 under the influence of the energy and security crisis and within the framework of REPowerEU policy. In the Black Sea, the development of offshore wind energy is at an early stage, but Bulgaria and Romania are already developing special laws and offshore spatial plans providing for the allocation of zones for future wind farms (CSD, 2022; OffshoreWind, 2024). Bulgaria became the first state in the region to promote a separate law on renewable energy in the maritime spaces, while Romania is working on a framework law on offshore wind (MOE Romania, 2023). The EU supports cooperation in the Black Sea basin through the “Common Maritime Agenda for the Black Sea” and funding for preparatory studies under REPowerEU, focusing on maritime spatial planning and network integration (European Commission, 2022).

In the Adriatic, cooperation is advancing faster due to more favorable security conditions and the availability of mature network infrastructure. Croatia and Italy are preparing joint approaches to auctions and network connections for floating-offshore projects, integrating offshore REs into their updated NECPs and maritime spatial plans (WindEurope, 2023). Albania and Montenegro receive support from the EU and the EBRD to assess the potential of deep-sea wind farms that meets the RED III and REPowerEU requirements for accelerated deployment of RES (EBRD, 2023).

Overall, the Black Sea is showing a gradual formation of the legislative framework, while the Adriatic is moving towards the coordination of joint auctions and integrated grid solutions. Both regions are identified by the EU as promising areas for the development of floating offshore wind, which is consistent with the updated energy security and decarbonization goals for 2030 and 2050 (European Commission, 2024).

According to Johannes P. Pfeifenberger, Alexander Orths, Wei Wang, and James DeLosa, the rapid decline in technology costs, the high quality of wind resources, and the increasing scale of turbines and offshore wind farms have made offshore wind the fastest-growing renewable energy technology globally (Pfeifenberger et al., 2024). In the context of the European Union's post-2022 climate policy, this observation has direct policy relevance. The EU increasingly relies on offshore wind expansion to simultaneously strengthen energy security and accelerate decarbonisation.

The introduction of the REPowerEU plan in 2022 was one of the key turning points in the transformation of the European Union's energy policy. Its emergence was a direct response to the energy and security crisis caused by Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which exposed the EU's vulnerability related to its long-standing dependence on Russian fossil energy (European Commission, 2022a).

The plan is based on three key areas of action. The first is the diversification of energy supply, which involves the replacement of Russian gas with alternative sources, the development of LNG infrastructure and the conclusion of new strategic energy partnerships (European Commission, 2022a). The second direction is the acceleration of the development of renewable energy sources, within which the RES target was raised to 45% in 2030, permitting procedures were significantly simplified and the “renewables go-to areas” regime was introduced for the accelerated development



of RES projects (European Commission, 2022b). Offshore wind energy, defined by the European Commission as a “critical component” of energy security and decarbonization (CERRE, 2023), occupies a special place in this block.

In the regulatory dimension, REPowerEU has strengthened the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 on Energy Union Governance and Climate Action, which imposes an obligation on Member States to develop and update National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) and ensure regional coordination, especially for cross-border infrastructure projects.

Through the mechanism of Regulation 2018/1999, the investment sections of REPowerEU were integrated into the updated national energy and climate plans, ensuring their consistency with other policy instruments. As a result, the share of Russian gas in EU imports decreased from about 40% to about 10% within two years, although this was accompanied by high price volatility (European Commission, 2023).

Despite of the REPowerEU's focus on intensive scaling up of renewable energy, the plan also includes a number of provisions related to gas infrastructure, reflecting the crisis nature of EU policy after 2022. The updated regulatory package allows investments in a number of gas projects, including LNG terminals, floating regasification plants, gas pipelines and gas storage facilities, and there are no separate emission thresholds or other environmental criteria for these investments. At the same time, certain restrictions are imposed: funds from EU ETS auctions cannot be used to finance gas projects, and the total amount of funding related to ensuring security of supply cannot exceed 30% of the resources mobilized in each section of REPowerEU. Additional conditions include the requirement to commission such projects by the end of 2026 and their compliance with the EU's long-term goals for 2030 and 2050.

In the same period, the EU Taxonomy of Sustainable Finance, introduced by Regulation (EU) 2020/852, became of considerable importance. In 2022, the European Commission adopted an Additional Delegated Act, by which nuclear energy and natural gas were included in the taxonomy as “transitional” activities, provided that strict technical criteria are met. This decision should be seen in the broader context of the governance of the Energy Union: Regulation 2018/1999 requires both decarbonization and the guarantee of energy security, which was especially relevant during the crisis of 2022. Gas has temporarily become a critical infrastructure, and nuclear energy has become a stabilizing element of the energy system. In this context, REPowerEU has provided for the possibility of limited and conditional financing of gas and nuclear projects aimed at rapidly reducing dependence on Russian energy, including through retroactive support mechanisms (European Commission, 2022a). At the same time, scientists point out that the inclusion of nuclear energy in the EU taxonomy was not accompanied by a sufficient scientific assessment of the impact of waste, water consumption and the full life cycle, and therefore this decision is problematic from the point of view of sustainability (Klein et al., 2024).

A strategic role is played by the package of legislative initiatives on sectoral policies in the EU “Fit for 55”, which defines the long-term trajectory of decarbonization and is a central element of the implementation of the European Green Deal (European Commission, 2021). Unlike REPowerEU, which was adopted as an emergency anti-crisis instrument in 2022, the “Fit for 55” package shapes systemic reforms in the EU ETS, renewable energy, transport, buildings and energy efficiency. It is this strategic framework that ensures a sustainable reduction in dependence on fossil fuel imports and creates economic incentives for investment in clean technologies. The institutional architecture of Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 and the additional investment impetus of REPowerEU accelerated the implementation of individual elements of the “Fit for 55”, strengthening the internal coherence of European energy and climate policy after 2022.

Maryna Medvedieva, Roman Yedeliev, Nataliia Reznikova, Anton Nanavov and Ganna Grydasova highlight that the implementation of the European Green Deal is taking place amid increasing geopolitical and economic pressures, which complicate the EU's path toward climate neutrality, but the same time, they stress that through coordinated efforts and updated strategic approaches, the EU has managed to maintain its overall direction of climate transformation and



continues to refine regulatory instruments to accelerate this process (Medvedieva, Yedeliyev, Reznikova, Nanavov, & Grydasova, 2024).

**Conclusions.** Since 2022, the European Union has adapted its energy policy to the context of the security crisis, relying primarily on the institutional framework of Regulation (EU) 2018/1999, which defines the obligation of Member States to update NECPs. It is through this mechanism that the integration of increased climate ambitions, new energy security requirements and updated maritime spatial planning has been ensured.

Within this framework, the REPowerEU plan has introduced specific anti-crisis measures aimed at diversifying supplies, reducing permitting procedures, building infrastructure and accelerating the deployment of renewable energy. Offshore wind energy and the formation of offshore energy hubs combining spatial planning, interstate coordination and grid modernization have become extremely important.

At the same time, in crisis conditions, transitional and compromise solutions have emerged, in particular, the allowed financing of certain gas projects and the recognition of gas and nuclear energy as transitional technologies within the Taxonomy of Sustainable Finance, which some scientists do not agree on.

Thus, after 2022, the EU's institutional architecture, special anti-crisis mechanisms, and transitional solutions have formed a new model of energy governance, which combines security needs, climate commitments, and spatial and infrastructural modernization.

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## **ОСОБЛИВОСТІ РОЗВИТКУ СВІТОВОГО ГОСПОДАРСТВА ТА МЕВ**

УДК: 378.1:330.342.146:339.9

### **KNOWLEDGE HUBS IN TIMES OF CRISIS: THE ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC ROLE OF UNIVERSITIES IN INTERNATIONAL RESILIENCE NETWORKS**

### **УНІВЕРСИТЕТИ ЯК ЦЕНТРИ ЗНАНЬ У КРИЗОВИЙ ПЕРІОД: ЕКОНОМІЧНА ТА СТРАТЕГІЧНА РОЛЬ ВИЩОЇ ОСВІТИ У МІЖНАРОДНИХ МЕРЕЖАХ СТІЙКОСТІ**

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**Abstract.** *This article explores the role of universities in frontline regions as strategic knowledge hubs contributing to international resilience networks amid wartime conditions. Using the case of the National Aerospace University "Kharkiv Aviation Institute" (KhAI), the study analyzes the modernization of educational content and internal quality assurance systems as tools of institutional resilience and economic sustainability. The authors present an integrated model that combines ESG standards, national accreditation requirements, and internal digital innovations to support educational continuity under crisis. The paper highlights the significance of hybrid learning, the creation of safe academic environments, stakeholder involvement, and academic integrity in transforming universities into centers of regional stability and global integration. The findings suggest that KhAI's model can serve as a blueprint for higher education institutions operating in crisis-affected areas, supporting national human capital recovery and international cooperation in the field of education. The scientific novelty of the study lies in introducing the concept of an "educational-regional trajectory" as an innovative approach to preserving knowledge hubs in frontline regions, as well as in developing the model of "safe education", which combines the use of shelters as learning spaces with hybrid formats and digital quality monitoring systems. This makes it possible to consider the KhAI experience not only as a local case, but as a universal model for modernizing higher education under wartime challenges. The practical significance of the study is defined by the applicability of its results to the activities of higher education institutions in Ukraine and includes the following aspects: the proposed practices can be adapted and implemented to ensure the continuity of education under threat; the results may serve as a basis for*

developing regional education development programs aimed at enhancing the resilience of educational environments and preserving human capital; the outlined approaches to modernizing educational content and internal quality assurance can form the foundation for further research on educational innovation, risk management, and educational recovery strategies; the outcomes of this study serve as a strong argument in favor of supporting Ukrainian universities, which continue to demonstrate resilience and innovation despite the war.

**Key words:** *education modernization, resilience, frontline universities, quality assurance system, hybrid learning, digitalization, academic integrity, international cooperation*

**Анотація.** У статті досліджується роль університетів прифронтових регіонів як стратегічних центрів знань, що сприяють формуванню міжнародних мереж стійкості в умовах воєнного стану. На прикладі Національного аерокосмічного університету «Харківський авіаційний інститут» (ХАІ) проаналізовано процес модернізації змісту освіти та внутрішньої системи забезпечення якості як інструментів інституційної стійкості та економічної життєздатності. Представлено інтегровану модель, що поєднує стандарти ESG, національні вимоги до акредитації та внутрішні цифрові інновації для забезпечення безперервності освітнього процесу в умовах кризи. Наголошено на важливості гібридного навчання, створення безпечного освітнього середовища, залучення стейкхолдерів і підтримання академічної доброчесності у перетворенні університетів на осередки регіональної стабільності та глобальної інтеграції. Доведено, що модель ХАІ може слугувати орієнтиром для закладів вищої освіти, які функціонують в умовах кризи, сприяючи відновленню людського капіталу та міжнародному співробітництву у сфері освіти. Наукова новизна роботи полягає у введенні концепту «освітньо-регіональної траєкторії» як інноваційного підходу до збереження центрів знань у прифронтових регіонах, а також у розробці моделі «безпечної освіти», що поєднує використання укриттів як навчальних просторів із гібридними форматами та цифровими системами моніторингу якості. Саме це дозволяє розглядати досвід ХАІ не лише як локальний кейс, а як універсальну модель модернізації вищої освіти в умовах воєнних викликів. Практична значущість результатів роботи визначається можливістю їх застосування у діяльності закладів вищої освіти України та полягає у наступному: запропоновані практики можуть бути адаптовані й впроваджені для збереження освітнього процесу в умовах загроз; результати можуть слугувати основою для розробки регіональних програм розвитку освіти, спрямованих на підвищення стійкості освітнього середовища та збереження людського капіталу; окреслені підходи до модернізації змісту освіти та внутрішнього забезпечення якості можуть стати підґрунтям для подальших досліджень з питань інновацій в освіті, управління ризиками та формування стратегій освітнього відновлення; напрацювання роботи є аргументом на користь підтримки українських університетів, які, незважаючи на війну, демонструють стійкість та інноваційність.

**Ключові слова:** *модернізація освіти, стійкість, університет прифронтового регіону, система забезпечення якості, гібридне навчання, цифровізація, академічна доброчесність, міжнародне співробітництво.*

**Introduction.** Modern global and national challenges require higher education institutions not only to maintain stability but also to continuously modernize their educational content. In the context of war, where a significant portion of the educational process occurs in regions with heightened security risks, such as Kharkiv, the need for a high-quality renewal of the educational environment becomes particularly urgent. In territories under constant shelling, universities become not only centers of knowledge but also hubs of resilience, building societal trust in Ukrainian education, ensuring the restoration of human capital, and strengthening regional identity.

Relevance to the specified area of the competition consists in the practical implementation of innovative solutions within the internal quality assurance system for educational activities. The National Aerospace University "Kharkiv Aviation Institute" (hereinafter – "KhAI") demonstrates an example of transforming the educational-regional trajectory amid military threats. Educational programs here are not only adapted to international standards and the requirements of the National Agency for Higher Education Quality Assurance, but are also focused on enhancing the resilience of the educational environment through the adoption of modern digital technologies, quality monitoring systems, and practices of open dialogue with stakeholders.

**The purpose of the article.** The aim of the study is to theoretically substantiate and develop an integrated model for modernizing educational content and the internal quality assurance system for a higher education institution in a frontline region (using the example of the National Aerospace University "Kharkiv Aviation Institute"). This model is intended as a tool for resilience, the preservation of knowledge centers, and an alternative to relocation. The study also aims to empirically demonstrate the model's effectiveness and scalability.

**Literature review.** During the preparation of this study, a set of methods was employed to ensure the scientific validity, reliability, and practical significance of the results: Analysis and synthesis of the legal framework – This involved examining the current legislation of Ukraine in the field of education (Laws "On Education," "On Higher Education"), the standards and recommendations of the NAQA (National Agency for Higher Education Quality Assurance), as well as regional programs (such as "Education of the Unbreakable Kharkiv Region" 2024–2028). This made it possible to identify the key requirements for the internal education quality assurance system and to define areas for its modernization. Comparative analysis of international experience – Ukrainian practices in education quality assurance were compared with approaches used in countries experienced in preserving education during military conflicts (Israel, the Balkan countries, Georgia). This provided an opportunity to outline the strengths and risks of various strategies and to confirm the relevance of the chosen educational-regional trajectory for KhAI. Case study of the National Aerospace University "KhAI" – The university's practical steps were analyzed, including the implementation of hybrid learning models, the arrangement of safe shelters, content digitalization, mechanisms for academic integrity, and international integration. This allowed for an examination of the specific internal innovations within the education quality system under the unique conditions of a frontline region. Statistical analysis – Official data from the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine on the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Kharkiv region were used, along with statistics from the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine and indicators of the university's participation in international rankings. The application of this method made it possible to support the conclusions with specific facts and quantitative characteristics. Systems approach – This ensured a holistic understanding of the problem by integrating different levels of analysis: from local (university) practices to national strategies and international trends. The use of these methods made it possible to substantiate the educational-regional trajectory as an effective mechanism for preserving knowledge centers, to confirm the innovative nature of KhAI's activities in internal education quality assurance, and to demonstrate the practical value of the results obtained.

**Main results of the research.** The full-scale war has created unprecedented threats to Ukraine's education system. In modern times, armed conflicts remain a common occurrence, despite the global efforts undertaken by the international community to peacefully resolve international disputes and prevent conflicts from escalating to military stages. The devaluation of knowledge centers located in frontline regions, which endure daily shelling, has become particularly palpable. Material damage from the destruction of buildings, equipment, and infrastructure is compounded by an even more serious loss: the risk of losing human capital. Faculty and students are forced to evacuate to safer regions or abroad, creating the danger of an "educational outflow" (brain drain) and the fragmentation of the academic community. Under these conditions, preserving universities in frontline regions as strategic hubs for national recovery is critically important. Educational institutions ensure not only the transmission of knowledge but also the cultivation of values such as

resilience, responsibility, and patriotism. They remain hubs for the development of science, culture, and innovation, without which the state's full recovery after the war is impossible. Universities in frontline regions play an exceptional role in maintaining social unity and national recovery. Amid constant security threats, they become not only educational institutions but also symbols of state presence, reinforcing citizens' trust in Ukrainian education and fostering strategic hope for the future.

From the first hours of the full-scale invasion, Kharkiv found itself on the front line. What transpired in the city and its surroundings needs no further reminder. Yet, despite relentless air alarms, periodic shelling, and damage to critical infrastructure, the residents of Kharkiv continue to work, ensuring and implementing the right of children to education. The National Aerospace University "Kharkiv Aviation Institute" (KhAI) is an example of an institution that continues to operate under extremely difficult conditions. Despite daily security challenges, the university maintains the integrity of its educational process, supports research activities, and demonstrates a model of resilience to society. As a result, KhAI serves not only as an educational institution but also as an example of a resilient educational institution in the region, proving that even amid war, Ukrainian education is capable of modernizing, developing, and fulfilling its strategic mission. Even during the spring and summer of 2022, NAU "KhAI" did not leave the city, remaining an educational and research institution.

The Kharkiv Aviation Institute has a specific educational-regional mission, which involves the integration of three key functions (Fig. 1).




Fig. 1. Functional components of the educational-regional mission of KhAI

As seen in Fig. 1, the practical significance of this mission is that KhAI not only ensures the continuity of the educational process but also fulfills a strategic role in preserving the scientific and educational potential of the Sloboda region (Slobozhanshchyna). It is thanks to its activities that Kharkiv retains its status as one of Ukraine's key educational centers, despite the danger that constantly accompanies the city's life. KhAI's educational-regional mission is not just a local but

also a national priority, as the preservation of the university in a frontline region guarantees the future recovery of both the regional economy and the state as a whole.

The current realities of the Kharkiv region, the permanent threats, and risks shape the vector for prioritizing the issues of securing the educational-regional trajectory and forming a system for preserving the existing hubs of the Ukrainian educational and scientific environment.

It is natural that Kharkiv holds the status of "Student Capital," a result formed over centuries, and Kharkiv itself was and remains a key center for the region's scientific development, including its technical, humanitarian, and science-intensive sectors. Kharkiv is one of the few cities that possesses a unique "education-business-community" complex. The city's developmental achievements are a natural outcome of the functioning of this interconnection, which yields a synergistic (additional) result not only for the region but for the performance of the entire country. The elimination of any link in this chain threatens a fundamental change in production quality standards, capacities, and, overall, the lives of its residents, destroying the possibility of rapid recovery. Neglecting support for these local drivers of development (education-business-community) creates an additional socio-economic burden on the state sector for subsidies and grants.

However, despite the extremely difficult situation, the educational process continues in the Kharkiv region. Under extremely challenging conditions, Kharkiv's education system is developing: the results shown by graduates of higher education institutions in intellectual contests, tournaments, and competitions testify to the high effectiveness of scientific and pedagogical work, even in difficult wartime conditions.

