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ПОЛІТИЧНІ ПРОБЛЕМИ МІЖНАРОДНИХ ВІДНОСИН

CRISIS ON BELARUSSIAN-EU BORDER AND RUSSIAN PLANS FOR INVASION OF UKRAINE

КРИЗА НА КОРДОНІ БІЛОРУСЬ-ЄС ТА РОСІЙСЬКІ ПЛАНИ ЩОДО ВТОРГНЕННЯ В УКРАЇНУ

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Abstract. The main point of the study is to prove that the crisis on the Belarusian-European border was a jointly planned action by the special services of Russia and Belarus with the aim of provoking a crisis on the eastern borders of the EU and diverting attention from Putin's plans for a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The article provides examples of the aggravation of the situation on the eastern borders of the EU, related to the illegal crossing of the border by migrants in 2015-2016 from Russia, as well as in 2021 from Belarus. In addition, the crisis on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border is mentioned. The reasons and goals pursued by Russia and Belarus, creating a migration crisis on the border with the Baltic states and Poland, are listed.

Key words: migration crisis, Ukraine, European Union, Russia, Belarus, military aggression

Анотація. Головною метою статті є довести, що криза на білорусько-європейському кордоні, була спільно спланованою акцією спецслужб Росії і Білорусі з метою провокування кризи на східних кордонах ЄС та відвернення уваги від планів В. Путіна щодо повномасштабного вторгнення в Україну у лютому 2022 року. У статті наводяться приклади загострення ситуації на східних кордонах ЄС, пов'язані з незаконним перетином кордону мігрантами у 2015-2016 роках з боку Росії, а також у 2021 році з Білорусі. Крім того, згадується криза на білорусько-українському кордоні. Перераховано причини та цілі, які переслідували Росія та Білорусь, створюючи міграційну кризу на кордоні з країнами Балтії та Польщею.

Ключові слова: міграційна криза, Україна, ЄС, Росія, Білорусь, збройна агресія

Introduction. Migration processes have become not only an objective reality but sometimes it is also an instrument of the policy of some countries exerting pressure on others. This is the phenomenon that the European Union (EU) has encountered at its external borders, where migrants are often used as a policy tool of non-EU countries (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, Russia, Morocco, and Turkey) against EU Member States (Romania, Poland, Spain, Lithuania, Latvia, Greece, Croatia). In March 2020, Turkey opened its borders with Greece to allow Syrian refugees to enter Europe, and in May 2020 and July 2021, Morocco allowed migrants from sub-Saharan Africa to cross the border with the EU in the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. By opening its borders to Syrian refugees, Turkey pursued two main goals: a) to get NATO, and especially the EU, to support its position in the Syrian war after the 2020 conflict between Syrian government forces and Turkish-backed rebels, b) to obtain financial assistance for maintaining camps for migrants [Kucharczyk, 2020]. On the other hand, Morocco wanted to persuade the Spanish government to support its position on the settlement of the Western Sahara issue. By opening their borders, both Turkey and Morocco have partially achieved their goals. It seemed that Belarus planned to follow in their footsteps and use migrants as a lever/instrument of blackmail and

pressure on the EU in order to lift individual and international sanctions imposed by the EU on A. Lukashenko and his regime after the August 2020 events in Belarus [Чайковський, 2021]. However, from the perspective of February 24, 2022, it turned out that the roots of this problem reach deeper and lead to Russia ...

The purpose of research is to prove that the crisis on the Belarusian-European border was a jointly planned action by the special services of Russia and Belarus with the aim of provoking a crisis on the eastern borders of the EU and diverting attention from Putin's plans for a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 of February 2022.

The latest literature review. The literature on the subject is very extensive. Migration crises in Europe, including those on the eastern border of the EU, are analyzed mainly in several categories: the political and security aspect, the legal aspect, and the social and humanitarian aspect. The article uses the monograph by Dembour, M. B., & Kelly, T. [2011], Fassin, D. [2012], Huysmans, J. [2006], Maciejewski. [2022], Pieczyński, M. [2022], Sirriyeh, A. [2018].

The situation on the eastern borders of the European Union. The migration crisis (2015) caused by the Arab Spring (2010) and the civil war in Syria (2011) became a test of endurance and solidarity for EU countries, and at the same time showed differences in the approaches to this problem. The crisis affected mainly the countries of Southern and Western Europe, and to a lesser extent (taking into account the number of migrants) the countries of Eastern Europe. In terms of the influx of migrants in the northeast borders of the EU, Norway and Finland faced the greatest problems in 2015-2016.

In 2015, the migration crisis took place on the Russian-Norwegian border called the "Arctic route". At that time, about 1,600 people crossed the Russian-Norwegian border (for comparison, in 2014, the border was crossed by several dozen people) [TVN24, 2015]. Most of them were Syrians, Iraqis, and Afghans. About three-quarters of them claimed to be from war-torn Syria. Norwegian authorities reported that 20-30 percent of them had the right to stay in Russia [Newsweek, 2015]. In early December 2015, Norway began sending back migrants with residence permits for living in Russia. The vast majority of migrants entered Norway (Storskog border crossing) on bicycles, as there are no pedestrian crossings in this region. In addition, the Norwegian border guard fined drivers of cars transporting migrants across the border. This wave of migration was symbolized by the piles of used bicycles that were bought on the Russian side of the border and abandoned immediately upon arrival in Norway [Polska Agencja Prasowa, 2021].

Shortly after the closure of the „Arctic route”, the “Northern route” was discovered on the border with Finland (Salla border crossing). As reported by the Finnish media, the Federal Security Service (FSB) helped to organize the movement of migrants on the Russian side of the border [Polska Agencja Prasowa, 2021]. From September 2015 to February 2016, Finland experienced the biggest migrant crisis in the country's post-war history. In 2015, the number of asylum applications amounted to 32,5 thousands (a 9-fold increase compared to 2014) [Rodkiewicz, Szymański i Żochowski, 2016]. According to Finnish regulations, the border could not be crossed on foot or by bicycle, so asylum seekers began using old Russian cars. The large increase in the number of migrants seeking asylum on the northern section of the Finnish-Russian border has forced Finland to start talks with Russia. On March 22, 2016, during the visit of Finnish President Sauli Niinistö to Moscow, inter-ministerial agreements were signed to limit the influx of migrants from Russia to Finland. The talks resulted in a sudden halt to the flow of migrants to Finland in March 2016. The price of an agreement on migration issues was Finland's withdrawal from the policy of limiting bilateral contacts, adopted as a reaction to the Russian intervention in Ukraine in 2014. In this way, the opening and control by Moscow of the “Arctic migration route” leading through Russia to Finland was a deliberate demonstration of “soft power” aimed at persuading Helsinki to activate efforts to normalize relations between the European Union and Russia and to show restraint in developing cooperation with NATO and in the region [Rodkiewicz, Szymański i Żochowski, 2016].

Migrants called the “Arctic route” and the "Northern route" the cheapest and shortest route to Europe, and safer than traveling across the Mediterranean sea. Syrians, Iraqis, and Afghans flew to Murmansk from Moscow. Their stay in Russia was fully legal. Most were granted tourist or

student visas [Polska Agencja Prasowa, 2015]. The influx of migrants to the Russian border with Norway and Finland could not take place without the supervision of the Russian internal security authorities. The migration route leading to the northwest of Russia, passing through the zone of special military importance (especially the Murmansk region), is under their constant supervision. This excludes the free movement of migrants or the uncontrolled activity of criminal groups involved in people smuggling [Rodkiewicz, Szymański i Żochowski, 2016].

These and other actions of the Russian Federation (territorial claims) have prompted many countries to build walls on the north-eastern border of the EU in order to prevent illegal people smuggling and ensure border security. As can be seen from table 1, the first wall on the border with Russia was raised by Latvia (2015), followed by Norway and Estonia in 2016, and Lithuania in 2017. In 2022, Poland announced the construction of a wall with the Kaliningrad Oblast in the north of the country. In 2021-2022, walls were built on the border with Belarus. All countries indicated security as the main reason for building walls on the eastern borders of the EU, the Baltic states indicated tensions and territorial claims as the second reason, and the issue of migration was given as the third one, which means that the likelihood of migrants from the Middle East and Africa appearing is unlikely the natural way.

Table 1

Dynamika budowy murów na wschodnich rubieżach UE

Rok	Miejsce	Cel	Parametry	Militarization status
2015	Latvia - Russia	Safety, territorial tension, Immigration Smuggling	276 km border 90 km width x 2 m (wall)	Wired fence; Cameras and video surveillance system; Border patrol
2016	Norway- Russia	Safety, immigration	196 km border 200 km width x 4 m (wall)	Wired fence; Cameras and video surveillance system;
	Estonia – Russia	Safety, territorial tension, Immigration Smuggling	294 km border 1,6 km width x 2,5 m (wall)	Electronic surveillance system or movement sensors; Barbed wire. Drones
2017	Lithuania – Russia	Safety, territorial tension, Immigration	227 km border 1,6 km width x 2,5 m (wall)	Cameras and video surveillance system;
2021- 2022	Poland – Belarus	Safety, Immigration	418 km border 170 km width x 5,5 height (wall)	Steel-concrete wall Cameras and video surveillance system Electronic surveillance system or movement sensors; Barbed wire

2021-2023	Lithuania - Belarus	Safety, Immigration	678.8 km border 330 km width x 4 height (wall)	Cameras and video surveillance system; Electronic surveillance system or movement sensors;
2022-2024	Latvia - Belarus	Safety, Immigration	172.912 km border The first round of 85,9 km will be completed by spring 2023 and the second round at 63,9 km by spring 2024.	Under construction
2022-	Poland - Kaliningrad region	Safety, Immigration	About 200 km Wide 3 m, height 2,5 m	Under construction

Source: the own study based on: [Bilotaitė, 2022], [Building Walls, 2022], [Five kilometers of fence constructed on Latvia-Belarus border, 2022], [TVP3, 2022].

The migration crisis on the north-eastern border of the EU was not a spontaneous phenomenon, but a well-planned action of the Belarusian services in cooperation with the Russian services in order to destabilize the situation in Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, and the entire European Union. As the above analysis shows, this was not the first attempt to transfer migrants from the East to the West. For the first time, migrants from the Middle East and Africa appeared on the border of Russia with Finland and Norway in 2015-2016 [Kozłowski, 2022]. Then Russia tested the tactic of shifting migrants on a smaller scale by opening its border crossings with these countries. So, it can be said without a doubt that two countries – Russia and Belarus – were involved in destabilizing the situation on the eastern borders of the EU in 2021. Russia, which had already checked a similar practice earlier, prompted the Belarusian authorities to repeat the attempt to transfer migrants from the Middle East and Africa to the EU, but on a much larger scale, as it was in 2015-2016. As you can see, Belarus agreed to this proposal. In this process, each side persecuted both its own and common goals.

The aim of the Belarusian authorities was to create an artificial political crisis in the countries that most support the Belarusian opposition. In addition, the appearance of Belarus on the side of Russia after February 24, 2022, was partly Lukashenko's revenge on the Kyiv authorities, which, in solidarity with the EU in 2020 and 2021, supported the sanction and banned Belarusian airlines from using the airspace over Ukraine.

The Russian Federation intended to achieve much more goals. One of the main ones was to divert attention from preparations for a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Intending to attack Ukraine, the Kremlin regime hoped that triggering a migration crisis in the eastern borders of the EU would not only distract the West from Ukraine but also discourage assistance to Ukraine and its citizens. Moreover, Russia hardly expected that after the invasion, the influx of refugees from Ukraine to the EU would be so numerous. As the situation after the liberation of the northern regions of Ukraine showed, the Russians intended to take over Ukraine in 3 days and hoped that the population would not object and would welcome them to their territories. However, they miscalculated. Ukraine only fought heroically, which resulted in the de-occupation of the northern regions and eastern parts. Among the other goals that Russia pursued by directing the crisis on the eastern borders of the EU

include: accelerating the process of launching “Nord Stream-2”; placing refugees in Europe, in particular from unstable regions in the Middle East; reduction of sanctions against Russia; legalization of the “DNR” and “LNR” groups in the occupied part of the Ukrainian Donbas; recognition by the European Union of the annexation of Ukrainian Crimea by Russia [Солонина, 2021]. None of these goals after February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation has achieved.

The common goal was to weaken the collective West, especially the European Union, and force it to make concessions on political, economic, defense and security issues [МИД, 2022].

The 2021 migration crisis on the eastern borders of the EU was also aimed at checking the vigilance of EU and NATO countries, looking for weak points. At that time, it was already known that the invasion of Ukraine would take place, but only the date and scale of Putin's plans were unknown. As the year 2022 showed, Putin was convinced that he would quickly conquer the territory of eastern Ukraine together with Kyiv. So assuming that if he succeeded, the next on the list would undoubtedly be Moldova along with Transnistria, and the threat to the security of the Baltic states and Poland would increase significantly.


Operation “Sluice”. The EU migration crisis with Belarus was called Operation “Sluice”. This is an action to bring migrants to Belarus from the Middle East or Africa, to transfer them to the EU, and cause a migration crisis there. In the context of the analysis of earlier events, it seems that the main originator of this operation was Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the self-proclaimed President of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, was its executor. The plan for this operation was devised in 2010-2011, and its co-organizers were the KGB of Belarus together with the border special forces OSAM and the Russian FSB, which at that time brought migrants through Russia to Belarus, and from there to the EU via the so-called “eastern route”. There is no border between these two countries and bringing migrants is not a problem [Kamińska, 2021]. The FSB recruited illegal migrants and then brought them to the border with the Smolensk region and handed them over to OSAM employees. OSAM then took over migrants at the border and, according to the command's orders, took them to the Lithuanian and Latvian parts of the border. And there they were transferred to the EU. OSAM is a border special forces unit responsible for transferring migrants to unobvious places on the border [Kamińska, 2021].

The fact that the migration crisis in Belarus is one of the tools of the Russian hybrid war with the West is indicated by many factors, such as the fact that the Belarusian secret services do not have sufficient resources and funds to organize the entire process of resettling several thousand people from the Middle East to Europe. The Russian GRU specializes in such operations, so it is quite possible that without the Kremlin's coordination, it could not have taken place here. It is worth mentioning, for example, the organization of a mass migration crisis on the southern flank of the EU after the Russian invasion of Syria in 2015 [Волошин, 2021].

Operation “Sluice” began shortly after the forced landing of a plane heading from Athens to Vilnius and the arrest of Belarusian blogger Raman Pratasevich at Minsk airport. In 2021, smuggling people through the eastern border with the EU looked like a much better-organized action compared to 2015-2016. Now, migrants not only were arriving from Russia but flew directly to the airport in Minsk (Fig. 1.).

President Lukashenko personally encouraged the arrival of migrants from the Middle East to Belarus and assured him that he would not prevent them from getting from its territory to the EU [Giczan, 2021]. Lukashenko's words were repeatedly broadcast on Iraqi television, and in the meantime, the Belarusian president took care to intensify air connections with Iraq [Pieczyński, 2022]. In this way, in 2018-2021, the Belarusian regime brought, according to various data, from 10,000 to 20,000 migrants to Belarus [Sieczkowska i Kunert, 2021]. Most of the migrants who in 2021 tried to cross the borders of three EU countries - Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia, were Iraqis.

Figure 1. Air connections from the Middle East and Turkey with Belarus



Source: [Січень, 2021]

The main purpose of bringing migrants through Belarus to the EU was to cause numerous problems in European countries and to divert the attention of the European Union from Belarus and Russia. In this way, Lukashenko could continue to fight the opposition and destroy the remnants of democracy with impunity. And Vladimir Putin hoped that he would take over Ukraine calmly and no one would stop him. Poland, in cooperation with Lithuania, Latvia, and the European Union, managed to contain the migration crisis for a while, but the problem has not been finally resolved.

According to statistical data based on Flightradar24, the number of countries that operated flights with Belarus until 2018 was about 50, in 2020, there were 58, and in 2021 - 51. The decrease in the number of countries in 2021 is explained by the fact that the leaders of the European Union decided on the closure of airspace and airports for Belarusian airlines and banned EU carriers from flying over Belarus, which was a reaction to the fact that Belarus forced a Ryanair plane to land in Minsk in May 2021 [Rzeczpospolita, 2021].

Broken down by years and the number of flights to Minsk, the situation was as follows: in 2018, 22,451 flights were made; in 2019 - 25,384 flights; in 2020 - 11,220 flights (the number decreased due to the covid-19 pandemic); in 2021 (until November 8) - 9,543 flights [Sieczkowska i Kunert, 2021]. In 2018-2020, most flights to Belarus were made from Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey. As for Ukraine, the number of flights to Belarus increased in 2015, when Ukraine banned the flights of Russian airlines on its territory [Українська правда, 2015]. Since then, to reach Russia, Ukrainians flew through Belarus or Turkey. In 2021, Ukraine joined the EU sanctions against Belarus and banned the flights of Belarusian airlines over its territory [Укрінформ, 2021]. As can be seen in Figure 1, after the closure of European and Ukrainian airspace to Belarusian carriers, the majority of flights to Belarus were via Russia. From January to November 8, 2021, the most flights to Minsk were from Turkey and Russia - 1,896 and 1,874 respectively. The following countries in the top ten are Egypt - 861, Georgia - 748, Ukraine (until May 2021) - 659, United Arab Emirates - 267, Uzbekistan - 260, Armenia - 256, Kazakhstan - 252, Azerbaijan - 200 [Sieczkowska i Kunert, 2021]. In addition, the number of flights from Iraq increased in 2021. As the Belarusian journalist Tadeusz Giczyn points out, at the beginning of 2021 there was only one flight a week between Iraq

and Belarus, from May 2021 this number was four flights a week. Initially, flights took place from Baghdad, and in August they opened new connections from three other cities - Erbil, Basra, and Suleymaniya [Giczan, 2021].

Bringing the Iraqis to Belarus was handled by the Belarusian state-owned company, Centrkurort, which belongs to the President's Affairs Administration. The center cooperated with Iraqi travel agencies that sold trips to Belarus and provided the center with lists of Iraqis who, after landing at the Minsk airport, received Belarusian tourist visas on the spot [Kamińska, 2021]. The price of a week's "tourist" visa ranged from \$600 to \$1,000. The "tourists" were accommodated in state-owned hotels in Minsk. After that, these people were recruited, formed into groups, and sent to the border. They reached the border on their own or by buses belonging to the Belarusian Ministry of National Defense [Pieczyński, 2022]. Some Iraqis used the help of smugglers, to whom they paid 1000-1500 dollars for transport to Vilnius [InfoSecurity24, 2021]. On internet forums, Iraqis exchanged instructions and advice on how to reach the EU border. Their content shows that they were aware that they were taking part in the illegal practice of crossing the border with the EU in cooperation with the Belarusian regime [Pieczyński, 2022]. Confirmation of the involvement of the Belarusian services in the illegal border crossing by migrants is also the specificity of the Belarusian border. To stay in the border zone in Belarus, you need a special pass. On the Belarusian side of the border (Belarusian border zone) no one can stay so close to Polish territory [DoRzeczy, 2021]. Earlier, administrative penalties were provided for foreigners for staying in the border area. And in 2021, they were suddenly abolished to legalize the current activities in the border zone. The point is that migrants should be able to stay there [Kamińska, 2021].

In 2021, the Border Guard recorded 39,700 attempts to illegally cross the Polish border from Belarus. The exponential growth began in August 2021, when 3.5 thousand attempts were recorded. In September, the number of attempts to cross the border illegally increased to 7,700. For comparison, in 2020 there were only 120 such attempts [Pieczyński, 2022]. Iraqis, who were the largest group, encouraged their compatriots in chat rooms and on internet forums to force borders and openly advise them to hide from the police in Poland, Lithuania, or Latvia in order to avoid having to apply for asylum in these countries. The main destination of migrants has been Germany from the beginning [Pieczyński, 2022].

Why do Iraqis choose Belarus as a transit route? Belarusian and Lithuanian journalists who went to Iraq to talk to people and better understand the causes of mass emigration from the country decided to find the answer to this question. From these conversations, it appeared that the Belarusian route is the cheapest, fastest, safest way to get to the European Union and then apply for asylum compared to other options. Previously, Iraqis traveled by truck through Turkey and the Balkans to reach the EU, a route considered dangerous, expensive, and complicated. With his "invitation", Lukashenko opened the gate that allows immigrants to get to the European Union - quickly and cheaply with the comprehensive support of the Belarusian authorities [Gazeta Prawna, 2021]. The crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border was reported by, among others, Kurdish TV Rudaw, where most of the migrants come from. The purpose of this broadcast was to make residents think before they decide to fly to Minsk. However, many of them were aware that this journey was a risk that they might lose their lives on the way to Europe. But some say to themselves: "No pain, no gain" and bought tickets, and flew to the EU [Kobla, 2021]. According to Tadeusz Giczan, the majority of people who try to get to the EU via Belarus "are not refugees, they are economic migrants from Iraq" [Gazeta Prawna, 2021]. Due to the decisive actions of the EU, a large number of migrants brought to the borders by the regime have become stuck in Belarus. As a result, Lukashenko had to stop bringing in more groups from abroad. Poland and Lithuania strengthened their borders, preventing migrants from crossing them illegally. Unable to cross it, they stay in Belarus, often near the borders [Kamińska, 2021].

According to the spokesman of the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ahmed As-Sahaf, the situation on the Polish-Belarusian border has become political, and "groups of Iraqi migrants have fallen victim to smuggling networks responsible for issuing illegal entry visas to Belarus" [Forsal, 2021]. In November 2021, when the crisis on the border between Poland and Belarus intensified,

thanks to diplomatic efforts, a number of decisions were made regarding flights to Minsk, including The General Directorate of Civil Aviation of Turkey issued a ban on the sale of tickets for citizens of Iraq, Syria, and Syria traveling to Belarus and Yemen [Business Insider, 2021]; The Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the country was suspending direct flights to Belarus and offered the possibility of returning to Iraqis stranded at the border [TVN24, 2021]; the Syrian carrier Cham Wings announced that it was suspending its flights to Minsk [PAP, 2021] transit restrictions were also introduced by Lebanon and Uzbekistan [Sieczkowska i Kunert, 2021].

On the territory of Belarus, there are not only citizens of Iraq, but also migrants from Congo, Syria, Mali, and Iran. According to French journalist Gulliver Gragg, migrants of another origin than Iraqis are found in a difficult situation. There are no repatriation flights from their countries of origin, so they have no chance to return to their countries of origin at all. And they can't go back to Minsk either. So they just stay in the Bruzgi camp near the Polish border [Прищепя, 2021].

Migration crisis and Ukraine. An attempt to smuggle migrants across the Ukrainian-Belarusian border was carried out by A. Lukashenko in 2020. An example of this is the situation with Hasidim who tried to cross the Belarusian-Ukrainian border in September 2020, while the borders of Ukraine were closed due to the covid-19 pandemic. The Lukashenka regime, as it happened in 2021, deliberately facilitated the entry of a large number of pilgrims to the territory of Belarus and enabled their transit to the border with Ukraine in 2020 [Слово і діло, 2020]. According to the Belarusian authorities, there were over 2,500 Hasidic pilgrims in the country, including 1,200 in the areas bordering Ukraine [Українська правда, 2020]. Wanting to get to Uman to celebrate Rosh Hashanah, the Jewish New Year, but were not allowed to enter Ukraine due to restrictions on the entry of foreigners and stateless persons introduced to combat the spread of coronavirus infection (Ordinance of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine) [Кондратенко, 2020].

The situation with Hasidim on the Ukrainian-Belarusian border in 2020 and the migration crisis on the eastern borders of the EU in 2021 showed the vulnerability of the Ukrainian border. The border between Belarus and Ukraine is 1084 km long. Until the beginning of the armed invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, border guards were on duty in the northern borders of Ukraine. The border between the two countries was marked, but there was no physical barrier.

After Ukraine regained its independence, the issue of demarcation of borders with Belarus was not a priority issue, partly because Ukraine has always treated Belarus as a friendly state and not a threat to its security, which cannot be said about Russia. The demarcation of the Ukrainian-Belarusian border began only in 1997 when an appropriate agreement was signed [Верховна Рада України, 1997]. However, the agreement was not ratified by the Belarusian parliament, as the Belarusian side directly linked the ratification of the agreement to the extinguishment of the debt of 80 to 150 million. \$, which appeared in the early 1990s. The Belarusian side claimed that after the collapse of the USSR, its enterprises transferred money to Ukraine for manufactured but not delivered products. Ukraine, in turn, did not consider this debt as state debt. The issue of border demarcation dragged on for years. In 2003, Ukraine and Belarus signed a bilateral protocol, according to which the amount of Ukraine's financial obligations was set at USD 134 million [УНІАН, 2010]. The Ukrainian side offered Belarus to repay 80% of the debt by tidying up the borders and building border crossings.

At the end of 2009, presidents Alexander Lukashenko and Viktor Yushchenko announced a solution to the problem. In exchange for debt forgiveness, Ukraine undertook to sell electricity to Belarus at a discount for re-export to Lithuania. In 2010, the Agreement on the state border was submitted to the Belarusian parliament. The document was ratified by both chambers of the Belarussian parliament and then had to be signed by President Lukashenko. The last step predicted the exchange of ratification documents, but Minsk refused to carry out this formal procedure. And only in June 2013, as a result of Lukashenko's visit to Ukraine, the parties signed the Protocol in exchange for letters of ratification of the Agreement between Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus on the state border of May 12, 1997, which was necessary for the entry into force of the Agreement on the border [Матюла, 2013].

The Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014 and the increasing rapprochement of Belarus with Russia required a more firm approach to the issue of borders on the Ukrainian side. Unfortunately, the issue of demarcation of the border was downplayed, to some extent because, until February 24, 2022, Ukraine did not perceive Belarus as hostile, despite some deterioration of relations after 2020. As the threat increased in recent years, the Ukrainian authorities intended to build a physical border not only with Belarus but also with Russia, which was prevented by the Russian invasion with the support of the Belarusian state [Шумило, 2021].

Ukraine stayed out of the crisis on the EU's eastern borders but was aware of the threats. After the situation on the Belarusian-Polish border escalated, there were reports of a possible redirection of migrants to the border with Ukraine. It was about the possibility of illegal immigrants entering the EU from the territory of Ukraine if the Polish border guards manage to stop their attack from Belarus.

The greatest threat to Ukraine in connection with this crisis could be the loss of the visa-free regime with the EU if illegal migrants were not stopped, who could potentially also try to cross the EU border from the Ukrainian side [Костюченко, 2021]. Such actions in this situation would be quite logical because there was a high probability that Belarus would send all these migrants to Ukraine. Ukraine could be used as another transit country. Arranging a migration crisis on the Dnieper could be quite possible, especially since Ukraine borders EU countries such as Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania [Волошин, 2021]. The largest faction of the German Bundestag, the SPD, came up with an unexpected proposal to place refugees stuck on the Polish-Belarusian border in Ukraine. However, Ukraine responded to this proposal in a not very diplomatic way. Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDC) Oleksiy Danylov proposed that the Social Democrats take the refugees home or place them in the Bundestag [Шумило, 2021]. Such statements prove that some political circles in the West perceive Ukraine as a transit country where illegal immigrants will be able to wait for the decision of European countries to accept them. In particular, migrants from Belarus could wait for their asylum application to be processed in the EU in Ukraine [Волошин, 2021].

W związku z zaostrzeniem sytuacji na wschodnich rubieżach UE, Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych i Państwowa Służba Graniczna zidentyfikowały 10 obszarów granicy Ukrainy z Białorusią, gdzie można spodziewać się masowych skupisk migrantów ze strony białoruskiej. Na tych odcinkach granicy Ukraina zwiększyła liczbę patroli oraz wzmocniła jednostki straży granicznej, przerzucając tam siły Gwardii Narodowej i policji. Głównym celem takich mobilnych grup było "zapobieganie masowemu przekroczeniu granicy państwowej" [Волинські новини, 2021].

Against the background of the unstable situation on the eastern borders of the EU, an additional 8,500 soldiers were sent to the border between Ukraine and Belarus. The enhanced border control regime was ensured by: 3,000 border guard units; 3,500 National Guard troops; 2,000 employees of the State Police; aviation of the Ministry of the Interior, in particular, 15 helicopters (should ensure mobility and deliver law enforcement officers and military personnel to specific border areas if necessary) [Волинські новини, 2021].

The migration crisis on the EU's eastern borders has accelerated efforts to ensure the security of the Ukrainian-Belarusian border. However, this did not save Ukraine from the invasion of Russian troops from the north, including from the territory of Belarus. Ukraine was aware of the possible aggravation of the situation but was not ready for the "Belarusian" scenario. Wishing to cause a crisis and problems for the EU, V. Putin contributed to Ukraine increasing its vigilance regarding the security of its borders until the launch of a full-scale invasion in February 2022. It is quite possible that this vigilance contributed to ensuring the defense of Kyiv. Thanks to the increase of special forces on the northern borders of the state, with huge dispatches, it was possible to stop the Russian army from entering the country and not allow it to enter Kyiv in the first months of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Ukraine joined the group of countries that introduced sanctions against Belarus. In connection with the above, a heated discussion began in political circles as to whether

Ukraine had done the right thing by taking into consideration the increase of Russian troops on its borders.

Even in 2021, the Polish authorities did not exclude the possibility that in the event of a failed attempt to cross the border with Poland or the Baltic States, migration streams could be directed to Ukraine. The head of the Polish government Mateusz Morawiecki said that illegal migrants may try to get to Ukraine first and then to Poland and other European Union countries [Волошин, 2021]. The Ukrainian-Belarusian border was not compact and closely guarded until the beginning of Russia's armed invasion of Ukraine, which used the territory of Belarus to attack northern Ukraine. The situation changed in 2022, now over 1,000 km of the Ukrainian-Belarusian border is fortified and mined and cannot be crossed. Regardless of hostilities on the territory of Ukraine. In November 2022, a group of migrants crossed the Ukrainian-Belarusian border illegally, with Belarusian border guards helping them. A group of 6 people, citizens of Pakistan and Bangladesh, was detained by the Ukrainian border guards in the Zhytomyr region. The detained men testified that they were driven to the border with Ukraine on the territory of Belarus by people in military uniforms, they presume that they were representatives of the border service of the Republic of Belarus. They were then told which direction to go. In addition, while also on the territory of Belarus, the migrants contacted Security Council officers who organized their illegal route and ordered them to call and report their whereabouts after illegally crossing the state border. This is also confirmed by messages on migrants' phones [Корогодський, 2022].

Conclusions. The covid-19 pandemic has silenced the modern, dynamically developing world for over a year and thus slowed down the intensity of irregular migrations to the EU, and also postponed the Russian invasion of Ukraine. After its end, events in Central and Eastern Europe began to accelerate rapidly, and tensions between the EU, the US, Russia, and Belarus began to grow. The main events that took place after the end of the pandemic outside the eastern borders of the EU were: a) rigged presidential elections in Belarus in 2020; 2) grounding in the Belarusian airspace of a Ryanair plane flying from Athens to Vilnius on May 23, 2021, under the pretext of a terrorist attack, and on board the Belarusian blogger and oppositionist Raman Pratasiewicz, 3) imposing severe sanctions on Belarus in connection with fraudulent elections presidential elections in August 2020 and mass persecution of oppositionists, journalists and circles unfavorable to the government [Fraszka, 2021] and 4) Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The attempt of migrants from Belarus to illegally cross the border with neighboring countries is not the first case. Earlier attempts to overcome the "Arctic route" and the "Northern route" were quickly brought under control. In addition, the very practice of crossing the borders on the northern borders of the EU in 2015-2016 was legal, as migrants crossed the borders in places specially designated for this purpose (border crossings) and used legal documents. Unfortunately, the EU ignored previous migrant crises (on a smaller scale) and did not prepare for the current events. The problem of irregular migrations began to be discussed in August 2021, when migrants from Africa and the Middle East appeared on the borders of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Belarus. The migration crisis that the self-appointed president of Belarus has been leading since June 2021, cynically using migrants from Arab countries as a demographic weapon, seemed to be part of the EU's political revenge - questioning the legality of elections, imposed sanctions and criticism of actions taken in the internal sphere. However, the real causes of the migration crisis on the eastern borders of the EU should be sought not in Belarus, but in Russia, as it became one of the stages of Russian preparations for a full-scale invasion of Ukraine [Maciejewski, 2022]. Initially, the Belarusian authorities tried to present the migration crisis as Turkey and Morocco had done before, but neither Rabat nor Ankara brought migrants to their territory on purpose. Most of them found their way to these countries as a result of natural migration processes from neighboring countries. On the other hand, migrants on the Polish-Lithuanian-Latvian-Belarusian border found themselves there as a result of Operation Sluice. On the other hand, the events on the borders of Belarus with Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland looked much worse, as migrants were forced to cross borders in unauthorized places. To some extent, the migration crisis has been halted, but with much worse results than in the case of the "Arctic route" or the "Northern route", as migrants still enter Poland and other EU countries illegally, very often

with traces of beatings. The migration crisis has not changed the position of the EU, the USA, and the rest of the civilized world toward Ukraine. Military support for Ukraine is growing every month, as is the number of countries supporting Ukraine. Unfortunately, the war is still going on. The problem of migration in the northeastern borders of the EU has not been completely solved, but stopped.

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RUSSIAN REVISIONISM AS A CHALLENGE TO THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER

РОСІЙСЬКИЙ РЕВІЗІОНІЗМ ЯК ВИКЛИК МІЖНАРОДНОМУ ПОРЯДКУ

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Abstract. The article is devoted to highlighting geopolitical ambitions of Russian revisionism to build a multipolar world, which should replace the modern liberal international order of the Western model. The focus is on revealing ideological foundations of the foreign policy doctrine of Russian revisionism. The historical and political conditions of formation and the main parameters of modern Russian revisionism – geopolitical, spiritual-moral, historical-mythological – have been clarified and are considered against the background of Russia's historical aspiration for hegemony in Eurasia.

The research is based on content analysis of public speeches and publications of Russian statesmen, ideologists and supporters of the Putin regime, which allows to determine the ideological basis of the revisionist course of the Kremlin, to establish declared and hidden motives of Russian aggression against Ukraine and the liberal international order. It is argued that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is an integral part of the strategy of building a multipolar world order, which involves establishing Russia as a civilizational pole, where the Kremlin projects power within the Russian sphere of influence. It is concluded that Russian revisionism poses an existential threat not only to Ukrainian independence and the countries of the post-Soviet space, but also to democratic institutions and values that define the liberal international order.

Keywords: Russian revisionism. International order. Geopolitics. War in Ukraine. Post-Soviet space. European security.

Анотація. Стаття присвячена висвітленню геополітичних амбіцій російського ревізiонiзму щодо побудови багатополярного свiту, який має витiснити сучасний лiберальний мiжнародний порядок захiдного зразка. В центрі уваги розкриття iдеологiчних основ зовнiшньополiтичної доктрини російського ревізiонiзму. З'ясовано iсторико-полiтичнi умови формування та основнi параметри сучасного російського ревізiонiзму – геополiтичний, духовно-моральний, iсторико-мiфологiчний, якi розглядаються на тлi iсторичного прагнення Росiї до гегемонiї в Євразiї.

Дослiдження спирається на контент-аналiз публiчних виступiв та публiкацiй російських державних дiячiв, iдеологiв та прибiчникiв путiнського режиму, що дозволяє визначити концептуально-iдеологiчну основу ревізiонiстського курсу Кремля, встановити декларованi та прихованi мотиви російської агресiї проти України та лiберального мiжнародного порядку. Стверджується, що російське вторгнення в Україну є складовою частиною стратегiї побудови багатополярного свiтового порядку, що передбачає утвердження за Росiєю статусу цивiлізацiйного полюсу, де Кремль здiйснює проєкцiю сили у межах російської сфери впливу. Робиться висновок, що російський ревізiонiзм становить екзистенцiйну загрозу не тiльки українській незалежності та краiнам пострадянського простору, а й демократичним iнститутам та цiнностям, якi визначають лiберальний мiжнародний порядок.

Ключові слова: Російський ревізіонізм. Міжнародний порядок. Геополітика. Війна в Україні. Пострадянський простір. Європейська безпека.

Research problem setting. Revisionism is a driving factor in Russia's foreign policy course and remains currently a key challenge to European security. In order to substantiate territorial claims and revise Russian borders, the Kremlin resorts to revising socio-political doctrines and events of the past, which are the ideological basis of Russian foreign policy doctrine, which involves a return to the archaic practice of establishing spheres of influence in the world. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine was prepared by a long-term policy of spreading the revisionist narrative, which became a defining component of the disinformation system created in Russia. The Russian autocratic regime aims not only to seize the territory of an independent state, but also to demonstrate power as a decisive factor in international relations and the destruction of the liberal international order. Therefore, revealing the conceptual foundations of Russian revisionism and clarifying its claims to the current world order is an urgent scientific and practical task.

The purpose of research. The purpose of the proposed publication is to define the doctrinal foundations of the geopolitical ambitions of Russian revisionism. The focus is on the disclosure of the main parameters of Russian revisionism – geopolitical, spiritual-moral, historical-mythological, which are considered in the broad context of Russia's historical aspiration for hegemony in Eurasia and efforts to delegitimize the international order.

Analysis of recent research and publications. The study of revisionism in international relations has an established tradition, the origins of which go back to classical realism, and is represented in the international political thought of the first half of the 20th century (E. Carr, H. Morgenthau, R. Niebuhr, etc.). An integral concept of revisionism from the standpoint of non-classical realism is presented in the book by J. Davidson "The origins of revisionist and status-quo states" [Davidson, 2006]. He uses it to characterize states whose goal is to change or put an end to the existing international system of power distribution. Revisionism is considered by J. Davidson as a fundamental source of instability in international affairs. Governments pursuing revisionist policies respond to the demands of powerful domestic groups, such as nationalists and the military, who believe they can defeat "imaginary" rivals [Davidson, 2006]. According to G. Balachandran, revisionist projects and resistance to them are the subject of international relations, integral to the international order and its dynamics [Balachandran, 2022].

The concept of revisionism is widely used in modern studies, especially against the background of the escalation of disputes between the United States and China. However, currently revisionism is less and less associated with territorial expansion and more and more identified with the change of political and legal regimes that ensure international security [DiCicco & Sanchez, 2021]. According to S. Goddard, revisionists are states that seek to partially or completely challenge the institutional order, established rules and norms that determine interaction [Goddard, 2018: 3].

The study of Russian revisionism is attracting more and more attention from scholars after the Russian invasion of Georgia and the forcible seizure of Crimea. To understand the nature of Russian revisionism and its consequences for the world order, the works of R. Allison [Allison, 2017], R. Dzarasov [Dzarasov, 2017], A. Piontkovsky [Piontkovsky, 2015], B. Pisciotta [Pisciotta, 2020] are of great interest. The article by W. R. Mead published in Foreign Affairs in 2014 [Mead, 2014] is decisive in this sense. The author noted the return of geopolitics to international relations and the revenge of revisionist states, such as China, Iran, and Russia, which have not come to terms with the geopolitical order that was formed after the Cold War and are trying to destroy it. Speaking of Russia as a revanchist state", E. Götz and C. Merlen [Götz & Merlen, 2019] draw attention to the broad agreement of analysts and commentators regarding Russia's desire to undermine the rules-based liberal international order.

Many publications by Ukrainian scientists show that Russian aggression against Ukraine is not an isolated case, but a long historical tradition, which is embodied today in the country's official foreign policy doctrine. Among the main works of this direction, monographic publications by M. Doroshko [Doroshko, 2018], E. Magda [Magda, 2017], V. Tkachenko [Tkachenko, 2016] and

others should be mentioned. Collective monographs edited by M. Rozumnyi [*Rezhym Putina, 2018*] and V. Gorbulin [*Svitova hibrydna viina, 2017*] and others.

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine caused a surge in publications devoted to Russian aggression. In the research by Y. Charalambides, Russian revisionism is considered from the standpoint of the geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the West in Eurasia [*Charalambides, 2022*]. I. Kotoulas and W. Pusztaï [*Kotoulas&Pusztaï, 2022*] focused on the interests and strategic goals of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The historical revisionism of the Kremlin, the reflection of Putin's version of history, which is used as an attempt to justify territorial claims, also appear in the field of view of many publicists and scientists.

Russian revisionism has a multidimensional nature and is in the ascendant stage, and the scientific reflections of the authors are mostly focused on the assessment of current processes, which often limits the research discourse of this problem to averaged conclusions about the Kremlin's desire to revive the Soviet Union or create its modern version. Undoubtedly, Russian aggression against Ukraine is, in some sense, an attempt to overcome the post-Soviet inferiority complex, to assert itself at the expense of absorbing another country. But Russian revisionist concepts cross the borders of Ukraine and the former USSR, actualizing a number of imperial nationalist doctrines and ideologies historically characteristic of the Kremlin, the evaluation of which requires additional study to understand its aspirations for hegemony in Eurasia in a macro-historical perspective.

Main research results. The modern liberal international order began to take shape after the Second World War. It is based on rules and regulations that combine the spread of democracy and the protection of human rights, international interaction through multilateral institutions, free trade and increased mobility of goods, capital, people and services. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar system, the liberal model spread to the post-communist world, which ensured the universalization of international cooperation. As J. Ikenberry aptly notes, the Cold War ended not with a military victory, but with the political and ideological triumph of Western democracy and the collapse of communism [*Ikenberry, 2020*]. The countries of the former "socialist camp" experienced a "democratic transit" from authoritarianism to democracy and market economy. The end of the period of bloc confrontation and the spread of liberal-democratic values became the basis for the conclusions about the "end of history" predicted by F. Fukuyama. Bearing in mind the end of the period of political-ideological confrontation and the creation of a global liberal-democratic civilization as "the end point of the ideological evolution of mankind" and "the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government" [*Fukuyama, 1989: 17*]. The post-bipolar world embodied the ideas of liberal internationalism under the undisputed global leadership of the United States, which acted as the guarantor of this world order.

Russia, like other post-socialist countries, has also taken advantage of the opportunities of economic liberalism, the economy and geopolitical influence of Moscow have grown rapidly since the 2000s. But it was no longer either a world superpower or an empire. The loss of such a status fostered not only nostalgia for great power, but also revisionist aspirations and hidden imperial ambitions, which made Russia an outspoken opponent of the liberal "end of history." Against this background, Russian and Chinese power circles actively promoted one of the key ideas of realist thinking about the multipolarity of the international order. In Russia, it was associated with the name of the Minister of Foreign Affairs – Yevgeny Primakov [*Primakov, 1996*]. However, if in the realist discourse multipolarity appeared as a constellation of self-sufficient centers of power and, in general, a rather pessimistic concept that threatened to spark conflicts, the Russian political community promoted it as a "fair" distribution of power between different poles of attraction. In any case, from the mid-1990s, this very concept will become one of the defining components of the Kremlin's foreign policy doctrine and the embodiment of a poorly veiled claim to a large-scale redistribution of power and influence. A vivid example in this sense is the ambitious Russian-Chinese declaration signed in 1997 by Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin on "multipolar world and the establishment of a New International Order" [*United Nations*].

The study by M. Doroshko shows that the "new" Russia, having declared itself the successor of the USSR, almost immediately resorted to the revival of the traditions of the imperial past, which is embodied in the Kremlin's foreign policy course in the post-Soviet space. Thus, as early as 1991, Andrei Kozyrev, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced the former republics of the USSR as the main sphere of Russia's foreign policy interests [Doroshko, 2018: 80]. Very soon it will receive regulatory approval. In the "Strategic course" of Russia in relation to the CIS countries approved in 1995, the post-Soviet countries will be declared the sphere of "main vital interests" of Moscow, and the strengthening of Russia as the "leading power" of the post-Union space is recognized as one of the priority tasks [Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, 1995]. As for Ukraine, attempts to return Ukraine and, in particular, Crimea to the orbit of Russian influence also emerged since Ukraine gained independence. During the 1990s, Russian politicians openly campaigned for the "return" of Crimea, Moscow resorted to "gas wars", and encouraged participation in various integration entities. Later, this aspiration became the existential guideline of the Kremlin's foreign policy. It was not by chance that Z. Brzezinski noted in "The Grand Chessboard" that independence of Ukraine was "the greatest loss for Russia", which "challenged the very essence of Russia's claims that it is the divinely chosen flag-bearer of Pan-Slavic unity", because without Ukraine "Russia cannot be a truly great and self-confident imperialist state" [Brzezinski, 1997: 87]. Therefore, plans for the "reintegration" of Ukraine remained a "dogma of faith" for many representatives of the Russian political elite in the 1990s.

"Frozen" conflicts and imposition of integration projects have become important tools for achieving the Kremlin's geopolitical goals in the post-Soviet space.

Having no significant success in the implementation of economic initiatives, Russia deliberately ignited and "froze" separatist conflicts in post-Soviet countries, waged "hybrid" wars, created puppet regimes and zones of influence. Examples of such policies include: Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Crimea, the so-called "people's republics" in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In 2014, Russian troops occupied Crimea and started a war in eastern Ukraine under the guise of separatists. At the beginning of 2022, under the guise of the CSTO, Russia sent its troops to suppress mass protests in Kazakhstan. In addition, the Russian army fully controls the territory of Belarus, which has been used to carry out attacks on Ukraine since February 2022. Today, most analysts agree that after suffering a catastrophic defeat and failing the plan to seize the Ukrainian capital in March 2022, the Kremlin again seeks to "freeze" the conflict, engaging Ukraine in long negotiations, which will allow to buy time for a further offensive.

Integration projects led by the Kremlin have become another important direction for restoring geopolitical influence in the post-Soviet space. They were aimed at making the European integration aspirations of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, etc. impossible and thus impose a strategy of "limited sovereignty". Moscow-initiated multilateral associations and integration structures (CIS, Eurasian Economic Community, Customs Union, Eurasian Economic Union, etc.) caused particular opposition in Ukraine. Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity (2013-2014) became the clearest embodiment of such sentiments. Millions of people in Ukraine strongly opposed the attempt of the then pro-Russian leadership of Ukraine to deviate from the European integration course and refuse to sign the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU. Realizing that the government's proposed alternative of joining the Customs Union with Russia would ultimately lead to a loss of sovereignty.

The end of the "Yeltsin era" in Russia marked the end of democratic experiments and the transition to state propaganda to discredit liberal values. With the appearance of a new leader in the Kremlin, V. Putin, a representative of the special services, Russian political elite was formed mostly from representatives of the power bloc, and the revisionist character of Russia's foreign policy acquired established features [Balachandran, 2022]. The vision of the future state presented by Putin was based on four "pillars" imbued with the apotheosis of the "great power": patriotism, statehood, statesmanship, and social solidarity. It is significant that statehood was explained as "great power", which is an "integral" characteristic of Russia's existence, and determines the mentality of Russians and government policy throughout history [Putin, 1999].

In Russia, an autocratic system of power is rapidly being formed, which is strengthened due to the rapid increase in energy prices, the formation of a clan-oligarchic system, and the establishment of state control over the media. Russian capital controlled by Moscow actively infiltrated the post-Soviet space, European countries and other regions of the world, forming various forms of energy and economic dependence and supporting right- and left-wing populist movements [*Svitova hibrydna viina, 2017: 126*].

With the formation of an autocratic regime in Russia, scientists increasingly began to notice the features of fascist societies in Russian society. In the book "Putinism: The slow rise of a radical right regime in Russia" (2013), which was published even before the occupation of Crimea, the famous Dutch political scientist Van Herpen draws attention to the "ultranationalist" nature of the Russian state ideology. The entire work is permeated with a large number of parallels between "Putinism" and fascism, between Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia, because both at one time experienced the post-imperial syndrome of loss of territories, hyperinflation and institutional chaos, which multiplied the disappointment from the loss of empires [*Van Herpen, 2013*].

As carbon exports and financial inflows to the "petrodollar" budget grew, the Kremlin began to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy, spreading openly revisionist discourse and resorting to hybrid warfare practices. As is known, since 2005, Putin has publicly and repeatedly stated that the collapse of the Soviet Union was "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century." In 2007, the head of the Kremlin in the well-known "Munich speech" harshly criticized unipolarity as "the world of one master" and "one sovereign" [*President of Russia, 2007*], thereby declaring to the West about his geopolitical claims on spheres of influence in Europe. In the Munich speech, there was also a decisive criticism of the expansion of NATO to the East and its approach to Russia's borders. Although by that time, almost all the countries of post-communist Eastern Europe, as well as the Baltic countries, which were part of the USSR, had joined NATO. Despite the fact that the expansion of NATO was accompanied by its demilitarization and was dictated by the defense initiatives of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which sought to protect themselves from a possible renewal of Russia's imperial aggression, as happened to Georgia in 2008.

After the "Munich speech", blaming the West for the expansion of NATO became the leitmotif of Russian foreign policy. The culmination of this policy was the presentation of almost ultimatum proposals to the USA and NATO on written security guarantees by Moscow in December 2021. They included demands to remove NATO infrastructure from Eastern Europe to the borders of 1997, exclude the possibility of Ukraine joining the Alliance, not to conduct military exercises in the post-socialist countries of Europe without the prior consent of Russia. It should be reminded that the "proposals", unprecedented in form and content, were made public against the background of the gathering of 100,000 troops at the border with Ukraine, which directly threatened European security. They were initiated against the background of Russia's prolonged hybrid war with Ukraine and the West, which made them impossible.

Russian demands, especially regarding the non-aligned status of Ukraine, are often used for propaganda purposes, claiming that the expansion of NATO allegedly provoked Russian aggression. However, the very idea of a Western-oriented but militarily neutral Ukraine has not withstood the test of history. It should be reminded that the military invasion of Ukraine in 2014 was not provoked by joining NATO (at that time Ukraine had a non-aligned status), but by Kyiv's rejection of the economic union with Moscow and an attempt to sign the Association Agreement with the EU. This decision was dictated by a stubborn reluctance to recognize the sovereignty of Ukraine and the geopolitical realities that developed after 1991. It was determined by distorted historical ideas that equate medieval Kyivan Rus with the modern Russian state. Putin explained the annexation of Crimea by "restoring historical justice." The first thing he drew attention to, speaking on this matter before the State Duma, was his pride in the shared history with Crimea, where the ancient Chersonesus was located and Prince Volodymyr of Kyiv was baptized [*President of Russia, 2014*].

After the seizure of Crimea and the intervention in Eastern Ukraine, Russia began to be perceived as a non-institutional and non-systemic actor in the system of international relations. The

White House made this quite clear when the 2015 National Military Strategy included Russia, along with Iran, China, and North Korea, on the list of "revisionist states." In the national security strategy of the United States in 2017, China and Russia were also defined as "revisionist states" that seek to form a world opposed to the values and interests of the United States, to project their influence in the world and, in particular, in all parts of Europe and Central Asia [*White House, 2017*].

Seeking to "soften" sanctions and find allies in the confrontation with the West, the Kremlin made a foreign policy adjustment, known as the "Pivot to Asia", ideological foundation of which became the concept of neo-Eurasianism, and the real basis was the "connection" or coordination of the ways of cooperation within the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road "Economic Belt" with the prospect of building the "Greater Eurasian Partnership" around the interaction between China, Russia, India, Kazakhstan, Iran and other countries, on which agreements were reached in 2015. Thus evolved a convergence of the two autocratic regimes of the largest countries of Eurasia, united by a common revisionist goal – the establishment of a multipolar (post-Western) world order, which guarantees the consolidation of spheres of influence and the preservation of their own authoritarian regimes. For Russia, this meant establishing a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space and in the countries of Eastern Europe, for China – the satisfaction of territorial claims in the South China Sea, established by the "nine-dash line" (since 1947 it has defined China's "historic rights" to marine areas). In 2019, Beijing and Moscow upgraded relations to the highest level of partnership in China's diplomatic relations hierarchy, underscoring the growing identity of the worldviews and interests of the two regimes. During his visit to Moscow in June 2019, Xi Jinping called the Russian leader his "best friend" [*China's Xi praises 'best friend' Putin during Russia visit, 2019*] against the background of a fierce trade confrontation with the United States.

Russian-Chinese strategic rapprochement has become a kind of "anti-democratic alliance" and a real challenge for international security. During 2021, Russia and China simultaneously intensified their separate military activities and threats to the sovereignty of Ukraine and Taiwan. The Winter Olympic Games in Beijing in February 2022, boycotted by the West, became a symbol of the unity of authoritarian revisionist regimes, where Xi Jinping and V. Putin declared "friendship without borders", which became a harbinger of the war in Ukraine. Beijing and Moscow issued a statement where they set out their agreed position on the rejection of the foreign policy of the US and Western countries, which seem to use the protection of democracy and human rights as a means of pressure on other countries. They noted the "transformation of the architecture of global governance and world order" and called on NATO to respect the sovereignty and security of other countries, to stop "expansion" in Eastern Europe, and condemned the formation of security blocs in the Asia-Pacific region [*Roth&Ni, 2022*].

The Russian invasion of Ukraine strengthened transatlantic ties and united the world's democracies in opposing the aggressor. It is no coincidence that the confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism became the key theme of the US National Security Strategy, released in October 2022. The strategy notes that the United States and the world are entering a "decisive decade" (mentioned several times) that will determine the terms of geopolitical confrontation. Since China, Russia and other authoritarian regimes are trying to change the international order itself. The biggest strategic problem, the Strategy notes, comes from states that "combine authoritarian rule with revisionist foreign policy" [*White House, 2022: 8*]. The strategy singles out China and Russia as distinct but different challenges facing different tasks. If Russia is defined as an "imminent threat to the free and open international system" that defies all norms of the international order today, China is a challenge to the global order. The PRC, according to the White House, is the "only competitor" that aims to "change the existing international order" [*White House, 2022: 8*].

At first glance, defining China as a major national security problem seems incompatible with the reality that Russia is waging a "hot" war and threatening the entire world with nuclear weapons. But it is about a "deeper danger" coming from Russia, which, violating the fundamental principles of the UN Charter, ceases to be a constructive and normative element of the system of international relations. It acts as an "immediate and constant threat" to international peace and stability, regional

security order in Europe, which lacks the full range of capabilities of the PRC. The strategy states that over the past decade, the Russian government has decided to pursue an "imperialist" foreign policy with the aim of "overthrowing key elements of the international order" [White House, 2022: 25].

Among the key parameters of Russia's neo-imperial revisionism, one can single out geopolitical, spiritual and value, and even historical-mythological foundations, which are closely intertwined. Let's reveal them in more detail.

Geopolitical revisionism. In a geopolitical sense, Russian revisionism is aimed at revenge for the defeat of the West in the Cold War and related attempts to destabilize the liberal project of the EU and the USA. It envisages the establishment of a "multipolar world" with great power spheres of Moscow's influence in Eurasia. The "core" of this influence, the "zone of privileged interests" of Russia is informally declared to be the post-Soviet space, where Moscow considers the unilateral use of military force possible. To substantiate these geopolitical ambitions, the Kremlin needed new doctrines of socio-political development, since the communist ideology proved ineffective, and liberalism did not correspond to the traditions of Russian authoritarianism. From the mid-1990s, the idea resulted in a little-known theory of Eurasianism (N. Trubetzkoy, P. Savitsky, P. Suvchinsky, etc.), which was developed in the white emigrant environment traumatized by the collapse of the Russian Empire in the 1920s and was based on earlier Slavophile ideas.

The basis of Eurasianism is criticism of Western colonialism, the Eurocentric world, soulless European culture, Europeanization, which is "an absolute evil" for any non-Romano-Germanic people. The key concept of the theory is the concept of "Eurasia" – a large space covering the East European, West Siberian and Turkestan plains on the border of Europe and Asia. The main territory within this space belongs to Russia [Trubetzkoy, 2007:15].

Eurasianists believe that Russia-Eurasia is not just a geopolitical construct, but a certain historical and cultural community, formed by Turkic, Slavic, Mongolian and other Asian peoples forming a special type of "Russian civilization" for which European ideas are alien and unnatural. It was claimed that in "Russian civilization" not only Byzantine, but also "steppe" cultures are organically combined. It was believed that the "heritage of the Horde", which played a huge role in the formation of Russian identity, acquires a unique geopolitical significance. According to N. Trubetzkoy, the real historical and not fictional Slavic Russia is "Russian-Turanian Russia-Eurasia", "heir to the great legacy of Genghis Khan" [Trubetzkoy, 2007:236]. Eurasians believe that the influence of the Mongol Empire was also reflected in the authoritarian traditions of the organization of power in Russia. In particular, I. Ilyin, the Eurasian-oriented philosopher most quoted by Putin, repeatedly warned about the fatality of democratic temptations after the fall of communism and the need for a "national-patriotic dictatorship," a "national leader," or even a "national dictator" [Ilyin, 2008: 129].

Thoughts of a special type of elites can also be found in L. Gumilev, another "guru" of modern Russian Eurasianism. Since the 1980s, his passionary theory of ethnogenesis has gained considerable popularity. He believed that different ethnic groups under the influence of "energetic impulses" and special "passionary" leaders can develop to the level of "super-ethnos". These super-ethnicities, among which L. Gumilev singled out the Russian one, constitute a community covering the scale of many states, united by ideology, a sense of complementarity and opposition to other super-ethnicities. At the same time, Gumilev imagined the Western super-ethnic group as an "existential threat" to Russia.

The Russian president also echoed the pseudo-scientific passionary theory, which explains the processes of ethnogenesis by the influence of energy impulses from space. Putin, like Gumilev, repeatedly claimed the "identity" of "Russian civilization", which should follow the "special path" and have a "special democracy" [Putin o demokratii, 2019]. In 2017, he noted that there is a certain "internal nuclear reactor" inside the Russian people, a Russian person. This, they say, is passionarity that "pushes our country forward" [Putin rasskazal, 2017]. Talking to the editors of Russian newspapers in 2021, Putin frankly admitted that he believes in passionarity, in the passionary theory, according to which Russia is "on the march of development", "on the rise", and the Russian

people have an "infinite genetic code" [*Putin zayavil o beskonechnom geneticheskom kode Rossii, 2021*].

In this context, it is important that Eurasianism is an idealized image of the future empire, which should be formed through the gradual transformation of the Soviet Union into a Eurasian one, but with the rejection of communism and the establishment of an Orthodox Eurasian ideocracy as a defined system of views. Eurasianism is understood by I. Ilyin as a "supranational organic attitude" that combines "positive orthodoxy, extreme social radicalism, rootedness in the rational past and supranational perspectives for the future" [*Ilyin, 2008: 89*]. This Orthodox-fundamentalist attitude serves as the ideological basis of Eurasianism and brings it into civilizational conflict with Western Christianity and Western civilization as a world that has "fallen into heresy." Against this background, it goes without saying that the leading Eurasians do not see the future of Russia without Ukraine. N. Trubetzkoy in his article "To the Ukrainian Problem" in 1927 argued that Ukrainian culture is an "individualization of all-Russian culture" and that Ukrainians and Belarusians should unite with Russians around the organizational principle of their common Orthodox faith [*Trubetzkoy, 2007*]. It is significant that even in contemporary history of independent Ukraine, Kyiv's refusal to join Moscow's Eurasian integration projects in favor of European integration was perceived not just as betrayal, but also as an element of civilizational confrontation, in which Ukraine is an outpost of Western liberalism. And the military defeats of the Russian army in Ukraine forced the Kremlin to once again change the image of the enemy, declaring that in Ukraine Moscow is not at war with Kyiv, but with NATO. In February 2023, the Russian president directly threatened to "fight back against the "aggression of the collective West" [*Putin uses Stalingrad, 2023*].