It should be noted that the problem of preserving educational potential in a warzone is a focus of attention for international organizations. For example, the UNESCO Report "Education under Attack 2022" emphasizes that Ukraine has become one of the most affected countries, where educational institutions systematically suffer from military actions, and universities in frontline regions bear a double burden—infrastructure destruction and the outflow of scientific and pedagogical staff. According to the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, as of early 2024, over 3,000 educational institutions of various levels had been damaged or destroyed, creating an unprecedented challenge for the restoration of the educational network.

Additionally, the World Bank, in its "Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment" report (2023), notes that direct losses to the education sector exceeded 9 billion USD, and that rebuilding the system will require a comprehensive approach emphasizing resilience and digitalization. Furthermore, the UN (UNICEF, 2023) highlights that over 5.3 million children and youth in Ukraine have experienced disruptions to their education, jeopardizing the formation of human capital at the national level.

KhAI's experience demonstrates that even under constant threats, it is possible to ensure the continuity of the educational process and fulfill the function of a regional recovery hub. This model is the basis for forming the concept of Ukraine's educational resilience, which must consider the specifics of regional challenges, the risks of human capital loss, and the need for rapid modernization of educational infrastructure.

The KhAI university community, working under constant security threats, realizes that traditional mechanisms for education quality assurance require significant renewal. The response to these challenges has been the implementation of a set of innovations aimed at guaranteeing the continuity of the educational process, increasing its effectiveness, and preserving the trust of students and society in the educational environment.

Among the leading innovations is the introduction of blended educational technologies, based on combining traditional classroom learning with digital platforms and remote teaching methods. The biggest innovation in wartime has been the implementation of hybrid and blended learning formats, which allow for the combination of offline and online classes. For KhAI, this approach became the foundation for preserving the educational process, as it allows for rapid format changes depending on the threat level. Its practical significance is that students can safely continue their studies while in shelters or even outside the region, and instructors receive tools to adapt



courses for different scenarios. This model ensures mobility, resilience, and psychological comfort for all participants in the process.

The integration of safe educational spaces (shelters equipped for learning) is considered a component of the internal education quality assurance system, as it creates conditions for the continuity of the educational process even in threatening circumstances. KhAI has paid special attention to the creation of safe spaces for learning. The university is implementing projects to equip modern shelters that perform a dual function: they provide physical protection for students and are simultaneously equipped for conducting classes. The use of multimedia equipment, internet access, and interactive platforms in such spaces allows for the organization of an uninterrupted educational process even during air alarms. This innovation forms a unique practice of "safe education," guaranteeing students the right to knowledge regardless of the circumstances. For instructors, this means the ability not to lose the educational rhythm, and for the university—a confirmation of its high level of responsibility towards its students and society. It should be emphasized that the equipping of safe shelters at KhAI is considered not just a requirement of the times, but as a component of the internal education quality assurance system. After all, the quality of education today cannot be separated from the creation of a safe environment for students and faculty. The integration of shelters into the educational process—with modern multimedia equipment, internet access, and the possibility of conducting classes in a hybrid format—guarantees the continuity of learning even during prolonged air alarms.

In parallel with the development of shelters and hybrid formats, digitalization is actively advancing at KhAI. The digitalization of educational content and the implementation of systemic monitoring of learning quality are becoming key tools for ensuring educational resilience. They not only allow for the adaptation of educational materials to distance or blended formats but also create a foundation for the objective assessment of learning outcomes. The university is creating electronic platforms for accessing educational materials, organizing distance courses, and collecting feedback. Electronic monitoring systems make it possible to track students' academic results, quickly identify problematic areas, and increase teaching effectiveness.

In conditions of societal instability, building trust in the education system takes on special significance. Academic integrity and the transparency of the educational process are becoming key principles for maintaining trust in university education. Adherence to the principles of integrity amid military challenges ensures the legitimacy of learning outcomes and the integration of Ukrainian higher education institutions into the European educational space. KhAI is implementing practices of public reporting, conducting regular student surveys, and actively involving student self-government bodies in managerial decision-making. This promotes the formation of an integrity culture, increases student motivation, and creates an atmosphere of responsibility within the academic community.

External validation of education quality is extremely important for KhAI. International integration and participation in global university rankings serve as important indicators of the resilience of higher education institutions. The university is actively integrating into the international educational space, participating in global rankings, and expanding partnerships. This not only increases the institution's competitiveness but also opens new opportunities for academic mobility for students and faculty. Participation in international projects and programs serves as confirmation that even under difficult conditions, KhAI remains part of the European and global educational space.

At the national level, issues of educational resilience are also enshrined in relevant strategic documents. For instance, at a plenary session of the Kharkiv Regional Council, deputies approved the Education Development Program "Education of the Unbreakable Kharkiv Region" for 2024–2028, which, in particular, provides for: the preservation and restoration of damaged and destroyed educational institutions in the region; the creation of favorable learning conditions for children; support for gifted and talented children and youth; and the incentivization of pedagogical work. It is precisely the modernization of curricula at KhAI that has become an important tool for increasing the resilience of the university and the entire educational system (Fig. 2).






Fig. 2. Toolkit for enhancing KhAI's resilience

Figure 2 illustrates the logic of building the university's resilience: global and national challenges necessitate the modernization of educational content, which combines traditional academic standards with innovative tools. The latter include adapting programs to modern conditions, integrating practical wartime case studies, strengthening STEM fields and digital competencies, compliance with NAQA requirements and international standards, and serving as a strategic alternative to relocation. It is these tools that enhance KhAI's resilience and the competitiveness of its educational environment.

Disciplines aimed at developing competencies in risk management, crisis management, cybersecurity, and economic and energy security are integrated into course content. The practical significance of these changes is that graduates receive not only specialized knowledge in their professional fields but also universal skills necessary for working in conditions of instability and rapid transformations.

The modernized curricula involve the use of real-world examples that reflect the current experiences of the economy, business, public administration, and the defense sector operating under wartime conditions. This allows students not only to master theoretical material but also to see the direct connection between knowledge and practice. This approach fosters the development of critical thinking, the ability to make decisions in crisis situations, and the capacity to act in conditions of high uncertainty.

The university is focusing on the development of STEM education, which corresponds to both global trends and national needs. A special emphasis is placed on digital technologies, artificial intelligence, automation systems, and engineering innovations. At the same time, students gain access to digital laboratories and simulation platforms, which allows them to practice skills in virtual environments and ensures the continuity of learning even while in shelters.

The modernization of educational content is carried out in strict accordance with the national accreditation standards set forth by the National Agency for Higher Education Quality Assurance. Simultaneously, the university aligns with international qualifications frameworks and standards, which ensures the compatibility of KhAI diplomas with the European Higher Education Area. The practical effect is the opportunity for academic mobility for students and faculty, as well as the enhanced competitiveness of graduates in the global labor market.

The modernization of educational content at KhAI has become a response to discussions regarding the expediency of relocating universities from frontline regions. While relocation often leads to the loss of academic schools, student communities, and socio-cultural potential, the adaptation of programs and the development of the educational-regional trajectory allow the university to remain in its city, fulfilling its role as a hub of knowledge and resilience. Thus, educational content becomes not only an academic tool but also a strategic resource for national security.

The simplest approach in difficult conditions is simple relocation – moving to safer regions. Relocation may result in staff layoffs and a general deterioration of the local community's economic standing, which will place an additional burden (both economic and social) on state institutions. The discussion regarding the advisability of relocating universities from front-line regions requires an objective analysis of its consequences compared to an alternative educational-regional strategy. To systematize the arguments, a comparative analysis was conducted, which is summarized in the table.

**Table 1.**

**Criterial comparison of relocation and the university's educational-regional strategy**

Criterion	University relocation	Educational-regional strategy
Sociocultural aspect	Loss of historical and cultural heritage, disconnection from the region's academic community.	Preservation of scientific schools, cultural identity, and student communities.
Educational and scientific potential	Risk of losing students and faculty, decreased competitiveness.	Support for personnel potential, development of local research initiatives.
Finances and infrastructure	Significant additional state expenditures on relocation, rent, and equipping new facilities.	Utilization of existing infrastructure, investment in restoration and modernization.
Local development	Weakening of the regional economy due to the loss of jobs and student flows.	Support for the local economy, collaboration with communities and business.
Quality of education	Risk of lowered standards due to a lack of resources and adaptation difficulties.	Quality assurance through hybrid models, digitalization, and safe learning environments.
Strategic perspective	A short-term solution that could lead to the institution's disappearance from the country's educational map.	A long-term strategy for development and resilience that promotes the recovery of the region and the state.

As the comparison shows, relocation has short-term effects but is accompanied by significant losses of sociocultural, educational, and economic potential. Conversely, the educational-regional strategy ensures the preservation of scientific schools, support for local communities, and the formation of resilience within the educational environment. These findings

can serve as a basis for state strategies on optimizing the network of higher education institutions, prioritizing the preservation of regional knowledge centers and their modernization, rather than mechanical relocation. Considering these risks is a crucial step when deciding on the relocation of a higher education institution and ensuring that the advantages outweigh the consequences.

A strategy of developing the university within its own sociocultural environment is more effective and promising than the relocation model. Thus, modernization steps in education serve not only as tools for quality assurance but also as a strategic resource for national security and state recovery. Further research into the effects of implemented innovations and an assessment of their scalability at both regional and national levels are essential. The implementation of innovative solutions in the education quality assurance system and the modernization of educational program content at KhAI have yielded comprehensive results, evident both within the university community and in the broader regional and national contexts. The summarized effects of these changes are shown in Figure 3.




Figure 3. Practical effects of the integration of innovative and modernization approaches into KhAI's education quality assurance system

As seen in Figure 3, the introduction of innovations into the internal education quality assurance system and the updating of educational program content at KhAI create multilevel effects spanning academic, organizational, sociocultural, and strategic dimensions. These results confirm that the university has not only maintained functionality amid wartime challenges but has also managed to strengthen its competitiveness. A further detailed examination of these effects allows for a clearer definition of their significance for local, regional, and national development.

Adapting curricula to modern challenges, integrating digital technologies, and combining classical academic traditions with practical wartime case studies have significantly strengthened the applied component of student training. As a result, the university's educational programs are

becoming more competitive and meet the requirements of both the National Agency for Higher Education Quality Assurance and international standards.

The introduction of hybrid formats, access to electronic platforms, and the participation of student self-government in managing the educational environment have enhanced the interactivity of learning. Students not only acquire knowledge but also actively influence its quality through feedback mechanisms. This fosters a sense of responsibility for their own educational path and increases their motivation to learn.

Through active participation in global ranking systems, implementation of international projects, and mobility programs, KhAI is strengthening its presence in the global educational space. Concurrently, the national level of trust in the university is growing due to the demonstration of its resilience in the face of wartime challenges. KhAI is perceived as an institution that has not only preserved its operations but also modernized them, becoming an example for other universities in Ukraine.

The development of the educational-regional trajectory is manifested in several areas: attracting applicants from Kharkivshchyna and other regions by creating safe learning environments;

collaborating with communities by participating in regional educational programs aimed at infrastructure restoration and youth support;

international projects that allow attracting investments into the development of university science, exchanging experience, and improving the quality of personnel training.

Thus, the practical results of KhAI's innovative activities indicate that the university has become not only a place for acquiring knowledge but also an important factor in the region's socio-economic resilience and Ukraine's positive image on the international stage.

First and foremost, there should be well-founded research into the causes of the depressive state of the higher education system in the regions, because the belief that simply moving or merging entities can remedy or revitalize regional education might be an illusion. The reasons for the system's depression are much deeper than just an "unoptimized network." And it is already clear that no reforms in line with the Bologna system, no quality assurance, no updated standards, no new qualifications frameworks, no friendships with stakeholders, etc., have revitalized the system.

The integrated model for modernizing education content and HEI resilience (Figure 4) summarizes the results of the innovations implemented at KhAI and demonstrates the interrelationship between input factors, key transformation modules, resource support elements, and achieved outcomes. Its construction allows not only for a structured presentation of the logic of the changes but also reveals the scientific novelty in forming the concept of an "educational-regional trajectory" as an alternative to relocating universities in front-line regions.

The model aims to transform a university in a front-line region into a "center of resilience and knowledge," where the modernization of education content and the internal quality system ensure continuity, trust, and competitiveness




Figure 4. Integrated model of education content modernization and HEI resilience (on the example of KhAI)

The proposed model involves a multi-level organization of modernization processes, encompassing the MEGA-level (state policy, international partners), MACRO-level (the university as an institution), MESO-level (departments, educational programs), and MICRO-level (faculty and students). This multi-level structure makes it possible to integrate local educational practices into the broader regional and national context.

At the core of the model are five modernization modules (M1–M5), reflecting the key areas of internal transformation: from the implementation of hybrid formats and the development of safe educational spaces to digitalization, the affirmation of academic integrity, and the expansion of international integration. All modules are supported by resource enablers—management and financial mechanisms, human capital development, digital infrastructure, and communication channels with stakeholders.

The result of this system's operation is the formation of Outputs, which manifest in four dimensions:

1. enhanced quality of educational programs and their compliance with international standards;
2. increased levels of student engagement;
3. ensuring the university's institutional resilience under conditions of constant risk;
4. strengthening the institution's international visibility and reputation.

The final block is the outcome, reflecting the model's strategic impacts: the retention of human capital in the region, support for the local economy, the formation of a positive international image for Ukraine, and the creation of a sustainable alternative to university relocation.

An important element is the feedback system: student feedback and external international validation. This ensures continuous improvement, adaptation to dynamic conditions, and increased effectiveness of internal transformations.

The scientific novelty lies in the conceptualization of the "safe education" model and the introduction of the category "educational-regional trajectory" as a strategic tool for preserving knowledge centers in front-line regions. Unlike approaches based on simple university relocation, the proposed model demonstrates that through the integration of hybrid formats, shelters as learning spaces, digital monitoring systems, and international validation, it is possible not only to maintain the institution's functionality but also to ensure its development.

The implementation of the model at KhAI has made it possible to:

1. ensure the continuity of the educational process, even during periods of active shelling;
2. increase the trust of students and their families in studying in a front-line region;
3. preserve scientific and pedagogical schools and prevent "educational outflow";
4. integrate the university into the international educational space despite the wartime risks.

, the model has both theoretical significance (developing the new concept of the educational-regional trajectory) and practical value (creating a universal framework for modernizing education content for universities operating in crisis and high-risk environments).

The results of implementing innovations and modernization processes at KhAI demonstrate that the university can act not only as an educational hub but also as a strategic factor for the region's social and economic resilience. Preserving universities in front-line regions is a matter not only of academic expediency but also of national security and state recovery. The educational-regional strategy, unlike the relocation model, ensures the preservation of scientific schools, cultural heritage, and personnel potential, while simultaneously creating a foundation for future development. Supporting regional universities must be considered a state policy priority, as they are the ones that build the human capital capable of ensuring Ukraine's recovery, its competitiveness, and its integration into the European educational space.

**Conclusions.** The results of the implemented changes confirm the effectiveness of the chosen trajectory. KhAI has ensured an increase in the quality of its educational programs, expanded opportunities for students to participate in shaping the educational environment, and formed a positive image in the national and international context. At the same time, the university has a tangible impact on the region's development by attracting applicants, cooperating with communities, and participating in international projects. Overall, KhAI's activities confirm that education is a key factor in society's resilience and the state's recovery. The modernization of education content and the introduction of innovations into the internal quality assurance system enable universities in front-line regions not only to endure but also to develop, securing a future for hundreds of thousands of young people.

*Recommendations for the state.* The obtained results indicate the need to form, at the state policy level, specific support mechanisms for universities operating in front-line regions. It is advisable to develop targeted funding programs for safe educational spaces, digital infrastructure, and the stimulation of scientific activity as a key factor in enhancing the education system's resilience.

*Recommendations for universities.* Higher education institutions in Ukraine can use KhAI's experience as a model for implementing innovations into their internal education quality assurance systems. Practices such as hybrid learning, digitalization, creating shelters for classes, and involving student self-government in management processes should be integrated into university development strategies, even outside of combat zones.

*Recommendations for international partners.* KhAI's experience demonstrates that Ukrainian universities are capable not only of preserving the educational process in crisis conditions but also of implementing unique innovative solutions. This creates a foundation for expanding international projects and support programs aimed at developing educational resilience, academic mobility, and Ukraine's integration into the global educational space.

*Compliance with the competition's focus.* The solutions proposed in this work directly relate to the introduction of innovations into the internal quality assurance system for educational activities: from hybrid learning models and digital monitoring to creating safe learning environments and strengthening academic integrity. This confirms that the work fully meets the requirements of the nomination "Modernization of education content in the context of global and national challenges." KhAI's experience holds not only local but also national significance. The introduced innovative practices—equipping safe shelters as learning spaces, implementing hybrid learning models, digital quality monitoring, and strengthening academic integrity—can be adapted by other universities in Ukraine, particularly those located in high-risk or resource-limited conditions. Scaling these solutions will enhance the resilience of the entire higher education system, ensure its compliance with international standards, and strengthen Ukraine's competitiveness in the global educational space. KhAI's educational-regional trajectory is an effective mechanism for overcoming the devaluation of knowledge centers, improving the quality of the educational process, and forming a competitive educational environment. This experience serves as a universal model that can become the basis for state policy in preserving and modernizing education in crisis conditions.

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## STUDY OF THE RESULTS OF ENERGY SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA

## ДОСЛІДЖЕННЯ НАСЛІДКІВ ЕНЕРГЕТИЧНИХ САНКЦІЙ ЩОДО РОСІЇ

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**Abstract.** *This article analyzes the impact of energy sanctions imposed on Russia after its military aggression against Ukraine, emphasizing their role as an instrument of economic pressure and geopolitical influence. The study examines how restrictions on oil and gas exports, technological cooperation, and access to international financial markets have weakened Russia's economic stability and limited its energy sector's modernization. Despite partial adaptation through the use of a "shadow fleet" of tankers and high global oil prices, the sanctions have significantly reduced export revenues, disrupted logistics chains, and reshaped the geography of energy supplies. The article identifies the loss of the European natural gas market as one of the most significant consequences, highlighting the structural shift in global energy flows and the increased role of Asian countries. The introduction of new sanctions in 2024, including those targeting the "shadow fleet" and the Arctic LNG-2 project, has intensified the economic strain on Russia and threatened key strategic energy initiatives. The results demonstrate that sanctions have become an effective non-military mechanism for influencing state behavior, while Russia's efforts to circumvent them reveal both its resilience and systemic vulnerabilities. The study concludes that continuous adaptation of the sanctions regime and international coordination remain essential to maintaining pressure and supporting global energy security.*

**Keywords:** *energy sanctions, Russian energy sector, oil exports, financial restrictions, shadow fleet, macroeconomic stability, natural gas, European market, sanctions pressure, technological restrictions.*

**Анотація.** *У статті проаналізовано вплив енергетичних санкцій, запроваджених проти Росії після її військової агресії проти України, з акцентом на їхню роль як*

інструменту економічного тиску та геополітичного впливу. Досліджено, як обмеження експорту нафти й газу, співпраці у сфері технологій та доступу до міжнародних фінансових ринків послабили економічну стабільність Росії та обмежили модернізацію її енергетичного сектору. Незважаючи на часткову адаптацію через використання «тіньового флоту» танкерів і високі світові ціни на нафту, санкції суттєво скоротили експортні доходи, порушили логістичні ланцюги та змінили географію енергетичних поставок. Одним із найважливіших наслідків визначено втрату Росією європейського ринку природного газу, що засвідчує структурні зміни у світових енергопотоках і зростання ролі азійських країн. Нові санкції 2024 року, зокрема проти «тіньового флоту» та проекту «Arctic LNG-2», посилили економічний тиск на Росію та поставили під загрозу реалізацію стратегічно важливих енергетичних ініціатив. Результати показують, що санкції стали ефективним немілітарним механізмом впливу на державну політику, тоді як спроби Росії обійти обмеження виявляють одночасно її стійкість і системні вразливості. Зроблено висновок, що подальше вдосконалення санкційного режиму та міжнародна координація є необхідними для збереження тиску та підтримання глобальної енергетичної безпеки.