Undoubtedly, the ideas of Eurasianism had a direct impact not only on the Kremlin elites and Putin personally, obsessed with the idea of reviving imperial grandeur, but also on the intellectual environment and creation of a corresponding narrative in Russia. Eurasian geopolitics, Russian Orthodoxy, traditional values, anti-Westernism have become the main ideological constructs that determined the revisionist nature of the foreign policy doctrine of Putin's Russia. The works of Eurasians and neo-Eurasians (A. Dugin, B. Yerasov, A. Prokhanov) are replicated and distributed among pro-ruling parties and state officials.

Eurasian ideological paradigm is embodied in the Kremlin's integration projects in the post-Soviet space. V. Putin's pre-election article about a new integration project for Eurasia, published in 2011, is particularly interesting in this sense. The article proclaimed an ambitious goal of building the Eurasian economic space as a "powerful supranational association capable of becoming one of the poles of the modern world" [*Putin, 2011*]. In the Valdai speech of 2013, Putin takes Eurasian ideas to the absolute, proposing the creation of the Eurasian Union. The latter, according to him, is a project of "preserving the identity of nations in the historical space in the new century and in the new world", and the Eurasian integration itself is: "a chance for the post-Soviet space to become an independent center of global development", and not remain "at the margins" of Europe and Asia. Following the Eurasian doctrine, he declares that Eurasia is the main geopolitical zone where the "genetic code" of Russia and its numerous peoples will be protected from "extreme Western-style liberalism" [*Vladimir Putin Meets with Members of the Valdai International Discussion Club, 2013*]. The article ends with another chauvinistic quote by the religious-conservative thinker K. Leontiev about the development of Russia as a "state-civilization", united by the Russian people, the Russian language, Russian culture, and the Russian Orthodox Church.

Understanding of Russia as a separate civilization within the neo-Eurasian ideology is gaining more and more supporters and is important for understanding the Russian concept of multipolarity. Messages about the formation of a "multipolar world" are heard in almost every speech of the Kremlin dictator. In this context, it is worth paying attention to the works of A. Dugin, the anti-liberal "philosopher" of neo-fascist direction, who is often called "the main ideologist of the Kremlin". A. Dugin is widely known for his anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western rhetoric, and his main political activity is aimed at creating a Eurasian superpower led by Russia. He is the author of many

books translated into different languages and is associated with European right-wing populist movements.

In his books, A. Dugin puts forward the idea of the "fourth political theory" (2009) as an alternative political ideology, since the previous three (fascism, communism and liberalism) were a product of the Western world and proved ineffective. The "fourth" theory rejects unipolar world and the Western liberal values associated with it such as democracy, human rights, individualism. The "multi-polar world" proposed by Dugin exists in opposition to neoliberalism and the basic principles of the classical Westphalian system, as it does not recognize the full-fledged "pole" status of formally sovereign national states. Dugin's "multipolarity" asserts fundamental inequality and denies the equality of national states, instead taking into account the real balance of forces and potentials. Dugin considers the main "poles" of such a multipolar world system to be "civilizations", understood as "poles of power and centers of local hegemony". Russia as "the future Eurasian empire" is recognized as one of these poles. Pushing the world into the Huntington paradigm of the "clash of civilizations", Dugin notes that it is Russia that can engage in "the last and decisive battle with the American empire of lies, oppression, moral decay and inequality" [Dugin, 2013].

Eurasian foundations of modern Russian foreign policy doctrine consistently promote the idea of Russia to create of a new geopolitical pole, imposing the image of a unique "civilization state", an "empire" built on civilizational features, which restrained the expansion of the West for centuries. In this sense, the so-called "special military operation" announced by the Kremlin means, as the Russian president stated, "the beginning of the transition from liberal-globalist American egocentrism to a truly multipolar world" [Cole, 2022]. The geopolitical utopia thus formed by the Eurasians became the regulation for Russia's practical policy of establishing control over a much larger part of the world.

Spiritual and moral foundations of Russian revisionism. If Eurasianism captures mostly geopolitical dimensions of Russian revisionism, its moral foundations, which determine the choice of goals and means, the legitimate sphere of the Kremlin's foreign policy actions, are formed by the concept of the so-called "Russian world." It arose as another response to the search for Russian identity after the collapse of the Soviet Union and was presented as the concept of "soft power" of Russia. The "Russian world" promotes the "unification" of a transnational community of people [Shedrovickij, 1999], who are connected to Russia in a cultural and spiritual sense by Orthodoxy, the Russian language and culture, common social views and traditional values, which seem to form "Russian civilization". From the moment of its emergence, the concept of the "Russian world" was based on outdated imperial conservative doctrines, spreading great power and anti-Western ideas, so it quickly slipped into the ideology of Orthodox fundamentalism.

In fact, the concept of "Russian peace" became a cover version of the medieval mythologeme "Moscow, the Third Rome" (15th century) and the conservative doctrine of nationality, which was formed in the 1930s of the 19th century. The emergence of the idea of Moscow as the "third Rome" is connected with the fall of Constantinople in 1453 and geopolitical changes in the position of Moscow, which assumed the messianic idea of the guardian and defender of world Orthodoxy, which was shaken in Tsargorod. The doctrine of "official nationality" promoted the triad of "Orthodoxy", "autocracy" and "nationality" as indispensable conditions for the existence of Russia.

The concept of the "Russian world" actively reproduces nationalist-conservative ideas of "official nationality", proclaiming the protection of Orthodoxy, the Russian language and Slavic unity as the value basis of Russian expansionism. The support of the imperial nationalist concept of the Russian "triune nation" (Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians), which denies the separateness of Ukrainians and Belarusians and was not used even in Soviet times, is indicative in this sense. The discourse on the "triune nation" and "triune Rus" is one of the defining ones for the "Russian world". Corresponding statements can be found in the speeches of Putin and Patriarch Kirill [Putyn schytaet Rossyiu, Ukraynu y Belorussian tryedynym narodom, 2022]. The patriarch repeatedly spread ideological stamps about the "unified historical space of Holy Rus", repeating one of his favorite slogans everywhere: "Ukraine, Russia, Belarus - together we are Holy Rus", even, no matter how cynical it sounds, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine [Patriarshee slovo, 2022]. This

fundamentalist ideology promoting "land reunification" was used to justify the occupation of Crimea and justify Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. Long before the invasion, Putin called Ukrainians and Russians "one nation." Speaking about the causes of the war in December 2022, he openly stated that the goal of the war in Ukraine is to "unite the Russian people" [*Putin says West wants to 'tear apart' Russia*].

The concept of "Russian peace" contributed to society's immersion in great-power messianism. The stubborn refusal to recognize the national identity of the Ukrainian people is based precisely on the sickly great-power attitude about the "state-building mission of the Russian people", which should "consolidate" Russian civilization with language, culture, and worldwide sensitivity [*Putin, 2012*]. The Russian president imagines himself as the defender of the boundless "Russian world", which crosses the borders of the nation state, which, in his opinion, "do not end anywhere" [*Sharkov, 2023*]. The messianic idea of "protecting" Russians is used to justify military interventions. War criminal Putin's speech from September 30, 2022, in which the annexation of four partially occupied Ukrainian regions was called "the accomplishment of a great liberation mission" [*Full text of Putin's speech at annexation ceremony, 2022*], is indicative in this sense. According to Putin, the West cannot be reassured that there is a new "Great Country" Russia in the world. Instead, according to him, Russia is fighting for its culture and language.

Within the framework of the "Russian world" ideology, Russia declares itself the legal successor of Kyivan Rus, the Russian Empire, the USSR, calls for Slavic unity, claiming the relevant spheres of influence. Moscow Patriarch Kirill, being one of the developers of this concept, claimed that Ukraine and Belarus, as countries linked to Russia by a common past, are the "core of the Russian world", the "backbone of historical Rus", which forms the spiritual ideal of "Holy Rus" [*Vystuplenie Svyatejshego Patriarha Kirilla, 2009*]. At the same time, spiritual ideals of the Patriarch did not prevent him from blessing the Russian army to kill the Ukrainian people, urging "to be ready to repel the enemy on the borders of our Motherland" [*V Den zashitnika Otechestva, 2022*].

The "Russian world" actively promotes the archaic Slavophile ideologeme about the hostility of the Catholic West to the "unique" Russian "civilization state" with a special "cultural code" and "historical experience" based on Russian cultural dominance [*Putin, 2012*]. In one of the speeches dedicated to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Putin expresses fierce criticism of Western colonialism, despotism and apartheid, accusing of trying to create a neo-colonial unipolar world order, overthrowing faith and traditional values, suppressing freedom. The West, Putin emphasizes, keeps looking for a new chance to "hit", "weaken", "destroy", "split" Russia, dooming it to poverty and extinction [*Full text of Putin's speech at annexation ceremony, 2022*]. Another mystical quote from the works of I. Ilyin, the admirer of fascism and monarchy, about faith in spiritual forces and the historical destiny of the Russian people was the symptomatic end of the speech.

Criticism of Western liberal ideology contained in the national-conservative concept of the "Russian world" extends to social values and norms. It involves the fight against Western immorality and decay. Instead, the Russian people are seen as carriers of traditional spiritual and moral values. They do not accept Western individualism, egoism, liberal values. But the unspiritual Western civilization seem to be traditionally trying to break their "cultural code". Back in 2009, conservatism was announced as the official ideology of the Russian pro-government United Russia party. Thus, Russia and its President Putin are not just defenders of the Russian-speaking and Orthodox, but a global defender of traditional and family values against liberal ideas and LGBT communities, inclusive. The spread of conservative discourse about the spiritual unity of the Russian people and the moral values that unite them is becoming an important factor in Russian politics, which is enshrined in official government documents.

Historical revisionism. Geopolitical, spiritual and moral parameters of Russian revisionism are already based on reanimated imperial and Soviet "historical" concepts and schemes. In this case, it is proposed to pay attention to the fact that historical myth-making, as well as the spread of certain historical metanarratives, has acquired a centralized character in Russia and is used for the needs of the disinformation system and the justification of revisionist claims. As is known, S.

Naryshkin, the head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, personally heads the Russian Historical Society. This institution, founded in 1866, continues imperial traditions and deals with the formation of historical policy and the promotion of commemorative practices, instrumentalizing the past for the needs of the political regime. The society, for example, has a commission on higher historical education, it develops standards for school textbooks on history, and there is a program on historical education for teachers and students from the separatist entities of "DPR" and "LPR". The Russian president himself holds meetings with historians and has repeatedly made pseudo-historical publications, including the infamous article "On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians" [Putin, 2021].

Already during the war, Russia approved a single "official" expanded concept of teaching history in higher education institutions. It should "put an end to diversity" in approaches and concepts of understanding the past. According to the Concept, large-scale protests in Belarus (2020-2021) and Kazakhstan (2020) are called "color revolutions", the revolution in Ukraine in 2014 is called an "anti-constitutional coup", the annexation of Crimea is marked as "the reunification of Crimea and Sevastopol with Russia", and the conduct of the so-called "special operation" was called "inevitable" due to the transformation of Ukraine into "anti-Russia" [*U kurs istoriyi rosijskih vishiv vklyuchili vtorgnennya RF v Ukrayinu*, 2023]. Let's consider this statement in more detail, since recently it has been actively used by Russian propaganda to justify the invasion of the territory of Ukraine. So, what is "anti-Russia"?

Analysis of President Putin's discursive practices shows that Ukraine as "anti-Russia" acts as a simulacrum of the hated collective West. This is a "territory from which dangers come" for Russia [Putin, 2021], an "anti-Russian enclave" created by the West [Putin calls Ukraine an "anti-Russian enclave", 2022], the idea of forming which is based on the outdated doctrines of Polish-Austrian ideologues regarding the construction of "anti-Moscow Russia". And Ukraine's "true sovereignty" is possible "only in partnership" with Russia [Putin, 2021].

Historical revisionism of the head of the Kremlin is also based on repeated arbitrary interpretations of Ukrainian history, which deny the existence of Ukrainians as a separate nation in a long historical period. In particular, he stated that Ukraine is a "product of the Soviet era", completely and entirely created by "Bolshevik, communist Russia" and V. Lenin personally. It was created to a large extent on the lands of "historical Russia", due to the annexation of "historical" Russian territories [Putin, 2021]. At the same time, Putin deliberately omitted that it was Lenin who destroyed the independent Ukrainian state that existed in 1917-1921, launched the "Red Terror" in the territories occupied by the Bolsheviks, and deprived the Ukrainian SSR of formal independence by integrating it into the USSR.

President Putin's articles and speeches regarding the occupation of part of the Ukrainian lands state manifestations of political will aimed at restoring "historical justice", "protection of Russian-speaking communities", which are called "a divided nation". The very ideological construction of a "divided nation" is strongly reminiscent of the rhetoric of interwar Germany, where the idea of "reuniting all Germans" scattered on the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire fostered Hitler's expansionism. As is known, Putin's propagandists have repeatedly called Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Ukraine "artificial" or "failed" states, emphasizing their right to "protect" Russian speakers.

The Kremlin deliberately instrumentalizes historical past, presenting Russia as a "great power" and a center of civilization that claims spheres of influence. A special role in this sense is given to the historical metanarrative about "Victory Day", which promotes the view of Russia as the successor state of the USSR, which defeated Nazi Germany in the Second World War and "liberated" Eastern Europe from fascist invaders. The Russian policy of commemorating the victory is determined, in particular, by the fact that the USSR, as part of the "Big Three", became one of the "architects" of the postwar world order in 1945, and Yalta is a symbol of recognition of Moscow's international influence. As a result, communist regimes were established in half of the European countries. Therefore, the desire of the political leadership of Russia to monopolize the status of the winner is completely consistent with the current foreign policy course to revive the "spirit of Yalta"

and "negotiate" a new configuration of forces in a multipolar world. Thus, in his next historical survey on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, President Putin put forward the ideas of a new Yalta conference. The "Forces of Victory", he noted, should approach "the creation of a new world order" with "maximum seriousness" in order not to "repeat the mistakes of the past". According to Putin, these forces were to be the "Big Five": the United States, France, Great Britain, Russia, and China [Putin, 2020].

It should be noted that Russian memory of the Second World War does not agree with the corresponding memory in European countries, especially in Poland and the Baltic states, which were occupied by the USSR before the beginning of the Second World War. It also contradicts historical memory of most European countries, whose "liberation" culminated in the establishment of authoritarian pro-Soviet regimes. Moscow's non-acceptance is also caused by the recognition of historical responsibility of the USSR for the beginning of the Second World War, since in 1939 the Soviet Union acted as a de facto ally of Nazi Germany, which together attacked Poland. Instead, a clear conclusion on this matter is offered by the resolution of the European Parliament adopted in 2019, which unequivocally condemns the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and assigns equal responsibility to Germany and the USSR for the start of the Second World War [European Parliament, 2109]. According to I. Boginska, this not only devalues the USSR's contribution to the victory over Germany, but also discredits modern Russia, including its myth about the "Great Victory" [Boginska, 2021].

Glorification of victory has become the main "fastener" of the Putin regime, the basis of the state myth that justifies past and present crimes, war and repression. It manifests itself in annual militaristic parades, exaltation of patriotism, glorification of Stalin, preservation and cultivation of the "image of the enemy". It is not surprising that the ribbon of Saint George became a symbol of the occupation of Crimea in 2014, the so-called "militia" in Donbas and the new stage of the war against Ukraine from February 24, 2022. Archaic ideological concepts of the Second World War have been used to justify full-scale Russian aggression and included the "denazification" of Ukraine, its "liberation" from the "Nazis", "Banderites", "neo-Nazis".

Conclusions. Russian revisionism is based on the geopolitical ambitions of V. Putin's political regime to build a multipolar international order. It envisages the establishment of Russia as a "Great Power" and a civilizational pole that projects power within the Russian sphere of influence. First of all, this applies to the post-Soviet space, where Moscow seeks to assume the role of a security regulator and imposes the concept of "limited sovereignty" for satellite countries. Turning to a forceful, anti-system strategy, Russian revisionism currently poses the greatest threat to the open international system compared to the revisionist projects of China and Iran. The Kremlin's revisionist policy aims to impose a new security architecture in Europe, limit the influence of NATO, and undermine trust in democratic institutions of the EU. Moscow sees the fulfillment of the ultimate requirement of recognition of security guarantees on the basis of an international agreement, which would fix the principle of spheres of influence, as an indicator of achieving such a state. Within this geopolitical logic, a full-scale unprovoked war against Ukraine aims to destroy the existing international status quo in Europe and actually demonstrate Russia's assertion of the principle of spheres of influence.

To ideologically justify the foreign policy doctrine of Russian revisionism, the Kremlin uses a bizarre combination of geopolitical concepts and ideologemes of different eras of Russian statehood – the Muscovite Empire, the Russian Empire, and the Soviet Union. The most important of them were: the medieval concept of "Moscow, Third Rome", the doctrine of official nationality, Slavophile ideology, right-wing radical monarchical ideas, geopolitical concept of Eurasianism, Orthodox fundamentalism. To justify territorial claims, Russian leadership actively uses various ideologemes such as "Russian civilization", "special way", "triune nationality", "Greater Eurasia", "Holy Rus", "historical Russia", "anti-Russia", "Victory Day", "Nazis", "Banderites", "one nation", etc. The ideology of the "Russian world" became the most expressive embodiment of these views. It professes to defend "Holy Rus" and traditional values, spreading anti-liberalism and criticism of the Western world instead. This explains the need to introduce "educated authoritarianism" in Russia,

militarization of society, restriction of human rights and freedoms as elements of an ideal political system that allows protecting "true" Christian values and "true" Russian sovereignty. The war of aggression launched by Russia is directly based on the national-conservative ideology of "Russian peace".

Russian revisionism poses an existential threat not only to the sovereignty of Ukraine, European institutions and values, and is not limited to Moscow's desire for regional hegemony in the post-Soviet space. Given the challenges to global food and energy security, the threat of using nuclear weapons, and most importantly, the ideological conflict, the Russian-Ukrainian war is taking on a global character. It is primarily about the global confrontation between liberal and autocratic views on the future of the world system, where revisionist power politics claims its own understanding of democracy, sovereignty and international law. This policy rejects universal human rights and asserts a utopian Orwellian picture of the spatial fragmentation of the world represented by the borders of several superpowers.

The utopian vision of the future world order is conditioned not only by the sickly attitudes of Russian political elites, but also by the global erosion of democracy and the liberal world order, which has been comprehensively attacked by authoritarian regimes and Russian propaganda as unsuitable for solving modern challenges. Against this background, the consolidation of Western democracies in support of Ukraine's sovereignty has become an unexpected turn for the Kremlin. The Russian invasion gave new strength and meaning to the promotion of democracy and liberalism and sharply undermined Russia's claims to the status of a great power. In the future, the Ukrainian victory should be the beginning of the end of the "authoritarian international". This requires a mandatory international criminal tribunal against the aggressor and reform of the UN Security Council, where veto abuse threatens the rules-based international order.

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УДК 327

PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOUR STATES OF UKRAINE CONCERNING THE RUSSIAN INVASION

ПУБЛІЧНИЙ ДИСКУРС В ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКИХ КРАЇНАХ-СУСІДАХ ЩОДО РОСІЙСЬКОГО ВТОРГАННЯ В УКРАЇНУ

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Abstract. *The war significantly affected Ukraine's, European and the world's political, security, economic, and social resilience and caused regular increases in information aimed at creating perceptions of a pseudo-escalation of the situation, strengthening panic ideas and national discontent. The public discourses in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Poland, and Hungary are characterized by different views on the Russian invasion of Ukraine: discreet, mostly neutral discussions take place in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Romania; discussions involving all communication channels are observed in Poland; mainly destructive criticism promoted by users on social media is noted in Hungary. The paper examines the thematic lines of discussions and their sentiments with an emphasis on the negative attitudes; the context of formed narratives; the interests of authors who write on the researched subject; the platforms and countries where discussions take place and their focus. In general, two trends could be distinguished in the creation of negative narratives about the war against Ukraine: the first is aimed at creating ideas of public despair towards the possibilities of social protection, and the second trend focuses on drawing parallels between historical and actual events with the addition of false historical facts.*

Keywords: war, invasion, refugees, sanctions, EU, Ukraine, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania.

Анотація. *Війна суттєво вплинула на політичну, безпекову, економічну та соціальну стійкість України, Європи та світу і призвела до зростання інформації, спрямованої на створення уявлень про псевдоескалацію ситуації, посилення панічних ідей та національного невдоволення. Публічний дискурс Чехії, Словаччини, Румунії, Польщі та Угорщини характеризується різними поглядами на російське вторгнення в Україну: стримані, переважно нейтральні, дискусії відбуваються в Чехії, Словаччині та Румунії; активні обговорення з використанням всіх доступних каналів комунікації спостерігаються у Польщі; переважно деструктивна критика, яку поширюють користувачі в соціальних мережах, відзначається в Угорщині. У статті досліджено тематичні лінії дискусій та їх контекст з акцентом на формуванні негативних наративів; інтереси авторів, які пишуть на досліджувану тему; платформи та країни, де відбуваються дискусії, та їх фокус. Загалом можна виділити дві тенденції формування негативних наративів про війну проти України: перша спрямована на поширення ідей суспільного відчаю щодо можливостей отримання соціального захисту, а друга спрямована на проведення паралелей між історичними та реальними подіями, до яких додаються неправдиві історичні факти.*

Ключові слова: війна, вторгнення, біженці, санкції, ЄС, Україна, Польща, Чехія, Словаччина, Угорщина, Румунія.

Introduction. To examine the perception of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania have been chosen because these states' political, economic, security and social stability depends on the predictability of military actions in Ukraine. The challenges of continuous military escalation, sanctions against Russia, energy dependence and migration flows are changing the balance of power in Europe and the world, as well as affecting the internal political and security situations of the European neighbour states of Ukraine.

In this context, the study of circulating information in the media space, the detection of conflict conversations and the identification of the media platforms or sources for spreading abusive speech are the main factors in overcoming political and security destabilization at the European and global levels. Under war circumstances, it's meaningful to have a resistant society that has the ability to think clearly and rationally, understand the logical connection between ideas, and balance out within political and economic instability.

Overview of Previous Research Findings. After the beginning of the war against Ukraine, there was a critical increase in disinformation in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania, which cannot be compared with the disinformation about the Covid-19 pandemic. The ideas of enmity, panicked rumours, people's expert opinions, and false religious attitudes have flooded the European and global media space, distorting any positive developments. The online space has become a battlefield that is difficult to enforce legal regulation.

Under such circumstances, government or public initiatives to combat disinformation should have broad support. Considering this, several important initiatives have been identified within the EU and Ukraine to overcome the outlined issues. In March 2022, GLOBSEC, a global think-tank from Slovakia, presented a report on how the population in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia felt about the Russian invasion of Ukraine. According to the main findings of the study, the war has strengthened solidarity and brought a sense of relief that the countries are no longer between different spheres of influence; the states have demonstrated robust and rising support for the West and the Western governance model; the public has identified Russia as an aggressor and a threat to regional and global security. Among problem areas, the experts highlighted that the widespread pro-Kremlin propaganda remains unchallenged for years; the distorted views of some public groups towards events in Ukraine combined with potential economic challenges could leave them as targets for populist and autocratic leaders; some political elites may exploit public fear and frustration for their political benefit [GLOBSEC: 2022].

The Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism investigated the transformation of the digital media landscape in 2022. Experts [Newman et al.: 2022] examined the connection between journalism and the public, a declining interest in news, a rise in news avoidance, audience polarization and access to information. As a part of the countries' reports, the following results have been presented regarding development of the national media space:

- in the Czech Republic, the intensification of the search for new business models and digital innovations in media and journalism has been observed, despite a rebound in the national media sectors and a partial decrease in news media trust [Štětka: 2022a].

- in Slovakia, the government tried to implement the legislative programme to increase media ownership transparency and combat disinformation and online abuse. At the same time, Slovaks have abandoned television as a news source, demonstrating low trust in the media [Chlebcová Hečková, Smith: 2022].

- in Romania, media legitimacy and credibility were affected due to the prevention of the publication of public interest stories, the use of political propaganda in media, the creation of a media blacklist, and the temporary management of public broadcasters [Radu: 2022].

- in Poland, the war against Ukraine and the refugee challenges have led to a growth in news consumption across TV and digital channels, which was preceded by a decrease in news interest and an increase in government pressure on independent media [Makarenko: 2022].

- in Hungary, a grip on the media is an essential factor in the evolution of the national media space, where many central outlets are under either direct or indirect government influence, and only some independent media remain, particularly online [Bognar: 2022].

The non-governmental organizations from Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine, namely the Civic Resilience Initiative, Kosciuszko Institute and Detector Media, presented a joint report highlighting the challenges emanating from Russian disinformation and propaganda activities in the Lublin Triangle countries. Researchers note that all countries show significant signs of resilience to Russian propaganda, despite the presence of differences in the main narratives and the use of various measures to combat disinformation [MFA: 2022].

After the military actions against Ukraine started on February 24th, the qualitative and quantitative levels of disinformation about the events increased in the EU and the world. To counter the avalanche of disinformation, the European Digital Media Observatory prepares regular reviews highlighting the main disinformation trends related to the war against Ukraine [EDMO: 2022a]. Since December 2022, six new hubs have been launched as a part of the European Digital Media Observatory, strengthening the European system's fight against disinformation: the Central European Digital Media Observatory (cedmohub.eu) has covered Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland with a coordinating institution at Charles University; the Bulgarian-Romanian Observatory of Digital Media has established in Bulgaria and Romania through the partnership of Sofia University St Kliment Ohridski and Globsec; the Hungarian Hub against Disinformation has been created in Hungary with a coordinating institution in Political Capital [EDMO: 2022b].

The study presented in the following parts allows an understanding of the transformation of public discourse in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and the world for 2022, revealing the created national and global narratives about the war against Ukraine, as well as outlining the prospects for solving the problems of false data dissemination at the European and international levels.

Methodology. The study is aimed at identifying the thematic lines of discussions and their sentiments with an emphasis on the negative attitudes; observing the context of formed narratives; revealing the interests of authors who write on the researched subject; determining the platforms and countries where discussions take place and their focus. The Ukrainian platform YouScan was used to conduct monitoring. The main advantage of YouScan [YouScan: 2022] is a social media monitoring and analytics AI-powered that allows us to track mentions, find important insights, respond to user issues, and analyse the public perception of activities. Among the significant functions of YouScan could be noted: monitoring of social networks, blogs, forums, review sites, messengers, as well as online media; sorting data by sentiments, geographical distribution, demographics features, and sources; forming a word cloud and visual insights to identify the focus of discussions.

The main themes 'War in Ukraine', 'EU sanctions against Russia' and 'Refugees from Ukraine' have been chosen for investigating public opinion in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania for the last year (November 2021 – November 2022). The selected period allows us to determine the topics of discussion and the peculiarities of public opinion formation before and during the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The representative data sample of messages is 7 000 news in Poland, 3 570 in the Czech Republic, 3 082 in Slovakia, 2 409 in Hungary, and 2 230 in Romania. The sample has been formed by the platform YouScan based on the given search queries.

The queries in YouScan have been formed in Polish, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, and Romanian languages. As a result, public opinion in five European countries was investigated in three thematic directions – 'War in Ukraine', 'EU sanctions against Russia' and 'Refugees from Ukraine'. The following search queries were generated in these areas: 1. the topic 'War in Ukraine' – 'war in Ukraine', 'Russian invasion of Ukraine', 'war with Russia', 'military aid to Ukraine' and 'weapons for Ukraine'; 2. the topic 'EU sanctions against Russia' – 'EU sanctions against Russia', 'European energy security' and 'EU crisis'; 3. the topic 'Refugees from Ukraine' – 'refugees from Ukraine', 'displaced Ukrainians', 'humanitarian aid for Ukraine' and 'support for Ukraine'.

The above-mentioned online tool allows us to determine public discourse tendencies, understand the transformation of conversations, and analyse how ideas circulate in the media space of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania. The platform [YouScan: 2022] contributes to easing the acquisition of statistical data and information that could be compared with other statistics at different periods. Absolute numbers, ratios and average indicators allow for regional and international comparisons.

Global public discourse on the Russian invasion. Online media platforms are being actively used at the level of government institutions to engage in dialogue with external and internal audiences. The transformation of media space in wartime led not only to an increase in the activity of government accounts but also to the expansion of interaction with the audience that received the opportunity to learn about foreign and domestic policy initiatives in real-time. Political and public actors began to actively discuss the current political and security issues or explain to society the peculiarities of international cooperation with various players. At the same time, the active use of video content has become popular among Ukrainian, European and world leaders, as well as public activists, expanding interaction and audience engagement.

The study of global trends showed that over 5 million of authors mentioned the topic ‘War in Ukraine’ more than 7 million times in one month (October 2022). ‘Weapons for Ukraine’ has become a popular subtopic of world discussions and posts, to which 56 % of information is devoted. About 30 % of authors have debated about ‘EU sanctions against Russia’ and ‘European energy crisis’, and 14 % – about ‘Ukrainian refugees’ and ‘Humanitarian aid to Ukraine’. Global trends in mentions of all topics except ‘Humanitarian aid to Ukraine’ have an indicator of increasing negative sentiment.

The general portrait of authors who write on all topics is a mom or dad who loves art and music and engages in politics and/or law. The authors’ additional interests, covering all topics, include delight in business, entrepreneurship, history, media, science, and writing. Authors who communicate about all topics except ‘European energy crisis’ are also interested in engineering, military and family. Users who describe the topic ‘European energy crisis’ have interests in analytics, games, innovations, sustainability, and technology.

The geographical core of public discussions is concentrated in the USA, the UK, India, Canada, Australia, France, Germany, and Ukraine. The main discourse in the American media space is devoted to the subtopics ‘Weapons for Ukraine’ and ‘European energy crisis’. It should be noted that discussions about the possibility of supplying weapons to Ukraine have covered more than half of all debates in the media space of the mentioned countries. The subtopic ‘EU sanctions against Russia’ prevailed in France and Germany. The European energy crisis has been actively discussed in India, Germany, and the UK. Information about Ukrainian refugees and humanitarian aid to Ukraine has become a part of the public discourse in the UK, Ukraine, France, Canada, and Germany.