**Ключові слова:** енергетичні санкції, російський енергетичний сектор, експорт нафти, фінансові обмеження, тіньовий флот, макроекономічна стабільність, природний газ, європейський ринок, санкційний тиск, технологічні обмеження.

**Introduction.** Energy sanctions have become an important element of the global strategy of pressure on Russia in response to its aggressive actions in Ukraine. These sanctions are not only aimed at limiting Russia's financial capabilities, but have also significantly affected its ability to finance military campaigns through the sale of energy resources. Introduced sanctions include numerous measures such as supply restrictions of oil and gas to international markets, export ban of advanced technologies necessary for development of new ones energy projects, as well as limitation of financial operations with Russia.

The strategic goals of these sanctions were not only to reduce Russia's export revenues, but also to hamper its ability to maintain and modernize its energy infrastructure, which is critical for long-term economic stability.

**The purpose of the article** is to assess the impact and effectiveness of energy sanctions imposed on Russia after its military aggression against Ukraine, focusing on their influence on the country's economic stability, export revenues, and energy sector adaptation, as well as on the broader consequences for global energy security.

**Literature review.** Literature includes analytical studies, reports and articles. Research KSE Institute and DiXi Group have become important sources of information about economic influence sanctions. They provide financial data losses of Russia, changes in exports of oil and gas, as well as adaptation of Russia to new conditions, including development of shadow fleet of tankers. Others sources are investigating macroeconomic stability in Russia, influence internal sanctions economy, inflationary pressure and infrastructure problems.

In recent years, the field of research on the impact of energy sanctions against Russia has seen increased activity from both Ukrainian and international expert-scientific researchers. Among them, it is worth noting Oleksandr Danyliuk, a Ukrainian economist and former Minister of Finance, who analyzes the economic consequences of sanctions for the Russian economy and their impact on international energy markets. The international level is represented by studies such as those by Anthony Bradshaw from the London School of Economics, who examines how sanctions have affected Russia's energy sector and overall European energy security. Also worth mentioning is Peter Woods from Georgetown University, who investigates the strategic aspects of energy sanctions and their impact on global political relations. These studies provide a deep analysis of the effectiveness of sanctions and their long-term consequences for Russia and the global economy. In this article, we will focus on analyzing the energy sanctions imposed on Russia and

their consequences for the country's economy and politics. Although there are numerous studies examining the overall impact of sanctions on Russia, some key aspects remain underexplored.

**Main results of research.** Sanctions are a non-military measure. They can be applied during an armed conflict between states or as an unfriendly act. In any case, they serve as a form of coercion that does not involve the use of force itself. In some cases, sanctions are a response to the use of force (*Koval & Bernatskyi, 2023*).

Harry Clyde Hufbauer classifies cases of sanctions imposition according to the foreign policy objectives of the initiating parties:

- a minor change in the policy of the sanctioned state;
- a regime change in the sanctioned state;
- gaining a military advantage;
- constraining the military potential of the sanctioned state;
- a radical change in the policy of the sanctioned state.

Hufbauer emphasizes that in order to assess the effectiveness of sanctions, it is crucial to clearly understand the purpose of their imposition. In some cases, this may be difficult or impossible to determine. Moreover, the goals of sanctions are not static; they may change over time due to political circumstances, economic factors, and other influences.

Energetic sanctions against of Russia became one from key tools of international community for pressure on Russian government to respond to its military aggression against of Ukraine. Introduction of these sanctions was aimed not only at limiting Russia's access to critically important financial resources, but also for deterrence its ability to finance war due to the sale of energy resources. Russia, as one of the largest exporters of oil and natural gas in the world, used revenues from energy sales to fill the budget, stabilization macroeconomic situation and support his own military potential (*Office of the President of Ukraine, 2024*).

Here are the key aspects of energy sanctions against Russia ( table 1):

Table 1

Key aspects of energy sanctions against Russia

Aspects of energy sanctions against Russia	Impact
Restriction on oil and gas exports	Reduction in export revenues, change in supply geography
Prohibition on export of advanced technologies	Complication of energy infrastructure modernization
Loss of revenue from oil exports	Economic instability, higher inflationary pressure
Investment in "shadow fleet" tankers	Development of alternative export routes
Adaptation to new sales markets	Exploration of new sales markets, strategy adjustments
Impact on international energy markets	Change in competitive landscape, geopolitical shifts

Source: created by the author

Sanctions have been introduced by the United States, the European Union and others countries, were aimed at several aspects of energy sector of Russia. These included supply restrictions Russian oil to world markets, export ban modern technologies necessary for development new ones energy projects, as well as restricting Russian access companies to international ones financial markets Such the strategy aimed not only reduce Russia's income from export, but also complicate its ability to maintain and modernize its energy infrastructure, which is key for the long-term preservation economic power countries

Thanks to these events are international community hoped that limitation export energy resources will significantly weaken Russian economy, will force the Kremlin to change aggressive policy and will create conditions for a peaceful settlement of conflict

Russia has allies, first of all queue, China, Turkey, UAE and countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus, which help (or play back an important role) in bypassing sanctions. Russia fixed it

networks through which it receives by roundabout ways western goods double appointment that are used by it for the needs of the military-industrial complex (*Office of the President of Ukraine, 2024*).

The impact of these sanctions on the Russian economy and global energy markets has been studied by several analytical organizations, including KSE Institute and DiXi Group, who published their research on the impact of energy sanctions in 2022-2024.

According to KSE Institute, sanctions related to the Russian energy sector have significantly affected the Russian economy, especially its oil industry, which is one of the key items of income for the state budget. The loss of \$78.5 billion in one and a half years is the result not only of EU restrictions, but also of the general international coordination of actions to reduce the demand for Russian oil.

The European embargo and price restrictions, implemented in December 2022, were intended to reduce Russia's revenue from oil sales while allowing global markets to access the energy at stable prices. Aggravation of losses in January 2023, when Russia lost \$8.6 billion, shows that the country was not fully ready for this large-scale changes in export conditions. In particular, they decreased volumes of export to Europe, which was one of the largest buyers of Russian oil, and a reorientation to new markets such as India or China, could not fully compensate losses

By the middle of 2023, Russia began to adapt to the new ones realities Although losses remained significant, they stabilized at the level of \$2.8 billion every month. It maybe testifies that country was able part find new sales markets and ways of circumventing restrictions. However, even under such conditions of sanctions continue to cause a serious blow to the economy, because oil is the main one a source of income for Russia on the international stage Arena (*KSE Institute, 2024*).

Introduced sanctions forced Russia to search alternative ways to work around restrictions that were superimposed on her energy sector. One of these measures was significant investment in the creation of the so-called "shadow fleet" tankers. Russia put in about \$8.5 billion in this fleet, which consisted of 435 vessels at the beginning of 2024. The purpose of this fleet was transportation oil bypass international sanctions, in particular, by masking routes, changes shipowners and registrants documents, as well as using less transparent ports for transshipment of oil.

However, international community quickly reacted to this an attempt to go around sanctions. In response were introduced new ones restrictions which directly concerned operations with the "shadow fleet" as well increased control over insurance and financing of vessels, which they can participate in transportation Russian oil These measures led to growth discounts on the Urals brand oil, which he sells Russia that temporarily increased the discount from \$13.7 to \$18.3 per barrel in the period from September 2023 to January 2024.

Sanctions against Russian of the energy sector led not only to a significant abbreviation of income from oil, but also to changes in geography to supply this strategic resource. The main factor was the limitation of Russia's access to key transport and financial channels. In particular, oil trade with India, one of the largest buyers of Russian oil after the start of the war, suffered essential changes Dixi Group reports that India in the first quarter of 2024 in full stopped purchases Russian oil that was transported by "Sovcomflot" sub-sanctioned tankers. Oil that used to be was delivered to India replaced Iraqi and American oil that indicates effort of India to lower dependence from Russian export because of fears of possible secondary sanctions from the West (*Hufbauer, Schott, & Elliott, 2009*).

Logistical problems became one of the main ones obstacles for Russia in support export oil sanctions made access to infrastructure difficult for tankers transportation that resulted in delays and increases transportation costs. Banks of China, Turkey and the United States Arabic Emirates (UAE) also began to implement tougher financial requirements operations with Russia, because they are afraid to get under American sanctions. It makes it difficult financing export Russian oil, even if it is sold to markets that remain open to Russia.

United Arab Emirates have banned Cameroonian - flagged vessels from entering their waters, a move that removes the emirate from risky vessels which were assembled for transportation of oil that got into under sanctions (Lee & Longley, 2024).

Except oil, export liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) as well experienced essential impact sanctions. Russian "Sybur" company, one of key exporters of LPG, faced a shortage of tankers for transportation its product to world markets. It caused by both supply sanctions new ones tankers, and physical ones damage infrastructure. In particular, the operation of the terminal in the port of Ust-Luga, which plays back important role in transportation of the Russian ZNG, was complicated by drone attacks that led to additional delays and risks for transportation (*DiXi Group, 2024*).

It is worth noting that supply and logistics issues deepen general trends on the market oil. Sanctioned pressure from the West countries, in particular new ones restrictions on the activities of the "shadow fleet" - tankers that help of Russia go around sanctions lead to more and more complication export processes. It indicates growth efficiency sanctions measures and that Russia forced to find new ones, less and less convenient and profitable ways to sell oil.

Although tough sanctions restrictions introduced against energy sector of Russia, its macroeconomic stability demonstrates relative stability. One of key factors that support Russian economy, remains export oil. According to KSE Institute, in the first half of 2024 monthly income from export oil averaged \$17.3 billion, which is 22% more compared to similar period of 2023. This allowed not only Russia to save currency income, but also to form a current account surplus balance of payments which reached \$40.6 billion (*KSE Institute, 2024*).

This surplus plays an important role in maintaining economic stability, as it provides sufficient foreign exchange to cover budget deficits and import costs. However, it should be noted that the increase in export earnings was not the result of increased oil sales, but rather the result of higher global oil prices, which helped Russia offset the discount on its oil due to sanctions restrictions.

Despite the increased military spending action and increase burden on the budget, as of June 2024, the federal budget deficit decreased by 60% to 930 billion rubles compared to the first half of 2023. To this contributed not only growth in export income, but also strict austerity measures, as well increase taxes and export duties to energy carriers (*KSE Institute, 2024*).

However, despite these positive macroeconomic indicators, Russian economy faces serious challenges. One of the main ones problematic aspects is high level inflation. Central Bank of Russia was forced to use measures for deterrence inflationary of pressure by increasing key rate at 1050 basis points from mid -2023. It was not meant to be to limit domestic demand and stabilize prices, but inflation continues to stay high levels due to growth cost imported goods and depreciation of national currency (*KSE Institute, 2024*).

High level inflation negatively affects the purchasing power ability population, increasing cost life, especially for those who depends on from imported goods. In addition, due to limited access to foreign technologies and capital Russian business faces more and more problems in support and updating production capacities that maybe to limit economic growth in the future.

Losses in Russia is one of the most significant in the European natural gas market, consequences in energy sanctions and restructuring energy EU policies. To the beginning full-scale war of Russia against of Ukraine Europe was the biggest consumer of Russian gas, and Russian Gazprom controlled significant share of European market. After aggression of Russia, The European Union, trying to reduce your addiction from Russian of energy resources, started active work on diversification of gas supplies and implementation of sanctions.

One of key elements of this strategy was implementation of sanctions against Gazprom and restrictions export Russian gas. EU significantly shortened purchases of Russian gas, replacing it for supply from others sources such as the USA, Qatar and Norway. A significant role in reducing dependencies of Europe from Russian gas was played back investment in renewables sources energy and development infrastructure for import of liquefied natural gas (LNG), which allowed the EU to significantly lower vulnerability to possible energy blackmail from Russia (*DiXi Group, 2024*).

Because of the loss, the European market for Gazprom for the first time since 1999 damages because he could not quickly reorient its deliveries to other markets. In particular, Russia tried to increase volumes of export to countries of Asia, such as China and India, however, due to logistics limitation and absence of necessary infrastructure, such deliveries could not be made to compensate losses to European market.

Also, try of Russia use gas flows as leverage the EU was put under pressure failures Reduction gas supply or its complete termination due to "Nord Stream-1" and "Nord Stream-2" did not lead to the expected growth energy prices, but instead sped up decision Europe from full rejection from Russian gas. European countries also became more united in their own efforts of software energy security, that yet more reduced odds of Russia for recovering supply in the coming years.

Apart from economic losses, Russia collided with infrastructural ones challenges because some gas pipelines, which earlier supplied gas to Europe, now idle or are used much less Restoration full-fledged cooperation with European partners in the gas industry sphere unlikely due to changes geopolitical situation and implementation long-term sanctions.

In the first Western quarters of 2024 countries much strengthened sanctioned pressure on Russia, focusing on strategic important sectors of the economy and schemes that allowed circumvention of previous ones restrictions. One of the basic directions became implementation of new secondary sanctions against the so-called "shadow fleet" - networks of tankers, which Russia used for transportation of oil to bypass installed price limits and embargoes. Under influence of these measures significant part of the fleet stopped that made it difficult to export oil increased logistic costs and forced Russia to search new ones methods to support their own energy supplies (Longley, 2024).

Sanctioned pressure on the "shadow fleet" was accompanied strengthening of control over the maneuvers of vessels, which were often performed atypical operations, trying to avoid detection The USA, EU and Great Britain actively monitored violation that forced Russia change routes and methods transportation oil, causing temporary abbreviation volumes export.

Apart from sanctions against the "shadow fleet", the USA and Great Britain introduced a new set of restrictions aimed at against of the "Arctic LNG-2" project, one of the key ones for Russia economy. The project faced serious problems due to impossibility to get specialized tankers arctic class required for transportation of liquefied natural gas. From the planned 21 tankers are ready for operation were only 3, and construction the rest of the ships were frozen due to rejection Korean and Japanese companies continue cooperation This put under a threat implementation of "Arctic LNG-2" and significantly lowered prospects export of Russian LNG from the Arctic region.

The European Union in its turn strengthened supply sanctions foreign equipment needed for support oil refinery industry of Russia Because of this the company "Lukoil" reduced production of high-octane gasoline at the Nizhnegorod Refinery twice, because she could not replace damaged catalytic converter cracking Lack of access to modern equipment and technologies makes it difficult support technological processes in Russian enterprises that lead to a decrease productivity and efficiency (Longley, 2024).

In addition, the EU introduced new compliance control rules price restrictions on Russian oil and oil products. These measures are aimed at to cover opportunities for detour sanctions through third parties countries and virtual schemes that included the sale of Russian oil at an undervalued price.

Countries of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) are primarily helping Russia circumvent sanctions. For example, Kazakhstan can resell oil and gas industry equipment to Russia, as it uses similar equipment (Koval & Bernatskyi, 2023).

**Conclusions.** Thus, the sanctions imposed on the Russian energy sector have proven effective as a tool of economic pressure. They not only reduced Russia's oil export revenues but also significantly complicated its ability to modernize its energy infrastructure and limited its access to international financial markets. The loss of \$78.5 billion from oil exports and the need for investments in the "shadow fleet" indicate the serious economic pressure Russia is under.

Russia has managed to partially compensate for its losses due to the rise in global oil prices and the creation of a "shadow fleet." However, these measures have not solved all the problems, and the pressure from sanctions continues to lead to increased transportation costs and complications in export processes. Investments in new tankers and attempts to circumvent sanctions by changing routes have only partially helped Russia, but these measures are not a long-term solution to the problem. Despite the sanctions, the Russian economy continues to show relative resilience thanks to high global oil prices and a surplus in the balance of payments. The reduction in the budget deficit and the preservation of foreign currency inflows indicate Russia's ability to maintain macroeconomic stability, even despite rising inflation and difficulties accessing foreign technologies.

However, the loss of the European natural gas market is a significant blow to Russia. The reduction in supplies and the shrinking of the market share, where Gazprom once dominated, demonstrate serious economic and infrastructural losses. The lack of opportunities to quickly redirect supplies to new markets and the inefficiency of gas leverage on the EU complicate the situation for Russia.

New sanctions, particularly against the "shadow fleet" and the Arctic LNG-2 project, as well as the tightening of control over compliance with oil price caps, have significantly complicated Russia's economic operations. These sanctions threaten the implementation of strategically important energy projects and limit the ability to bypass previous sanctions.

Thus, sanctions have become a powerful tool for impacting the Russian economy, but Russia continues to adapt to new conditions, using various strategies to maintain its economic and energy interests. Meanwhile, Western countries continue to refine the sanctions regime to increase pressure on Russia and support global stability.

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## **GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE AT THE POINT OF STRUCTURAL DECOUPLING: HOW FRAGMENTATION AND RENATIONALIZATION REDEFINE GEOECONOMIC COMPETITION**

## **ГЛОБАЛЬНА ІНФРАСТРУКТУРА В УМОВАХ СТРУКТУРНОГО ДЕКАПЛІНГУ: ЯК ФРАГМЕНТАЦІЯ ТА РЕНАЦІОНАЛІЗАЦІЯ ПЕРЕОСМИСЛЮЮТЬ ГЕОЕКОНОМІЧНУ КОНКУРЕНЦІЮ**

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***Abstract.** The article explores the evolving character of global infrastructure under the accelerating conditions of geoeconomic fragmentation. It examines how the erosion of the previous model of hyperglobalization, the restructuring of international production networks, the weaponization of interdependence and the politicization of global value chains redefine the strategic logic of infrastructure development. The study emphasizes that fragmentation has become a systemic force reshaping patterns of connectivity, financial flows, and investment priorities, while infrastructural decoupling increasingly acts as a mechanism through which states seek to protect national interests and reduce vulnerabilities. The paper analyzes key drivers of fragmentation, including the crisis of multilateral institutions, the resurgence of industrial policy, the*



*intensification of technological rivalry, the rise of economic nationalism, energy insecurity, and differentiated regional responses to global shocks.*

*Special attention is devoted to the duality of contemporary infrastructural transformations. On the one hand, global connectivity remains a critical foundation for economic development, trade, digitalization, and supply chain efficiency. On the other hand, the strategic behavior of states reflects a growing preference for the renationalization of investment, selective protectionism, the securitization of critical infrastructure, and the construction of parallel networks outside traditional Western-centric systems. This dual process leads to the emergence of competing infrastructural regimes, where global, regional and national interests intersect and frequently collide. The article highlights that competition for control over transport corridors, energy routes, digital platforms, and financial infrastructure increasingly determines the new geoeconomic configuration.*

*The research demonstrates that infrastructural decoupling is not merely a technical or economic trend but a broader political phenomenon shaped by the logic of power redistribution. Rivalry between major global actors intensifies the fragmentation of rules, standards and technological ecosystems, generating mixed effects for emerging economies and smaller states. Some countries benefit from strategic diversification of partners and new investment windows, while others become more exposed to supply disruptions and asymmetric dependencies. The study shows that the global economy is transitioning towards a hybrid connectivity landscape, where universal integration is replaced by a mosaic of competing blocs, selective partnerships and differentiated institutional architectures.*

*The analysis identifies several structural consequences of fragmentation for global infrastructure. These include weakened coordination of transnational projects, rising capital costs due to geopolitical uncertainty, a shift towards state-driven financing models, the prioritization of resilience over efficiency and the formation of overlapping spheres of influence. The article argues that investment renationalization has become an essential tool for governments aiming to strengthen autonomy, protect critical assets, reduce strategic exposure and support national development goals. At the same time, fragmentation stimulates new infrastructural coalitions, accelerates the search for alternative corridors and contributes to the reordering of global economic geography.*

*The findings confirm that infrastructural decoupling is becoming a central feature of the emerging world economy. It reshapes connectivity patterns, transforms strategic behavior, alters institutional frameworks and deepens geoeconomic competition. Understanding these processes is crucial for assessing long-term risks to global stability, investment flows and development trajectories. The article offers a conceptual foundation for interpreting the future of global infrastructure in an increasingly fragmented international environment and provides analytical tools for evaluating scenarios of renationalization, divergence and contested connectivity.*

**Key words:** *global infrastructure, infrastructure project, megaproject, alliance, decoupling, differentiation, concentration, competition, cooperation, coopetition, fragmentation, localization, sanctions, value chains, supply chains, dependency, connectivity, energy sector, energy market, financing mechanisms, financial assets, investments, cluster, transatlantic cluster, Middle Eastern cluster, OPEC*

**Анотація.** *Стаття досліджує змінний характер глобальної інфраструктури в умовах прискореної гео економічної фрагментації. Аналізується спосіб, в який ерозія моделі гіперглобалізації, реструктуризація міжнародних виробничих мереж, використання взаємозалежності як інструменту тиску та політизація глобальних ланцюгів вартості переозначають стратегічну логіку розвитку інфраструктури. У роботі підкреслюється, що фрагментація перетворилася на системну силу, яка змінює конфігурації зв'язності, фінансових потоків та інвестиційних пріоритетів, тоді як інфраструктурний декаплінг дедалі частіше виступає механізмом, за допомогою якого держави прагнуть захистити національні інтереси та зменшити вразливості. У статті розглянуто ключові чинники*

фрагментації, серед яких криза багатосторонніх інститутів, ренесанс індустріальної політики, посилення технологічного суперництва, зростання економічного націоналізму, енергетична небезпека та диференційовані регіональні реакції на глобальні шоки.

Особливу увагу приділено дуальності сучасних інфраструктурних трансформацій, що супроводжують формування конкуруючих інфраструктурних режимів, у яких глобальні, регіональні та національні інтереси перетинаються та нерідко вступають у конфлікт. У статті підкреслюється, що конкуренція за контроль над транспортними коридорами, енергетичними маршрутами, цифровими платформами та фінансовою інфраструктурою дедалі більше визначає нову гео економічну конфігурацію.

Дослідження показує, що інфраструктурний декаплінг є не лише технічною або економічною тенденцією, а й ширшим політичним феноменом, сформованим логікою перерозподілу влади. Суперництво між провідними глобальними акторами посилює фрагментацію правил, стандартів і технологічних екосистем, створюючи змішані ефекти для країн, що розвиваються, та для малих держав. Деякі з них отримують вигоди від стратегічної диверсифікації партнерів та нових інвестиційних можливостей, тоді як інші стають більш вразливими до збоїв у постачанні та асиметричних залежностей. Стаття демонструє, що глобальна економіка переходить до гібридного ландшафту зв'язності, у якому універсальна інтеграція поступається місцем мозаїці конкуруючих блоків, вибіркового партнерства та диференційованих інституційних архітектур.

У роботі виокремлено кілька структурних наслідків фрагментації для глобальної інфраструктури. Серед них послаблення координації транскордонних проєктів, зростання вартості капіталу через геополітичну невизначеність, зсув до моделей державного фінансування, пріоритизація резильєнтності над ефективністю та формування перехресних сфер впливу. У статті стверджується, що ренаціоналізація інвестицій стала ключовим інструментом урядів, які прагнуть зміцнити автономію, захистити критичні активи, зменшити стратегічні ризики та підтримати національні цілі розвитку. Водночас фрагментація стимулює появу нових інфраструктурних коаліцій, прискорює пошук альтернативних коридорів та сприяє переформатуванню глобальної економічної географії.

**Ключові слова:** глобальна інфраструктура, інфраструктурний проєкт, мегапроєкт, альянс, декаплінг, диференціація, концентрація, конкуренція, кооперація, конкуперація, фрагментація, локалізація, санкції, ланцюги вартості, ланцюги поставок, залежність, зв'язність, енергетичний сектор, енергетичний ринок, механізми фінансування, фінансові активи, фінансові центри, інвестиції, кластер, трансатлантичний кластер, близькосхідний кластер, ОПЕК.

**Introduction.** The implementation of global infrastructure projects is undergoing an unprecedented transformation driven by geoeconomic fragmentation, technological separation, and the redefinition of resilience as a strategic concept. Evidence provided by the World Bank Infrastructure Monitor (World Bank, 2025) reveals profound shifts in the architecture of investment flows and logistics networks, which collectively shape a new reality of global development. An analysis of these trends demonstrates how fragmentation is transforming not only the geography of capital but also the strategic logic of infrastructure development in a multipolar world.

The World Bank Infrastructure Monitor (World Bank, 2025) identifies a significant decline in private investment in infrastructure across the Global South, which fell to \$71.5 billion in 2023, the lowest level since 2015. This represents a 40% decrease compared to the peak of \$120 billion recorded in 2017. The decline reflects a structural transformation of the global investment paradigm rather than a cyclical fluctuation. A key factor behind this contraction is the heightened perception of risk resulting from geopolitical instability. Institutional investors, who historically viewed infrastructure as a stable asset class with predictable cash flows, are reassessing risk in the context of sanctions, currency volatility and political uncertainty. According to the Infrastructure Monitor, the average risk premium for infrastructure projects in low- and middle-income countries increased

from three hundred fifty to five hundred twenty basis points between 2020 and 2023 (*World Bank, 2025*).

The sectoral distribution of declining investment shows that fragmentation affects industries unevenly. The energy sector experienced the sharpest contraction, with a fifty-two percent decline in private investment due to the uncertainties of the energy transition and the increasing politicization of energy markets. In contrast, telecommunications demonstrated relative resilience with a fifteen percent decline, reflecting the critical importance of digital infrastructure for economic development. Financing mechanisms are also undergoing structural transformation. Traditional project finance based on long-term, low-risk loans is increasingly being replaced by corporate finance and government-backed guarantees. The share of projects involving multilateral development banks increased from 23 percent to 41 percent, highlighting the growing importance of public risk mitigation mechanisms for mobilizing private capital. This development creates a paradox in which the countries most in need of private investment become disproportionately dependent on public financing.

Regional variations further reveal the complex geography of investment fragmentation. Sub-Saharan Africa witnessed the most severe decline, with private investment falling by 58 percent, while the majority of remaining projects are concentrated in a limited number of states with relatively stable institutions, such as Kenya, Ghana, and Senegal. Latin America exhibits high volatility, with significant disparities between countries; Chile and Uruguay remain attractive destinations for investment, while Argentina and Venezuela are largely excluded from private capital flows. South Asia exhibits relative resilience due to the scale of its domestic markets in India and Bangladesh; however, investment remains concentrated in specific sectors and regions.

Simultaneously, the Global North has experienced an unprecedented concentration of infrastructure investment. According to the *World Bank Infrastructure Monitor 2024*, 73% of all global infrastructure investment in 2023 occurred in OECD countries, compared with 61% in 2019 (*World Bank, 2025*). This process of investment renationalization reflects a fundamental shift in the logic of global capital allocation. Drivers of this concentration include both economic and geopolitical factors. Large-scale infrastructure modernization programs in the United States, the European Union, and other developed economies generate significant demand for capital. At the same time, policies of nearshoring and friendshoring redirect investment toward politically aligned jurisdictions. Estimates indicate that approximately \$340 billion in infrastructure investment was redirected away from the Global South toward advanced economies between 2020 and 2023 (*Geopolitical Monitor, 2025; World Bank, 2025*).

Technological factors reinforce this concentration. Investment in next-generation infrastructure, such as 5G networks, quantum communications, green hydrogen, and advanced energy storage systems, is increasingly concentrated in economies with strong innovation ecosystems. The *Monitor* reports that eighty-nine percent of global investment in next-generation digital infrastructure is concentrated in the fifteen most advanced economies (*Geopolitical Monitor, 2025; World Bank, 2025*), posing the risk of a widening technological divide that may further marginalize developing countries. Financial innovations also contribute to this concentration. Green bonds, infrastructure funds, and related instruments are predominantly issued in the deep capital markets of advanced economies. In 2023, eighty-two percent of green bond issuances for infrastructure projects originated in OECD member states. Even when financing is intended for developing economies, the structuring of instruments takes place through financial centers such as London, New York and Tokyo, maintaining the control of developed economies over global capital flows.

Institutional investors are adjusting their strategies to the emerging environment. Pension funds and insurance companies, which traditionally sought diversification through investments in emerging markets, are increasingly shifting their capital toward safer jurisdictions. For example, the Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board reduced its exposure to developing countries from 35% to 18% between 2020 and 2023. The integration of ESG criteria has become a decisive factor in investment decisions. According to the *Infrastructure Monitor 2024*, 67% of institutional investors

consider ESG indicators critically important, compared with 31% in 2019 (Turner, C., 2021). Climate-related considerations dominate. Net-zero commitments made by investors controlling more than \$70 trillion in assets effectively exclude carbon-intensive projects from their investment portfolios. The Monitor documents a 78 percent decline in investment in coal-related infrastructure and a 45 percent decrease in financing for gas projects. Although investment in renewable energy has increased by 156 percent, 84 percent of this growth is concentrated in developed economies with stable regulatory environments and subsidized frameworks.

Social requirements add further complexity. Obligations related to community consultations, resettlement, gender equality, and labor standards raise both the cost and duration of project implementation. The average preparation time for an infrastructure project that meets international social standards has increased from 3.2 to 5.7 years (Geopolitical Monitor, 2025; World Bank, 2025). Ironically, countries with the most urgent infrastructure needs often have the weakest capacity to meet complex ESG requirements. Localization has emerged as a strategic imperative in a fragmented environment. Requirements for local content vary widely, ranging from 30% in Brazil to 70% in Nigeria. These requirements significantly alter project economics. Projects with high localization requirements exhibit 23% higher capital costs and face implementation delays of up to 18 months. At the same time, localization fosters long-term benefits through the development of domestic supply chains and technology transfer (Geopolitical Monitor, 2025; World Bank, 2025).

Technological localization now extends far beyond the domestic production of components. The Chinese model of infrastructure plus technology transfer, which includes the establishment of local R&D centers and specialized training programs, increasingly competes with the Western model of infrastructure plus governance, which emphasizes institutional capacity building. Recipient countries increasingly demand not only physical infrastructure but also technological competencies necessary for its maintenance and further development. Finally, ESG arbitrage has emerged as an unintended consequence of regulatory divergence. Projects rejected by Western investors on ESG grounds increasingly receive funding from alternative sources. The Monitor documents more than 200 such projects, with a combined value of \$45 billion US dollars, financed by Chinese, Middle Eastern, or Russian institutions. This dynamic contributes to the formation of parallel investment ecosystems with distinct standards and operational logics (Geopolitical Monitor, 2025; World Bank, 2025).

**Despite the growing body** of research on geoeconomic fragmentation and its implications for global development, the dynamics of infrastructural decoupling remain insufficiently conceptualized. Existing studies rarely address how fragmentation reshapes the strategic behavior of states in global infrastructure systems, how investment renationalization alters the geography of connectivity, and how geoeconomic competition transforms the institutional architecture governing cross-border flows. This study seeks to fill this gap by examining the mechanisms through which fragmentation reconfigures global infrastructure and by clarifying the geoeconomic logic that drives states to pursue decoupled infrastructural strategies.

**The purpose of the article** is to investigate how infrastructural decoupling unfolds under conditions of accelerating global fragmentation, to identify the economic and political mechanisms behind investment renationalization, and to examine how these processes contribute to the rise of geoeconomic competition in key strategic sectors.

**Literature review.** Research on global infrastructure under conditions of fragmentation emerges at the intersection of institutional, geoeconomic, and technological approaches. Analytical reports from international organizations highlight a large-scale reconfiguration of investment flows, logistics networks, and financing mechanisms, emphasizing the systemic nature of current infrastructural transformations (World Bank, 2025). Studies addressing the restructuring of the world economic order highlight the relationship between global fragmentation, the rise of regional blocks, and the emergence of new models of infrastructural interaction, which influence investment priorities, risk profiles, and the accessibility of capital (Reznikova & Panchenko, 2023). Work examining economic conflicts and the uneven distribution of interests in the global economy provides a theoretical foundation for interpreting infrastructural competition in a

multipolar environment (Reznikova, 2013). Methodological developments in evaluating economic dependence and asymmetry between states help explain investment renationalization as a form of structural reconfiguration of global infrastructural systems (Reznikova, 2012). At the same time, research on the macroeconomic effects of the energy transition highlights the growing role of circular development models and the impact of decarbonization on the logic of infrastructure investment (Reznikova & Grod, 2024).

Monographic studies on the modification of the economic dependence paradigm emphasize that the transition toward a synergistic model of global development is accompanied by the emergence of new forms of infrastructural interaction and competition for control over critical assets (Reznikova & Grydasova, 2024). Regional analyses of infrastructural transformation in specific spatial environments show how fragmentation and mosaic integration shape new configurations of connectivity, influencing logistics, investment, and techno-economic models (Reznikova, Panchenko & Vitchenko, 2025). Concepts of regionalism and institutional cooperation underscore that infrastructural systems have become essential instruments of regional integration, while also reflecting tensions between cooperation and competition (Knecht, 2013). Research on the governability of regional processes highlights the institutional paradox in which infrastructure develops more rapidly than the regulatory mechanisms required to ensure its sustainability (Luszczuk et al., 2022).

Comparative studies of maritime routes and transport corridors reveal that the fragmentation of global infrastructure is influenced by both technological capabilities and political-economic considerations, which drive the creation of alternative routes and intensify competition among them (Ostreng et al., 2013). Geoeconomic analyses highlight the increasing strategic competition for control over energy and logistics routes, which directly impacts the infrastructural decisions of states (Geopolitical Monitor, 2025; World Bank Group, 2022; ESCAP).

Studies of megaprojects and their transformative impact on global development emphasize that large-scale infrastructural initiatives act as catalysts of structural change but remain highly vulnerable to geopolitical risks and financial shocks (Dimitriou & Field, 2019). Research on the determinants of project success highlights institutional, psychological, and technical factors that shape the performance of large-scale infrastructure, particularly under conditions of heightened geopolitical uncertainty (Flyvbjerg & Gardner, 2023). Documents of international development banks underline the ongoing reorientation of investment flows and the strategic importance of state-driven financing mechanisms for critical infrastructure (AIIB). Analyses of the political economy of regional infrastructure systems explain how global fragmentation stimulates the emergence of alternative infrastructural clusters, new investment alliances, and competitive regulatory regimes (Turner, 2021).

**Main results of the research.** Infrastructure decoupling is the process of deliberate or forced separation of interdependencies within global infrastructure systems, resulting in the emergence of parallel technological, energy or logistics networks. Unlike classical economic decoupling, which refers to the separation of supply chains, infrastructure decoupling reflects a structural fragmentation of the very architecture of global interaction, including its physical, digital and regulatory channels of connectivity.

Table 1

**Classification of Infrastructural Decoupling Types**

Type of decoupling	Characteristic	Example or mechanism	Economic consequences
<i>Radical (structural)</i>	Complete separation of infrastructural systems between blocks with autonomous networks, standards, and protocols	Splinternet, parallel 5G systems (Huawei and OpenRAN)	Loss of scale effects, rising costs, and formation of new blocs of global power
<i>Sectoral</i>	Selective disconnection in	European discontinuation of	Temporary decline in

	specific sectors such as energy, digital technologies, or finance	Russian energy imports, export controls on microchips	trade, redirection of flows, acceleration of innovation
<b>Temporary (sanctions-induced)</b>	Short-term blocking of access or investment due to political decisions	SWIFT restrictions, sanctions on ports or energy projects	Market destabilization with potential recovery after restrictions are lifted
<b>Institutional</b>	Divergence in regulatory standards and financing rules	Differences among AIIB, World Bank, and EIB frameworks, heterogeneous ESG requirements	Reduced system compatibility, competition among institutional models
<b>Technological</b>	Incompatibility of technical standards, protocols, and data architectures	Separated telecommunications systems, cyber sovereignty, proprietary cloud architectures	Higher transaction costs, erosion of global network effects

Source: Author's elaboration

The key mechanisms of infrastructure decoupling (see Table 1) include: (1) geopolitical rivalry that redirects energy and transport flows; (2) sanctions policy and technological restrictions, for example, in semiconductors or 5G systems; (3) institutional asymmetry between alternative infrastructure initiatives such as the BRI, the PGII, and the Global Gateway. The concept materializes in the infrastructure sector through the formation of parallel and often incompatible logistics networks. The World Bank Infrastructure Monitor 2024 documents an unprecedented reconfiguration of global supply chains, where geopolitical considerations increasingly outweigh economic efficiency. The cost of such duplication, estimated at around \$ 180 billion for digital infrastructure alone, represents a significant burden on the global economy, but also contributes to resilience through diversification. Paradoxically, infrastructure decoupling not only increases transaction costs but also creates new forms of systemic resilience, as diversified networks make the global economy less vulnerable to monopolization.

Technological decoupling is most visibly manifested in the domain of digital infrastructure. The phenomenon of the splinternet, or the fragmentation of the once unified internet into regional networks with different standards and rules, is becoming a practical reality. The Monitor indicates that forty-three countries have introduced or plan to introduce data localization requirements, which creates the need to duplicate data centers and network infrastructure. The cost of such duplication is estimated to be \$ 180 billion by 2030. The divergence between 5G ecosystems (Huawei versus Ericsson, Nokia, and Samsung) means that countries are effectively choosing a technological trajectory for decades ahead (*Geopolitical Monitor*, 2025; *World Bank*, 2025).