In general, Twitter and YouTube became the main platforms for spreading information about the Russian invasion, however, Telegram, Reddit, and Facebook significantly lost ground to the mentioned media. All platforms work as social news aggregates that focus on a few public-facing discussions – ‘Weapons for Ukraine’ and ‘Ukrainian refugees’ on Twitter and Reddit, ‘Weapons for Ukraine’ and ‘European energy crisis’ on YouTube and Telegram, ‘Ukrainian refugees’ on Facebook (see Figure 1).




Figure 1. Global resources where topics are mentioned

Source: compiled by author based on YouScan.

We should note that video content outperforms other content types in understanding and remembering various events, especially if public has the opportunity to view short eyewitness clips of military actions. The war increased disinformation trends when the spread of fakes is disguised as ‘objectivity of opinion’. Authors of fakes like to present information impartially, ‘clarifying’ the positions of all parties. As a result, freedom of expression and media ethics became hostages of the situation. When pseudo-objectivity becomes a manipulation tool that harms the state interests, contributes to the death of people, and increases panic.

In addition, people who feel fear for their own lives and relatives started going to a church more often and watching religious video content. Religion has also become a tool of manipulation, creating feelings of enmity, because some heads of religious institutions spread evaluative narratives about the war, at the same time, selfish interests prevail over critical thinking, forming a distorted attitude of believers to the situation.

The prevalence of disinformation and incompetent dissemination of data have led to the dominance of permissiveness on social media that requires not only regular technical support services for accounts but also a strict law concerning administrative and criminal liability for disseminating false data. Nevertheless, the activity within the information space in wartime should be done carefully to minimize the negative consequences and ensure maximum results from information and outreach activities, so development of global public discourse depends on an unbalanced misinformation media space.

The media space is dominated by negative sentiments regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in particular, there is only one positive post for every two negative posts in the subtopics ‘Weapons for Ukraine’, ‘EU sanctions against Russia’, and ‘Ukrainian refugees’ (see Figure 2).




Figure 2. Global sentiments about the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Source: compiled by author based on YouScan.

The context of global negative references to the ‘War in Ukraine’ consists of exaggerating the tragedy of the situation, spreading panic ideas, using news about actual events with the addition of false events, and forming eloquent political headlines that do not correspond to reality. For example, videos with the following content are shot: US troops officially on the ground in Ukraine, Iran may attack Saudi Arabia within 48 hours, North Korea thinks the USA is ready to invade, Putin unofficially declares war on the UK (NATO) over Liz Truss iPhone row, climate chaos and diesel shortages. The video materials are posted on the official platform of the online store (canadianpreparedness.com) that sells goods for extreme tourists. The audience engagement of one such video is 355,707 views and 4,832 comments with thanks for ‘true stories’. Dissemination of information in such a manner could be considered false advertising of goods and services, as well as misinformation or manipulation.

In general, two trends could be distinguished in the creation of negative narratives mentioning the ‘War in Ukraine’: the first is aimed at forming ideas of public despair towards the possibilities of social protection, the second trend focuses on drawing parallels between historical and actual events with the addition of false historical facts.

Within the first trend, there is excessive emotional use of slogans of fighting for justice, assisting the oppressed, protecting the environment or strengthening social protection. There is a substitution of socially important concepts by actions that deepen the overhead-mentioned problems and do not contribute to their solution. In the global information space, we can observe the process of transforming the incredible and invisible into the ‘tangible and believable’, aimed at a radical rethinking of the future. Pseudo-fighters for fairness unjustifiably manipulate the rights to freedom of speech, religion, or choice, replacing the positive context of such rights and disguising them with ideas that lead to the rise of enmity, discrimination, or genocide.

The second trend is the mixing of actual and historical events/characters with the addition of ‘true’ ideas that are transformed into ‘believable’ sentiments with heightened emotional colouration. The public may lose the connection between reality and pseudo-truth that gives rise to disbelief in objective information.

The context of global negative mentions of the ‘Weapons for Ukraine’ is the use of weapons not for their intended purpose, the sale of provided weapons, the US combat operations in Ukraine, the initiation of the Third World or Nuclear war by the United States through the support of Ukraine, and the provision of weapons by Ukraine to Russia.

Pseudo-experts and pseudo-pacifists who present an ‘alternative and true’ vision of the situation are used for creating negative and false messages. As a result of the formation of public distrust of government decisions and the presence of confirmed facts, any anti-government information spreads quickly and is immediately recognized as ‘true’, although it may be otherwise. Consequently, calls for peace, the non-proliferation of weapons or the reduction of their production with an emphasis on complicated economic situations will always have support in a society that cannot always understand the purpose of using such slogans.

The context of global negative mentions of the 'EU sanctions against Russia' is public protests against European sanctions imposed on Russia, Europeans do not want to freeze together with Ukraine, European disastrous economic policies, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy's war, a war provoked by the USA, the EU, and NATO. The spread of such negative ideas occurs through the publication of short messages on social media that supposedly show the authority of thousands of opinions, but the content of the posts is the same, translated into different languages and repeated regularly. In this way, public opinion is manipulated, ideas of hatred are instilled, and governmental, supranational, or international decisions are discredited.

The context of global negative mentions of the 'European energy crisis' is related to the depletion of strategic petroleum reserves, food shortages, natural disasters, runaway inflation/stagflation, record consumer debt, increased Chinese aggression towards Taiwan, and record oil company profits. Compared with the previous negative narratives, it should be noted that the manipulation of data in economics and energy is almost impossible to detect by non-professionals. The use of professional terms makes it difficult to understand the context of the message, and the lack of necessary knowledge leads to the perception of economic and energy data as a pre-existing truth. 'Authoritative' people, agencies, or news portals are used to spread information and complicate the refutation of false data.

The context of global negative mentions of 'Ukrainian refugees' and the 'Humanitarian aid to Ukraine' is giving preference to Ukrainian refugees over refugees from other countries, spreading neo-Nazism ideas, increasing Ukrainian refugees due to the infrastructure destruction, challenging life of Ukrainians in Europe, and plundering the US aid.

As for negative references to 'Ukrainian refugees' and 'Humanitarian aid to Ukraine', personal stories are used to describe the situation that may be true, a combination of true and false data, or specially invented to discredit Ukrainians and humanitarian aid, provided within the EU, the USA and Ukraine. The high emotional colouration of such messages complicates the level of critical perception of information.

The war led to the political, security, economic and social destabilization of Ukraine, the EU, the USA, and the whole world, however, there is a regular increase in information aimed at forming perceptions of a pseudo-escalation of the situation, growing panic and national enmity, or strengthening crisis where it is not foreseen. It should be noted that any war leads to adverse economic and social consequences. However, extreme situations may arise due to the immediacy, permissiveness, and lack of control of the spread of disinformation when the population in a state of panic could unconsciously harm the state's political, economic and security stability through own actions. Such behaviour in one country causes a chain reaction in other countries, covering regions around the world.

National public discourse in the European neighbours of Ukraine concerning the Russian invasion. The national public space of Ukraine's neighbouring countries regarding assessments of the Russian attack could be divided into several categories: discreet, mostly neutral discussions take place in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Romania; discussions involving all communication channels are observed in Poland, which spread both constructive criticism and negative messages of a manipulative nature; mainly destructive criticism promoted by users on social media is noted in Hungary. Since social media allows the creation of information content beyond reliable control, which is used by unscrupulous actors to achieve their goals (see Figure 3).




Figure 3. Share of conversations in the public discourse of Ukraine’s European neighbours concerning the Russian invasion

Source: compiled by author based on YouScan.

Experts note that the transformation of public space and strengthening of political elites’ influence on the national media is observed in the EU, particularly in Hungary and Poland, where it has been part of democratic standards’ erosion. In both states, they mark the lack of independence of media regulators, the transformation of public media into government propaganda outlets, the capture of private media, the state’s disproportionate funding of government-supporting private media and the creation of obstacles for private media independent of government [Wójcik: 2022a].

The restraint of public space in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Developing democratic standards and freedoms allows us to characterize the Czech Republic and Slovakia as consolidated democracies [Sybera: 2022; Učeň: 2022] in which political rights and civil liberties are generally respected [Czech Republic: 2022; Slovakia: 2022]. However, political disputes, illiberal rhetoric and the influence of powerful business entities impede the progress of legislative activity and adequate protection of the Czech media space. Significant challenges for Slovakia’s democratic institutions remain entrenched discrimination and growing hostility towards migrants and refugees, as well as political corruption. These national challenges form the media space of countries and determine their foreign policy goals and European orientations.

Regarding the investigated issues, the public discourse of the Czech Republic is focused on the topic of war in Ukraine (88 % of messages) and aid to Ukrainian refugees (11 %). Around 1 % of posts are devoted to the EU sanctions against Russia. Audience engagement is heterogeneous, in particular, 86 % of users are involved in the exchange of opinions about the war in Ukraine, and 14 % are about Ukrainian refugees, while fewer participants are concerned about economic and energy issues related to the Russian invasion, and messages have a news nature.

The media space of Slovakia covers the two topics ‘war in Ukraine’ (97 % of messages) and ‘Ukrainian refugees’ (3 %) with an absolute predominance of messages about the war, which are informative and neutral. The subject of the implementation of EU sanctions against Russia is mentioned in the context of reports about the war, but the emphasis is on the sanction policy, in contradistinction to Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania, where the focus is on European energy security. Audience involvement is low, and users primarily exchange opinions about the war against Ukraine. The tonality of the media space regarding military events in Ukraine is homogeneous and neutral.

In the Czech Republic, the central point of public discourse is the mention of words that relate to the war in Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees. If news is devoted to the topic of war, then 85 % of

messages mention the phrase 'válka na Ukrajině' (war in Ukraine), 6 % – 'ruský útok na Ukrajinu' (Russian attack on Ukraine), 6 % – 'zbraně pro Ukrajinu' (weapons for Ukraine), 3 % – 'válka s Ruskem' (war with Russia). If posts are dedicated to refugees, 57 % of messages use the word combination 'Ukrajínští uprchlíci' (Ukrainian refugees), 32 % – 'podpora Ukrajině' (support for Ukraine), 11 % – 'humanitární pomoc Ukrajině' (humanitarian aid to Ukraine). As for economic and energy issues that have arisen in Europe and the Czech Republic, 53 % of messages are about 'evropská energetická bezpečnost' (European energy security), 36 % – 'sankce EU proti Ruské federaci' (EU sanctions against Russia), and 11 % – 'krize v EU' (crisis in the EU). The media coverage of the war in Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees is usually neutral and homogeneous. There are no active debates regarding Ukrainian refugees or EU sanctions against Russia, while the discussion of topics is exclusively related to military actions in Ukraine.

The thematic focus of the Slovak public discourse regarding the Russian invasion is concentrated on the mention of the following phrases – 31 % of posts use the words 'vojna s Ruskom' (war with Russia), 26 % – 'ruský útok na Ukrajinu' (Russian attack on Ukraine), 14 % – 'Ukrajínští utečenci' (Ukrainian refugees), 11 % – 'zbrane pre Ukrajinu' (weapons for Ukraine), 10 % – 'sankcie EÚ voči Ruskej federácii' (EU sanctions against Russia), 6 % – 'podpora Ukrajine' (support for Ukraine), and 2 % – 'európska energetická bezpečnosť' (European energy security).

Among the Czech authors who communicate about the war and Ukrainian refugees, there are predominantly younger and older men interested in business, law, politics, and media. Women over 18 are also actively involved in the discussion. A typical portrait of Slovak authors is composed of middle-aged and older men, as well as younger and older women interested in business, media, and fashion. Middle-aged men actively discuss the topic 'Ukrainian refugees'.

The geographical core of Czech public discussions about the war in Ukraine is concentrated in the Czech Republic (94 %), Slovakia (2 %), Germany (2 %), and the USA (2 %). At the same time, the impact of sanctions on Czech energy security is primarily discussed in the Czech Republic, and the topic 'Ukrainian refugees' concerns the Czech Republic (98 %) and the USA (2 %). The geographical core of Slovak public discussions about the war is concentrated in Slovakia (97 %) and the Czech Republic (3 %), and the topic 'Ukrainian refugees' is covered only in Slovakia.

The national media space of the Czech Republic is homogeneous concerning the use of different resource types: 95 % of mass media content, 4 % of social media posts, and 1 % of blog texts are devoted to military themes and Ukrainian refugees; the EU sanctions and energy security are mainly discussed in the Czech mass media. Overall, the main media platforms that write about the war in Ukraine are maaxi.cz (63 %), denik.cz (7 %), parlamentnilisty.cz (6 %), echo24.cz (5 %), ceskenoviny.cz (4 %), cnn.iprima.cz, zpravy.aktualne.cz, e15.cz (3 % each), podcasty.seznam.cz, extra.cz, idnes.cz (2 % each). Regarding Ukrainian refugees, 77 % of content is prepared by maaxi.cz, 6 % by reflex.cz, 4 % by echo24.cz, 3 % by ceskenoviny.cz, 2 % by denik.cz and novinky.cz. The EU sanctions against Russia and energy security issues are discussed on the opinion platform of former Czech Prime Minister Jiří Paroubek (vasevec.parlamentnilisty.cz) and the online portal on economy and finance (kurzy.cz).

The leading Czech media has fewer publications about the war in Ukraine than media aggregators, which collect information from many Czech sources and distribute news mirrors, increasing the significance of specific ideas. There are positive and negative consequences of a similar algorithm for structuring information on the Internet. The advantages include time-saving when searching for the necessary data and maintaining awareness of issues of interest. The disadvantages could be the spread of inaccurate information as an information avalanche, false advertising, and user confusion, who may not know whether they are reading the original text or a copy on another online portal.

In the public media space of Slovakia, 91 % of the content in media, 7 % on social networks and 2 % in blogs and forums are dedicated to military topics and Ukrainian refugees. The main media platforms that write about the war in Ukraine are pravda.sk (57 %), sme.sk (12 %), youtube.com (8 %), netky.sk (6 %), dennikstandard.sk, topky.sk (4 % each), aktuality.sk (3 %),

economics.sk, webnoviny.sk, and teraz.sk (2 % each). Regarding Ukrainian refugees, 52 % of content is prepared by pravda.sk, 16 % by sme.sk, 11 % by dennikstandard.sk, 5 % by topky.sk, 3 % by cas.sk, 4 % by info.sk, 4 % by webnoviny.sk, 2 % by dnes24.sk, and 2 % by hlavnespravy.sk. In contrast to the Czech Republic, news about the war in Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees is published by the leading Slovak media, which cover the issues in the context of politics, economy, finance, and social life.

Since the beginning of the war against Ukraine, the Czech and Slovak government institutions have made more efforts to overcome disinformation, propaganda, and hoaxes in the national media space. The Czech Association of leading internet providers blocked eight main disinformation websites (CZ.NIC, 2022), three of which resumed their activity by mid-December 2022. Thus, in the Czech media space, there is a constant struggle against spreading pro-Russian propaganda and disinformation. In addition, there is no law on disinformation in the state, so the National Cyber Defence Centre or the Centre Against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats operated by the Ministry of Interior work selectively and do not have sufficient legal authority to combat all manifestations of propaganda and disinformation [Štětka: 2022b; Gosling: 2022a]. The lack of clear legislative measures led to the possibility of using outdated tools of manipulation that prompted 70 thousand of people to take to the streets in September. Protesters argued that sanctions against Russia and support for Ukrainian refugees prevented the government from providing more assistance during the energy and inflation crisis [Gosling: 2022b]. However, the situation also contributed to the launch of new media initiatives supporting Ukrainians, including a new station 'Radio Ukrajina' by the Media Bohemia group, online streaming of the Ukrainian public service radio on Czech Radio or a simultaneous interpretation of news into Ukrainian on Czech Television [Štětka: 2022b].

It should be noted that the Slovak media space has a better level of legislative regulations. The Act on Cybersecurity (National Council, 2018) allows the National security authority to block sources of malicious content or serious disinformation, and the dissemination of disinformation could be prosecuted under the Criminal Code of Slovakia [National Council: 2022]. In addition, the action plan proposed by the Ministry of Defence for the coordinated countering of hybrid threats for 2022-2024 was approved by the Slovak government [Ministry of Defence: 2022]. The government attempts to eliminate hate speech on social media or block websites that spread Russian propaganda [Slovak Spectator: 2022]. However, the blocked websites remain visible outside the national media space, and various emojis or word combinations allow users to bypass online censorship.

Balancing public space of Romania. Romania is a semi-consolidated democracy [Badulescu: 2022] that continues to demonstrate the freedom of political rights and civil liberties. Democratic transformations are hindered by entrenched political interests pushing back against civic and institutional anti-corruption efforts, discrimination against minorities and control over media [Romania: 2022].

Romania's media space is divided almost equally between informing citizens about the Russian attack (52 % of messages) and Ukrainian refugees (44 %), while 4 % of posts are devoted to the topic of EU sanctions policy. However, audience engagement is heterogeneous, in particular, 86 % of users are involved in the exchange of opinions about the war, and 14 % are about Ukrainian refugees. Compared to the Czech Republic and Poland, discussions about European energy challenges are more active in Romania. The media tone regarding events related to Ukraine is homogeneous and neutral.

A feature of the Romanian media space is dominated by the phrase 'war with Russia', while other states focus on the words 'war in Ukraine'. In particular, if media messages are devoted to military topics, 39 % of messages mention the phrase 'războiul cu Rusia' (war with Russia), 24 % – 'războiul în Ucraina' (war in Ukraine), 15 % – 'atacul Rusiei asupra Ucrainei' (Russia's attack on Ukraine), 16 % – 'invazia rusă a Ucrainei' (Russian invasion of Ukraine), 6 % – 'ajutorul militar pentru Ucraina' (military aid to Ukraine). If news is devoted to refugees, 60 % of messages use the word combination 'refugiați din Ucraina' (refugees from Ukraine) and 40 % – 'sprijin pentru Ucraina' (support for Ukraine). As for European energy issues, 92 % of posts concern 'securitatea

energetică a Europei' (Europe's energy security), 7 % – 'sanctiunile UE împotriva Federației Ruse' (EU sanctions against Russia), and 1 % 'criza UE' (EU crisis).

The authors participating in the discussion of war and Ukrainian refugees are middle-aged and older men and middle-aged women who show interest in public activism, acting and art, while middle-aged men actively discuss the topic 'Ukrainian refugees'. The geographical core of public discourse about all topics is concentrated in Romania (98 %) and the USA (2 %).

The national media space of Romania is almost uniform regarding the use of different resource types – 91 % of content in mass media, 5 % – on social networks, and 4 % – in blogs is devoted to military topics, Ukrainian refugees, and European energy security. So, the main media platforms that write about the war are replicaonline.ro (30 %), libertatea.ro (17 %), g4media.ro (10 %), evz.ro, gazetarul.ro, youtube.com (7 % each), stiri.tvr.ro, cancan.ro (6 % each), romaniatv.net, mediafax.ro (5 % each). Regarding Ukrainian refugees, 35 % of content is prepared by the platform libertatea.ro, 18 % by replicaonline.ro, 9 % by stirileprotv.ro, 8 % by stiri.tvr.ro, 8 % by g4media.ro, 5 % by youtube.com, 5 % by facebook.com, 5 % by ziarelive.ro, 4 % by gandul.ro, 3 % by gazetarul.ro. The European energy security issues are dedicated to 38 % messages on libertatea.ro, 11 % on agerpres.ro, 9 % on g4media.ro, 6 % on bizlawyer.ro, bursa.ro, caleaeuropeana.ro, capital.ro, gazetarul.ro, and mae.ro.

Romania has a balancing experience in overcoming disinformation. In 2020, the Romanian government passed several decrees (Holdiș, 2020) that allowed blocking resources indicted of spreading false information about the pandemic. However, public activists accused the authorities of violating freedom of expression and access to information. Experts [*Toma, Popescu and Bodea: 2022; Rubica: 2022*] also confirm that the lack of reliable data on disinformation, disproportionate information of poor quality and misleading commentary are the main problem of national media space. As a result, the European Commission supported the establishment of six new hubs in the European Digital Media Observatory, strengthening the fight against disinformation. In December 2022, the Bulgarian-Romanian observatory of digital media [*EDMO: 2022b*] started its activity as a regional centre for combating disinformation in Bulgaria and Romania.

The controversy of public space Poland. Poland's semi-consolidated democracy is developing under the impact of nationalist and discriminatory rhetoric, and an increase in political influence on state institutions damages national democratic progress [*Wójcik: 2022b; Poland: 2022*]. Experts assess the media's political independence and market plurality in Poland as having a high risk of being controlled and restrained by the political elites. However, a significant number of private media, including media conglomerates and local media, are independent of the government [*Wójcik: 2022a*].

The public media space of Poland covers all the studied topics, demonstrating the highest activity of discussions compared to the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Hungary. It was found that 72 % of messages about Ukraine are devoted to military topics, 27 % are related to Ukrainian refugees, and 1 % are dedicated to EU sanctions, regional and national energy security. Audience engagement is different, in particular, 91 % of users are involved in the exchange of opinions about the war in Ukraine, and 9 % are about Ukrainian refugees, while in the discussion of economic and energy issues related to the attack of Russia, the number of participants is not high, and the messages have mainly news nature.

The thematic orientation of the public discourse is focused on the mention of phrases related to the war in Ukraine and the attack of Russia, therefore, in the context of humanitarian cooperation, words about support for Ukraine are most often mentioned. In particular, if messages are about military topics, then 63 % of messages mention the phrase 'wojna w Ukrainie' (war in Ukraine), 16 % – 'inwazja Rosji na Ukrainę' (Russian invasion of Ukraine), 15 % – 'atak Rosji na Ukrainę' (Russia's attack on Ukraine), 3 % 'wojna z Rosją' (war with Russia), and 3 % 'broń dla Ukrainy' (weapons for Ukraine). If media messages are devoted to refugees, 64 % of messages use the word combination 'wsparcie dla Ukrainy' (support for Ukraine), 32 % – 'uchodźcy z Ukrainy' (refugees from Ukraine), and 4 % 'pomoc humanitarna dla Ukrainy' (humanitarian aid for Ukraine). As for the economic and energy issues that have arisen in Europe and Poland, 58 % of

news concern ‘bezpieczeństwo energetyczne Europy’ (Europe’s energy security), 31 % – ‘sankcje UE wobec Federacji Rosyjskiej’ (EU sanctions against Russia), and 11 % – ‘kryzys w UE’ (EU crisis).

Even though messages about the war, Ukrainian refugees, EU sanctions and European energy issues are primarily neutral and informative, 11,5 % of negative news about the war and 4,9 % about Ukrainian refugees are aimed at discrediting Polish-Ukrainian relations, misrepresenting facts, and distorting the surrounding reality. Unscrupulous media and experts mix facts from the political life of Ukraine, Poland, other European countries, and the USA, as well as official statements of political leaders, adding implausible reflections. For the first dissemination of implausible ideas, non-thematic sites of touristic, practical, or religious orientation are mainly used. Pseudo-experts record their video considerations and create the illusion of ‘disclosing secrets’. For several weeks, unscrupulous media and media aggregators have been spreading ‘expert-analysis texts or videos’. At the same time, algorithms for the promotion of information on social media and search engines are focused on the analysis of quantitative characteristics of user interaction with text, video, or picture and can automatically contribute to the promotion of false information during searches or according to users’ interests. In this way, a stable dissemination of information in a circle is created when each additional interaction with text, video, pictures, or comments leads to the transition of data to a higher degree of popularization and coverage of the audience.

The danger of spreading false data under war and peace leads to various consequences. In peacetime, false information deepens the discredit of politicians and state leaders, as well as could cause political and economic crises that further exacerbate social issues. The degree of false information influence during a war increases, leading to an expansion of civilian and military casualties, destruction of cities, territories, and infrastructure, as well as global security, economic and political disorientation.

The general portrait of authors who discuss the war, Ukrainian refugees, EU sanctions and European energy security is formed by middle-aged and older men, showing an interest in history and technology, although older women also actively participate in the discussion of the war in Ukraine. The geographical core of public discourse about the war in Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees is concentrated in Poland (92 %), the USA (7 %) and Germany (1 %). At the same time, the impact of sanctions on Polish energy security is primarily discussed in Poland.

Mass media and social networks have become the main platforms for the publication of information about the investigated subject. Among social media, YouTube is the main source for posting news about the war in Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees, while topics related to EU sanctions and energy security are more actively discussed on Facebook. Polish online platforms, where discussions are concentrated, influence the formation of national and international public opinion, and also act as a constant news source. Compared to the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania, Poland’s public space is diverse concerning using resource types: 83 % of content in mass media is devoted to the war and Ukrainian refugees, 10 % is in blogs, 6 % is on social networks, 1 % is in forums; EU sanctions and energy security are mainly given attention in the mass media (94 %) and social networks (6 %). Accordingly, the media platforms that write about the war in Ukraine are wiadomosci.onet.pl (20 %), rp.pl (16 %), rmf24.pl (10 %), wydarzenia.interia.pl (9 %), wiadomosci.wp.pl (8 %), polskieradio24.pl (8 %), newsweek.pl (8 %), youtube.com (7 %), polsatnews.pl (7 %), and wnp.pl (7 %). Regarding Ukrainian refugees, 31 % of news is prepared by niezalezna.pl, 14 % by wiadomosci.onet.pl, 12 % by rmf24.pl, 11 % by polskieradio24.pl, 9 % by wnp.pl, 5 % by youtube.com, 4 % by pl.bfn.today, 4 % by rp.pl, 4 % by newsweek.pl, 3 % by pap.pl, and 3 % by fakt.pl. The EU sanctions against Russia and energy security issue are discussed at polskieradio24.pl (18 % news), dlahandlu.pl, humanmag.pl (14 % each), dziennikzachodni.pl, facebook.com, gospodarkapodkarpacka.pl, klubjagiellonski.pl, rmf24.pl (9 % each), biznesalert.pl (5 %), and biegowelove.pl (4 %).

The war in Ukraine affected the Polish media space. On one side, in February 2022, Poland’s National Broadcasting Council [*Dziadul: 2022*] removed numerous Russian channels from the register of permitted TV services. On another side, the Polish media launched news services in the

Ukrainian language for Ukrainian refugees – news portal ‘Ukrayina’ by gazeta.pl (ukrayina.pl), news portal ‘Ukraina’ by Onet (ukraina.onet.pl), news service ‘Vpolshchi.pl’ by Wirtualna Polska (vpolshchi.pl) and others [Klimkiewicz: 2022]. Poland established a valuable space for communication, understanding, integration, and consultations between Poles and Ukrainians.

The ‘disguise’ of Hungary’s media space. The transitional or hybrid regime in Hungary has consolidated control over the national independent institutions, including the judiciary. The surveillance of journalists and restrictions on the activity of independent and critical media have become typical management instruments of the ruling political elite [Végh: 2022; Hungary: 2022]. In Hungary, a vast majority of private media have been captured by entities close to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party, so trust in media is low [Wójcik, 2022a]. The destruction of media freedom and pluralism has led to the imbalance of the national public space and the growing popularity of social media. At the same time, the unrestricted use of social media contributed to the creation of conditions for increasing disinformation, since social media have not become a full-fledged alternative to critical media.

The public media space of Hungary is divided almost equally between informing citizens about the war in Ukraine (58 % of messages) and Ukrainian refugees (41 %), while the topic of EU sanctions policy is devoted to 1 % of posts. In comparison with other countries, when the ratio of unique authors is directly proportional to the amount of prepared content, the Hungarian media space has developed a tendency towards the predominance of authors who write about Ukrainian refugees. In particular, 60 % of authors write about refugees from Ukraine, 39 % of authors communicate about the war in Ukraine, and 1 % – about the subject of EU sanctions against Russia.

A feature of the Hungarian media space about the military events in Ukraine is other semantic accents compared to the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Poland, in particular: anchor words from various languages are intensively used in the Hungarian media space; in the meaningful content of messages, the emphasis is on Russia and its military operations in Ukraine, the number of weapons received by Ukraine, the comparison of Syrian and Ukrainian refugees, as well as the aggravation of the crisis in the EU and the increase in threats to European energy security.

The public discourse regarding the Russian invasion focused on the mention of the following phrases: 85 % of messages used the phrase ‘háború Ukrajnában’ and ‘war in Ukraine’, 6 % – ‘orosz támadás Ukrajna ellen’ and ‘Russian attack on Ukraine’, 6 % – ‘háború Oroszországgal’ and ‘war with Russia’, 3 % – ‘fegyverek Ukrajnának’ (weapons for Ukraine). In the topic ‘Ukrainian refugees’ the emphasis is placed only on using the phrase ‘ukrán menekültek’ (Ukrainian refugees), and in the topic ‘EU sanctions’ 55 % of messages are aimed at the word usage ‘Európa energiabiztonsága’ (European energy security), and 45 % – ‘válság az EU-ban’ (crisis in the EU).

The dissemination of information about events in Ukraine is enhanced by active commenting, in particular, 65 % of comments are on the topic of Ukrainian refugees, 18 % of comments are related to EU sanctions against Russia, and 15 % of comments are about the war in Ukraine. We should note that only 35 % of the news is published about Ukrainian refugees, which users automatically popularize in search engines and news feeds on social networks by actively commenting. Moreover, 82 % of posts are devoted to the EU sanctions policy, which is also accompanied by discussions, and 85 % of posts are about the war, which has fewer comments and less popularity. Compared to other countries, the most active commenting on military events in Ukraine and related topics is in Hungary. Increasing the negative tone of comments can contribute to enhancing the meaning of a discrediting context or diminishing the essence of a neutral/positive news context. Through intensive negative commenting, it is possible to create a distorted view of information content circulated in the Hungarian media space and to impose narratives.

The tone of the Hungarian public discourse regarding the war in Ukraine is distinct from Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Romania. In the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Romania, neutral and explanatory news on the Russian invasion is prevalent, with a low percentage of negative tone in Poland. In Hungary, 57,9 % of messages about the war in Ukraine have a negative tone, 10 % of news have a negative context regarding the EU sanctions policy against Russia, and 5,2 % of posts contain antagonistic reactions concerning Ukrainian refugees.

The formation of a negative media space in Hungary occurs through the creation of closed groups on social media and the use of public non-thematic channels of the tourist, practical, or artistic direction for spreading information. To prepare discrediting content, a multilingual semantic core of the page is created using search words that have a high search frequency and popularity. Such posts don't have coherent sentences, they only contain repetition of tags and keywords in several languages – English, Russian, Serbian, Ukrainian, Uyghur, Hungarian, Thai, Tajik, Hindi, Hebrew, etc.

The general portrait of authors participating in the discussion of the war in Ukraine is formed by middle-aged and older men, and older women who are interested in pets, beauty, design, travels, music, cars, and nature. SEO specialization should be highlighted among their professional orientations.

The geographical core of public discussions is concentrated in Hungary (75 %), the USA (14 %), Romania (5 %), Slovakia (2 %), Morocco (1 %), France (1 %), India (1 %), Turkey (1 %). We would like to add that 50 % of the video dedicated to the war in Ukraine, which were commented in Hungarian and in the content of which there are keywords-anchors in the Hungarian language, do not have a geographical identification with any country. Additionally, most of this news is already closed in the middle of December 2022 according to YouTube policy. At the same time, the topic 'Ukrainian refugees' is covered Hungary (94 %), Romania (2 %), Turkey (2 %), the USA (1 %) and Algeria (1 %). The impact of sanctions on Hungary's energy security is primarily discussed in Hungary (89 %) and Turkey (11 %).

Social media have become the leading online platforms for Hungary, where discussions about the war in Ukraine are concentrated, and only the EU sanctions policy is covered mainly by the mass media. 82 % of content on social networks, 11 % in mass media, 6 % in blogs, and 1 % in forums are devoted to military topics and Ukrainian refugees. The crisis in the EU and energy security are mainly paid attention by mass media (82 %) and blogs (18 %). Therefore, the media platforms that write about the war in Ukraine are youtube.com (79 %), facebook.com (10 %), Disqus.com (4 %), portfolio.hu (2 %). 76 % of content on youtube.com, 12 % on facebook.com, 3 % on Disqus.com, 2 % on portfolio.hu, and news.leportale.com are devoted to the topic of Ukrainian refugees. The EU crisis and energy security are discussed on 168.hu (28 % of content), Disqus.com (18 %), blogaszat.hu, klubradio.hu, news.leportale.com, portfolio.hu, szeretlekmagyarorszag.hu, and ujszo.com (9 % each).

The Hungarian public discourse is overloaded with the spread of Russian propaganda narratives. Attempts by non-governmental organizations (the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union and the Political Capital) and European institutions (the European Digital Media Observatory and the French news agency Agence France Presse) to change the situation remain less visible against the background of uncontrolled dissemination of falsified data. The launched Hungarian-language fact-checking sites Lakmusz (lakmusz.hu) and Ténykérdés (tenykerdes.afp.com) are unable to resist the spread of politically motivated information [Bátorfy, Bleyer-Simon, Szabó, Galambosi: 2022]. The situation is further complicated by the government decision regarding the distribution of press products during a state of emergency in Hungary that has been declared in June 2022. According to Regulation 210/2022 [Magyarország Hivatalos Lapja: 2022], indirect state support for newspaper vendors could be granted for press products with official government news about an emergency. As a result, the government-aligned press can receive additional assistance in contradistinction to the government-critical media.

The public space of Hungary and Poland is characterized by more active publication of negative information about the war events in Ukraine and related topics compared to the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Romania. The geographically heterogeneous media space of Hungary and Poland is distinguished by numerous messages with a negative tone, and YouTube has become the central platform for their propagation. At the same time, the Hungarian media space is noted by an increase in negative assessments of the war in Ukraine and military aid to Ukraine, as well as an emphasis on the crisis in the EU. Typical features of negative messages in the Hungarian and Polish public space regarding war stories in Ukraine are the use of sensational headlines, provocative

pictures, and derogatory comparisons; creation of authorities from the 'people' who possess 'secret knowledge'; misrepresentation of decision-makers; shift of accents.

The joint public discourse of all countries regarding Russian invasion is focused on mentioning stable phrases to describe the situation in Ukraine. In particular, when mentioning the topic of war, Czech, Slovak, and Hungarian media platforms most often use the phrase 'war in Ukraine', although in Poland 'Russian attack' and 'Russia's attack on Ukraine' are popular, and in Romania – 'war with Russia'. The topic of refugees from Ukraine is represented by the stable phrase 'Ukrainian refugees', which is simultaneously used by the phrase 'support for Ukraine' in Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania. Within the EU sanctions policy, attention in all countries is focused on the discussed energy security in the context of EU sanctions against Russia, and in Hungary the emphasis is on the crisis in the EU.

Results and Conclusions. With the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the government accounts of world leaders and European neighbour states of Ukraine have become the multilingual media agencies that cover not only news but also national defence strategies, visits by high-ranking officials, and bilateral and multilateral support for Ukraine at the official and public levels. However, the public space of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Hungary turned out to be contradictory regarding the formation of narratives about the war events in Ukraine after the Russian invasion and on the eve. It is possible to highlight trends that have formed in the context of the war, Ukrainian refugees, and EU sanctions against Russia.

- Theme 'War in Ukraine'

On the eve of the invasion (November-December 2021 and January-early February 2022), there was not much activity regarding the publication of news about the danger from Russia's side to Ukraine. It can be noted that key messages in media focused on the danger of escalation of the confrontation between the West and Russia and mentioned the weakness of Ukraine, as well as the inability to resist such security challenges. These ideas continued to be repeated even after the Russian invasion almost until the end of March 2022.

Since February 2022, the increase in the amount of news about military actions in Ukraine and the support of the international community and neighbouring countries of Ukraine has led to the strengthening of anti-Ukrainian rhetoric in the European and global media space. Thanks to the consolidation of the efforts of Ukraine and European partners, who have promoted the activities of civic organizations to detect and refute fake news, a partial transformation of the media space of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Poland is taking place, but the public space of Hungary remains overloaded with manipulative news. Regarding changes in the media space of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland, it is possible to note the emergence of a tendency to consciously prepare news about Ukraine with unclear and indistinct content, which prompts users to subjective comparative thoughts about the events in Ukraine and the policy of the USA, Germany, the UK, and France in other regions. The majority of citizens do not have knowledge about the historical development of countries, the actual reasons of conflicts and confrontations but have general ideas about such events. However, the combination of different historical events and eras leads to the formation of an associative chain and distortion of the main meaning of the message.

- Theme 'Ukrainian refugees'

In November-December 2021, only in Poland there were publications on the topic of Ukrainian refugees, which were discussed in the context of a possible escalation of military actions by Russia. At the beginning of 2022, the activity of public discourse in Poland and Romania increased in the direction of discussions of the countries' actions that would be adopted by the national governments if Russia starts an invasion of Ukraine. While the public space of Slovakia was focused on the news about the blocking of Nord Stream II and the appropriate security and social consequences for the EU and the state. The Czech media talked about the provision of humanitarian aid to Ukraine in the context of a possible Russian invasion. Hungarian public discourse was focused on the discussion of Viktor Orbán's visit to Moscow and the 'dividends' for the state, as well as the weakness of Ukrainian policy towards national minorities.

After the invasion of Russia and the increase in the flow of Ukrainian refugees, there is an extension of thematic news in all countries with an emphasis on the provision of humanitarian aid to Ukrainians who remained in Ukraine and citizens who began to leave for safe neighbouring countries. Most of the discussions and news about Ukrainian refugees fell on Poland, Romania, and the Czech Republic, but the public space of Hungary turned out to be the most replete with negative news concerning Ukrainian refugees.

- Theme 'EU sanctions against Russia'

Discussion of the EU sanctions policy against Russia before its attack was most active in Romania and Poland, which also demonstrated sustained public interest in the topic after the start of war against Ukraine. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, narrow thematic discussions can be observed, which take place in accordance with the decision-making by the European Commission regarding the introduction of the next sanction package. The predominance of negative discussions about the EU sanctions policy against Russia is observed only in Hungary.

Thus, the public discourse of Poland before and after the start of war against Ukraine remained more stable regarding the assessment of events in the context of war, refugees, and sanctions, i.e., there was no sharp increase in negative or positive reports about possible and current war events. In contrast to Hungary, where there has been an intensification of negative messages since February 2022, and before that more neutral assessments of events in Ukraine in the context of war, refugees and sanctions prevailed.

Discussion. At the expert level of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Hungary, there was an underestimation of the human resource potential of Ukrainians, as well as their ability to perform tasks under any circumstance. The mental portrait of the Ukrainian nation has always been perceived through the prism of Russian disinformation and was artificially imposed on both European and global level. However, the Ukrainian army overcame the negative world assessment of its ability to defend the state and maintain control over the capital Kyiv. In general, the spread of discrediting or false news about Russian attack in the national space is related to the role of each country in the process of influencing decision-making regarding the provision of political, economic, military, or social assistance to Ukraine, as well as the specifics of activities of the ruling political elite of each country. The further development of public discourse will be formed under the focus of attention of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and partially Hungary on overcoming national barriers to create an open and transparent media space, devoid of propaganda and disinformation.

Solving the issue of spreading disinformation is very difficult since the technological development of society allows creating and dispersing of any information without any restrictions. Only measures at the global level, which would not turn into a fight against freedom of speech, will be able to reduce the level of disinformation but not overcome it completely. In the short term, there will be technological updates regarding the identification of authors and their blocking for the dissemination of discrediting information, the modernization of the legislation of EU countries concerning prosecution for the dissemination of fake announcements and hate speech, the increase in centres engaged in fact-checking and refutation of false data, deepening of knowledge in media literacy, the standards' transformation of ethical conduct of journalists and their responsibility for spreading fake news. In the long term, the mentioned processes should become a global trend of ethical conduct with information.

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THE STRUGGLE AND PIONEERS OF THE INTELLIGENTSIA CLASS IN GEORGIA

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Annotation. In this article, the struggle of İlia Çavçavadze, one of the most prominent figures in the political life and literature of the 19th century in Georgia, and the intelligentsia class in which she was a member were examined.

Keywords: Georgia, the intelligentsia, İlia Chavchavadze, Tergdaleuli, russian empire

1. What is the intelligentsia?

When we say smart, enlightened or intellectual, we are not talking about those who are considered enlightened these days just because they have a higher education certificate. We are talking about intellectuals who are truly devoted to enlightenment. Let's talk about the concepts of ulema and intellectual as used in the Ottoman Empire, intellectual as used in the West, intelligentsia as used in Russian, and perhaps intellectual in a broader sense [1, p.1]. In fact, we mean almost the same people in body, although they are different in name. At least when we search for it as a word, we will come across similar meanings: scholar, enlightened, cultured, intelligent and s. With the opening of madrasas in the Ottoman period, religious scholars appeared and they developed over time and formed the ulema class. Thus, they start to provide education in religion and many different fields. Subsequently, they came to the fore in the form of a reactionary class because they could not keep up with the innovative understanding and adopted an hostile attitude. During the Republican period, intellectuals were divided into two groups. The group that forms the background of the newly established regime and the group that opposes it. During this period, they call themselves munevver to distinguish themselves from the ulama, and later aydin is preferred. The concept of intellectual is thought to have entered cultural life in the 19th century. This word was used by Leon Bloy in 1886 as close to the meaning used today. At that time, this word did not attract attention because it was not an event that gave him life. Later, it became widespread in the 1890s and after the Dreyfus incident, it definitely settled into the language of culture. When a group following in the footsteps of Emile Zola published a manifesto, Maurice Barres, who opposed Zola in the Dreyfus case, described them as "intellectual" in the sense of insulting the signatories of this manifesto. By the manifestos, this word was adopted and began to be used [1, p.9-10]. The two most famous 20th-century definitions of intellectuals are in diametrically opposite positions. According to Antonio Gramsci, "all people are intellectuals, but not everyone functions as an intellectual in society" [2, p.19]. Gramsci divides those who perform intellectual functions into two: traditional intellectuals and organic intellectuals. On the other hand, Louise Julien Benda has a famous definition that shows intellectuals to be made up of a handful of super talented philosopher-kings [3, p.22]. According to Jean-Paul Sartre's definition, it is "a person who pokes his nose into things that do not concern him" [4, p.15]. As we have seen, although all of these concepts are related to knowledge and thought, it is quite difficult for us to give a definition that is generally accepted by all segments. As for our main topic, if we talk about the popularization of the concept of "intelligentsia", this term was first used in Russian culture by the writer Pyotr Boborykin in the 1860s [5]. The concept of intelligentsia is a name given to a group of educated people who oppose the despotism of tsarism and the Orthodox church [1, p.10]. Boborykin has stated that he borrowed this term from German culture. This word has also passed from Russian culture to Georgian racially.

2. Enlightenment in Georgia

If we look at the beginning and development of the intelligentsia in Georgia, we see that the idea began to spread at the beginning of the XVIII century and then started and developed in the middle. The Georgian Enlightenment was influenced by the ideas of both Western European and Russian Intellectuals. The revolutionary democratic intellectuals of Georgia were receiving their

education in Russian higher education institutions and were therefore exposed to the influence of the intellectuals of that region. However, Ilia Chavchavadze did not bring the ideas of neither Russian nor Western European intellectuals directly to Georgia, because he was striving for the Georgian intelligentsia to be according to national traditions. At the same time, he thought that the ideas of the Russian revolutionary democrats could not be adopted because the problem of Georgia was different. The occupying Tsarist Russia had only one problem and that was the social problem, but Georgia, a Russian colony, had both national and social problems. Chavchavadze prioritized the national issue because it was related to the existence of the Georgian people and he said first let me live and then make me happy [6].

3. Ilia Chavchavadze

Let's talk about Ilia Chavchavadze, one of the leading intellectuals in Georgia. Chavchavadze is a Georgian writer, poet, journalist and political thinker. He is one of the most prominent figures of the 19th century, and as the architect of Georgian national thought, he became the leader of the country's liberation movement from the Russian yoke. It was later declared holy by the Georgian church [7]. He received his higher education in Petersburg, which was the most prestigious university of the Russian Empire at that time. However, the government, worried about revolutionary tendencies, put pressure on the university in 1861, and the students went to a boycott to protest this and organized demonstrations against the government. Due to these turmoils at the university, Chavchavadze had to leave his education and return to Georgia. He returns with great hopes to make important changes in Georgia and dedicates his whole life to the liberation of his country. In 1877, he published the journal "Iveria", one of the main centers of the national, spiritual and intellectual life of Georgia [8]. Later, he was the founder of two modern newspapers, "Sakartvelos Moambe" and "Iveria". Despite the harsh conditions of censorship, the magazine "Sakartvelos Moambe" has become the true flag of the national liberation movement [7]. Throughout his life, his aim has been the unification, national resistance and development of the Georgian nation. He never left himself to despair and believed with all his heart that the future will be the people and that Georgia will come to life again. Even in his writings, he invites his contemporaries to join forces and fight together for national independence and social justice. Often the main subject of his writings is the fate of Georgia. He dedicates his works, in which he expresses his enthusiastic love for his homeland, to the rebirth of the country and the arrival of spring. He was often detained by the police, as he fiercely opposed the tsarist regime and was one of the foremost representatives of the Georgian national liberation movement. Even his books were banned at that time, as the government saw him as a very serious obstacle to the policy of Czarist colonization. The cause of literary and political social activities was declared *persona non grata* by the Tsarist Russia. He died as a result of an assassination on September 12, 1907. His death is a matter of debate even today. Social democrat Bolsheviks were suspected due to historical facts, mainly because of his death, it is said that he was assassinated because he showed their inner face to the public. During World War II, an old man confessed that he was hired by the Russian gendarme to kill Ilia. As a result of the research, it was understood that this was the hand of the Russian tsar. The Georgian people, on the other hand, accepted his death as a tragedy [9].

In 1861, an article by Ilia Chavchavadze was published in the magazine "Tsiskar" (Dawn), and this article caused a heated debate in the Georgian society and divided the society into two. Young people are in favor of an invitation to independence, while those who are traditional are worried about the possibility of starting a new war. Historically, this conflict is called the "Battle of the Fathers and Sons" [10].

4. 'Tergdaleuli'

After this article, these young people who have sworn to fight for independence leave an indelible mark on Georgian history. The young people of this generation, known as "Tergdaleuli" (a socio-political and literary movement in Georgia), are the generation who are educated and come before the public with a well-thought-out liberation plan for their country that has been colonized for millennia. A new and higher phase of the Georgian Enlightenment also began with their entry into the political arena. The concept of "Tergdaleuli" made itself known in the newspapers of the

period such as “Süre”, “Moambe” and “Collection” written by Çavçavadze and its ideas were organized in these newspapers as a social movement [8]. “Tergdaleuli” is a Georgian term that literally means “one who drinks the waters of the Terek”, meaning someone who has been on Russian soil. “Tergdaleuli” were called conservative opponents of young Georgians educated in Tsarist Russia; some of them were Georgian educators until the 60s, who took a semi-secret opposition to the old and demanded the inclusion of the new in public life [11]. The program of the “Tergdaleuli” envisioned both the national and social liberation of the Georgian people. They were well acquainted with the thoughts of Russian and European political and public figures; They were aware of the ongoing political processes in the world, and according to their program, their first task was to gain autonomy within the Russian Empire under their occupation and then create an independent nation-state. They aimed to change and liberate Georgian society. They saw science and technology as the most important way out for liberation. The basis of education as salvation must be applied not only theoretically, but also practically. For example, the spread of social education and reading should be ensured. In order for science to reach everywhere, schools should be opened everywhere and education should be made open to everyone. Assistance should be sought from art and a wall should not be erected in front of it, on the contrary, science and art should not use a language that is difficult to perceive. The biggest contribution of this generation to Georgian literature is that it has presented understandable products to people in artistic and scientific language. They perceive art and literature as a social worker. The author, who insists on the importance of language, expresses this as follows: If there is no mother tongue, school is not a tool to develop the mind, on the contrary, it turns into a place that tries to suppress, obscure, trample and destroy the consciousness. The mother tongue is the first subject that the child has to learn in order for the school to function. The school should serve the public [8]. Because Georgia is a colonial country for centuries and is living in a feudal system next to the economically poor, advancing world. According to them, this bondage must end now. The Georgian culture of millennia is compressed into two cities, Tbilisi and Kutaisi, and according to them, no Georgian could and should not have put up with this situation. The new world could have been created together. Even if bridges were broken between people, this destruction could be repaired with the help of art. The struggle for freedom, which is the right of every human being, had to be based on fundamental and just reasons. The activities of the “Tergdaleuli” coincided with the strengthening of the Russification policy. They even wanted to ban the term “Georgia” and the Georgian press could only work in the provinces of Tbilisi and Kutaisi. Even in this difficult period, Iliia Chavchavadze and his supporters managed to maintain the national cause. Under their leadership, national banks were established in the provinces of Tbilisi and Kutaisi. Most of the money the bank raises is spent on financing Georgian schools and theatre. They become partners in a social awakening [1].

The “Tergdaleuli”, including I. Cavcavadze, A. Tsereteli, G. Tsereteli and N.Nikoladze, called for the social and national liberation of the Georgian people by attacking the feudal-serf system, taking into account the interests of the Georgian peasants and small-town bourgeoisie. In the 1860s and 1870s, the “Tergdaleuli” argued that freedom could be achieved through the re-establishment of an independent Georgian state, by organizing an approach to the general population [12].

Later, considering the positive impact of the progressive social life of Tsarist Russia on Georgian society, the “Tergdaleuli” demanded more political rights for the Georgian people within the framework of the Russian Empire. They defended the principles of materialist philosophy and realistic aesthetics and encouraged the establishment of a new Georgian literary language. The views of the “Tergdaleuli” developed under the influence of the ideologists of Russian revolutionary democracy, V.G.Belinskii, N.G.Chernyshevskii and N.A.Dobroliubov, as well as European Utopian socialists.

5. Associations and institutions

In May 1879, the “Association for the Promotion of Education and Training of the Georgian People” was established (the first president was Dimitri Kipiani), also translated as “Literacy

Association” among Georgians [13]. It is a charitable organization founded by a group of prominent Georgian intellectuals to promote a cultural renaissance among Georgian peasants, which was then part of the Russian Empire, and it operated until 1926/7, surviving until the early Soviet period. Organized by local educators such as nobles Ilia Chavchavadze, Dmitry Kipiani, Iakob Gogebasvili and Mariam Jambakur-Orbeliani, the Community ran a nationwide network of schools, bookstores and libraries; trained teachers and sponsored Georgian newspapers and magazines. During this period, public schools were opened, the whole country was invited to read and hundreds of books were published. At the same time, ancient manuscripts and folklore materials are collected and the maintenance of historical monuments begins. Georgians become interested in their own history. A well-known writer, Chavchavadze continued to play the leading role in the Society until his assassination in 1907, replacing the first president Kipiani in 1885. The association made an invaluable contribution to the establishment and development of Georgian national pedagogical thought and the national education system, as well as to the awakening of the national spirit in Georgian society. Georgian halls of Georgian language education were established by this society in Tbilisi and Kutaisi in the 1980s. Ilia Çavçavadze, together with Akaki Tsereteli, is the creator of the new Georgian literature and literary language. Chavchavadze and his associates carried out one of the most important reforms in the history of Georgian writing to improve the modern Georgian literary language, removing 5 old Georgian archaic letters that are no longer used in the language. In 1879, when the possibility of the Georgian national theater to be reactivated arose, he was elected president of the Georgian Theater Art Association and assumed the management of the theater, providing resources for its development. Chavchavadze attaches special importance to theater, because according to him, theater is very important for the formation of national identity, as it is a place where we can express our sorrows and troubles in our mother tongue. Today, the strongest roots of Georgian freedom should be sought in the initiatives of this period [8].

When we look at the Soviet Union period, it is possible to say that the Georgian patriots who were shot and deported at that time were innocent victims. From 1921 to 1941, about 100-200 thousand patriots were shot in Georgia. Even a few days after the 1924 uprising, up to 3,000 people were shot in just one night. Political repression started in Georgia in 1921. These pressures intensified and reached a large scale, especially in the mid-1930s. The sole purpose of repression in the Soviet Union was always to preserve political power [14].

The enormity and brutality of the 1930s repression was due to several reasons: first, the majority of the population who truly believed in ideology and creating a socialist structure were disappointed. Instead of a socialist system, they had a system based on violence that trampled on human rights and blinded people to the political system. Second, opponents of Jozef Stalin (1878-1953) emerged in the Communist Party. The third reason was the old intellectuals who never compromised with the Soviet system. For all these reasons, a strong opposition view has emerged in the country, which poses a great threat to the Communist Party [14].

Stalin and his associates decided to launch large-scale political repression to maintain the political system. The repressions of the 1930s affected all social classes, especially the intelligentsia. Victims of repressiya were especially prominent writer Miheil Javakhishvili, conductor Evgeni Mikeladze, literary critic Vakhtang Kotetisvili, famous poets Paolo Iashvili, Titsian Tabidze and others. Many Georgian cultural figures spent years in exile and prison. These were the words of the Georgian writer Miheil Cavahishvili on behalf of himself and other victims of repression: “I am innocent! I do not commit a crime against the Georgian people and my own conscience, however, I am ready to sacrifice my life for Georgia if needed. You can destroy me, but you can never erase what I left behind. I planted an oak tree in the soil-water of Georgia, whose roots you can never destroy”. Political repressions also severely affected the Georgian Bolsheviks: Mikheil Kakhiani, Mamia Orakhelashvili, Levan Gogoberidze, Polikarpe (Budu) Mdivani, Mikheil Okujava, Samson Mamulia and others were sentenced to death [14].

The only battlefield where the Georgian people could express their protest against the Soviet regime was the fields of writing, painting, theater and other arts. This is why these areas became the target of the Soviet Government. The main aim of the Soviet Government was to fight against and

destroy the Georgian intelligentsia. The majority of Georgian intellectuals could not get used to Soviet politics and therefore they were struggling to protect their national values and spirit. During this 37-year period of repressing, Paolo Iashvili, Titsian Tabidze, Miheil Cavahishvili, Sandro Ahmeteli, Nikolo Mcisvil and other important Georgian personalities cost their lives. Their “confession” testimonies are summarized in a document kept at the Archives Office of the Interior. These Soviet documents talk about the activities of Georgian intellectuals. The document also discusses the “harmful” actions of Soviet enemies in various fields [14].

Today, it is already clear to everyone how cruelly tortured it was that the intellectual section was compelled to make this confession, which did not even include the nature of the truth. According to these articles, the Georgian intellectuals had started their work as espionage, spying and counter-revolution. In addition, the confession letter stated that literary groups and associations served rather fascist and counter-revolutionary organizations rather than the development of Georgian literature. “This organization consists of fascist elements and is in sharp contrast to the Soviet government. It is fighting against the Soviet authorities, but waiting for the right time to act. The platform of the organization is to overthrow the Soviet Government and establish an independent Georgia under the protection of Germany”. According to the report, the Rustaveli theater was also the home and shelter of this organization. This fascist terrorist organization mainly consisted of the actors of the theater and the writers Paolo Iashvili, Titsian Tabidze, Miheil Javakhishvili, Davit Tsereteli were agents, provocateurs, traitors and bad people of Germany, France, Italy and Poland. In the Soviet era, nationalism and patriotism were considered the greatest and unforgivable crimes, and the state was waging a great war against them. After receiving a statement from Miheil Javakhishvili, the “Cheka”, the first intelligence and security agency of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, they shot him. However, before that one of the first victims of the repression was Paolo Iashvili. Baptized as a spy, agent, and terrorist, the poet committed suicide in protest. This fact shook Georgian intellectuals deeply. “He was a real man, superior to anyone!” – These words belong to Miheil Javahishvili. Nikolo McIschvili, like the others, was not pardoned and was shot in 1937, being branded as an agent and a spy. During this period, the theater director Sandro Ahmeteli tried to stage plays full of national ideas at the Rustaveli theater. Shalva Dadiani’s play “Tetnuldi”, based on the idea of fighting for a free Georgia, was staged in the theater in 1931. At the same time, with the help of Sandro Ahmeteli, Konstantine Gamsakhurdiya tried to stage her play based on nationalism and patriotism. Ahmeteli's brave steps were not forgiven, and he was arrested on fabricated spy charges and executed in 1937 [14].

Conclusion. Most of the intellectuals whose names we have mentioned fought for what they believed in, and this cost some of their lives. When necessary, they even opposed their own states for the right. They defended their beliefs, which they thought were right, without being attached to anyone and without hesitation. Sartre sets an example in this regard. Because, despite being French, he opposed the French war against Algeria. Another example is Emile Zola, who, in the Dreyfus case, was prosecuted for insulting the military with the caption “I do not accuse” him as a party. When we look at Georgia, we witness the struggles and lives given in the name of national identity. In addition to a valuable figure such as İlia Çavçavadze, we talked about many important intellectuals who struggled for independence. In short, no matter how different the concepts used are in terms of time and geography, the struggles are completely different.

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VIETNAM: AN ECONOMIC DRAGON AGAINST ALL ODDS

В'ЄТНАМ: ЯК СТАТИ «ЕКОНОМІЧНИМ ДРАКОНОМ» НЕЗВАЖАЮЧИ НА ОБСТАВИНИ

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Abstract. *Vietnam is the country that experienced the wars with France, the US and China and suffered a great damage of infrastructure and agriculture as a result. The communist leadership preserved its hold on power even after the collapse of the Soviet Union by introducing far-reaching market reforms with Chinese specifics. Unlike many of its neighbours in the region, Vietnam achieved considerable results in this field by creating a highly diversified economy and becoming the factory of the world for the top multinationals. Our article is trying to explore the main reasons for the dynamic growth of Vietnamese GDP and the most important sectors of national economy that contributed to it.*

The article notes that modern Vietnam is an agrarian country with a mixed-type industry. Vietnam is actively developing various sectors of its economy thanks to cheap labour and the ability to ensure fast production rates. Due to this, the country acts as one of the key directions for foreign investments and the outpost for the placement of industrial capacities of foreign corporations. By developing various industries, Vietnam is trying to increase its own exports through the maintenance of infrastructure projects and transport potential.

Along with its industrial production, the country is actively developing the agricultural sector by exporting exotic fruit, tea, coffee and rice which are in demand not only in the Southeast Asian region, but also in the Western Hemisphere and Europe.

Tourism is a significant source of income generation for the country, too. The Vietnamese government is encouraging foreign tourists to visit the country's cultural monuments and prominent places by improving air connections.

Therefore, in the conditions of increased internal and external threats and challenges, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam impresses with consistently high growth rates and strong attention of foreign investors, while combining the market with the principles of late socialism preserved in the state. The analysis of Vietnam's economic development policy proves the incompleteness of the industrialization process. Nevertheless, technological renewal combined with the attraction of foreign investments and the increase of production is observed in various spheres of the national economy.

Keywords: *Vietnam, textile industry, tourism, infrastructure, ports, coffee, agriculture, smart phones, seafood.*

Анотація. В'єтнам – це країна, яка перебувала у військових конфліктах із Францією, США і Китаєм, що призвело до значних економічних втрат у інфраструктурній та аграрній царинах. Однак комуністична еліта зберегла контроль над політичною владою навіть попри розпад СРСР завдяки тому, що запровадила ґрунтовні економічні перетворення з китайською специфікою. На відміну від багатьох регіональних сусідів, В'єтнам досягнув значного рівня диверсифікації економіки і перетворився на справжню фабрику світу, яка виконує замовлення транснаціональних корпорацій. У своїй статті автори намагаються з'ясувати головні причини динамічного зростання в'єтнамського ВВП і найбільш важливі галузі економічної активності, що сприяли цьому процесу.