Energy supply chains are experiencing the most profound transformation since the oil crisis of the 1970s. Sanction regimes, energy security imperatives, and climate objectives are generating a mosaic of parallel energy systems. The Monitor identifies at least three major energy clusters: the transatlantic cluster (comprising the United States and the European Union, with a focus on LNG and renewable energy), the Eurasian cluster (dominated by pipeline gas and coal), and the Middle Eastern cluster (OPEC Plus, with its traditional focus on oil). Infrastructure adapts to this fragmentation through the construction of new LNG terminals, the reorientation of pipeline flows, and the establishment of regional energy hubs (*Geopolitical Monitor*, 2025).

The transatlantic cluster is formed around energy cooperation among the United States, Canada, and the European Union, with a focus on diversifying supply and decarbonization. Its core characteristics include the rapid expansion of infrastructure for liquefied natural gas, the development of offshore wind power, hydrogen logistics, and energy storage systems. The cluster combines energy security with climate objectives, creating an institutionally coordinated space of green Trans-Atlanticism in which ESG standards and technological compatibility function as instruments of political cohesion. The Eurasian cluster, in the context of mosaic integration of the

Arctic, represents a polycentric zone of infrastructural activity shaped by state-guided large-scale energy, transport, and logistics projects that ensure connectivity across the continental spaces of the North. Its distinctive feature is the dominance of vertically integrated institutional structures, industrial chains, and transcontinental corridors that link the European and Asian components of the world economy. Within the mosaic architecture of the Arctic, the Eurasian cluster embodies the logic of managed scale, where infrastructure is used as a tool for stabilizing vast territories and shaping strategic interdependence between states and markets. Consequently, the Eurasian cluster encompasses continental energy systems based on pipeline gas, coal, and nuclear energy. Its logic relies on centralized resource management, vertically integrated companies, and strategic planning of trunk infrastructure. The primary objective is to preserve energy sovereignty through control of resource flows and transit corridors. The Middle Eastern cluster (*OPEC Plus*) maintains its traditional dominance in oil markets, while gradually diversifying its energy structure by investing in gas, hydrogen, and solar infrastructure. Its main characteristic is institutional coordination of production and pricing through multilateral mechanisms that balance market stability with exporter revenues. In the mosaic logic of global energy, this cluster represents energy pragmatism, combining supply control with technological adaptation to the requirements of the green transition.

Transport corridors are being reconfigured according to new geopolitical realities. The Middle Corridor, spanning the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus, which bypasses Russia, has attracted over \$ 10 billion in investments as an alternative to the traditional northern route. The International North South Transport Corridor through Iran creates a new Russia-India axis. The Belt and Road Initiative is adapting by developing southern routes through Pakistan (CPEC) and Myanmar. This multiplicity creates redundancy and inefficiency, as the duplication of logistical infrastructure increases global transport costs by 8 to 12 percent (*Geopolitical Monitor*, 2025; *World Bank*, 2025). Production chains are fragmenting due to reshoring and friendshoring policies. Semiconductor supply chains are splitting between an America-centered ecosystem (supported by the CHIPS Act with \$52 billion in subsidies) and China's strategy of technological self-sufficiency (with more than \$150 billion *invested in local manufacturing*). Europe is attempting to form a third pole through the European Chips Act, with forty-three billion euros (*Geopolitical Monitor*, 2025; *World Bank*, 2025). This triad results in the tripling of global investment in semiconductor infrastructure but also creates incompatible standards and technologies. Financial infrastructure is adapting to fragmentation through the creation of alternative payment systems. SWIFT, which has long dominated international settlements, is now facing competition from China's CIPS, India's UPI, and cryptocurrency-based payment bridges for international transactions. The Monitor indicates that the share of SWIFT in global payments declined from 98% to 87% between 2020 and 2023. This shift requires investment in parallel clearing systems, correspondent banking networks, and regulatory infrastructure.

Fragmentation is fundamentally transforming not only the geography of investment and the architecture of supply chains but also the very concept of infrastructure development. The World Bank Infrastructure Monitor 2024 (*World Bank*, 2025) documents the transition from universal models based on the principles of the Washington Consensus to a pluralistic system with competing development paradigms. The model of «infrastructure as a service» is emerging as a response to financial constraints and technological complexity. Instead of the traditional build-and-transfer approach, new models rely on the long-term management of infrastructure assets by specialized providers. Digital Colony, with assets exceeding \$25 billion, focuses on managing digital infrastructure ranging from data centers to mobile network towers. Similar models are expanding in the energy sector through virtual power plants, in transportation, and in water systems through water-as-a-service. This shift transforms infrastructure from a capital-intensive asset into an operational service (see Table 2).

Table 2

**Shifts in Infrastructure Delivery Models amid Global Economic Fragmentation**

Model	Key characteristic	Application field	Economic effect	Analytical significance
<b>Infrastructure as a service</b>	Transition from asset ownership to service-based management; monetization of infrastructure through operational contracts.	Digital, energy, transport	Reduced capital expenditure; increased efficiency of asset use.	Reflects the shift to a service-based infrastructure economy.
<b>Modular infrastructure</b>	Decentralized and scalable architecture capable of rapid adaptation.	Energy, logistics, IT	Thirty-five percent lower risk of stranded assets; forty percent higher flexibility.	Indicates the transition to adaptive and flexible systems.
<b>Hybrid ownership models</b>	A combination of private management and public control through golden share mechanisms and concessions.	Critical infrastructure (energy, transport)	Balance between efficiency and sovereignty; preservation of control over strategic assets.	Represents a new form of public-private interaction.
<b>Resilient infrastructure</b>	Design, based on risk awareness and resistance to climate, cyber, and geopolitical shocks.	All infrastructure sectors	+15 to 20 percent capital costs but minus 40 to 60 percent operational losses.	Shifts project evaluation logic from cost minimization to life cycle optimization.
Ecosystem model	Integration of different infrastructures into a coordinated environment (smart cities, eco-industrial parks).	Urban governance, logistics, industry	Synergy generates an additional 25 to 40 percent of added value.	Reflects the shift from isolated projects to networked ecosystems.

Source: Author's elaboration

Modular infrastructure is becoming a strategic response to uncertainty and rapid transformation. Instead of large-scale centralized systems, new projects prioritize distributed and scalable solutions. Microgrids are increasingly replacing large power plants, while distributed data centers are reducing dependence on single hubs. Modular ports also allow for rapid adaptation to changing trade flows. The Monitor shows that projects with modular architecture have a 35 percent lower risk of stranded assets and 40 percent higher adaptability to demand fluctuations (*World Bank, 2025*).

Infrastructure diplomacy views infrastructure as an instrument of cooperation and partnership. Through bilateral and multilateral agreements, joint financing, and technical assistance, states strengthen trust and develop soft power. This form of interaction is hybrid, as it combines elements of cooperation and competition, forming infrastructure alliances that support sustainable development. In contrast, infrastructure geopolitics reflects a competitive logic in which infrastructure becomes a tool of geoeconomic influence. Major powers such as the United States, China, the EU, and India use transport corridors, energy systems, and digital networks as levers of strategic control over space and resources. This model contributes to the fragmentation of the global economic landscape and the formation of alternative infrastructural blocs. Depending on the scale and actors involved, three types of infrastructure projects can be distinguished (Table 3).

Table 3

#### Forms of Infrastructure Cooperation

Criterion	Infrastructure Project	Infrastructure Megaproject	Global Infrastructure Project
Scale	Local or regional	National or interregional	Transnational or global
Level of impact	Technical, operational	Institutional, political	Geopolitical, civilizational



Governance model	Technocratic	Adaptive strategic	Geoinstitutional, network-based
Function	Provision of basic services	Structural transformation	Formation of global flows and dependencies
Actors	State agencies, contractors	Government, business, communities, MDBs	International coalitions, supranational institutions
Duration	3–10 years	10–30 years	20–50 years or more

Source: Author's elaboration

Infrastructure alliances constitute a new system of international governance in which cooperation is carried out through network-based mechanisms. They integrate political, technological, social, and economic dimensions, creating shared infrastructure spaces that operate as environments for collective action. In other words, an infrastructure alliance is a form of cooperative partnership in which states, private companies, and international organizations coordinate joint infrastructure initiatives through the use of harmonized standards, digital platforms, and financial instruments.

Unlike traditional models of international cooperation, infrastructure alliances operate not as supranational structures but as collaborative networks based on data exchange and principles of mutual trust. According to the definition (*World Bank Group, 2022*), such alliances form a global ecosystem of interconnected initiatives within which technological, financial, and institutional flows become mutually dependent.

Infrastructure investment has become a central element of the global financial architecture of the twenty-first century, combining the long-term character of capital, the socio-economic function of development, and the political significance embedded in the system of international relations. Unlike traditional financial assets, infrastructure represents the material foundation of productivity, enabling the mobility of resources, the connectivity of markets, and the resilience of societal systems. Infrastructure investment constitutes a distinct asset class characterized by stable cash flows, low correlation with other markets, and high social value. At the same time, it is one of the most complex segments in terms of valuation, risk management, and long-term return. Consequently, infrastructure investment functions today as a hybrid instrument that is simultaneously financial and social, private and public, market-oriented and strategic. Its development requires a balance between economic efficiency and societal benefit, making this form of capital unique within the contemporary political economic system.

**Conclusions.** This study provides evidence that infrastructural decoupling has become a structural determinant of the emerging geoeconomic order, marking a transition from the universal connectivity model of hyperglobalisation to a selective, strategically filtered connectivity regime. The findings show that fragmentation does not simply reduce global interdependence but reorganizes it into differentiated infrastructural spheres, where political alignment, technological compatibility, and institutional reliability increasingly outweigh considerations of cost and efficiency. This represents a fundamental shift in the operational logic of global infrastructure.

The research confirms that the renationalization of investment and the redirection of private capital from the Global South toward advanced economies constitute a long-term systemic reconfiguration rather than a temporary reaction to uncertainty. This realignment reshapes global development trajectories by reinforcing asymmetries in access to finance, technology, and innovation capacity. The concentration of infrastructure investment in OECD economies, combined with the rising cost of capital in developing regions, establishes a new hierarchy of infrastructural opportunities and constraints.

A key contribution of this study lies in identifying the mechanisms through which fragmentation materializes in infrastructure systems. The analysis demonstrates that infrastructural decoupling unfolds simultaneously at the technological, financial, regulatory, and spatial levels. Technological divergence leads to the development of parallel digital ecosystems and incompatible data architectures. Financial fragmentation gives rise to alternative payment networks and competing capital pools. Regulatory divergence multiplies non-aligned standards

and ESG regimes. Spatial reconfiguration manifests in competing transport corridors and plural energy clusters. Together, these mechanisms constitute a multilayered architecture of decoupling.

The study advances the conceptual understanding of global infrastructure by demonstrating that infrastructure alliances, modular and service-based infrastructure models, and resilience-oriented design principles emerge as adaptive institutional responses to the fragmentation of infrastructure. These instruments do not replace multilateralism but reshape it into network-based governance, where coordination occurs through flexible coalitions rather than universal rules. This represents a significant evolution in global infrastructure governance.

The analysis reveals that fragmentation redefines the strategic behavior of states: infrastructure becomes a tool of geoeconomic competition and a means for redistributing influence across global flows. States increasingly use corridors, energy systems, digital platforms, and financing tools to shape the geography of dependence and autonomy. As a result, the global infrastructure landscape evolves into a mosaic of overlapping clusters and selective partnerships rather than a single integrated system. The analysis demonstrates that infrastructural decoupling is not a uniform phenomenon but a multidimensional process that unfolds across structural, sectoral, sanctions-driven, institutional, and technological levels. The typology introduced in this study enables the conceptualization of distinct forms through which global infrastructure becomes fragmented and the identification of mechanisms that generate these disconnections. The structural dimension reflects the emergence of autonomous infrastructural ecosystems across competing blocs, the sectoral dimension captures decoupling within critical industries, the institutional dimension emerges through the divergence of regulatory standards and financing models, the sanctions-driven dimension has a temporary and politically induced character, while the technological dimension produces long-term trajectories of incompatibility across digital, energy, and logistics systems. This typology provides a conceptual lens for understanding why infrastructural decoupling has become a defining feature of the new geoeconomic configuration and how different forms of fragmentation jointly reshape investment patterns, connectivity corridors, and the dynamics of global competition.

Overall, the study concludes that infrastructural decoupling is a long-term structural trajectory that will continue to reshape global development patterns. In an environment where universal integration is no longer the baseline, the capacity of states and alliances to design adaptive, resilient, and strategically aligned infrastructural systems will determine their position in the future geoeconomic landscape. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for anticipating systemic risks, allocating investment resources effectively, and shaping policies that strike a balance between efficiency and sovereignty in an increasingly complex global order.

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## **RUSSIA'S MIGRATION POLICY: BARRIERS AND PROHIBITIONS FOR LABOR MIGRANT WORKERS**

## **МІГРАЦІЙНА ПОЛІТИКА РОСІЇ: БАР'ЄРИ ТА ЗАБОРОНИ ДЛЯ ТРУДОВИХ МІГРАНТІВ**

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**Abstract.** *This article examines the complex set of legal, administrative, digital, and economic barriers that shape a discriminatory environment for labor migrants in the Russian Federation. Particular attention is given to the role of the state not as a guarantor of rights, but as a source of systemic restrictions designed to produce a vulnerable and dependent workforce. The analysis focuses on formal prohibitions on certain types of employment; limited access to healthcare, education, housing rights, and family life; as well as economic instruments of pressure — quotas, rising patent fees, and regional and temporal limitations on residence and work. The article also explores emerging mechanisms of digital surveillance, including the proposed mandatory registration of migrants via a mobile application that collects geolocation and biometric data, and the inclusion of individuals in a “registry of monitored persons” as a form of administrative control. The author argues that these restrictions constitute an integrated system of “managed dependency” that deepens social marginalization and hinders the integration of migrants. The article further situates these developments within the broader political and ideological context of Russia’s increasingly restrictive migration policy, highlighting its contradictions with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and international human rights standards. The conclusion emphasizes the need to acknowledge the discriminatory nature of the current policy regime and to revise approaches to labor migration governance in line with the principles of non-discrimination, legal equality, and human dignity.*

**Keywords:** *labor migrants, Central Asia; rights/(lack of rights) of migrants; discriminatory practices; migration policy; managed dependence; social marginalization; Russian Federation; human rights.*

**Анотація.** *У цій статті розглядається комплекс правових, адміністративних, цифрових та економічних бар'єрів, що формують дискримінаційне середовище для трудових мігрантів у Російській Федерації. Особлива увага приділяється ролі держави не як гаранта прав, а як джерела системних обмежень, спрямованих на створення вразливої та залежної робочої сили. Аналіз зосереджується на формальних заборонах на певні види зайнятості; обмеженому доступі до охорони здоров'я, освіти, права на житло та сімейного життя; а також на економічних інструментах тиску — квотах, підвищенні патентних зборів та регіональних і тимчасових обмеженнях на проживання та роботу. У статті також досліджуються нові механізми цифрового спостереження, зокрема запропонована*

обов'язкова реєстрація мігрантів за допомогою мобільного додатку, що збирає геолокаційні та біометричні дані, а також включення осіб до «реєстру осіб, що перебувають під наглядом» як форма адміністративного контролю. Автор стверджує, що ці обмеження становлять інтегровану систему «керованої залежності», яка поглиблює соціальну маргіналізацію та перешкоджає інтеграції мігрантів. Далі в статті ці події розглядаються в ширшому політичному та ідеологічному контексті дедалі більш обмежувальної міграційної політики Росії, підкреслюючи її суперечності з Конституцією Російської Федерації та міжнародними стандартами у сфері прав людини. У висновку наголошується на необхідності визнання дискримінаційного характеру чинної політичної системи та перегляду підходів до регулювання трудової міграції відповідно до принципів недискримінації, юридичної рівності та людської гідності.

**Ключові слова:** трудові мігранти, Центральна Азія; права/(відсутність прав) мігрантів; дискримінаційні практики; міграційна політика; керована залежність; соціальна маргіналізація; Російська Федерація; права людини.

**Introduction.** In recent years, the migration policy of the Russian Federation has demonstrated a persistent trend toward strengthening restrictive and control mechanisms concerning labor migrants, primarily those originating from Central Asian countries. Although migrants traditionally occupy socially and economically vulnerable positions in the Russian labor market, the tightening of migration regulations became especially pronounced after 2014. This period was characterized by changes in the country's foreign policy course, intensified internal ideological control, and the state's efforts to mobilize the population amid growing socio-economic difficulties. Overall, the share of migrants from Central Asian countries remains high, despite the fact that before 2014 a significant portion of foreign labor migrants in Russia were Ukrainian citizens. As of February 2, 2014, approximately 1.6 million Ukrainian citizens resided in Russia, of whom around 1.0 – 1.1 million were labor migrants [e-ir.info, (2017)]. Citizens of Uzbekistan account for approximately 55.4% of the total number of labor migrants, while citizens of Tajikistan comprise around 39.89%. The total number of Central Asian citizens (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan) residing in Russia is estimated at roughly 4 million, continuing to play a key role in meeting the needs of the Russian labor market.

Political events, including the annexation of Crimea and military actions in Donbas, as well as worsening living conditions, led to a mass outflow of Ukrainian migrants, despite simplified procedures for obtaining residence permits or citizenship for some of them. Today, the share of Ukrainian labor migrants in Russia has been virtually reduced to zero.

Modern migration policy in Russia exhibits a selective and ethnically asymmetric character: control measures and legal restrictions predominantly affect Central Asian migrants, reinforcing their vulnerable position and highlighting institutional constraints that limit the rights and opportunities of foreign workers.

Previous research, including the author's own studies, has identified the formation of a stable model of institutional discrimination, manifested in selective law enforcement, limitations on migrants' access to legal protection mechanisms, as well as social and media stigmatization. In public discourse, the figure of the labor migrant often substitutes for the systemic causes of economic and social problems, becoming an object of political and propagandistic instrumentalization.

Since 2022 — in the context of Russia's full-scale armed aggression against Ukraine and the ensuing internal mobilization — migration control measures have been significantly intensified. State initiatives in this sphere have taken an overtly repressive form: the powers of law-enforcement agencies were expanded, residence regulations tightened, and the number of inspections, deportations, and refusals to renew residence and work permits increased [A. Kubal (2016); Ivanchak & Palkina (2017); F. Khonkhodzhaev (2019); C. Schenk (2023)]. Importantly, these

policies are being implemented despite the persistent labor shortage in key sectors of the Russian economy, underscoring the contradictory and ideologically driven nature of the measures applied.

**Research Aim and Objectives.** The aim of this study is to analyze the institutional constraints imposed on labor migrants in Russia and to assess their influence on shaping the overall character of the state's migration policy.

The objectives of the study are as follows:

1. To identify the key institutional constraints applied to labor migrants in Russia;
2. To classify these constraints according to their legal, administrative, and socio-economic nature;
3. To examine the regulatory and legal framework governing labor migration in order to identify barrier-based and prohibitive mechanisms;
4. To determine the role of institutional barriers in shaping the overarching character of Russia's migration policy.

**Methodology and Limitations.** The study employs a mixed-methods approach that combines both qualitative and quantitative research techniques. The primary empirical component consists of a survey conducted among more than 300 labor migrants across various regions of Russia, including Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Moscow and Kaluga Oblasts, Leningrad Oblast, and the city of Samara. The sample also includes former and current labor migrants from Tajikistan originating from the cities of Isfara, Khujand, Konibodom, and Asht. Initially, the surveys were administered online via messaging applications (WhatsApp and Telegram). However, some respondents expressed concerns about answering questions through these platforms due to the perceived possibility of device monitoring. To obtain more reliable information, audio calls were used, allowing for clarification of responses and creating a safer and more comfortable environment for participants.

In addition, the study draws on an analysis of media publications, academic journals, scholarly works by colleagues, official government sources, and statistical reports.

**Research Limitations.** The survey primarily targeted migrants from Central Asian countries, which may limit the generalizability of the findings to migrants from other regions or categories. Furthermore, respondents' caution—stemming from heightened surveillance and control over their communications—may have affected the completeness and accuracy of the information they provided.

**State of Research.** Studies on Russia's migration policy and the situation of labor migrants in recent years have been marked by a notable shift in scholarly and expert attention toward descriptive-normative and applied tasks. The majority of publications focus on issues of migrant adaptation, the legal regulation of labor migration, socio-demographic trends, and the economic effects of migration flows.

At the same time, critical engagement with the institutional practices of the state aimed at tightening migration control and restricting migrants' rights remains significantly underdeveloped in the Russian academic literature.

This situation is largely shaped by the characteristics of the contemporary academic environment, in which migration research is closely intertwined with the political and ideological priorities of the state. After 2014 — and especially after 2022 — public and expert discourse increasingly framed migration primarily as an object of governance and a potential threat. This dynamic has narrowed the space for independent and critical inquiry. Scholarly publications in this field typically avoid assessing the repressive aspects of migration policy, instead focusing on issues such as the “optimization of regulation,” “enhancing the effectiveness of control,” and “the integration of migrants into the host society” [Florinskaya 2021; Kozlov 2020]. As a result, the

problem of institutional discrimination and legal restrictions affecting labor migrants remains insufficiently explored. Works that attempt to analyze the socio-political foundations and ideological mechanisms of migration policy appear only sporadically and are more often published outside the official academic sphere — in independent expert outlets, analytical reports, and international studies [HRW Report (2023); Migration Governance Snapshot: The Russian Federation, Geneva: IOM, (2022)].

Thus, the degree of scholarly development of this issue can be characterized as fragmented and constrained by the boundaries of permissible academic discourse. The absence of critical analysis of the state's institutional practices toward migrants creates a significant gap in understanding the actual mechanisms through which migration policy operates and the ways in which it shapes the social structure of Russian society.

**The Stage of Institutionalization of Migration Control (2014–2025).** Whereas in the 2000s Russia's migration policy was shaped by a liberal-economic logic—one that viewed migration as a mechanism to offset demographic decline and support economic growth—starting from 2014 it entered a phase of systematic control and the narrowing of migrants' rights. The turning point was marked by the events surrounding the annexation of Crimea, subsequent international isolation, and intensified domestic ideological mobilization.

From this period onward, Russia's state migration policy has evolved into a system of institutionalized restrictions on the rights of labor migrants. The grounds for refusing the issuance or renewal of residence and work permits were expanded, the number of deportations increased (see Table 2), and police raids in migrant living areas became part of routine enforcement practices. Although formally justified as efforts to “restore order,” these measures were in practice accompanied by legal arbitrariness and the proliferation of corruption.

The period from 2014 to 2025 can be characterized as a transition from selective tolerance to institutionalized control. In the absence of a coherent integration strategy, labor migrants continued to constitute a significant and economically indispensable segment of the workforce, yet their legal and social status became increasingly marginalized.

Our research demonstrates how the first Russian migration Concept — adopted in 2003 under the title “Concept for the Regulation of Migration Processes in the Russian Federation” — which initially prioritized the attraction of “compatriots” (defined broadly as individuals born in the former Soviet republics) and facilitated their voluntary resettlement to Russia, gradually transformed in the opposite direction: into a mechanism of managed dependency.

The current policy framework is aimed at institutionalizing a rotational, short-term model of labor migration, in which foreign workers arrive for limited periods, without families, with no prospects for integration into Russian society, and with restricted access for their children to the educational system.

One of the most illustrative manifestations of this trend has been the tightening of regulations governing the residence and social integration of labor migrants' families. At the official level, Russian authorities increasingly emphasize the need to restrict the entry of migrants with children, justifying such measures with references to “adaptation challenges” and the need to “improve the quality of education.” In several regions, additional barriers have been introduced for the enrollment of migrant children in schools, including examinations even for six-year-olds applying to the first grade. According to official data, in 2025 approximately 87.4% of migrant children were not admitted to general educational institutions: out of 23,616 submitted applications, only 12.6% (2,964 children) were accepted, while the rest were denied admission [Rosobrnadzor (2025)]. More than 80% of the applications were rejected at the documentation stage on formal grounds — such as “incomplete paperwork” or “lack of available places.” In practice, these measures solidify a policy of social exclusion and institutionalize inequality between migrant children and Russian citizens.

A natural question arises: why have the authorities progressively tightened migration regulations, particularly regarding citizens of Central Asian countries—Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan?



Analysis indicates that these changes cannot be understood outside of their political context. The intensification of migration policy has become part of a broader strategy of domestic mobilization and the consolidation of authoritarian control, in the context of international isolation resulting from Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, and subsequent economic sanctions. In recent years (2022–2025), Russia adopted three new laws that strengthened migration control — Federal Laws No. 316-FZ (10 July 2023), No. 260-FZ (8 August 2024), and No. 121-FZ (23 May 2025) — and introduced eight amendments to key acts, including No. 115-FZ “On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation” and No. 114-FZ “On the Procedure for Exiting and Entering the Russian Federation” [Consul Group 2023–2025]. These changes affected a wide range of issues, from the tightening of migration registration and digital monitoring to stricter requirements for legalization and obtaining residence permits.

The tightening of legislation has been accompanied by socio-economic and ideological factors. During periods of economic downturn and sanctions-induced pressure, authorities have often used migration as a tool to redirect social discontent, attributing labor market problems to the “excessive presence of foreign workers.” At the same time, the perception of migration as a national security threat has intensified. In official discourse, migrants are increasingly framed not only as labor resources but also as potential sources of extremism and illegal activity. Consequently, the role of law enforcement agencies (the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB) in migration regulation has significantly increased.

Thus, the intensification of migration policy since 2014 forms part of a broader trend toward internal consolidation and enhanced control. Central Asian migrants are positioned not merely as participants in the labor market but also as elements of a politico-symbolic space through which the state conveys notions of order, loyalty, and stability.

A central element in this system is the institution of registration at the place of residence. Formally, it serves as a tool for statistical accounting, but in practice it retains features of the Soviet-era *propiska* — a mechanism of administrative control over population mobility [Gladkikh, M (2019); Blackburn, M (2021)]. Failure to register entails fines, deportations, and entry bans, effectively transforming this mechanism into an instrument that perpetuates the legal vulnerability of migrants [Khonkhodzhaev, F (2019); Demintseva, M. (2017)].

The institutional legacy of the Soviet internal control system has become the foundation of the modern model of “managed dependency” for labor migrants — a system in which their legal status is entirely contingent upon administrative procedures controlled by the state and law enforcement agencies.

Economic mechanisms of restriction have also intensified, including quotas, bans on employment in certain sectors, and increased costs for work permits. These measures make legalization increasingly expensive and inaccessible for many migrants, effectively turning economic pressure into a tool for creating a powerless, dependent, and highly vulnerable labor force, whose role is reduced to performing low-paid and physically demanding work without any social guarantees.

Another direction of tightening has been direct legislative restrictions aimed at gradually reducing the number of legally employed migrants. In 2025, restrictions for foreign workers were introduced in 51 federal subjects of the Russian Federation; in 2024, in 47 subjects; and in 2023, in only 15. These measures include both direct bans on employment in certain sectors and economic levers that render the presence of labor migrants economically disadvantageous. Our research shows that by 2025, a comprehensive set of regulatory barriers had been established in Russia, including:



- direct prohibitions on employment in specific sectors;
- registration of migrants as “controlled persons”;
- mandatory residence registration (*propiska*);
- reduction of the allowed period of stay from 180 to 90 days per year;
- the introduction of entry bans ranging from 1, 3, 5, to 10 years.

In addition to these measures, the introduction and use of new digital technologies targeting labor migrants has become another example of the expansion of digital surveillance practices and the restriction of their rights and freedoms.

For instance, in 2025, a “Registry of Controlled Persons” was created [Interfax 2025], encompassing foreign nationals under administrative supervision. As of autumn 2025, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs’ registry included approximately 772,000 foreign citizens. Inclusion in this registry effectively deprives individuals of basic civil rights: it prohibits marriage registration, obtaining a driver’s license, access to banking services, and the enrollment of children in schools and kindergartens.

Furthermore, starting from 1 September 2025, an experimental digital monitoring system for migrants was launched in Moscow and Moscow Oblast, requiring labor migrants to download a specialized mobile application and register. This system grants state authorities access to their personal data, movements, and employment activities. It should be noted that such measures contravene several provisions of the Russian Constitution, particularly Articles 23, 24, and 27, which guarantee the right to privacy, the confidentiality of personal information, freedom of movement, and the choice of place of residence.

In practice, however, legal and constitutional guarantees in contemporary Russia have largely lost their significance: state institutions systematically disregard both national legislation and international norms that enshrine the rights of migrants. Under these conditions, reliance on legal protection mechanisms becomes largely formal and does not provide genuine safeguarding of labor migrants rights.

Thus, legal, digital, and institutional restrictions constitute an integrated system of control over migrants, with economic instruments serving as an additional means of pressure. The dynamics of work permit costs across Russian regions serve as an indicator of this trend.

Table 1. Dynamics of work permit (advance) costs for labor migrants in Russian regions with high inflows of labor migrants (2020–2025/2026\*).

Region	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026*	Increase, % (2020–2025/2026)	
Moscow	5 350	5 341	5 900	6 600	7 500	8 900	10 000	+66,4 %	+86%
Moscow Region	5 100	5 092	5 900	6 600	7 500	8 900	10 000	+74,5 %	+96,1%
St. Petersburg	4 000	4 000	4 200	4 400	4 600	6 000	8 000	+50 %	+100%
Leningrad Region	4 000	4 000	4 200	4 400	4 600	6 000	8 000	+50 %	+100%
Krasnodar Region	4 351	4 474	5 940	5 810	10 080	17 120	27 000	+293,6%	+ 520%

**Source:** Data from the Department of Economic Policy of Moscow, the Federal Tax Service of the Russian Federation, and regional executive authorities (compiled by the author).

\* The data provided on the cost of a patent for 2026 has already been legislatively approved by the relevant regional authorities and will come into force on January 1, 2026.

The table demonstrates that the increase in work permit (patent) costs for labor migrants from 2020 to 2025 has become a consistent trend. This pattern reflects not only inflationary processes but also the use of economic instruments as a form of administrative control over migration flows, which collectively exacerbates the economic vulnerability of labor migrants. At the same time, it is important to note that revenues from taxes paid by labor migrants under the

work permit system are substantial for regional budgets. In 2024 alone, these revenues exceeded 123 billion rubles ( $\approx$  \$1.33 billion), in 2023 they amounted to 110 billion rubles, and in 2022 they surpassed 100 billion rubles ( $\approx$  \$1.5 billion) [RBC (2025); TASS (2024)].

However, the work permit constitutes only part of the total expenses borne by labor migrants for the legalization of their residence and employment in Russia. In addition to the monthly advance payment for the permit, migrants incur several other mandatory costs. These include: the state fee for issuing the permit; mandatory medical examinations (the costs of which vary by region); registration fees; the purchase of a health insurance policy (for six months or one year); and expenses for obtaining a certificate demonstrating proficiency in the Russian language, as well as knowledge of Russian history and the fundamentals of the legal system.

Collectively, these expenses impose a significant financial burden. According to surveyed migrants, the total annual costs of maintaining legal status can amount to several months' average wages. Thus, even with formal legal mechanisms for legalization in place, financial barriers render them practically inaccessible for a substantial portion of migrants, making legal status conditional and temporary, maintained at the cost of continuous financial effort.


Moreover, full compliance with formal requirements does not guarantee freedom of movement or protection from arbitrary inspections. According to our field data, regular police raids and informal coercive practices persist, and in some cases are supplemented by youth or quasi-patriotic groups (such as "Russkaya obshina", "Rusich," "Imperskiy Legion," etc.) conducting "raids" against migrants, further intensifying the atmosphere of fear and legal vulnerability.

Another restrictive mechanism for labor migrants is the practice of deportations, which in recent years has acquired a systemic and often arbitrary character. Despite the existence of interstate agreements, formal compliance with legislation, and the completion of all legalization procedures by migrants, the number of deportations has increased annually (see Table 2).

In 2025, a sharp decline in deportations was observed; however, this does not indicate that the system has become more fair or humane. According to initiatives supported by the Government Commission on Legislative Activities, the authorities appear to be using the law as a means of pressure to mobilize labor migrants for participation in military operations against Ukraine. Survey results indicate that even labor migrants possessing all necessary documents — including work permits, registration, and other supporting papers — were frequently subjected to expulsion on formal or contrived grounds. In some cases, leaving the house without carrying one of the required documents served as a reason for deportation; subsequent presentation of the documents at a police station was generally disregarded.

Our earlier studies also documented cases of collective judicial proceedings and mass deportations of migrants, predominantly from Central Asian countries, in which decisions were made without proper individual consideration of the circumstances. These practices, observed even before 2021, point to a trend toward the institutionalization of a repressive approach in migration control [Ryazantsev, S. et al. (2021); Akramov, Sh & Khonkhodzhaev, F. (2020)]. Relevant materials and statistical data illustrating the scale of these processes are available in the cited publications by the author.

**Table 2. Dynamics of Labor Migrant Deportations from Russia (2021–2025\*).**



\* As of November 2025, the Ministry of Internal Affairs reported 128,000 violations of migration legislation, while only 19,000 individuals were actually deported. According to draft law initiatives supported by the Government Commission on Legislative Activities, an alternative is provided for the remaining “violators”: either administrative sanctions or the option to enter a military service contract.

**Source:** compiled by the author based on data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.

**Conclusion.** Contemporary migration policy in the Russian Federation exhibits a clear trend toward the institutionalization of restrictive and repressive practices targeting labor migrants. Analysis indicates that migration regulation extends beyond the purely socio-economic domain and acquires a pronounced political dimension. Migrants increasingly find themselves not only as participants in the labor market but also as objects of administrative and foreign-policy instruments. During periods of heightened tension between Russia and the countries of Central Asia, there is a noticeable intensification of migration control, an increase in deportations, and stricter entry restrictions, reflecting the instrumental use of migration policy for political purposes.

At the same time, the governments of the labor migrants’ countries of origin — Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan — are limited in their ability to protect the rights of their citizens abroad due to significant economic, energy, and political dependence on Russia. The absence of a systematic diplomatic response or effective consular support mechanisms further exacerbates migrants’ vulnerability, reinforcing their status as a dependent and unprotected social group. Thus, Russian migration policy not only creates an internal system of social inequality but also reflects the characteristics of the post-Soviet regional hierarchy, where labor mobility becomes part of the political geometry of power.

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УДК 339.9+339.5

## ТАРИФНІ РЕЖИМИ У МІЖНАРОДНІЙ ТОРГІВЛІ: ГЕНЕЗИС І СТРУКТУРА

## TARIFF REGIMES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: GENESIS AND STRUCTURE

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**Abstract.** *Tariff regimes are a key instrument of international trade, influencing the economic development of countries, global supply chains, and geopolitical stability. This article analyzes the genesis of tariffs, starting from the mercantilist era of the 17th-18th centuries, with a focus on the Napoleonic Wars (the role of Britain and France through the Continental Blockade and Corn Laws) and the period leading up to World War I (French Méline tariffs, German Bismarck reforms), where protectionism is seen as a potential catalyst for conflict, reducing trade by 10-50% and intensifying economic nationalism. The structure of tariff regimes is classified by type (ad valorem, specific, combined), multi-level regimes (customs unions, preferential agreements) and institutions (the role of the WTO, GATT, regional blocs such as the EU or USMCA), using empirical data from the WTO and IMF for 2025, which indicate a 1.5-2% increase in rates due to trade wars.*

**Key words:** *tariff regimes, international trade, genesis of tariffs, Napoleonic Wars, Continental Blockade, Corn Laws, protectionism, World War I, Méline tariffs, Bismarck reforms, mercantilism, WTO, GATT, trade wars, US-China, Brexit, geopolitics, EU integration, Ukraine, artificial intelligence, cyclicity of protectionism.*

**Анотація.** *Тарифні режими є ключовим інструментом міжнародної торгівлі, що впливають на економічний розвиток країн, глобальні ланцюги постачань і геополітичну стабільність. У статті аналізується генезис тарифів, починаючи від меркантилістської епохи XVII-XVIII століть, з акцентом на Наполеонівські війни (роль Британії та Франції через Континентальну блокаду та Хлібні закони (Corn Laws) та період напередодні Першої світової війни (французькі тарифи Меліна (Méline tariffs), німецькі реформи Бісмарка), де протекціонізм розглядається як потенційний каталізатор конфліктів, що знижував*

торгівлю на 10-50% і посилював економічний націоналізм. Структура тарифних режимів класифікується за типами (адвалорні, специфічні, комбіновані), багаторівневими режимами (митні союзи, преференційні угоди) та інституціями (роль СОТ, ГАТТ, регіональних блоків як ЄС чи ЮСМКА (USMCA) з використанням емпіричних даних СОТ та МВФ за 2025 рік, які свідчать про зростання ставок на 1,5-2% через торговельні війни.

**Ключові слова:** тарифні режими, міжнародна торгівля, генезис тарифів, Наполеонівські війни, Континентальна блокада, Хлібні закони (*Corn Laws*), протекціонізм, Перша світова війна, тарифи Меліна (*Méline tariffs*), реформи Бісмарка, меркантилізм, СОТ, ГАТТ, торговельні війни, США-Китай, брекзит (*Brexit*), геополітика, ЄС-інтеграція, Україна, штучний інтелект, циклічність протекціонізму.