У статті відзначено, що сучасний В'єтнам є аграрною країною з промисловістю, яка вибудовується за змішаним типом. В'єтнам активно розвиває різні галузі економіки завдяки дешевій робочій силі та можливості забезпечити швидкі темпи виробництва. Завдяки цьому країна виступає в ролі одного з ключових напрямів для іноземних інвестицій та форпосту для розміщення промислових потужностей зарубіжних корпорацій. Розвиваючи різні галузі виробництва, В'єтнам намагається нарощувати власний експорт за рахунок розвитку інфраструктурних проектів та транспортного потенціалу.

Поряд із промисловим виробництвом країна активно підвищує темпи розвитку сільськогосподарського сектору, експортуючи екзотичні фрукти, чай, каву та рис, котрі користуються попитом не тільки в регіоні Південно-Східної Азії, а й у Західній півкулі та Європі.

Крім того, вагомим джерелом нарощування прибутків для країни є туризм. Влада В'єтнаму заохочує іноземних туристів до відвідування культурних пам'яток і видатних місць держави, вдосконалюючи авіасполучення.

Відтак, в умовах посиленних внутрішніх та зовнішніх загроз та викликів Соціалістична Республіка В'єтнам вражає стійко високими темпами зростання та потужною увагою зарубіжних інвесторів за умов поєднання ринку з принципами пізнього соціалізму, що збереглися в державі. Аналіз політики економічного розвитку В'єтнаму доводить незавершеність процесу індустріалізації. Тим не менш, у різних сферах економіки спостерігається технологічне оновлення із залученням іноземних інвестицій та нарощуванням виробництва.

Ключові слова: В'єтнам, текстильна промисловість, туризм, інфраструктура, порти, кави, сільське господарство, смартфони, морепродукти.

Problem statement. Vietnam is located in the region where several powerful competitors for foreign direct investments like the largest Muslim state of the world Indonesia and the Philippines that support special relations with the USA are present. Moreover, the country is the only one ASEAN Member State that suffered an extensive damage during the wars with great powers and still engaged in the arms race with China. Finally, the geographical shape of Vietnam represented by a narrow and long strip of land next to the South China Sea is not very conducive for economic development because of the lack of its strategic depth and mountainous terrain. Against all odds, however, Vietnam became the economic leader of the region, and the authors are striving to find out the main reasons for this.

Research assumption. The paradox of the situation is in the fact that Vietnam had to face significant difficulties on the way of its economic development. However, we are witnessing the dynamic rise of the national GDP. The authors believe that the country succeeded in using its relative advantages like cheap workforce and strategic location, liberalized the economy, and found many clients for its products abroad by efficiently integrating itself into the global supply chains.

Analysis of the latest publications. There are many studies on the Vietnamese success. Muhammad Abdul Kamal claims that it liberalized external trade with 72 countries, and the most importantly with the ASEAN Member States and the USA, made the emphasis on development of technical skills of the population, and streamlined the business procedures [Kamal, 2022]. Rodion

Ebbighausen states that the Vietnamese success depended on the active participation of the country in global supply chains and luring of the corporations that had left China because of rigid anti-COVID policy. On the other hand, he is confident that Vietnam suffers because it had to import huge amounts of spare parts and raw materials to maintain the production at large [Ebbighausen, 2022]. Son Ji-Hyoung considers the rise of foreign direct investments and introduction of the technical know-how along with them as the important factors of Vietnamese economic success, but warns that domestic business is dwarfed by multinationals who are exporting the lion's share of products from the country. Because of this the Korean model of capitalism with chaebols is unlikely to take root here [Ji-Hyoung, 2022]. Nie Huihui underscores that Vietnam is located at the crossroads between ASEAN and China, where it gets low-cost raw materials from, while its major market is in the USA that is facilitated by growing American demand for cheap Vietnamese goods [Huihui, 2021]. Finally, Dhananath Fernando says that Vietnam became so successful because its government dramatically scaled down its participation in the economic processes, took considerable efforts in signing numerous trade agreements, gained the confidence of strategic investors worldwide by treating the first foreign stakeholders in the country fairly that encouraged other multinationals to follow their example and to enter Vietnam [Fernando, 2020]. All those conclusions are interesting but, unfortunately, they do not provide a comprehensive picture of economic success that is also based on the agriculture, industry, remittances, as well as the tertiary sector.

Vietnam is considered the Southeast Asian economic dragon despite the fact that it used to be the communist country and historically had to participate in the regional arms race in order to protect itself from more powerful China. Since 1986, Vietnamese economy has been demonstrating the significant growth that can be attributed to the successful implementation of the Doi Moi policy establishing the market economy in parallel with a rigid one-party political system [Vietnam's reforms..., 2020].

Aim of the article. The aim of the article is to explore how Vietnam, that lost the Soviet Union as its principal donor in 1991 and had to guard itself from eventual Chinese threat, became so successful and still meets significant annual economic growth.

Presentation of the main research outcomes. Along with Thailand, Vietnam is the most important regional power in the continental Southeast Asia. The country is shaped as the US dollar sign and surrounds with its land area more traditional and rural Cambodia and Laos to the west. On the other hand, the northern region is bordering Chinese territory and the smallest Hainan Province is located not far from the Vietnamese coast. The land border of both neighbours is 1300 kilometres long, and because of the strategic whereabouts of Hainan Island the northern part of Vietnam is practically encircled by the Chinese territory [A history of boorishness..., 2020].

The land area of Vietnam constitutes about 331,698 square kilometres but it is very narrow in the middle section and becomes wider predominantly in the North and in the South. This state actor is bordering the South China Sea and the length of the national coastline constitutes 3,260 kilometres, while creating the necessary preconditions for development of the international trade due to existence of 90 ports [Vietnam Union of Friendship Organizations, 2014]. Vietnam also enjoys the access to both the Tonkin Bay and the Thailand (Siam) Bay. Only 15 per cent of the Vietnamese territory is represented by the plains next to major waterways such as the Mekong River and the Red River, while the rest area is covered by the rugged mountains and hills [Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam..., n.d.]. If to take into account the 'explosive heritage' of the Vietnam War and general contamination of the national soil, it is hard to imagine how such a lean and prolonged mountainous country can be successful in agricultural respect, but it is the fact.

The national population constitutes 98.5 million people, and Vietnam occupies the 3rd position in the region behind Indonesia and the Philippines. Among all the Vietnamese, only 12.58 million residents are aged over 60 that is conducive for development of the labour market [Retirement homes..., 2022].

To understand the economic miracle of Vietnam, it should be noted that it is very attractive in tourist respect. In villages, one can see the dwellings on wooden stilts but the urban concrete houses

with several floors and extremely narrow façade dominate. Vietnamese people own at least 50 million motorbikes that are using gasoline [Plenty of road left..., 2022]. As a result, foreign tourists usually remember Vietnam as the chaotic land of 'flat' houses and traffic jams but the country is more interesting than that. The national architecture represents the fusion between the Chinese, French, and even Soviet traditions. Among all cities, southern cultural hub Ho Chi Ming stands out because of numerous skyscrapers and French architectural heritage with famous 'Quadrangle' of the Opera House, the Notre-Dame Cathedral Basilica of Saigon of 1880, the People's Committee Building of 1909 (the former Town Hall in colonial times), and the meticulously decorated Central Post Office of 1891 [Ho Chi Minh City attractions, n.d.].

In general, the country boasts eight sites under the protection of UNESCO. Among them, one should especially single out old capital Hue with royal buildings of the Chinese style, Hoi An town known for its temples, canals and the unique Pagoda Bridge, the ruins of Cham monuments, and old fortresses in Hanoi and the Thanh Hoa Province [UNESCO official site, n.d.]. But what really stands out in Vietnam is the Ha Long Bay with 1,600 islands within the Greater Bay of Tonkin where one can find caves, floating markets, limestone rocks of unusual shapes, and striking rocky beaches next to the deep-green water. Numerous traditional boats with red sails or modern ships are available for cruises. It is needed only two hours by bus to get to this UNESCO-protected area from Hanoi [What to see..., n.d.].

In 2012, the new travel motto 'Vietnam – the Timeless Charm' was introduced instead of less inspiring slogan 'Vietnam – Hidden Charm', and it sounds rather crafty. The lotus flower with petals of different colours is featured on the logo and represents the strong Buddhist traditions of the society and many types of tourist activities that foreigners may enjoy while staying here [From 'hidden' to 'timeless charm'..., 2014].

Vietnam is famous for numerous resorts like Nha Trang, Danang and Phan Thiet and is considered as the only regional competitor of Thailand with more developed aviation industry but so far remains not so popular with foreigners. Vietnam Airlines Group having about 100 planes is the state-owned corporation with insignificant Japanese minority stake that operates (like Ethiopian in Africa) the modern fleet of Boeing 787 Dreamliners and Airbus A350s for long-haul destinations. Serving the regional flights, the main 'working horses' of the carrier are represented by 68 Airbus A321s. The airplanes are painted in dark-blue colours with the traditional lotus as the symbol of tourism industry depicted on their tails [Jaafar, 2022; Ahlgren, 2022].

The main domestic competitor of Vietnam Airlines Group is Viet Jet that is considered the largest private carrier in the country. The airline boasts one of the youngest fleets in the region with 65 jets of Airbus A320 family painted in red [Fly Vietair, n.d.]. In 2016 and 2019, Viet Jet and Boeing Corporation agreed to implement two enormous contracts that stipulated the supply of 200 Boeing 737 Max aircrafts. Despite the fatal crashes of two planes of this type in Ethiopia and Indonesia in the recent years, this Vietnamese airline decided to go ahead with the contract in 2022. It might bring USD 35 billion into the US economy and is likely to increase the importance of Vietnam as the US strategic partner [Vietjet, Boeing sign deal..., 2022]. Finally, Bamboo Airways was created as another private entity only in 2017 and today boasts the mixed fleet of 29 Boeing Dreamliners, Neo Airbus A321s, Embraers 190, and several other planes whose tails are painted in green and navy-blue colours [Bamboo airlines..., 2022].

The visa regime in Vietnam is described as partly liberal and cannot be compared to generous Thai regulations. Currently, the residents of 80 countries are enjoying the right to get the electronic permission that entitles them to stay in the Vietnamese territory during 30 days [E-visa tips..., 2022].

Vietnam was more or less successful in tourist respect with 18 million tourist arrivals and USD 33 billion profits from the hospitality industry back in 2019. However, the rise of the COVID-19 pandemic forced the communist leadership to introduce the strict quarantine and the number of foreigners substantially dwindled. As a result of the isolation, the country attracted 3.8 million foreigners in 2020 and only 157,000 people in the subsequent year [Int'l arrivals..., 2021; Vietnam reopening..., 2022]. The analysis says that the holidaymakers from the certain countries prefer

vacations in Vietnam. For example, the Chinese tourists dominated in the traffic with 5.8 million visitors in 2019, then followed the South Korean citizens with 4.3 million arrivals, and finally went the residents of Japan and Taiwan with less than 1 million visitors as the representatives of each state [2019 a year..., 2019]. So, the future aim is to increase the number of foreigners from the USA and the members of the European Union.

In the final count, one must say that Vietnam is attractive because of wide selection of resorts and islands (the Ha Long Bay is especially popular with the international tourists), cheap food and hotel rooms, numerous architectural masterpieces, and highly developed aviation industry with modern planes. Moreover, the trip to this country can easily be combined with the excursions to Laos, Cambodia or even Thailand. For example, the flight time to get from the Southern Vietnamese aviation hub Ho Chi Minh to Phnom Penh constitutes only 50 minutes, while a modern jet carries passengers in 90 minutes from Ho Chi Minh to Bangkok.

Vietnam boasts two economic capitals, i.e. Ha Noi ('The Land between the Rivers') with 8.2 million people within the Delta of the Red River in the North and Ho Chi Minh (Saigon) with 8.8 million inhabitants next to the mighty Mekong in the South. As a result, Vietnam has twin economic 'magnets' for rural dwellers and vast agricultural areas around both megalopolises are extensively cultivated. Being more dirty and chaotic than Ho Chi Minh, Hanoi nonetheless is surrounded by the belt of multinational factories and regarded as the main technological hub of the country. The city is suffering from polluted air and congestion but high-rise buildings are not numerous here [What Hanoi's FDI..., 2021]. Hanoi factories are exporting their products via Hai Phong Port southeast of the capital that is suitable for the ships of enormous size and considered the second largest in Vietnam. Hai Phong city has 2 million residents and is actively participating in external trade [Tera Logistics.com, 2021].

Ho Chi Minh is the main business centre of Vietnam, as it is responsible for creation of 23 per cent of GDP [Market report IO, 2021]. This city was named after the regional Saigon River during the French colonial rule and subsequently renamed in honour of the leader of Vietnamese revolution in 1976 [Ho Chi Minh city history, n.d.]. In 2021, it was the 21st busiest port in the world with the turnaround of 8 million standard containers that is more than the Port of Colombo in Sri Lanka catering the needs of the huge Indian market handled or the largest African and Mediterranean Port Tangier-Med in Morocco served the same year [Global top 30 container ports in 2021, 2022]. Ho Chi Minh also boasts the most important airport of Vietnam, Tan Son Nhat, that can cater the needs of about 40 million passengers. However, new Long Thanh aerial hub is being constructed in order to cater the needs of 100 million passengers and as much cargo as handles the world leader Hong Kong by 2040 [Vietnam's airport infrastructure..., 2022].

In 2021, the Vietnamese GDP constituted USD 363 billion and it was one of the leaders in the ASEAN region by those indicators. The per capita of average resident during the same year was equal to USD 3,694 that is not a large amount. It means that Vietnam remains an attractive spot for international investors because of small wages of workers and young energetic workforce [Ferro, 2022]. At the same time, the country had USD 110 billion of foreign exchange reserves in March 2022 that was more than enough for the procurement of critical import for many months [Foreign exchange reserves..., 2022].

The secret of success is in the fact that Vietnam runs a highly diversified economy with export sectors catering the different interests of international investors. But the most important field of activity is the production of the smart phones and spare parts for them. Because of this the country is dubbed 'The Second Republic Samsung', while the main markets for such phones are located in the US and Western Europe. Back in 2021, the Vietnamese enterprises exported this product to the tune of USD 57.54 billion, with China, the USA and the EU Member States being the major consumers [Made in Vietnam phones..., 2022]. Why the South Korean giant is investing in Vietnam so heavily? The country shares the common border with China and enjoys the access to its own enormous consuming market and respectively to the markets of the ASEAN Member States with gigantic population like Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand.

The presence of Samsung (or 'Three Stars' in the Korean language) in Vietnam is very important. The example of this corporation is luring other multinationals like Apple or Google which are working in the same field and dramatically developing the technical skills of the national workforce. So far, this player has invested USD 18 billion in the production base here and remains the largest manufacturer of mobile devices in the world with 270 million units in general. It operates the net of six factories with two northern smart phone-making facilities Thai Nguen and Bac Ninh being the top suppliers of those products [Nguyen, 2022]. It is truly amazing that powerful Samsung is producing 60 per cent of its global quantity of smart phones here, in Vietnam [Nha, 2022]. The engineers of this multinational are also building its first research and development centre outside their home country not far away from Hanoi and there are plans to introduce the manufacturing of semiconductors here in order to streamline the process of assembly of phones. Because of the contribution of this player and other Korean multinationals, South Korea remains in the list of the most important trade partners of Vietnam with the turnout of USD 78 billion and the aggregate investments of USD 80 billion in 2021 [Samsung plans to invest..., 2022].

Vietnam became the top textile producer and is competing with Bangladesh and Turkey for the crown of the world's second largest exporter only behind China. The country has some 6000 factories at its disposal, while the sales of garments brought into its coffers USD 40 billion in 2021. As a result, it enjoys 6.4 per cent share of world trade in such goods but many essential materials are delivered from the Chinese suppliers that creates a constant dependency [Vietnam to rise..., 2022]. Why is Vietnam popular as the source of investments in the production of garments? The country is a cheap place to hire workers, owns numerous ports that are catering the needs of every region, does not have the devastating seasons of natural calamities like Bangladesh, and has never experienced such tragic events like the collapse of Rana factory in 2013 that forced many foreign investors to leave Bangladesh or to introduce strict inspections of production facilities there [Bangladesh..., 2022]. On the other hand, another competitor, Turkey, experiences its own difficulties with ongoing Kurdish conflict and Syrian refugees.

Vietnam can also be described as 'The Land of Nike', since it is considered the hub of production of sports goods and footwear. For example, this gigantic American corporation is making 50 per cent of its goods in the country and provides the jobs for at least 300,000 of its citizens. As a result, this multinational is responsible for the one third of export of the Vietnamese footwear [Positive signs..., 2022]. At the same time, its top European competitor Adidas is saying that 43 out of 100 pairs of shoes are also produced in Vietnam on the annual basis. At least 200,000 people are working for Adidas in the country that is much greater number than this German maker employs in China. In 2021, Vietnam earned USD 20.7 billion from the overseas sales of sports goods and footwear. In general, by the number of the shoes produced it occupied the third place in the world with some 920 pairs of them that is a tremendous achievement [Adidas affirms..., 2022; Best products..., 2022].

Vietnam is well-known in the region for its massive steel and cement output. In 2021, the national factories produced 101.1 million tonnes of cement and clinker, since the national middle class is growing and its representatives are looking for their own houses or flats. At the same time, the tourism industry is developing at a quick pace and the demand for construction of new hotels remains high. Vietnam boasts the cheapest production of cement in the region due to the extremely small wages of workers and the economy of scale [Vietnam's cement exports..., 2022]. More than 25 million tonnes out of 45 millions exported in 2021 were bought by China where construction industry is working unabated. The rest were consumed by the Philippines and Bangladesh as the countries that were chronically suffering from the natural calamities [Cement, clinker exports..., 2022]. The production of steel constituted 23.6 million tonnes and by this indicator Vietnam occupied the 12th place in the world in 2021 [World Steel Association..., 2022].

Thailand, known as 'The Detroit of Asia', is the most important regional maker of cars but Vietnam is trying to become its competitor. The Vingroup national conglomerate has been producing the very first Vietnamese cars under the VinFast brand since 2018 and subsequently added the line of electric cars to its assortment in 2021, with the total investment of USD 3.5

billion. The corporation operates the factory in the largest Northern Port Hai Phong that is capable of assembling 250,000 cars and another facility in North Carolina (the USA) would go online with the output of some 200,000 vehicles in 2027. The prices of electric jeeps are quite competitive, but cars are still not known to the general public outside Vietnam [Quian, 2022]. The owners of the corporation hope to dominate in the national market, since Vingroup is already the top catering corporation in the country and almost all citizens have a general idea about this brand. Not only cars, but also electric scooters are manufactured by this conglomerate that is important for the country where two-wheelers are still dominating in the streets [Fast and serious..., 2018]. In general, motorbike-infested Vietnam apparently has very low percentage of car owners and this market remains quite lucrative with a strong potential of growth.

Despite predominantly mountainous terrain and a long and narrow coastline, Vietnam remains an important agricultural player in the region. The forest area of the country occupies 42 per cent of the national territory and the land under the trees is equal to 14.7 million hectares [Forest covers..., 2022]. As a result, Vietnam remains the top producer of timber. In 2021, this field of economic activity brought to state coffers around USD 14.81 billion with the residents of the USA and the East Asians being the top customers. The national corporations are mainly supplying raw materials, however, the Southern region of Vietnam is known as the place where the sets of sophisticated furniture are produced [Vietnam's wood exports..., 2022]. The authors should underscore that the wooden products, especially ships and dolls, are the vital part of national crafts and are widely available in gift shops.

The hills of mountains of Central Vietnam are suitable for cultivation of coffee trees and tea bushes. On the other hand, the country is relatively small contributor to the world green tea industry. In 2021, national enterprises sold this drink abroad to the tune of USD 214 million, while Pakistan, the Russian Federation and Taiwan were their main customers. The factories of Vietnam are churning out more black tea than green variety that is unusual for this region of Asia [Vietnam should not miss..., 2022]. In general, Vietnam was the 7th largest tea producer in the world and 123,000 hectares were occupied by the plantations of tea bushes in 2021 [Vietnam ranks 7th..., 2022].

At the same time, it is the 2nd largest producer of coffee only after Brazil and respectively – the number two exporter. The Arabica saplings were brought to the country in the middle of the 19th century but could not stand the cold weather of the highlands and the French colonizers switched to Robusta variety as the more efficient, cold-tolerant, and disease-resistant tree later in 1908 [Opportunities for foreign investors..., 2022]. Today, the country is producing mainly Robusta that is considered a cheaper kind of coffee bean and used for preparation of instant drinks. The name 'Robusta' means robust or powerful and this type of coffee is stronger in taste and slightly more bitter because of the less natural sugar content [10 differences..., 2014]. Usually, the Vietnamese workers are picking around 30 million of standard bags that contain 60 kilograms of beans and subsequently processing them at 160 coffee roasting factories [Vietnam seeks to double..., 2022]. In 2021, the country exported the coffee to the tune of USD 3 billion and among those volumes only USD 433 million of sales were represented by the products with the added value, while the rest were sold as raw beans. So, the aim of the industry is to invest more funds in processing facilities in order to sell ready-to-drink product at higher price [Coffee industry..., 2022]. The representatives of Vietnamese farmers are hoping that the growing interest of consumers in 1.4-billion strong Chinese market will help them to increase the international presence of instant coffee, taking into consideration the existence of common border between China and Vietnam. Indeed, Vietnamese factories sold coffee to China to the tune of USD 128 million in 2021 and this may only be the beginning of the fruitful cooperation [Vietnamese coffee..., 2022]. Moreover, Vietnam is likely to have a brand problem because there are no national producers that are well-recognized in the world.

The country is also an important player in the international rice markets. In 2021, the national farms collected 44 million tonnes of rice and sent 6.57 million of them abroad. The profits from the export were slightly higher than the amounts that their counterparts got from the sales of coffee abroad [Vietnam rice..., 2022]. The internal consumption of this product remains substantial as

well, since the majority of the Vietnamese dishes are rice-based. Among them, one should single out the rice with eggs and pork, the rice with seafood, the soups with Vietnamese rice noodles, and the rice paper rolls with fish or meat inside [12 Vietnamese dishes..., 2020]. Vietnam occupies the 2nd place in the world after India as the top rice exporter and is actively vying for the regional dominance with Thailand. Overpopulated Indonesia and the Philippines that are prone to natural calamities are the top importers of this agricultural commodity [Nguyen, 2022].

Vietnam is the world leader in the field of pepper production, since it is responsible for 40 per cent of international output of this spice from the land area of 130,000 hectares in the Central and Southern regions and remains the most important exporter of the commodity by a large margin. At the same time, among the residents of the country the pepper is not very popular that created the preconditions for export [Vietnam pepper..., n.d.].

Vietnamese farmers are not only growing cashew nuts, but also importing them raw from numerous African countries in order to add the value in national factories and subsequently to resell the product again, since national production facilities can handle as much as 4 million tonnes of them. The most important buyers of such product are living in the US and Europe [Khurana, 2021]. Usually, cashew nuts are widely used as the snacks for drinks in developed countries. It is also a custom in many Western cultures to spread the butter from cashew nut on the bread and to eat it while having breakfast or lunch. In 2021, Vietnam exported cashew nuts to the tune of USD 3.6 billion to the USA, the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy while competing with India in the world market as the top supplier of the commodity [Lang, 2022]. We can make a conclusion that the industry earns more than the famed coffee branch and is broadly involved in global chains of production and distribution.

Vietnamese companies are actively selling fruits and vegetables abroad, too. This happens because the country has numerous climatic zones from the coast to the hills and mountains and from the North to the South. The national specialization is represented by rare fruits like mangosteen, lichi, sour star apple, rambutan, longan, and dragon fruit. The ports are ready to handle the production from any region of the country, while there are so many of them. In 2021, Vietnam exported fruits and vegetables to the tune of USD 3.55 billion, with China being the largest customer who bought 53.7 per cent of them. It means that this field of economic activity is bringing even more profits than coffee industry and almost as much as cashew products. At the same time, Vietnam is considering a lucrative market of the European Union where exotic fruits are not harvested as the next destination of enlargement of its sales abroad [Vietnam's fruit and vegetable exports..., 2022]. So far, the county is the top supplier of agricultural goods to China along with Thailand, the Philippines, the USA, and such South American states within the temperate zone as Chile and Peru [Fruit imports..., 2021]. Unlike its main competitor Thailand, Vietnam shares a border with the Chinese market that is truly convenient.

In 2021, Vietnam sold fish and shrimps to the tune of USD 8.9 billion that was a great achievement compatible to the trade statistics of such giants as Norway or Chile [Vietnam association of seafood exporters and producers, 2022, January 25]. The share of the shrimps in the export constituted USD 3.9 billion, with strategic American market providing the largest sales of USD 1 billion, while China and Japan were the second and the third most important destinations [Vietnam association of seafood exporters and producers, 2022, January 26]. Pangasius (or Asiatic Catfish) is the most famous product from the Southern region of Vietnam. The fish is raised in the pools next to the Mekong River in order to sell frozen fillets to the Chinese and US customers who love it. The white meat of Pangasius is locally known as 'Tra' and regarded as one of the cheapest fish products in the world. In 2021, Vietnam received USD 1.62 billion from the successful export of it [Chanh, 2022].

Another specialty is represented by tuna fish with the sales on international markets to the tune of USD 757 million [Tuna industry grows..., 2022]. In many countries, canned tuna is welcomed as a useful and meaty addition to the salads, and in East Asia it is eaten raw with sushi. Tuna is very muscular fish whose meat tastes like the beef and its canned variety allows saving

considerable time during the preparation of salads. Apparently, both Vietnam and Thailand are capitalizing on that.

Traditionally, the overpopulated entities like the Philippines and Vietnam depended on the export of workforce. The remittances to the country constituted some USD 18 billion in 2021 and it belonged to the list of the top ten receivers. The Diaspora in the US is the largest for Vietnam abroad and consists of 2.2 million people. The people of the Vietnamese origin in Cambodia, Japan, France and Australia are also noticeable providers of such funds [Vietnamese payment service provider..., 2022]. The residents of Ho Chi Minh and Southern cities in general get the largest share of money transfers, since many of their relatives left for the USA at the final stage of the Vietnam War. For example, the dwellers of the Southern economic capital probably received the third of all national remittances in 2021 [Remittances to Vietnam..., 2021]. By this indicator Vietnam occupies the second place among all the ASEAN Member States only after the Philippines that are famous for their English-speaking Catholic domestic workers who sent home USD 34.884 billion in 2021 [Philippine remittances..., 2022]. Vietnam is also counting on the support of Diaspora whose members became the investors in different technical startups or hospitality projects.

The country is partly self-sufficient in fossil fuels because the state monopolist Petro Vietnam is extracting crude oil at a large scale in the South China Sea. Back in 2021, the output of its production constituted almost 11 million tonnes and, at the same time, the corporation was one of the top makers of fertilizers [PetroVietnam's revenue..., 2022]. On the other hand, the coal is in the short supply because the mines in the North largely fail to keep up its output with strongly growing economy and population explosion. In 2021, the country bought 38.8 million tonnes of this type of fuel mainly from Indonesia and Australia in order to generate enough electricity. The price and the scarcity of coal is constantly growing because of the war in Ukraine in 2022 that forced European countries to abandon Russian gas in the favour of coal from world markets and Vietnam is feeling the impact with the rise of periodic blackouts [Vietnam's energy crunch..., 2022].

The import is more or less traditional as for the typical country of the region and consists of complex weapons systems, gasoline and diesel, copper products, and the raw materials for textile and leather industries. In 2021, the trade turnover of the country constituted USD 668 billion and the value of import was worth USD 336.3 billion that probably reflects the dependence from machinery, semiconductors, buttons, cloth and, of course, from the Indonesian and Australian coal [General statistics office of Vietnam, 2022].

Why is the country such efficient as the top FDI destination? Firstly, it has considerable young population and lucrative internal market. Secondly, it is located close to China and its workforce is cheaper and younger that allows shifting the factories here quickly during the US-Chinese trade wars. Another factor is that the Chinese leadership has been practicing 'Zero' policy towards COVID-19 for several years when the whole huge megalopolises were sealed. Those harsh measures were not suitable for many international investors which lost their timetables of production and chose the relocation to more liberal in this respect Vietnam instead. Moreover, the Vietnamese land does not face such powerful natural calamities as the landmasses of such main competitors as the Philippines, Indonesia or Bangladesh. The wages remain low and oscillate, in many cases, between USD 132 and 190 per month [Vietnam to increase..., 2020]. Vietnam who gained the membership in ASEAN in 1995 can also be regarded as the gateway to this organization where nine other members are located and some of them, like Indonesia or the Philippines, boast the consumer markets of enormous sizes [ASEAN official site, n.d.]. Finally, this country as the one party-state remains predictable in its investment policy and does not change the rules of the game after elections. We have also never heard of serious unrest among industrial workers here that may disrupt the production of goods.

The question on whether Vietnam can be long-term competitor or the substitute of China is not viable because of the issues with logistics and relatively small internal consumer base. The roads in the country are better developed next to the coast and in the interior mountains and hills that does not allow creating the net of bullet trains or even modern highways. The expensive infrastructure for fast trains is needed, since the length of Vietnam is 1,650 kilometres and the

central region is relatively sparsely populated, unlike the North and the South [Vietnam Geography, n.d.]. Vietnam with 3,000 kilometres of usual tracks cannot compete with China, where the bullet train lines will probably be extended to the length of 50,000 kilometres by 2025 [Vietnam speeds up..., 2021; China plans to expand..., 2022]. Moreover, the PRC dominates in the list of the top ten container ports, while Vietnam has none of them with only Ho Hi Minh port occupying the 21st relatively modest position [Global top 30 container ports in 2021, 2022]. Moreover, the country has many ports in general, but not all of them can host ships of impressive size.