**Introduction.** In today's globalized world, tariff regimes remain a key instrument of international trade policy, affecting not only global flows of goods and services, but also the geopolitical stability of states. The relevance of the topic is due to the rapid growth of protectionism in 2025, caused by the escalation of trade conflicts, such as the trade wars between the US and China, in which D. Trump announced base tariffs of 15-50%, which led to negotiations in Stockholm and a significant reduction in exports of rare earth metals from China. (*Trade Compliance Resource Hub, 2025*) According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), this will cause global trade growth to slow to 1.7% in 2025 compared to previous forecasts, and global GDP will decline to 2.8% due to new US tariffs, which are keeping uncertainty high. (*IMF, 2025*) In addition, the UK's exit from the EU (Brexit) continues to reinforce tariff barriers, affecting British firms. According to estimates by the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), 17% of companies expect prices to fall due to US tariff announcements, while UK GDP grew by only 0.7% in the first quarter of 2025, followed by a 0.1% contraction in May. (*Authors' note, 2025*) The World Trade Organization (WTO) in its World Trade Profiles 2025 notes an increase in average tariff rates of 1.5-2% in more than 170 countries, with an emphasis on agricultural and industrial products, highlighting the cyclical nature of protectionism, like historical patterns during the Napoleonic Wars or on the eve of World War I. (*WTO, 2025*)

**Purpose of the article.** The purpose of the article is to analyze the genesis and structure of the use of tariff regimes in international trade, examining their historical role as a potential catalyst for regional and global conflicts and their contemporary implications. In particular, the authors set out to examine historical aspects using the example of the Napoleonic Wars and the period leading up to World War I, from the perspective of the introduction of tariffs as a possible cause of the escalation of armed conflicts, to identify and describe the structure of tariff regimes, including classification, multilevel regimes and institutions, analyze contemporary challenges for the global economy, such as trade wars and geopolitical implications, and develop recommendations for Ukraine in the context of the country's integration into the European Union (EU).

**Literature review.** Research into the application of tariff regimes in international trade has deep roots in economic history, in which scholars analyze their genesis: from mercantilism to modern multilateral trade agreements, as well as their structure as an instrument of protectionism or liberalization. In his academic work "The Worldwide Economic Impact of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars," K. O'Rourke analyzes Napoleon's Continental Blockade in detail as a protectionist tariff regime that blocked British imports and, as a result, caused European trade to decline by 40-50%, leading to a deterioration in relations between Britain and France. (*O'Rourke, 2006*) Also, R. Finlay and K. O'Rourke, in their work on trade wars, "Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second Millennium," reveal the genesis of tariffs from mercantilism, emphasizing them as a geopolitical tool that combined trade with wars, particularly in the context of the British Corn Laws as a response to French blockades. (Findlay & O'Rourke, 2009) D. Irwin, in his academic work "The Aftermath of Hamilton's 'Report on Manufactures'" examines the policy of protectionism on the eve of World War I, focusing on the French Méline tariffs of 1892 and Bismarck's German reforms (1879), which raised rates by 15-20% and strengthened economic

nationalism (*Irwin, 2004*). P. Bairoch and S. Burke, in the section "European Trade Policy, 1815–1914" of their fundamental work "The Cambridge Economic History of Europe," provide empirical data on the growth of tariffs in Europe after the Napoleonic Wars, where British tariffs remained lower (about 5-6%), while French and German tariffs reached 18-20%, contributing to pre-war tensions. (*Bairoch, 1989*) In his book *The Pity of War*, Neil Ferguson interprets tariffs as a factor of "economic imperialism" before World War I, where British protectionism in imperial preferences contrasted with continental protectionism, causing global alliances and conflicts. (*Ferguson, 2000*)

Regarding the structure of tariff regimes themselves, P. Krugman, M. Obstfeld, and M. Melitz in *International Economics: Theory and Policy* classify tariffs as ad valorem, specific, and combined, analyzing their impact on the trade balance and welfare. (*Krugman, Obstfeld, & Melitz, 2022*) J. Bhagwati, in *Protectionism*, views protectionist regimes as a "double-edged sword," where the structure includes the most-favored-nation principle and preferential agreements. (*Bhagwati, 1989*) B. Hochman and M. Kostetsky, in their study *The Political Economy of the World Trading System*, describe the institutional structure of the WTO, the evolution from GATT, and the role of regional blocs, such as the EU or NAFTA/USMCA, in the formation of multilevel regimes. (*Hoekman & Kostetski, 2009*)

Contemporary research on the regulation of trade regimes in international trade in the era of globalization draws certain parallels with historical examples of tariff application. For example, D. Rodrik in "The Globalization Paradox" analyzes the cyclical nature of protectionism, comparing tariffs of the Napoleonic era with modern trade wars between the US and China, where the structure of regimes evolves under the influence of geopolitics. (*Rodrik, 2011*) K. Blattman, M. Clemens, and J. Williamson in *Who Protected and Why? Tariffs the World Around 1870-1938* empirically study global tariffs on the eve of World War I, showing how protectionism in 35 countries, including Britain, France, and Germany, increased due to political factors, compared to the corresponding statistical data on rates from the 1870s. (*Blattman, Clemens, & Williamson, 2002*) P. O'Brien, in *The Contributions of Warfare with Revolutionary and Napoleonic France*, argues that the Napoleonic Wars stimulated the British Industrial Revolution through tariffs, redistributing resources. (*O'Brien, 2011*) In addition, O. Levkovich, in his dissertation "Liberals and Protectionism: Britain's International Trade Policy," analyzes the British free trade regime alongside French protectionism in the 19th century, focusing on the genesis of modern regimes. (*Levkovich, 2022*) S. Geshonke, in his work "How to solve the tariff-growth paradox?", studies German tariffs from 1880 to 1913, showing the paradox of growth through protectionism, with data on approximately 4 million observations. (*Geshonke, 2024*) Finally, A. Hirschman, in "National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade," considers tariffs as an instrument of power, with examples in the context of the beginning of World War I. (*Hirschman, 1945*)

**Main results of research.** The genesis of tariff regimes in international trade dates back to the mercantilism period of the 17th-18th centuries, when states used tariffs as a tool to accumulate gold, protect national markets, and strengthen economic power. Mercantilism, as an economic doctrine, envisaged active state intervention in trade through high import duties (often up to 40-50%) and export subsidies, which created the basis for protectionism. However, the role of tariffs as a potential catalyst for geopolitical conflicts became particularly noticeable in the 19th century, when economic barriers were combined with policies of imperialism and nationalism, turning them into instruments of economic warfare. As we mentioned earlier, scholars such as R. Finlay and K. O'Rourke point out that trade and war were intertwined, with tariffs acting as a "double-edged sword." (*Findlay & O'Rourke, 2009*)

The Napoleonic Wars (1799-1815), in our opinion, are a classic example of when tariff regimes became an instrument of economic blockade, leading to the aggravation of inter-state relations and even to full-scale armed conflicts. The Continental System, introduced by Napoleon through the Berlin Decree (1806) and the Milan Decree (1807), was essentially a protectionist tariff regime that prohibited trade between France and its allies and Britain on the territory of continental Europe. This system imposed high tariffs (up to 30-50%) on British goods such as textiles and grain in order to weaken the British economy and stimulate French industry. According to K. O'Rourke's



estimates, the blockade led to a 40-50% decline in European trade, with particular damage to France, where imports fell by 60%, causing a shortage of resources and an increase in smuggling and the shadow economy. (*O'Rourke, 2006*) Scholars believe that this policy was not only a military strategy but also mercantilist protectionism aimed at developing French industry, but it provoked a response from Britain, thereby increasing geopolitical tensions. (*Forrest & Hicks, 2022*)

French tariffs, reinforced by the Trianon Decree (1810), added new duties on colonial goods such as sugar and coffee imported from Britain, with the aim of redirecting trade to French colonies. This, as statistics show, led to a 50-100% increase in prices in France and an economic crisis, but at the same time stimulated innovation in the textile industry. (*O'Brien, 2011*) Britain responded to French tariffs through the Orders in Council (Orders in Council, 1807), which blocked neutral trade with France, and the aforementioned "grain laws" of 1815, which imposed high tariffs on grain imports (up to 20-30%) to protect domestic farmers. J. Nye refutes the myth of Britain's "free trade," noting that its tariffs on wine and other alcoholic beverages, for example, were higher than France's for a century, reaching 30-40%, and served as a fiscal tool to finance the war. (*Nye, 1991*) Thus, it can be concluded that tariffs became a serious cause of wars, as Napoleon's economic nationalism (raising tariffs on British goods to 35%) led to a shortage of resources, rising inflation, and the formation of anti-French alliances, including the Sixth Coalition (1813-1814). (*Todd, 2015*) Ultimately, French tariffs not only protected the national economy, but also provoked conflicts in the geo-economic environment.

At the end of the 19th century, Europe experienced a "second wave of protectionism," where tariffs became a key factor in the economic tensions that contributed to World War I (1914-1918). After the Great Depression of 1873-1896, European states, including France, Germany, and Britain, raised tariffs to protect industry and agriculture. The French "Mélinae tariffs" of 1892, mentioned earlier, introduced rates of 18-20% on agricultural goods, protecting farmers from American and British imports but increasing tensions with neighbors. In addition, Bismarck's German tariffs of 1879 established a protectionist regime for industry with rates of 13-15% on grain and steel, which reduced global trade by 10-15% and stimulated "economic imperialism." (*Blattman, Clemens, & Williamson, 2002*) Britain, in turn, despite its free trade rhetoric after the repeal of the Corn Laws (1846), introduced imperial preferences, where duties on non-imperial goods reached 5-6%, contrasting with the continental 15-20%. (*Pollard, 2001*)

Scholars, including Ferguson, agree that tariffs could have caused an escalation in international relations, as protectionism strengthened alliances: the French and German regimes increased tensions with Britain, where trade fell by 20% due to barriers. (*Eichengreen & Irwin, 2010*) In his study, Gesonke demonstrates the "tariff-growth paradox" for Germany between 1880 and 1913, where protectionism stimulated GDP growth of 1-2% annually, but at the cost of international isolation, with an analysis of 4 million observations. (*Geschonke, 2024*) Hirschman, in turn, considers tariffs as an instrument of power before the start of World War I, where Germany used them to dominate Central Europe. (*Hirschman, 1945*)

The evolution of tariff regimes from mercantilism to the creation of GATT in 1947 and the WTO in 1995 demonstrates a transition from protectionism to liberalization, but with cyclical relapses. In the mercantilist era (16th-18th centuries), tariffs were fiscal instruments (rates of 30-50%) aimed at achieving a positive trade balance, as in France or Britain. After the Napoleonic Wars and the world wars, tariffs were significantly reduced: with the abolition of the Corn Laws, which had been in force for about four centuries, Britain ushered in an era of free trade, but protectionism returned in the 1930s. The GATT, signed by 23 countries in 1947, reduced tariffs from 40% to 5% through eight rounds of negotiations, later evolving into the creation of a separate, fully-fledged international organization, the WTO. (*WTO, 2025*)

The Uruguay Round of WTO negotiations (1986-1994) created a single dispute settlement system. However, the cycle continues: in 2025, tariffs rose by 1.5-2% due to trade wars, demonstrating the evolution of the tariff system from mercantilist instruments to global trade regulators while maintaining the potential for conflict.



**Conclusions.** The analysis of the genesis and structure of tariff regimes in international trade allows us to conclude that they are not only an economic instrument for regulating trade, but also a powerful geopolitical factor that cyclically affects global stability. The genesis of tariffs, beginning in the mercantilist era with high protectionist barriers, evolved through periods of intensive use, such as in the Napoleonic Wars and on the eve of World War I, where they served as a catalyst for conflict. Napoleon's Continental Blockade (1806-1814) and the corresponding British Corn Laws (1815) demonstrated how tariffs reduced trade by 40-60% and caused tension in inter-state relations, confirming the authors' view of their role as a "double-edged sword" – protecting national interests and a source of wars. Similarly, the "second wave of protectionism" we described at the end of the 19th century, with the French Méline tariffs and the German Bismarck reforms, reinforced economic nationalism, contributing to alliances and World War I, where trade fell by 10-20%. The evolution of international trade through the signing of the GATT in 1947 and the creation of the WTO in 1995 marked liberalization, reducing rates to 5%, but the cyclical nature of protectionism persists: in 2025, a 1.5-2% increase in tariffs due to trade wars to some extent repeats historical patterns, slowing global trade growth to 1.7%, confirming the article's hypothesis about tariff regimes as a geopolitical tool that provokes conflicts, with parallels to contemporary challenges, including "technological protectionism" under the influence of artificial intelligence.

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## **TOKENISED GREEN BONDS IN THE ARCHITECTURE OF SUSTAINABLE FINANCE AND THE FORMATION OF THE GREENIUM**

## **ТОКЕНІЗОВАНІ ЗЕЛЕНІ ОБЛІГАЦІЇ В АРХІТЕКТУРІ СТАЛИХ ФІНАНСІВ ТА ФОРМУВАННЯ ЗЕЛЕНОЇ ПРЕМІЇ**

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**Abstract.** *This article develops a greenium-centred analytical framework for tokenised green bonds and explains when tokenisation can influence green bond pricing rather than merely digitising issuance. The framework treats the greenium as a fragile equilibrium outcome shaped by three interacting channels: (i) liquidity and market microstructure, including settlement finality and interoperability with mainstream custody and post-trade arrangements; (ii) credibility of green claims, driven by the cost and quality of verification, disclosure integrity, and the auditability of allocation and impact evidence; and (iii) lifecycle frictions embedded in issuance, servicing, reporting, and assurance. By linking these channels to a tiered architecture – legal governance, registry and custody, settlement (including the “cash leg”), and a disclosure-data-attestation stack – the article clarifies why many tokenisation pilots fail to translate operational innovation into pricing effects. Evidence from sovereign and corporate cases is used to illustrate channel activation: Hong Kong’s repeated, multi-currency digital green bond issuances demonstrate the importance of scalability and investor accessibility for reducing novelty-related liquidity discounts. In contrast, corporate initiatives highlight the roles of legally recognised registers and data-centric reporting infrastructures. The analysis further discusses the relevance of monetary surrogates, stablecoins, and central bank digital currencies as potential settlement assets enabling delivery-versus-payment in tokenised securities markets. For Ukraine’s reconstruction-oriented sustainable finance agenda, the framework implies that tokenisation is most justified where it strengthens verifiable transparency, reduces verification and reporting burdens, and preserves interoperability with established capital-market infrastructure. The article presents a coherent market-design perspective that integrates financial engineering, structured finance, and digital asset infrastructure into a sustainable analysis of debt pricing.*

**Keywords:** tokenised green bonds; greenium; blockchain; asset tokenisation; digital assets; virtual assets; monetary surrogates; stablecoins; central bank digital currencies (CBDC); delivery-versus-payment (DvP); settlement finality; interoperability; disclosure integrity; impact reporting; structured finance; risk management; Ukraine reconstruction finance.

**Анотація.** У статті запропоновано аналітичну рамку для токенизованих зелених облігацій, у центрі якої перебуває «greenium» як результат ринкової рівноваги, а не як автоматична премія за маркування. Рамка пояснює, за яких умов токенизація здатна впливати на ціноутворення зеленого боргу, а не лише оцифровувати випуск. Доведено, що greenium формується взаємодією трьох каналів: (1) ліквідності та мікроструктури ринку, включно з фінальною розрахунковою визначеністю й інтероперабельністю з основною кастодіальною та посттрейдинговою інфраструктурою; (2) довіри до «зелених» тверджень, що залежить від вартості та якості верифікації, цілісності розкриття інформації та аудитовності доказів щодо розподілу коштів і впливу; (3) фрикцій життєвого циклу інструменту – витрат на емісію, обслуговування, звітність і assurance. На прикладі суверенних і корпоративних кейсів показано, що масштабованість і доступність для інвесторів є критичними для зниження «новизняних» дисконтів ліквідності, тоді як правове визнання цифрового реєстру та даноцентрична архітектура звітності підсилюють канал довіри. Окремо обґрунтовано роль грошових сурогатів, стейблкоїнів і CBDC як розрахункових активів для DvP у токенизованих ринках. Для України зроблено висновок, що токенизація є найбільш виправданою там, де вона підвищує верифіковану прозорість і знижує вартість звітності без втрати інтероперабельності.

**Ключові слова:** токенизовані зелені облігації; greenium; блокчейн; токенизація активів; цифрові активи; віртуальні активи; грошові сурогати; стейблкоїни; CBDC (центробанківські цифрові валюти); доставка проти платежу (DvP); фінальність розрахунків; інтероперабельність; цілісність розкриття інформації; звітність щодо впливу; структуроване фінансування; управління ризиками; фінансування відновлення України.

**Introduction.** Green bonds have matured from a niche segment into a systemic component of sustainable finance, yet the market remains constrained by structural inefficiencies that distort pricing and limit participation (Spydra, 2025). While the financial promise of these instruments is standardised, the environmental promise remains heterogeneous and costly to verify, creating a classic information asymmetry problem between issuers and investors (NGFS, 2022). The issuance process is hindered by high transaction costs associated with tracking, reporting, and external review, which act as a barrier to entry for smaller issuers and create friction in secondary markets (ICMA, 2025). Consequently, the efficiency of capital allocation is dampened not by a lack of demand but by the operational opacity and verification lags that characterise the current market infrastructure (NGFS, 2022).

These frictions are economically significant because they directly interact with the formation of the ‘greenium’ – the yield differential that incentivises issuers to bear higher compliance costs. This premium is not an automatic, label-driven reward, but rather a fragile market equilibrium that is sensitive to liquidity conditions and the credibility of green claims. Tokenisation, often reduced to a discussion of technological novelty, must instead be analysed as a market-design intervention capable of altering this equilibrium. If tokenisation functions merely as a digital wrapper without addressing the underlying costs of trust and settlement, it fails to correct the market failures that suppress the greenium; however, if it reshapes the informational and operational architecture, it has the potential to transform the economics of sustainable finance.

**The purpose of this article is** to develop a greenium-centred analytical framework that links tokenised green bond design choices to pricing outcomes through liquidity, credibility, and lifecycle-friction channels. It aims to substantiate this mechanism using the Hong Kong sovereign programme and selected corporate cases, deriving implications for Ukraine’s reconstruction-

oriented sustainable finance agenda.

**Literature review.** Empirical research on the pricing of green bonds converges on the finding that green premia are conditional outcomes rather than guaranteed rents. Evidence from corporate bond markets suggests that the average premium is often modest and exhibits considerable heterogeneity across issuers and currencies, indicating that the market struggles to consistently price environmental attributes (Zerbib, 2019). Crucially, studies modelling ‘green credibility’ demonstrate that investors price governance signals that reduce information asymmetry regarding the use of proceeds, implying that the cost of verification is a determinant of the yield (Dekker et al., 2025). Conversely, where liquidity is constrained, or the environmental claim does not materially alter investor beliefs, evidence of a meaningful greenium is frequently weak or absent (Larcker & Watts, 2019). This literature strand suggests that any mechanism aiming to strengthen the greenium must address the structural determinants of liquidity and trust rather than relying solely on labelling.