Conclusions. As it is shown, both the PRC and Vietnam share similar economic characteristics in many areas and are trying to preserve the one-party rule with economic reforms that bring the openness and trade liberalization, while attracting important foreign investors at the same time. Vietnam largely followed the Chinese example and became the hub that produces smart phones and electronic components, textile and sport goods, cement and steel products, fruit, rice, and different types of seafood. Like China, Vietnam is considered an attractive tourist destination with developed aviation industry. On the other hand, the land logistics remains challenging, while manufacturing industry badly needs the import of Chinese and Korean components and internal market is rather small, if to compare with the number of people in gigantic China.

There is also the shadow of possible war with China which Vietnam with predominantly old Soviet weapons and several more modern Russian systems is unable to win. Therefore, the country remains the 5th largest importer of Russian weapons in the world and the leader by defense expenses in the region, since it bought weaponry from the Russian Federation between 1995 and 2021 for the amount of USD 7.4 billion [Hiep, 2022]. As it is widely known, Russian military industrial complex is considering China as its main customer, so Vietnam cannot gain quality edge. Vietnam is too dependent on the import of fossil fuels like coal and the facilities that generate green energy are not so well-developed. As a result, both countries will remain important for international investors but Vietnam will always be the only second choice for many of them. But in general, Vietnam will continue to attract numerous investments that is conducive for the dynamic growth of national economy.

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СУЧАСНА СИСТЕМА МІЖНАРОДНОГО ПРАВА

УДК 341

EUROPEAN MODEL OF LEGAL REGULATION OF COMPETITION: IMPACT OF ORDOLIBERALISM

ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКА МОДЕЛЬ ПРАВОВОГО РЕГУЛЮВАННЯ КОНКУРЕНЦІЇ: ВПЛИВ ОРДОЛІБЕРАЛІЗМУ

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Abstract. *Article is devoted to the analysis of theoretically and practical aspects of human rights protection mechanisms in cases of violations of competition into the EU. It was determined that the right to fair competition has economic as well as social aspect. The basics of competition protection on the EU level (covered in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU) were rooted from the doctrine of ordoliberalism. The social aspect of the right to fair competition shows consumers the right to receive fair benefits to the domestic market by staying in the equal access to the goods and / or services. The Charter of Fundamental Rights, which, according to the Treaty of Lisbon, is one of the fundamental documents of the EU, confirms this social dimension of the right to fair competition. Article 38 of the Charter states that “the Union’s policies ensured a high level of consumer protection.” This means that one of the objectives of EU competition policy is to protect consumer rights. It should be noted that in almost all cases concerning violations committed by the subjects of competition law, the EU Court of Justice deviated from the issue of the protection of human rights.*

CJEU jurisprudence in the field of human right violations in competition sphere & the ECHR practice in cases concerning violations of competition (specifically Menarini case) was researched. This case demonstrates the immediate relevance of fundamental rights to EU competition law enforcement.

Keywords: *ordoliberalism, competition law, EU, human rights, European Court of Human Rights, Menarini case.*

Анотація. *Стаття присвячена аналізу теоретичних і практичних аспектів механізмів захисту прав людини у справах про порушення конкуренції в ЄС. Визначено, що право на добросовісну конкуренцію має економічний, а також соціальний аспект. Основи*

захисту конкуренції на рівні ЄС (викладено у статтях 101 і 102 ДФЄС) ґрунтуються на доктрині ордолібералізму. Соціальний аспект права на добросовісну конкуренцію свідчить про право споживачів отримувати справедливі переваги на внутрішньому ринку, і мати рівний доступ до товарів та/або послуг. Хартія основоположних прав, яка, відповідно до Лісабонського договору, є одним із основоположних документів ЄС, підтверджує цей соціальний вимір права на добросовісну конкуренцію. У статті 38 Хартії зазначено, що «політика Союзу забезпечила високий рівень захисту споживачів». Це означає, що однією з цілей конкурентної політики ЄС є захист прав споживачів. Слід зазначити, що майже у всіх справах щодо порушень, які скоїли суб'єкти конкурентного права, Суд ЄС відхилився від питання захисту прав людини.

Було досліджено судову практику Суду ЄС у сфері порушень прав людини у сфері конкуренції та практику ЄСПЛ у справах щодо порушень конкуренції (зокрема у справі Менаріні). Ця справа свідчить про безпосередню актуальність основоположних прав для правозастосування конкурентного законодавства ЄС.

Ключові слова: ордолібералізм, конкурентне право, ЄС, права людини, Європейський суд з прав людини, справа Менаріні.

Statement of the problem. The notion of “freedom to compete” was established in ordoliberalism theories. It was introduced through the main goal of competition – to increase social welfare. When defining competition as a necessary element of a functioning market economy, it is worth noting that it should be premised on the basic principles, values and freedoms. Especially it must be determined by the protection of human rights. This very issue will be the core element of this research.

The purpose of the article is to explore the correlation of fair competition mechanisms through the human rights protection given that in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), there is introduced a new category of “values” among which we should pay attention to equality and human rights. In course of the analysis, special attention will be paid to the fact that basic principles of EU law were formed and developed by the CJEU jurisprudence which is focused on the principle of the protection of human rights and freedoms in accordance with Art. 6 TEU and Art. 16 TFEU.

Analysis of recent research and publications. The study of economic stability for the internal market through the prism of the right to fair competition in the EU is relatively new, but the doctrine is characterized by a diversity of views in this area. Among Western scholars, the issue of interaction of human rights and the consumer was researched by various lawyers, such as A. Andreangeli [1; 262] who is the author of a monograph devoted to compliance with competition rules and at the same time human rights. We can also isolate single special research of the relationship of competition law and human rights, such as M.Ramsden's [2; 61-68], E.Ameye's, A.Brawn's, A.Riley's, W.Wils [3] works.

Study of the right to fair competition requires the definition of “unfair” competition and “freedom” to compete. At the core of this concept there are such fundamental characteristics as integrity, fairness and justice. The concept of free competition was founded in theories of liberalism, especially reflected in the current ordoliberalism. The idea ordoliberalism was founded in Germany by scientists such as W. Eucken and F. Böhm. They advocated the main idea of the movement – free competition and protection. This idea was supported and spread within the Member States of the European Union [4].

The core of the research.

1. Ordoliberalism as an inspiring basis for European model of Competition Law

Ideas of competition in a liberal market are borrowed from the works of ordoliberalists who recognize this form of market economy in which the competition framework is created by the state in order to achieve the highest possible intensity of competition and, at the same time, to limit factors that distort competitive conditions. Ordoliberalists believe that the regulation of monopolies and competition automatically facilitates social justice.

German school of neoliberalism represented by W. Eucken, L. Erhard, A. Müller-Armack is becoming the most influential one among European neoliberalism movements. Representatives of this school focused on combining economic freedom and non-interference of the state in the economy with the principles of social justice, without limiting the role of the state to being a guardian of market relations, determining that it has the right to arrange of public life. In the post-war period, Germany was directly faced with the acute social effects of the self-destruction of the market economy. However, against the background of the total collapse of the centrally controlled forced economy, German economic thought gave no support to the idea of pure liberalism; it asserted the ideas of a strong state. The functions of such a state were to perform institutional and organizational functions, as well as aims to consciously create a strong competitive economy. These ideas confirm that Germany drew on centralized US antitrust law, thus supporting the ideas of Keynesianism, but paying proper heed to its own national interests as to the limited functions of the state.

The founder of the German neoliberal school is considered to be Walter Eucken, who formed his own Freiburg school in the post-war period. In 1948, the scientist, together with his supporters, including lawyer F. Böhm, founded “Ordo”, a yearbook that served as a platform for German neoliberalism idea. “Ordo” means the order of the economic system, the natural structure of the free market economy. That is why the ideas put forward by W. Eucken and his followers were called *ordoliberalism* in the doctrine.

The essence of ordoliberal doctrine comes down to the fact that the role of the state is limited to shaping economic order, while regulation as such and the specifics of the economic process take place in a spontaneous manner. Central to the concept of ordoliberals was setting up a viable price system of perfect competition, which, in their opinion, should be made an important criterion for introducing any economic policy measure. Competition was characterized as a state institution constantly protected from monopolies’ encroachment.

W. Eucken described the correlation of the “centrally governed economy” (or forced economy) and the “market economy” (i.e., a market economy) [5]. The scholar presented three main principles of the market structure theory: 1) the principle of individual freedom which was sought in post-war Germany, which is ensured by private property and economic independence of economic entities; 2) the principle of a strong state which is traditional for Germany, yet the state does not interfere in economic processes, but only establishes the requisite legal framework for the economic processes to operate; 3) the principle of consistency in economic policy. W. Eucken considered the basic principles of competition (inviolability of private property, competitive open markets, freedom and protection of economic agreements, freedom of entrepreneur’s actions and his/her responsibility, consistency of economic policy) to be the prerequisites for the emergence of a market economy. Ordoliberals understood the competitive order to be a kind of market economy in which the competition framework is actively established by the state so that to achieve the maximum possible competition intensity and at the same time limit its factors that distort the competitive environment. Thus, they believed the most important task of the state to be prevention and limitation of economic monopoly power.

The ordoliberals conceive of the free economy in conventional terms: free markets are governed by the principles of scarcity, private property, freedom of contract, exchange between equal legal subjects, each pursuing their own self-interested ends. Free markets allow social cooperation between autonomous individuals that communicate with each other by means of a „signalling system“ that is, the price mechanism. They thus require monetary stability to permit its effective operation as a „calculating machine” that informs consumers and producers of the degree of scarcity in the whole economy.

According to F. Lassalle, the essence of German ordoliberalism comes down to the role of “night-watchman”, which is traditional for the entire constitutional system of Germany. In this role, the state ensures compliance with the rules of the game (i.e., legal norms) in economic life. Under these prerequisites, the state plays an active role in maintaining the capacity of a market economy, ensuring free competition environment. Representatives of British neoliberalism, who, on the

contrary, put forward the idea of a “minimal state intervention” meaning that the state only monitors market forces’ actions, clearly could not agree with this. Whereas ordoliberalism built on the constant, systematic stimulation of competition by the state and the expansion of competitive environment, the British neoliberals limited the functions of the state to a natural, spontaneous response to deteriorating competition or economic downturn.

Theorists of ordoliberalism came up with the idea of combining free market principle with “social equalization” principle. In 1947, A. Müller-Armack for the first time used the term “social market economy” [6], which aims to achieve a high level of well-being for the vast majority of society in the modalities of economic freedom based on competition. In his writings, he abandoned the idea of reviving the modalities of perfect competition by “curbing monopolies.” Although antitrust idea was a part of the doctrine, it gave way to social policy. Ordoliberals believed that regulating monopoly and competition automatically contributes to establishing social justice. A. Müller-Armack declared, on the contrary, that active social policy is a distinctive feature of the social market economy, which distinguishes it from the capitalist economy.

Starting from 1948, the ideas of ordoliberalism and the social market economy became the official ideological doctrine of the German government, and already in 1965 L. Erhard, who held the position of Chancellor of Germany, announced that the country is no longer building a social market economy and that Germany will be transformed into a “formed society”.

The main structural elements of the social market economy are: competitive system based on private ownership of the means of production; market as a coordinating mechanism and regulator of economic activity; undertakings; and the state which ensures and controls the general framework for the functioning of the market system through policies to strengthen competition and promote social equalization. The role of the state, according to L. Erhard [7], is similar to the position of the referee on the football field who strictly monitors the teams’ actions, but has no right to participate directly in the game. In other words, in order to maintain the framework for the “social market economy” as an ideal type of free market economy, the state must make sure that the rules of free competition are complied with, it must control pricing and suppress attempts to establish monopoly prices. To some extent, the long-awaited ideas were in tune with the social and economic processes that were at the same time taking place in France, where the policy of “dirigisme” aimed to solve social problems. However, in France, economic planning and dirigisme aimed mainly to overcome unemployment, whereas in Germany, the social market economy supposed that competition is a benefit to the consumer, thus bringing social benefits to the population.

Ordoliberals’ theoretical views were actively supported immediately after World War II by business community in West Germany. In the 1950’s, the social market economy ideas were specified and supplemented by the thesis of “welfare for all”. It is due to translating into life of the synthesized ideas of ordoliberalism and social market economy that L. Erhard is called the “father of the German economic miracle”.

The ordoliberalism defined their stance as neo-liberal in character. They criticised laissez faire liberalism because of its perceived inability to facilitate and sustain a competitive free market economy. For the ordoliberals, things are at a standstill because the state did not discharge its responsibility for maintaining the economic competitiveness and enterprise with requisite authority. When things are at a stand, this manifests a failure on the part of the state to act as effective „market police“.

The starting point for supranational regulation of competition in the post war period was inspired by national experience mainly in Germany and France. And national ordoliberal doctrine laid down the basic nature of competition rules provisions in the first founding treaties of the European Communities and thus described in the Lisbon Treaty (Treaty of Functioning of the EU)

2. Main issues on legal regulation of the competition in the EU

The EU competition policy serving as protection of fair competition from illegal restrictions and distortions is an important factor in creating and effective functioning of an integrated internal market in the EU. The principle of an open market economy with free competition is one of the

foundations of the economic system of the European Union due to the special Protocol the TFEU and other provisions of TFEU. Thus, the implementation of the principle of respect for EU supranational institutions endowed with exceptional powers in this area. In particular, Art. 3 TFEU defines the exclusive competence of the EU in establishing of the competition rules necessary for the effective functioning of its internal market of the European Union. It should again be emphasized that the meaning of the Treaties implies that competition policy plays a key role in establishing and functioning of the internal market in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition, which is directly reflected in Art. 119 TFEU. The basis of the EU internal market is the ability of undertakings to compete on equal terms. Competition policy ensures competitive behaviour of enterprises and protects the interests of consumers, enabling the production of quality goods and services.

3. The right to fair competition

The right to fair competition has both economic and social aspects.

From an economic perspective, entities & undertakings have the right to not distorted (fair) competition. It follows the basic prohibition of antitrust behaviour covered in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The right to fair competition is endowed by states through legal regulation that ensures refraining from giving undue advantage to certain subjects or industries which distorts or threatens to distort competition. Such actions of the Member States are rendered incompatible with the internal market under Art.107 TFEU. Another aspect relates to the obligation of national monopolies in the provision eliminating any discrimination expressly provided for in Art. 37 TFEU.

The social aspect of the right to fair competition shows consumers the right to receive fair benefits in the domestic market by having equal access to the goods and / or services. To ensure fair competition, entities have to make legitimate fair measures to attract consumers and consumers have the right to benefit from fair competition. This approach was supported by the sociological jurisprudence. Court of Justice of the EU in its judgment in the case of GlaxoSmithKline [8] pointed out that the purpose of Art. 101 (p.1) TFEU is to prevent companies from actions that would reduce the welfare of the final consumer.

The Charter of Fundamental Rights, which, according to the Treaty of Lisbon, is one of the fundamental documents of the EU, confirms this social dimension of the right to fair competition. Article 38 of the Charter states that “the Union’s policies ensured a high level of consumer protection.” This means that one of the objectives of EU competition policy is to protect consumer rights.

The EU has exclusive competence as regards the right to fair competition. Under Regulation 1/2003 [9], the Commission has broad powers to obtain information, to investigate and take an appropriate binding decisions. However, the Commission applies its right in quite active manner by imposing fines in the millions and billions of euros [10]. However, any decision by the Commission may be subject to judicial review under Art. 263 TFEU.

In other words, the right to fair competition from both positions (both economically and from the social aspect) is ensured not only the power of the Commission, but by judicial mechanisms as well. Decisive for the right to fair competition in the light of the prohibition of antitrust behaviour in the market are the powers of the Commission (in accordance with Regulation 1/2003) and the distribution of jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU claims from individuals and businesses with regard to acts in which they are recipients or directly and immediately affected by them (according to para 4 Art. 263. TFEU). It should be noted that in almost all cases concerning violations committed by the subjects of competition, the EU Court of Justice deviated from the issue of protection of human rights (such as in the case of Pioneer [11]).

4. ECHR’s point of view

But since the 2000s, the role of human rights in Commission’s implementation of its powers increased, and in 2011 the European Court of Human Rights considered the case in the field of violation of competition rules.

Due to the fact that the EU and the Council of Europe share common values of human rights protection and include its legal system rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, the question arises as to the mechanisms of their implementation specifically in the sphere of competition protection. In other words, there is the practical question of the value of competition in the market and human rights. This also applies to the issue of human rights while the Commission exercises its powers to enforce of the competition rules, in particular during the investigation by the Commission. The main provisions of the Convention relevant in the context of EU antitrust enforcement are Article 6 (right to a fair trial), Article 7 (no punishment without law), Article 8 (right to respect for private life), Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) and Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the Convention (right not to be tried or punished twice).

In other words, there is the practical question of the relation of competition in the market and human rights. This also applies to the issue of human rights when the Commission exercises its authority to monitor compliance with competition rules, in particular during the investigation by the Commission.

Thus, the question is whether cases related to competition rules violations fall under the jurisdiction of the ECHR. Thus, Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights defines the right to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time whether civil or criminal proceedings are concerned. Furthermore, this paper corresponds to Article 47 (para 2) EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which defines the right to an effective remedy and access to impartial courts.

Despite the fact that Regulation 1/2003 has established that sanctions are not criminal liability, litigation is somewhat of a different position on this issue. The the ECHR judgment in the case of *Société Stenuit v. France* [12] analysed the fines imposed under national competition law. Here the court considered the issue in the light of a criminal nature in connection with the nature of national competition law of France, whose goal is to protect free competition in the French market, i.e., the general interests of society, which is usually protected by criminal law. In the judgment in the case of the EU *KME Germany and others v. Commission* the Court found that the Commission's decision to impose a fine relating to competition is associated with "criminal charge" for the purposes of Article 6 (1) [13]. Furthermore, it is well known that in the light of Art. 6 (1) of the European Convention, in defining "criminal charge", the Court must not only be independent and impartial, but must also have full jurisdiction to hear and decide all questions of fact and law relevant to the dispute which it considers [14].

ECHR judgement in the case *Menarini* [15] reaffirmed the applicability of Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights to cases involving the protection of competition in Europe. The very bright example of such correlation is the *Menarini* case. The decision of the ECHR of September 27, 2011, confirmed that the procedure against *Menarini* in the Italian jurisdiction had a "criminal nature" for the purpose of Article 6 of the Convention. This case demonstrates the immediate relevance of fundamental rights to EU competition law enforcement.

This Western doctrine confidently declares that this case has given rise to possible further appeals to the ECHR in cases involving violations of competition [16]. The "Menarini" ruling of the European Court of Human Rights paves the road to a material and significant enhancement of a company's rights of defence in antitrust cases based on Article 6 of the Convention and on the respective seminal case-law of the European Court of Human Rights which materializes the principles associated with the due process of law in a detailed manner.

However, in the future there is another rhetorical question of the appropriateness of trial states in accordance with Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In accordance with Art. 6 of TEU, Union will accede European Convention on Human Rights. This affiliation will allow to apply the ECHR mechanism to anyone who claims that his rights under the European Convention on Human Rights have been violated by the European Commission or the European Union Court during its review of decisions of the Commission .

5. Conclusions

The concept of competition is so ambiguous that it is not covered by any universal definition. This is an economic category, and a set of legal tools that are designed to market regulation on compliance with competition. The competition has not only purely economic function regulator of market mechanisms, but also the social function shown in getting positive benefits of competition and consumer welfare achievements by receiving fair pricing and quality products. developed the idea of neoliberalism (F. von Hayek, L. von Mises, M. Allais, M. Fridman), whose substantiate the idea of freedom of competition in the market without the active participation of the state. Neoliberalism admits the possibility of partial, limited government influence on the economy as opposed to Keynesian active government intervention.

Much of the idea of competition in a liberal market were in the works ordoliberalists (V. Oyken, A. Müller-Armak, L. Erhar) who recognized under competitive procedures this form of market economy in which competition framework actively created state in order to achieve the highest possible intensity of competition and at the same time limiting its factors that distort competitive conditions. Antitrust orientation although it remained part of the doctrine, but ceded its leadership role a matter of social policy. Ordoliberalists believed that regulation of monopoly and competition automatically facilitates social justice.

The presence of competition in the market leads to an increase in economic efficiency so that consumers receive the appropriate share of wealth. Thus, we can conditionally display concept «antitrust welfare», which comes also to economic efficiency and well-being of consumers and competition in the market. Described influence of theoretical doctrine of ordoliberalism showed its practical development of supranational regulation in the EU. More current practice showed that the legal mechanisms of human rights protection within the European Convention of Human Rights also shared experience in cases with competition rules protection (Menarini case). Nevertheless of the terminating of negotiations of the EU's acceding to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the question of competition law protection through the prism of human rights protection will remain in the focus.

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ОСОБЛИВОСТІ РОЗВИТКУ
СВІТОВОГО ГОСПОДАРСТВА ТА МЕВ

УДК: 339.9:004.9

THE IMPACT OF SPECIFIC FACTORS ON THE REVENUE OF THE IT SECTORS IN POLAND AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

ВПЛИВ СПЕЦИФІЧНИХ ЧИННИКІВ НА ДОХОДИ ІТ-СЕКТОРІВ ПОЛЬЩІ ТА ЧЕХІЇ

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Abstract. *This article reveals the dynamics of the development of Poland's and the Czech Republic's IT/ITC sectors. The following groups of factors influencing the economic component of the IT/ITC sector were identified: tax policy, factors related to education, and labor force indicators. The simplified regression models were used for each group, and the influence of elements on the economic component of the efficiency of companies in the IT/ITC sector was presented separately. As a result of the weak argumentation of models for each group, the need to create unique models for each country based on a combination of different groups' factors was proved. Based on Var models, when conducting correlation-regression analyzes, models were derived for the dependence of the economic performance indicators of the sectors of Poland and the Czech Republic on given factors.*

Keywords: *IT sector, ITC sector, the revenue of IT sector, factors of influence, tax rates, number of employees in IT, number of students in ITC*

Анотація. *В представлений статті виявлено динаміку розвитку ІТ/ІТК секторів в Польщі й Чехії. Було визначено наступні групи чинників впливу на економічну складову сектору ІТ/ІТК: податкова політика, освітня складова, людський ресурс через показники робочої сили. За використанням спрощених побудованих регресійних моделей для кожної групи, було представлено впливовість елементів на економічну складову ефективності компаній ІТ/ІТК сектору. Внаслідок недостатності аргументації через показники моделей для груп окремо було доведено необхідність створення спеціальних моделей для кожної країни на основі сукупності чинників із різних груп. На основі Var-моделей за проведеними кореляційно-регресійними аналізами було виведено моделі залежності економічних показників ефективності секторів Польщі та Чехії від заданих чинників.*

Ключові слова: *IT сектор, ІТК сектор, розміри продажів, чинники впливу, податкові ставки, кількість робітників в ІТ, кількість студентів в ІТК*

Introduction. Developed IT/ITC sectors help improve the country's economy; all this directly dependency the economic and financial efficiency of these sectors. The Central and Eastern European countries represent one of the economy's fastest-growing and most efficient examples in this direction. In this case, Poland and the Czech Republic are excellent examples of the representation of the CEE region.

The purpose of the article is to analyze the status and performance of the IT/ITC sector in Poland and the Czech Republic; determine the impact factors on the economic component of the sector results for each country.

Recent literature review. International-type companies have a significant influence on the development of both the economies of individual countries and the relationship between countries. Small and medium-sized companies represent a significant part of the development of TNC networking [1]. Currently, companies in the technology sector have begun to occupy significant positions. Different researchers analyzed the efficiency factors of companies. For example, Madhani (2009) noticed that the educational component as a concept of human capital could be seen as a component of the concept based on the main three types of resources that increase the company's competitiveness and form the Resource Based View [2]. Bollen et al. (2005) noted the importance of human capital and its impact on their work. However, a rather complex relationship between indicators was noted, and the difference in indicators across sectors was indicated [3]. Agiomirgianakis et al. (2011) examined indicators of spending on research and development, investment in human resources, graduates in science and technology, and GDP per capita. The study further proved the positive impact of human capital on companies [4]. Durante (2021) presented an analysis of several studies that confirmed the impact of tax policy on economic growth. The positive impact of lowering tax rates can be noted [5]. R. Katz and J. Jung (2021) proved that companies depend on special tax rates. Since the placement of capital is a rather important aspect of the development of companies, corporate tax harms this aspect [6]. In addition, earlier studies have examined the dependence of TNC companies' revenues on investment in R&D and noted the rise in economic performance from using different tax rates to avoid paying the total amount [7,8].

The topic is mainly disclosed without specified sectors or from the side of research and development and investment. However, the IT/ITC sector is exciting and needs to be understood.

Methodology. The primary test based on the constructed VAR model verifies the non-causality of the Granger Causality Test, with the dependent variable and the selected factors. The general model takes the following form for the dependent variable:

$$\text{Revenue}_t = \alpha_1 + \sum_{i=1}^p \beta_{1i} \text{Tax}_{t-1} + \sum_{i=1}^p \gamma_{1i} \text{Study}_{t-1} + \sum_{i=1}^p \varepsilon_{1i} \text{Emp}_{t-1} + \sum_{i=1}^p \epsilon \text{Opt}^1_{t-1} + \sum_{i=1}^p \theta \text{Opt}^2_{t-1} + \delta_{1t} \quad (1)$$

An explanation of the components of the equations presented: Revenue – an economic indicator of activity; Tax – taxation rates; Study – spending on all levels of education; Emp – the number of employees in the IT/ITC sector; Opt¹ – variable factor: the number of students of the ITC specialization for all students (Stall) or the number of graduates of the ITC specialization for all graduates (Grall); Opt² – variable factor: wages in the IT sector (Wg) or personnel costs in the IT sector (PC); δ – error period; α – constant component, β , γ , ε , θ , θ – coefficients that need to be estimated; p – lag order.

The Granger test is based on the hypothesis of non-causality from the factors influencing revenue at 5%. The models have checked against Log likelihood confidence values and entry roots AR. Next, was checked the causal relationship, according to Granger. Another option for testing the model was the Wald test. The test makes it possible to note the importance and acceptability of variables in the constructed model in the presence of time delays according to limited lag values.

The final regression-correlation analyses were conducted to determine models of influencing factors for the dependent variable in each country separately. The model will acquire one of the types:

$$\text{Revenue} = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 \text{Tax} + \varepsilon_1 \text{Study} + \theta_1 \text{Grall} + \gamma_1 \text{Wg} \quad (2)$$

$$\text{Revenue} = \alpha_1 + \delta_1 \text{Emp} + \vartheta_1 \text{PC} \quad (3)$$

Preliminary analysis. An essential element in understanding the effectiveness of the IT sector for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is the study of the number and size of companies.

In Poland, in 2021, there were 149,111 companies registered in the ITC sector. It represents the maximum value for the period from 2010 to 2021. In 2021, the IT segment represented a value of 86.82% in the ITC sector. An increase of 7.95 percentage points since 2010 is noticed. Similar dynamics are shown in the Czech Republic. The maximum value of the number of companies in the general ITC sector and the IT segment was reflected in 2021. It was 56,682 registered companies in the ITC sector in the Czech Republic. The number of IT companies in the general ITC sector was 89.56% in 2021. Since 2010, there has been an increase in the weight of IT companies in the sector by 2.98 percentage points. In 2010, the value was 86.57% [9–11].

In 2010, Poland's number of companies in the ITC sector amounted to 55,304 units, with an increase of 85,841 units by 2021. It is an increase of 169.62 percentage points. The average annual growth in the number of companies from 2010 to 2021 in the ITC sector is 1.09 times, with a given value for the IT segment of 1.10. In 2010, the number of companies in the ITC sector in the Czech Republic was 35,261 units, with an increase in 2021 of 21,421 units. It represents an increase of 60.75 percentage points. The average annual growth in the number of companies from 2010 to 2021 in the ITC sector is 1.04 times. The average annual growth of IT companies in the studied years was 1.05 times [9–11].

A comparison of the indices reflects the growth of IT companies with faster changes than the growth of the whole ITC sector both in the Czech Republic and Poland.

The preliminary reviews of the ITC sectors in the countries of the CEE region made it possible to note that most companies forming the sector are represented by SMEs. From this, it can be noted that the share of SMEs in the Polish ITC sector has been growing over the study period for ten years. From 2010 to 2017, the value was more than 99.8%; since 2018, the value has reached 99.9% and has been stable over the following years. The situation in the IT segment has similar dynamics; from 2010 to 2017, there was an increase in the indicator with a value exceeding 99.8%. However, since 2018, the value has been stable at 99.89%, which is quite close to the value for the ITC sector. Hence, it is noted that the correlation between the indicators of both the general ITC sector and the separate IT segment [9–11].

Presenting the study's results for the Czech Republic, it is noted that for 2021, the number of SME companies in the ITC sector is 99.84%, while the given value for IT is 99.85%. The value is consistently represented during the study period by exceeding 99.8% [9–11].

Based on the analysis carried out on the example of the Czech Republic and Poland as representatives of CEE in the analysis of general ITC sectors and IT segments, it can be noted that, on average, the weight of SMEs by sectors or segments is at least 99.8% of the total number of companies.

Based on the available statistics, the revenue was chosen as the most comprehensive and appropriate indicator of economic activities for the IT/ITC sectors of Poland and the Czech Republic. The interval periods were chosen for each country separately: Poland from 2010 to 2020 and the Czech Republic from 2005 to 2020.




Figure 1. Dynamics of revenue by the country for the corresponding periods for the IT/ITC sector, million Czech crowns, and thousand Polish zlotys
Source: compiled by the authors based on [9,10].