Parallel to the pricing literature, institutional analyses frame the adoption of distributed ledger technology (DLT) as a coordination problem rather than a purely technological upgrade. Policy-oriented syntheses emphasise that the scalability of tokenisation depends on enabling conditions such as interoperability, legal certainty, and governance standards that prevent market fragmentation (OECD, 2024). Similarly, market-facing frameworks argue that while tokenisation offers a pathway to reduce reconciliation costs, these gains are contingent on operating models that allow legacy institutions to adopt new infrastructure without prohibitive transition costs (World Economic Forum, 2025). In this context, recent assessments of Hong Kong’s pioneering initiatives confirm that digital innovation can significantly enhance the impact of green finance, provided it is underpinned by a supportive ecosystem (Namoniuk & Matei, 2025). Ultimately, the economic validity of a tokenised instrument rests on the legal recognition of the digital register as the definitive record of ownership, as illustrated by issuances under frameworks like Germany’s Electronic Securities Act (Siemens, 2023), and on adherence to market standards such as the Green Bond Principles (International Capital Market Association, 2025).

**Main results of the research.** Tokenised green bonds have moved from isolated proof-of-concept transactions toward a recognisable, albeit still small, segment of sustainable debt that combines green bond governance with digital issuance and servicing architectures. A deal-level review of the market identifies nine tokenised green bond transactions across seven jurisdictions between February 2019 and February 2024, with an aggregate volume of about 1.15 billion, spanning sovereign, supranational, and corporate issuers (Asset Tokenisation, 2024). In Europe, green and ESG-linked tokenised bond issuance reached approximately €483 million in 2024, accounting for around 28% of the total tokenised fixed-income volume in the region. This signals that sustainability-linked use cases are becoming one of the leading application layers within the broader tokenised debt space (Blockinvest, 2025). Hong Kong provides the clearest benchmark of sovereign-scale progression: in November 2025, the HKSAR Government conducted its third digital green bond offering with a record issuance size of HK\$10 billion, while total subscriptions across four currency tranches exceeded HK\$130 billion (approximately US\$16.7 billion), indicating strong institutional demand for digitally issued, multi-currency green sovereign debt (HKSAR, 2025). At the same time, the macro context matters for interpretation: the global green bond market is estimated to be roughly US\$673 billion in 2025, meaning tokenised green bonds remain a marginal fraction of the overall green bond universe and cannot be assessed solely through growth narratives (Mordor Intelligence, 2025).


These figures establish momentum and policy relevance, but they do not, on their own, resolve the core economic question that determines whether tokenisation is more than a new issuance format. The key issue is whether tokenisation changes the pricing equilibrium of green debt – specifically, whether it can strengthen or stabilise the greenium by altering the constraints under which investors form yield expectations and allocate capital. Put differently, scale and subscription statistics indicate market interest, yet the analytical task is to explain the mechanism through which digital design features (fractionalisation, faster settlement, auditable disclosure trails,

or automated servicing) translate into an observable pricing effect rather than remaining operational novelties (*World Economic Forum, 2025*).

A greenium-centred interpretation of tokenised green bonds becomes analytically useful only when the greenium itself is treated as an equilibrium outcome rather than a label-driven premium. The empirical literature suggests that average green premia tend to be modest and heterogeneous across markets and time (*Zerbib, 2019*), while other evidence shows settings where a meaningful premium is weak or absent (*Larcker & Watts, 2019*). This implies that the greenium is best understood as the net result of at least three interacting forces: investor preference for environmental attributes, market microstructure and liquidity conditions, and the credibility of the “green” claim.

Where investor preference exists but liquidity is thin, or credibility is contested, liquidity discounts and credibility discounts can compress the premium. Conversely, where credibility is strong and the instrument is operationally easy to hold and trade, the same preference can translate into a more visible premium. Tokenisation matters economically only to the extent that it reshapes liquidity, credibility, and transaction frictions in ways that investors can recognise and incorporate into pricing.

A practical way to formalise this argument is to treat the observed greenium as a net pricing effect that can be decomposed conceptually into a positive preference component and three subtractive components: a liquidity discount, a credibility discount, and friction costs. Figure 1 presents the integrated framework that connects this pricing logic to the institutional design of tokenised green bonds. In the upper part of the figure, the greenium is represented as the net result of preferences minus liquidity and credibility discounts, as well as lifecycle frictions. In the lower part, a tiered reference architecture is presented, spanning foundational legal governance, market infrastructure (registry and custody), settlement (including the “cash leg” for delivery-versus-payment), and the disclosure-data-attestation stack that produces verifiable evidence of environmental performance. The key contribution of the figure is the explicit mapping between layers and channels: infrastructure and settlement layers primarily operate through the liquidity channel; disclosure, data, and attestation layers operate through the credibility channel; and the combined efficiency of the stack determines whether lifecycle frictions decline sufficiently to matter for pricing. Consequently, if tokenisation changes only the form of issuance without activating these architectural channels, by improving tradeability, settlement reliability, and the cost of verification, the framework predicts that the observed greenium will remain largely unchanged.



**Fig. 1. Mapping Tokenised Bond Architecture to Greenium Formation Channels**

Source: IOSCO, 2025

To operationalise the decomposition, tokenisation must be described institutionally rather than generically. The term ‘tokenised green bond’ covers materially different legal and operational



arrangements, and the taxonomy determines which frictions are actually reduced and which are merely reallocated. Table 1 specifies this taxonomy in pricing-relevant terms by distinguishing between native digital issuance (where the digital register is the legally definitive record), tokenised representation or wrapper models (where the token mirrors an off-chain asset while the authoritative record remains in a traditional CSD), and hybrid designs that combine native issuance with interoperability to mainstream custody and settlement workflows. This distinction is not semantic: it determines whether tokenisation can plausibly reduce reconciliation costs and settlement frictions without imposing a new rail penalty that fragments liquidity.

**Table 1. Taxonomy of Tokenised Green Bonds and Economic Implications**

Tokenisation Model	Authoritative Register	Settlement Path	Expected Influence on Liquidity & Frictions
Native Digital Issuance	Digital / DLT Legally definitive record, e.g., eWpG	On-Ledger / Atomic  Potential for simultaneous DvP	Mixed - high reduction in reconciliation costs. Risk of 'liquidity islands' if incompatible with mainstream workflows.
Tokenised Representation (Wrapper / Twin)	Traditional CSD (Token mirrors beneficial claim)	Legacy Rails Settlement depends on off-chain updates	Neutral - limited cost savings due to retained reconciliation burdens; preserves legacy post-trade bottlenecks.
Hybrid Model (Native + Interoperability)	Integrated (Native issuance linked to CSDs)	Connected Bridge to cash legs	Positive - Reduces issuance costs while minimising the 'new rail' penalty for investors.

Source: Siemens, 2023.

A set of complementary conditions fosters liquidity in fixed income markets, including predictable settlement finality, the ability of intermediaries to manage inventories and collateral efficiently, investor confidence in operational processes, and broad compatibility with custody and compliance infrastructures (BIS, 2024). Tokenisation can influence liquidity only through mechanisms that improve these conditions. One mechanism is settlement compression: shorter settlement cycles reduce counterparty exposure and can improve balance-sheet efficiency for dealers and large investors, supporting trading activity. A second mechanism is transfer and servicing efficiency. If the transfer of ownership and the servicing of coupons and corporate actions become less operationally burdensome, market-making becomes cheaper and secondary-market participation becomes less costly. A third mechanism is investor-base expansion: to the extent that tokenised issuance supports multi-currency distribution, new distribution channels, or structurally lower minimum denomination without creating new custody complexity, it can expand the set of feasible holders. None of these mechanisms operates automatically. Their effect depends on whether tokenised instruments remain operationally legible to the institutions that dominate the green bond market. If tokenisation forces a new custody stack, novel onboarding requirements, or idiosyncratic settlement arrangements that cannot be integrated into mainstream post-trade practice, the liquidity channel can be neutral or even negative because the instrument becomes "special," reducing the pool of marginal buyers and dealers.

Hong Kong's sovereign programme is therefore analytically valuable not simply because it exists, but because it provides evidence of an intent to avoid the liquidity-island outcome through repeat issuance and mainstream investor accessibility. In February 2023, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority announced the HKSAR Government's inaugural tokenised green bond offering with an issue size of HKD 800 million (Hong Kong Monetary Authority, 2023). In February 2024, the Government reported a successful multi-currency digital green bond offering of approximately HKD 6 billion across HKD, RMB, USD, and EUR (Hong Kong Monetary Authority, 2024). A



multi-currency structure is not a cosmetic design choice; it is a direct lever on the investor-base component of liquidity because currency denomination constrains the eligible universe of institutional investors. Repeated issuance also matters because liquidity is expectation-driven: market participants become willing to invest in operational integration and to quote prices when they believe a format is repeatable and scalable rather than a one-off pilot. In greenium terms, repetition reduces novelty-related liquidity discounts and makes any preference-based premium more likely to be priced rather than offset by operational uncertainty.

The credibility channel, which is among the most pricing-sensitive dimensions in the greenium literature, cannot be treated as a side feature. Evidence indicates that “green credibility” can be a determinant of pricing differentials, implying that investors respond to governance and verification arrangements that reduce information asymmetry (*Dekker et al., 2025*). Tokenisation improves credibility only when it improves the production and integrity of evidence. A blockchain can preserve records immutably, but it cannot validate environmental reality on its own; therefore, tokenisation must be coupled with an informational architecture that strengthens how claims are documented, versioned, and verified. In the integrated logic of Figure 1, this requirement is captured by the disclosure-data-attestation layers: disclosures must be tamper-evident and time-stamped; proceeds allocation and project performance data must be linked to reporting in a structured audit trail; and assurance responsibilities must be clearly assigned so that investors can trust the integrity of the evidence regime. Tokenisation becomes materially relevant to credibility when these layers reduce the investor’s cost of verifying claims and increase confidence that reporting is disciplined rather than discretionary.

Hitachi’s digitally tracked green bond architecture, as described publicly by Nomura, illustrates why credibility must be treated as a data and governance problem rather than a label problem. Nomura characterised its cooperation in issuing Hitachi’s digital green bond as aiming to improve transparency and the effectiveness of gathering and providing environmental data for green investment, highlighting a Green Tracking Hub combined with a blockchain layer (*Nomura, 2023*). Interpreted through the greenium decomposition, this is best seen as an attempt to lower the credibility discount by changing the informational production function: the bond is paired with a structured evidence channel that is easier to monitor and, in principle, harder to manipulate retrospectively. The technology itself is not a guarantee of credibility; the credibility guarantee lies in the governance of data and assurance that the technology helps operationalise and make more observable to investors.

The transaction-cost channel completes the framework by linking issuer-side incentives to market-level outcomes. Tokenisation can reduce issuance and servicing costs when it substitutes away from paper-based processes and reconciliation-heavy post-trade arrangements, particularly in jurisdictions where electronic or DLT-based registers are legally recognised as authoritative. Siemens’ 2023 digital bond is analytically informative because it illustrates the issuer-side narrative of operational substitution. Siemens stated that issuing the bond on a public blockchain could render paper-based global certificates and central clearing unnecessary, as associated with Germany’s eWpG framework (*Siemens, 2023*). In the greenium-centred logic presented earlier, this should not be read as a claim that cost reductions automatically generate a greenium. Instead, cost reduction functions as a supply-side condition that can support market deepening by expanding the set of issuers and project pipelines for which green bond issuance becomes economically viable. As issuance becomes more repeatable and marginal costs decline, market conventions can standardise, and secondary-market functioning can improve. However, the equilibrium discipline remains strict: cost reductions are relevant for greenium formation only if they coincide with improvements in liquidity and credibility that raise investors’ willingness to accept lower yields. Otherwise, efficiency gains may be captured largely on the issuer side while pricing remains unchanged because demand-side constraints persist.

This interdependence also clarifies why a hybrid technology posture is best interpreted as a coherent design solution rather than a compromise. A purely permissionless approach may maximise openness but can create institutional barriers related to identity management, regulated

custody, and operational governance; conversely, a purely permissioned approach may satisfy compliance and resilience requirements yet fail to generate verifiability signals that strengthen credibility in a way that is visible and actionable for investors. The integrated architecture in Figure 1 implies a pragmatic combination: permissioned DLT for issuance, registry, onboarding, and core settlement workflows, complemented by the selective anchoring of disclosure hashes and time-stamped reporting artefacts on a public chain. This posture is consistent with policy-oriented assessments that emphasise governance, interoperability, and operating models as key constraints on tokenisation adoption (OECD, 2024; World Economic Forum, 2025). It is also consistent with a credibility-driven view of the greenium: if improvements in disclosure integrity become publicly verifiable without exposing confidential transaction-level information, the credibility discount can plausibly decline because investors can validate the immutability of key artefacts without relying solely on issuer assertions.

**Table 2. Implementation Levers Linking Tokenisation Choices to Greenium Channels**

<b>Design Lever</b>	<b>Liquidity Channel (Market Microstructure &amp; Access)</b>	<b>Credibility Channel (Trust &amp; Verification)</b>	<b>Friction Channel (Issuance &amp; Lifecycle Costs)</b>	<b>Enabling Condition</b>
Authoritative Register Model (Native vs. Wrapper vs. Hybrid)	Native can improve transfer efficiency but risks liquidity fragmentation if isolated; hybrid reduces “new rail” penalty	Native reduces record-discrepancy risk (“dual truth”); wrapper effect is limited	Native can reduce reconciliation; wrapper preserves legacy frictions	Legal recognition of the authoritative register; enforceable investor rights
Custody and Onboarding Model (Mainstream-compatible vs. special wallets)	Mainstream custody compatibility expands feasible institutional participation	Regulated custody supports KYC/AML and operational trust	Reduces investor-side operational overhead if integrated into existing workflows	Interoperability with standard custody interfaces and asset servicing
Settlement Design (Atomic DvP vs. hybrid settlement)	Atomic DvP reduces counterparty risk and supports market-making; hybrid limits gains	Settlement finality strengthens confidence in trade completion	Reduces failures, back-office delays, and settlement frictions	Credible settlement asset for the cash leg (tokenised deposits/wholesale CBDC or equivalent)
Investor Access and Distribution (Multi-currency/global vs. narrow/local)	Multi-currency expands the eligible investor set and supports demand depth	Broader participation can signal repeatability and acceptance	Limited direct effect on per-trade cost	Instrument legibility for global portfolio systems (e.g., standard identifiers, reporting conventions)
Evidence and Reporting Architecture (Anchored disclosures + structured data vs. document-only)	Indirectly supports liquidity by providing better information for pricing and risk management systems.	Directly reduces credibility discount via a tamper-evident, auditable evidence chain.	Lowers recurring reporting and verification frictions if the data is structured	Data governance and assurance; credible verification of inputs, not just immutable storage

*Sources: Zerbib, 2019; OECD, 2024; World Economic Forum, 2025).*

To make the framework operational at the level of design choices, Table 2 consolidates the principal implementation levers and illustrates how each lever aligns with the liquidity, credibility, and friction channels. The table is intentionally structured around investor-relevant constraints

rather than around technology features. What matters is whether a design choice reduces “new-rail” penalties, improves settlement reliability, and lowers the cost of verifying green claims. The table also highlights enabling conditions because effects are conditional. In particular, atomic delivery-versus-payment requires a credible settlement asset for the cash leg, and credibility improvements require data governance and assurance that turn disclosure into an auditable chain of evidence rather than a static set of documents (OECD, 2024).

In institutional terms, a scalable tokenised green bond format is unlikely to emerge from a single issuance. The equilibrium logic implies a phased pathway: first, the legal and operating architecture must be stabilised (authoritative register model, custody and onboarding model, and a reporting schema aligned with established green bond governance); second, an inaugural issuance must validate end-to-end processes, including settlement and assurance workflows; third, repeat issuance must be achieved to build expectations of continuity and to motivate intermediaries and investors to integrate the format into standard workflows. The market relevance of Hong Kong’s programme is consistent with this logic, as it demonstrates repeat issuance and a deliberate multi-currency design that expands the eligible investor set and signals an intent to avoid liquidity islands (*Hong Kong Monetary Authority, 2023, 2024*).

In Ukraine’s reconstruction context, all three greenium channels identified above become simultaneously binding constraints: liquidity is limited by investor access and post-trade interoperability, credibility is conditioned by the verifiability of allocation and impact evidence under heightened scrutiny, and lifecycle frictions are amplified by the administrative costs of compliance and reporting for issuers and public-sector stakeholders (*UNDP, 2022*). Ukraine has established a sustainable finance policy foundation since 2021, which includes the treatment of green bonds (*National Bank of Ukraine, 2021*). At the same time, internationally documented estimates underscore the exceptional scale of reconstruction and recovery needs (*World Bank, 2024*). In such a context, investor attention to credibility and verification costs is heightened: international capital is conditioned not only on the nominal greenness of projects but on whether allocation and impact evidence can be audited efficiently and reported in an internationally legible manner. This makes tokenisation potentially valuable not as a technological modernisation project but as a mechanism for lowering the credibility discount – and, secondarily, the liquidity discount – by improving the production, integrity, and accessibility of evidence while maintaining interoperability with mainstream custody and post-trade arrangements. The baseline governance reference remains the Green Bond Principles, which specify expectations around use of proceeds, project evaluation, management of proceeds, and reporting (*International Capital Market Association, 2025*). In practical terms, a Ukraine-relevant approach is one in which tokenisation strengthens these expectations operationally: disclosures become tamper-evident and time-stamped, allocation and impact reporting are tied to structured evidence flows, and assurance responsibilities are clearly assigned so that investors can reduce verification effort without lowering standards of scrutiny.

Taken together, the continuous logic of this section is that tokenised green bonds should be evaluated as a market-design intervention whose economic relevance is mediated by greenium formation. Hong Kong anchors the liquidity and repeatability dimension through sovereign scaling and multi-currency access (*Hong Kong Monetary Authority, 2023, 2024*). Siemens illustrates the legal and cost dimensions by demonstrating how statutory recognition of electronic registers can enable operational substitution and cost reduction (*Siemens, 2023*). Hitachi illustrates the credibility dimension by highlighting a reporting and data architecture designed to make environmental evidence more observable to investors (*Nomura, 2023*). The bridge between these cases is equilibrium, not technology: liquidity, credibility, and frictions jointly determine whether investor preference becomes a priced greenium or dissipates into discounts. The hybrid posture follows directly from this mechanism because it prioritises interoperability and auditable transparency as the conditions under which tokenisation can translate into pricing power.

**Conclusions.** The tokenised green bonds should be evaluated as a market-design intervention whose economic relevance is mediated by greenium formation rather than by the

novelty of digital issuance. A greenium-centred framework reveals that pricing outcomes depend on the joint interaction of three channels: liquidity conditions and post-trade interoperability, the credibility of green claims, and the cost of verification, as well as lifecycle frictions embedded in issuance, servicing, and reporting. The evidence from leading initiatives indicates that tokenisation creates value only when it activates these channels through institutionally robust choices, including legally recognised registers, mainstream custody compatibility, reliable settlement arrangements, and auditable disclosure and data architectures. Sovereign-scale programmes that prioritise repeat issuance and broad investor accessibility are particularly important because they reduce novelty-related liquidity discounts and anchor market expectations of scalability. For reconstruction-oriented contexts, such as Ukraine, the framework implies that tokenisation is most justified when it enhances verifiable transparency, reduces reporting burdens, and preserves interoperability with established capital-market infrastructure.

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