The financial and economic characteristics of the IT sectors in the Czech Republic and Poland have similar dynamics during the years studied for each country. Examining the dynamics by country, it can be noted that growth for both representatives of the CEE in the IT sector began after 2014.

a) The tax system as a factor influencing the economic performance of companies

The IT sector is quite vulnerable to tax rate changes. The absence of preferential or special conditions for the IT sector characterizes the tax policies of Poland and the Czech Republic. The main influencing force for IT companies in these countries is changes in general tax rates. The central rates used in the study are corporate tax, payroll tax, and social and medical contributions of companies. The study of each of the taxes presented allows for indicating the change over time. In general, the change is characterized by a decrease in tax rates.

Corporate tax for the two countries in 2020 was 19%. This corporate tax rate is among the highest in Central and Eastern Europe for a given year. The indicated rate is chosen as an average. In Poland, from 2008 to 2020, the corporate tax rate has not changed and amounted to 19%. In the Czech Republic, however, the corporate tax rate has changed. From 2005 to 2020, there was a decrease in the tax rate from 26% to 19% [12,13].

The payroll tax rate for 2020 is 17% for Poland and 15% for the Czech Republic [12,13].

Social and medical contributions for both countries are presented separately due to significant differences between the components and their changes over time. Social contributions in Poland have four rates: retirement, disability, sickness, and accident. The central rates for types of social insurance payments are presented below in the time change.

Table 1

Change in tax rates by type of social payments for companies in 1999-2021 in Poland

		Type of payments/time/rate											
		1999 - 2021											
		19.52%											
		1999-2007	2007	2008-2011	2012	2013 - 2021							
Retire ment		13%	13%, 10%	6%	6.6%, 8%	8%							
Disabi lity		1999 - 2021											
		2.45%											
Sick ness		1999- 2002	2003- 2005	2006	2007- 2008	2009	2010- 2011	2012	2013- 2014	2015	2016- 2017	2018	2019- 2021
Accid ent		1.62%	1.93%	1.93%, 1.80%	1.80%	1.8%, 1.67%	1.67 %	1.67%, 1.93%	1.93%	1.93%, 1.8%	1.80 %	1.8%, 1.67%	1.67%

Source: compiled by the author based on data [13,14].

Health insurance as another tax burden for companies in the Polish sector has also changed over time. The central rates for medical penalties were: 7.5%, 7.58%, 7.75%, 8%, 8.25%, 8.50%, and 9%. In addition, the levy on the labor fund was 2.45% over the years [13,14].

In the Czech Republic, social payments are shown at rates for companies (as employers) based on four main contributions: health fund, pension, sickness, and unemployment contributions. The following shows how the size of these contributions' changes over time.

Table 2

Change in tax rates by type of social payments in 2000-2021 in the Czech Republic

Type of payments/time/rate	
Health fund	2000 - 2021 9%
Pension	2000 - 2004 19.5% 2005 - 2021 21.5%
Sickness	2000 - 2008 3.3% 2008 - 2020 2.3% 2020 - 2021 2.1%
Unemployment	2000 - 2004 3.2% 2005 - 2021 1.2%

Source: compiled by the author based on data [12,15].

The most significant decline in Czech was experienced in unemployment payments. Despite this, there was an increasing indicator of the non-pension fund. In 2000, the total rate for the payment of social contributions was 35%, and in 2021 – 33.8%.

b) The educational component

The Czech Republic and Poland, as representatives of the CEE region, are defined as countries with a significant indicator of the quality of graduates in the professional orientation field of IT/ITC. The figure below shows a comparison of spending by country on education at all levels from 2000 to 2020. The specified data are presented in local currencies. Government expenditures on education are also displayed as a percentage of GDP.




Figure 2. Spending on all levels of education and government expenditures on education as a percentage of GDP for Poland and the Czech Republic from 2000 to 2020, Polish zlotys, and Czech crowns and %

Source: compiled by the author based on data [16,17].

When considering government spending as a percentage of GDP, it is worth noting that in 2020 the indicator's value for each country was approximately at the same level. In Poland, the indicator's value was 5.19%, while in the Czech Republic, this value was 5.08% [17]. A more significant increase occurred for the Czech Republic with an increase of 1.44 percentage points; in Poland, the growth over twenty years amounted to 0.21 percentage points.

The total spent on the educational component of all types for all sources shows an increase from 2000 to 2020 in Poland. The growth amounted to 257.54 percentage points. In total, the value of receipts in 2020 in Poland for all educational programs amounted to 129,002 million Polish zlotys, with a value of 36,080 million Polish zlotys in 2000 [16].

According to the Czech Republic, from 2000 to 2014, a trend towards an increase in the indicator is reflected. In this period, the annual average cost increase was 1.06 times or a change of 5.53 percentage points. In 2020, the value of education spending at the state level amounted to 299,751 million Czech crowns. Comparing twenty years, one can note an increase in spending by 228.14 percentage points [16].

Another essential aspect of the study is analyzing the number of students enrolled in ITC programs and the number of graduates from these programs.




Figure 3. Comparative dynamics of the number of students and graduates and ratio to all students in the Czech Republic and Poland during 2008-2020, persons, and %
Source: calculated and compiled by the authors based on [9,10,16].

The number of students in ITC programs in Poland prevails over that of students in the Czech Republic. It is because Poland represents many institutions with a technological base.

Continuing the analysis of Poland in 2020 indicator of the number of students in ITC programs is 66,402 students. It was 10,485 students completed their studies in this area in 2020. At the same time, the share of students studying in the areas of ITC from the total number of students in 2020 was 5.45%, and graduates – were 3.57%. There was an increase in the share of attracted students from the value of 4.55% in 2008, graduates from the mark of 2.14%.

In the Czech Republic in 2020, the number of students in the field of ITC was 21,647, and the number of graduates – was 3,673 people. At the same time, the share of students studying in the areas of ITC from the total number in 2020 is 7.24%, and graduates – 5.83%. There was an increase in the share of attracted students from 6.29% in 2008 graduates from 5.03%.

For both countries, there is a downward trend in students from 2008 to 2020. It is explained as a consequence of less interest in obtaining specialization at universities and the opportunity to gain specialization skills in specialized courses.

c) The labor forces

High-quality education and low wages allow companies to choose markets in Poland and Czech while using this advantage to reduce labor costs.




Figure 4. Providing relevant labor force indicators in Poland and the Czech Republic, persons, million Polish zlotys, and million Czech crowns
Source: compiled by the author based on data [9–11].

The general trend over the decade is an increase in the number of employees in the IT segment in both countries.

Overall employee growth over the decade in the ITC sector in Poland was 66.94 percentage points. This growth was formed based on the increase of the indicator in the IT segment of 100.38 percentage points. As a result, the share of IT employees in the overall ITC sector has been growing throughout the study period. In 2010, this figure was a share of 64.94%, and in 2020 – 77.94%. Therefore, an increase of the indicator by 16.36 percentage points is stated.

The number of employees in the general ITC sector in the Czech Republic experienced an increase of 53.27 percentage points from 2005 to 2020. In 2005, the mark was 116,670 employees, and in 2020 – 178,818 employees. The growth rate in the sector is relatively stable during the study period. The average increase was 1.06 times or 5.74 percentage points [11].

The expenses on wages of companies in the IT sector saw an increase of 132.09 percentage points during the decade in Poland. The average annual growth of this type of cost amounted to 8.81 percentage points. The highest costs compared to previous periods were from 2015 to 2018. The average annual growth in these years was 10.93 percentage points [9].

The wages in the IT sector in the Czech experienced an increase of 5.5 percentage points from 2005 to 2020. As a result, in 2020, the number of expenses of companies in the sector related to the payment of wages amounted to 16,669 million Czech crowns; in 2020, this figure reached 74,259 million Czech crowns [10].

The average annual growth amounted to a growth rate of 10.63 percentage points. The most significant growths were reflected in the periods 2006-2008. The significant growth is the consequence of the country's accession to the EU. It led to an increase in the infusion of investments and an increase in wage expenses to match the then members of the union. This statement is substantiated by the fact that, during this period, the most significant growth dynamics in the wages paid in the foreign sector companies took place.

Moreover, there was an increase in personnel costs in the ITC sector by 179.66 percentage points in the Czech Republic. The average growth rate was 1.1 times. The increase in labor costs in the Czech IT segment correlates with earlier data, an increase in the number of employees. Growth indicators reflect a difference of 2.5 times: with an increase in the number of employees per person, there was an increase in expenses per employee by 2.5 times.

The above analysis reflects the same dynamics for both countries: the indicator of the number of employees has an upward trend; payroll spending by IT companies is also on an upward trend.

Main research results. The general analysis carried out for the IT sectors of the Czech Republic and Poland, taking into account the selected factors of influence on the economic and financial components of companies in the sectors, allows moving on to building models and studying the relationship and influence of the selected factors on the dependent variable.

1. Depending on the tax policy of the country
 - 1.1. Poland

A correlation analysis is carried out based on previously determined tax rates for the ITC sector in Poland. The primary dependent variable is the revenue of the ITC sector. The analysis is carried out on quarterly data from 2007 to 2021.

The model takes the following form:

$$\text{Revenue} = 1.38669\text{e}+08 - 1.43606\text{e}+08\text{Tax} \quad (4)$$

The resulting model allows noting the inverse relationship of indicators: with an increase in tax rates, there will be a decrease in the indicator of the economic efficiency of companies. The statistical indicator R^2 is not sufficient to argue for the existence of a model with only one influence per shift.

1.2. The Czech Republic

A correlation analysis is carried out based on previously determined tax rates for the IT sector in the Czech Republic. The revenue of the IT segment represents the dependent variable. The study period is from 2005 to 2020.

The model takes the following form:

$$\text{Revenue} = 1.45272\text{e}+06 - 1.79129\text{e}+06\text{Tax} \quad (5)$$

The resulting model reflects the dependence on tax rates. The dynamics of interaction is an inverse characteristic: with an increase in tax rates, there is a decrease in the economic indicator of companies. The model acquires the value of low R^2 for independent existence; it is necessary to expand the factors of influence that allow the creation of an optimal model.

The constructed models in equations no.4 and no.5 allow stating information for the two countries that with a decrease in taxes, there is an increase in revenue for the sectors under study. The tax cuts across countries refer to general rates, which allows concluding that the reduction in standard rates leads to an increase in the economic performances of companies in the sector.

2. Depending on the educational component

2.1. Poland

A general review of the educational component made it possible to conduct a correlation analysis. For the initial construction of the model, the following factors were chosen spending on all levels of education, public spending on higher education, the ratio of ITC students to all, and the ratio of ITC graduates to all. Based on the constructed models, certain influencing factors were rejected in the following order: the ratio of students in ITC to all students and government spending on higher education. The annual data from 2008 to 2020 were used.

From here, the model takes the following form:

$$\text{Revenue} = 2.90497\text{e}+07 + 412.709\text{Stud} + 8.84851\text{e}+08\text{Grall} \quad (6)$$

According to the constructed model, a direct relationship between the indicators can be noted: an increase in the total costs of the educational component instigates an increase in companies' revenue. The number of graduates from ITC programs concerning all graduates was determined as the second influential factor. The overall indicator R^2 allows noting the expediency of the model's existence.

2.2. The Czech Republic

The leading indicators for the analysis were chosen: the number of students and graduates in the field of ITC, the percentage of this number to the total number, spending on all levels of education, and the ratio of graduates to students in the field of ITC. The dependent variable is revenue. The period is annual data from 2005 to 2020.

There were three analyzes with gradual deviation factors, which had a low value of the t-statistic – rejected: percentage value of the number of students in the field of ITC in general, the number of students, the ratio of the number of graduates to the number of students in the ITC, the number of graduates.

The model takes the following form:

$$\text{Revenue} = - 696121 + 0.5879\text{Study} + 1.18674\text{e}+07\text{Stall} \quad (7)$$

The two factors presented directly impact the change: the dependent variable will grow with an increase in the value of the factors. However, the model changes based on the value of a negative constant and may decrease the dependent variable's value. Therefore, the model can acquire a

negative correlation value despite a separate increase in indicators. That is, the positive correlation of this model will be the value at which the results of education spending indicators and the percentage of ITC students in the number of all students, when increased by their coefficients, will exceed the negative value of the constant.

3. According to the labor force

3.1. Poland

After building models based on data on the number of employees in the IT sector and the number of wage costs, no logical correlation was found. It was revealed due to the Log likelihood index's relatively significant negative value.

It turned out to be optimal to build a model depending on the variable of each of the factors separately. Hence, analyzing the indicators using the Var model according to the Wald test is more expedient. The test makes it possible to note the simultaneous influence of indicators of wage costs of companies and the number of employees in the IT sector. The test was based on an autoregressive model using two lags. The test is proven due to the pure occurrence of AR roots in the boundedness of values. The study period for building the model was from 2010 to 2020.

Table 3

The result of the Wald test for Poland by labor force category

Dependent variable: Revenue			
Excluded	Chi-sq	df	Prob
Emp	13.44757	2	0.0012
WG	27.58692	2	0.0000
All	83.83557	4	0.0000
Sample: 2010 - 2020			
Included observation: 9			

Source: received and compiled by the author

Thus, when examining the test with a possibility of 5%, it was indicated that the indicators were influential.

The model takes the following form:

$$\text{Revenue} = - 0.16\text{Revenue}_{-1} + 0.71\text{Revenue}_{-2} + 18032.78\text{Emp}_{-2} + 41491927.3 \quad (8)$$

The results allow noting the impact of indicators of the number of employees in the IT sector and the level of expenses by companies related to wages on companies' revenue in the ITC sector.

3.2. The Czech Republic

The analyses are based on annual data from 2005 to 2020. The correlation model of the first type made it possible to discard the value of the influence of the size of the wages due to an inappropriate p-statistic. Hence, the influential factors for the variable are personnel costs and the number of employees in the sector.

The model takes the following form:

$$\text{Revenue} = 113041 - 2.76\text{Emp} + 5.68\text{PC} \quad (9)$$

The resulting model reflects the significant influence of factors on the dependent change: with an increase in personnel costs, the dependent variable grows, while at the same time, with an increase in the number of employees, there is an inverse relationship.

In evaluating the model, the R² indicator is satisfactory. It allows asserting the possibility of the model's existence as a separate model. At the same time, the model cannot be considered complete only if one group of indicators exists.

4. Building a general model for each country

The analyzes carried out and the models being derived allow noticing the heterogeneity of the models for each country. Despite the same study of a group of indicators by influential factors for each country, there are different elements of the economic component of the IT/ITC sector.

4.1. Poland

A general study of individual groups of factors influencing the revenue of the IT/ITC sector in Poland made it possible to derive a dependent variable model from influential factors. The derived model is valid: according to the Var model, the validity of a polynomial equation is noted,

according to which the value of AR roots remains acceptable within specific values of the circle; the value of R^2 is close to 1; the Log likelihood ratio is the most widely accepted.

According to the Granger/Wald test, individually selected elements do not affect the dependent change; however, when testing for a group of elements as a specific system, the situation is reversed.

Table 4

The result of the Granger test for Poland

Excluded	Prob.	Excluded.	Prob.
Tax	0.0014	Grall	0.8854
Study	0.0934	Wg	0.0915
	All	0.0001	

Source: received and compiled by the author

The given test results allow noting the influence in the aggregate of all factors of the model on revenue, which makes the indicator dependent on changes in the elements in the system over time. From here comes the confirmation of the statements noted during the tests for groups of factors separately regarding the need to group factors into a system.

The final model takes the following form:

$$\text{Revenue in PL} = 1.18e+08 - 1.01e+08\text{Tax} + 272\text{Study} + 9.88e+08\text{Grall} + 211\text{Wg} \quad (10)$$

According to the derived model, the dependence of the economic component of the IT/ITC sector of the Polish sector on various factors is formed not only based on tax policy and changes in the tax burden over time but also on the factors of the educational component and labor force indicators. Tax rates reflect an inverse relationship. A direct relationship between change and influencing factors is demonstrated based on the indicator of the number of ITC graduates from the total number of students, government spending on all levels of education, and the costs associated with the wages in the sector.

4.2. The Czech Republic

Based on the studied factors of influence, in the example of the Czech Republic, an acceptable model was derived for a dependent variable: according to the Var model, a polynomial equation, where the value of AR roots is within the range of fair values, the value of R^2 is close to 1; the Log likelihood factor is acceptable.

According to the Granger/Wald test, individually selected elements do not affect the dependent change; however, when testing for a group of elements as a specific system, the situation is reversed.

Table 5

The result of the Granger test for the Czech Republic

Excluded	Prob.
Tax	0.0002
Emp	0.3556
PC	0.3994
All	0.0026

Source: received and compiled by the author

The data presented after analysis indicate that the value of the final test results improves when grouping data and creating a system of influencing factors. The probability of 5% and hypotheses of influence are acceptable for the number of employees in the sector and the companies' costs for maintaining workers (not only the costs associated with the wages). According to the general model, the value is included in the range of acceptable values with a probability of 5%.

The derived model for the IT sector in the Czech Republic takes the following form:

$$\text{Revenue in CZ} = -3.81e+04 + 1.65e+05\text{Tax} - 1.83\text{Emp} + 4.98\text{PC} \quad (11)$$

The tax burden factor can be leveled due to the influence of the indicator of the number of employees and the cost of their maintenance as the main factors of influence.

The new view of the model will be more simplified:

$$\text{Revenue in CZ} = 1.13\text{e}+05 - 2.76\text{Emp} + 5.68\text{PC} \quad (12)$$

This model represents the primary dependence of the economic efficiency of the IT sector in the Czech Republic on factors related to human resources as a workforce. It should be noted that in the dependence model only between revenue and the number of employees, the correlation has a positive value with a significant negative data constant. In the extended model, shown by equation no.12, under a more significant impact of costs on employees, the relationship between revenue and the number of employees changes when the constant value changes. Hence, the direct impact on revenue reflects a change in the values of personnel costs since, with an increase in costs, the motivation of employees to work improves in favor of working for the company's results. Conversely, the inverse relationship is related to the number of employees. Therefore, this may be caused by an increase in companies' costs for employees, directly the cost of wages.

Conclusion. The main influencing factors in the IT/ITC sector were tax policy, educational component, and human resources. The first part examined the historical change in the tax burden for countries. Due to the lack of special conditions or benefits for the IT sector, the change in rates and impact on the company's revenue by corporate tax, payroll tax, and social and medical contributions were investigated. For the second part, expenditures at the state level for the educational component and the number of students and graduates assigned to the sector were studied. The third part, which marks the labor force, was studied in various indicators, such as the number of people employed in the sector, the companies' expenses for maintaining workers, and wage costs.

The final correlation and regression models and the models built based on the Granger test made it possible to determine the main factors of influence for sectors in each country separately. So, for Poland, all three of the above groups affect the economic component of the companies in the sector.

For the Czech Republic, a correlation can be noted with each group of factors. However, the maximum dependence for all tests is noted for the labor force group, namely the number of employees and the personnel costs in the sector.

Hence, despite the importance of all factors for sectors by country, each country's systems of a group of factors affecting the revenue of sectors were derived. Therefore, it will allow policy change for these factors to increase revenue in IT sectors and use taken information for other countries due to understanding the leading segment, which is necessary for improving the IT/ITC sector.

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MODELLING SUBJECTIVE VIEWS OF INDIVIDUALS ABOUT NATIONAL MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

МОДЕЛЮВАННЯ СУБ'ЄКТИВНИХ ОЦІНОК НАСЕЛЕННЯ ЩОДО ЕКОНОМІЧНОЇ СИТУАЦІЇ В КРАЇНІ

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Abstract. *The aim of this paper is to estimate the effect of the main macroeconomic indicators on opinion of individuals about economic situation in their country. Correlation and regression analysis was applied to the data about 43 economies in 2002-2021. The most positive subjective views of economic situation were before crisis years (in 2007 and 2016-2019).*

This paper confirms positive effect of economic growth on perceived national economic situation. The effect is stronger under high income inequality in the long run and in advanced economies in the short run. Some models suggest that acceleration of economic growth may also be important. Gross savings is another positive factor. The long-term effect of savings is stronger in countries with high income inequality and in 2013-2021 also in advanced economies. Correlation between opinion of people and current account is positive, but the regression analysis results show that this factor does not have a separate significant effect.

Unemployment influences perceived national economic situation negatively. But earlier (in 2002-2012) this effect was weaker than in 2013-2021. The long-term effect is stronger in countries with high income inequality. The effect of inflation is negative, but it existed only in the first subperiod (2002-2012) in advanced economies. Then the fear of inflation disappeared at least before 2022, when inflation increased.

Income inequality, its change and economic development level do not affect perceived economic situation themselves. But high income inequality increases sensitivity of people to trends in economic growth, unemployment and gross savings. High development level also increases such sensitivity and earlier in XXI century dependence on inflation.

Key words: *macroeconomic situation, subjective well-being, business cycles, economic growth, unemployment, gross savings, inflation, income inequality.*

Анотація. *Метою статті є оцінка ефекту основних макроекономічних показників на ставлення населення до економічної ситуації в своїй країні. Використано регресійно-кореляційний аналіз даних для 43 країн у 2002-2021 рр. Найбільш позитивні суб'єктивні уявлення щодо економічної ситуації спостерігалися в передкризові роки (2007, 2016-19 рр.).*

Підтверджено позитивний вплив приросту ВВП на оцінки громадськістю економічного стану в країні. В довгостроковому періоді вплив цього показника сильніший в країнах з вищою нерівністю доходів, в короткостроковому – в розвинутих країнах. Окремі моделі показують, що може грати позитивну роль також прискорення економічного зростання. Валові заощадження впливають позитивно. В довгостроковому періоді ефект заощаджень сильніший в країнах з вищим

розширенням населення за доходами, а в період з 2013-2021 рр. і в розвинутих країнах. Кореляція поточного рахунку платіжного балансу із громадською думкою позитивна, але регресійний аналіз не показує значущого окремого впливу поточного рахунку.

Рівень безробіття впливає негативно. Проте в перший період (2002-2012 рр.) цей ефект слабший ніж у 2013-2021 рр. В довгостроковому цей ефект сильніший в країнах з вищим розширенням населення за доходами. Вплив інфляції негативний, але наявний тільки у перший період (2002-2012 рр.) в розвинутих країнах. Потім побоювання щодо інфляції зникли принаймні до 2022 р., коли інфляція зростає.

Нерівність доходів населення, її динаміка та рівень економічного розвитку самостійного впливу не здійснюють. Але високе розширення населення за доходами посилює чутливість настроїв населення щодо економічної ситуації в країні до економічного зростання, безробіття та валових заощаджень. Високий рівень економічного розвитку також підвищує чутливість до цих показників, а на початку XXI століття й до інфляції.

Ключові слова: макроекономічна ситуація, суб'єктивний добробут, економічні цикли, економічне зростання, безробіття, валові заощадження, інфляція, нерівність за доходами.

Introduction. Measuring objective macroeconomic indicators may show whether a country has a good economic performance or faces serious challenges requiring remedies in a form of policy actions. But each individual has his or her own subjective impressions about well-being. Economic situation may affect happiness of people and their confidence in future, which may influence directly their personal decisions (in labor activity, consumption behavior, investment priorities, propensity to stay or migrate etc.) and indirectly government policy (via elections or considering sentiment analysis results).

The purpose of research is to estimate the effect of the main macroeconomic indicators on opinion of individuals about economic situation in their country. First, we provide literature review of subjective well-being factors. Then we explain the choice of the variables and the way correlation and regression analysis was applied. In the last section research results are presented and robustness check is provided.

Previous literature review. Several studies have found factors affecting subjective well-being of individuals or their opinion about economic situation in their country.

Wolfers (2003) concluded that perceived well-being is negatively affected by unemployment, its volatility and inflation. Hayo & Seifert (2003) used a sample consisting of Eastern European countries in early 1990s to find a positive effect of relative income and prospects for economic improvements in future on subjective well-being, and a negative impact of unemployment and worsening economic situation relatively the past experience. Welsch (2007) suggested that people are more satisfied under economic growth and better employment ratio as well as stability. The latter is measured by low inflation or low interest rates. Malesevic Perovic (2008) further analyzed transition economies to prove that inflation, and especially unemployment and GDP growth are important for subjective feeling of economic well-being. Welsch & Bonn (2008) estimated that convergence in macroeconomic conditions and especially in inflation rates led to convergence of life satisfaction in the EU member states.

Stanca (2008) has found interaction effects. Income affects happiness stronger in poor countries, while unemployment is more important factor in developed economies with high unemployment. Pew Research Center (2012) used cross-sectional data to find a strong correlation between GDP growth and the share of people considering the situation in their country is good. Mayer (2015) proved the negative impact of job loss and reduced consumption of the main products. Welsch & Kühling (2015) wrote about a negative impact of the crisis in 2008-09 on well-being of individuals in advanced economies. The reason was drop in GDP and unemployment which were not offset by the positive effect of lower inflation experienced in several countries.

Mikucka et al. (2017) used data for developing, transition, and developed countries to conclude that income inequality reduction in advanced economies and stable social trust help to increase the positive effect of economic growth on perceived well-being. Maison et al. (2019) used

a survey of Polish residents and came to a conclusion that subjective financial situation depends on making savings. Yan & Wen (2020) wrote that subjective well-being negatively depends on corruption and inequality, although there is a positive effect of inequality on the views of rural residents. Dluhosch (2021) states that a negative effect of income inequality is amplified by trade globalization.

European Commission (2022) provided a survey of the most important problems in the EU in summer 2022 according to its residents' point of view. 34% respondents worried about inflation (+10 pp in comparison to winter), 28% – energy supply (+12 pp), 19% – general economic situation (+1pp), 13% – state of public finance (-5pp), 13% – immigration (-9pp), 5% – unemployment (-3pp), 3% – pensions (-1pp) and 3% – taxation (0 pp).

Methodology. We use two variants of a dependent variable (share of respondents who consider that the current economic situation in their country is good): static value Op in % (perceived national economic situation) and its change relatively a previous year Δ Op in percentage points (pp) according to the surveys by Pew Research Center (2022). First, Op is used to assess the general trends in sentiments worldwide (analysis of time series) and variation of economic optimism across countries (cross-sectional data analysis).

Then several independent variables were tested (data from Word Bank (2022)):

- EG – GNI per capita growth (annual %) to measure economic growth;
- Pr – Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) or price instability;
- Un – Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate) or scarcity of jobs;
- GS – Gross savings (% of GNI) indicating ability to earn more income than it is necessary for consumption and to use domestic resources to finance investments;
- CA – Current account balance (% of GDP) as an indicator of external competitiveness;
- GINI – Gini index measuring income inequality within a country;
- GNIpc – GNI per capita, PPP (constant 2017 thousand international \$) denoting economic development level of a country.

Independent variables marked with Δ mean change relatively a previous year in pp or pp/GDP. Change in GNIpc is not used because it duplicates information about economic growth. The analyzed period is 2002-2021 (without 2003-2006 when the data on Op is not available), which is divided into 2 subperiods: 2002-2012 and 2013-2021.

Correlation analysis is used to provide primary selection of potential factors. T-test is used to estimate significance of correlation coefficients. Possible interaction effects are also studied (we assume that Gini index or GDP per capita may affect the influence of other factors) by using products of the indicators in regression formulas.

Regression models are calculated for the entire period and 2 subperiods to see possible changes in regularities. The final models have significant regression coefficients, normal distribution of residuals, absent multicollinearity and mostly absent substantial heteroscedasticity. Serial correlation of residuals is also tested.

Since panel data is used within regression analysis, we use Hausman test for static models (when the average Op differs substantially in various countries). If it rejects the hypothesis of appropriateness of random effects estimation method, fixed effects models are estimated too. When high serial correlation of residuals is faced, we also change specification of a model by adding the dependent variable value in the previous year Op_{t-1} , which helps to eliminate dependence of residuals. Outliers are excluded in smaller samples to check robustness of results, but the coefficients remain significant and similar.

Finally, country specific correlations between the dependent variables and factors or their increases (except for change in Gini index due to lower availability of data) are calculated for countries with available data for at least 8 years.

Results. Table 1 shows the values of the dependent variable Op in several countries (the entire analyzed sample consists of 43 countries). The most positive subjective views of economic situation were before crisis years (in 2007, 2016-19). The highest economic pessimism was in 2009

(Great Recession) and around it, in 2002 (as a result of the slowdown in 2001) and in 2020 (Coronacrisis). Considering the entire analyzed period, the most optimistic countries include China, Sweden, the Netherlands, India, Philippines, Germany and Australia. The lowest average Op was registered in Greece, Ukraine (although the data for it was available only for 2014-2015 and 2019), Lebanon, Tunisia, Italy, Republic of Korea and Spain.

Table 1

The share of population who consider the current economic situation in their country to be good, %

Year	Australia	Brazil	Canada	China	France	Germany	Italy	Japan	Korea, Rep.	Mexico	Poland	Russian Federation	Spain	Türkiye	United Kingdom	United States	Mean for 43 countries
2002			70	52	45	27	36	6	20	31	7	13		14	65	46	31.0
2007			80	82	30	63	25	28	8	51	36	38	65	46	69	50	46.9
2008	69			82	19	53		13	7	36	52	52	35	21	30	20	35.9
2009			43	88	16	28	22	10	5	30	38	28	12	24	16	20	25.3
2010		62		91	13	44		12	18	24	53	33	13	34	20	24	32.0
2011		54		88	17	67		10		30	26	29	10	49	15	18	32.9
2012		65		83	19	73	6	7		35	29	32	6	57	15	31	28.5
2013	67	59	67	88	9	75	3	27	20	38	27	33	4	53	15	33	38.1
2014		32		89	12	85	3	35	33	40	29	44	8	50	43	40	40.1
2015	55	13	57	90	14	75	12	37	16	34	38	24	18	47	52	40	41.1
2016	57		48	87	12	75	33	30			49		13		47	44	45.0
2017	60	15	59		21	86	15	41	15	28	64	46	28	65	51	58	46.0
2018	67	9	63		43	78	15	44	31	28	69	42	30		46	65	46.4
2019	66	21	72		37	79	23	37	30	49	74	35	42	40	50	60	47.0
2020	36		38		18	51	11	13	16				15		21	30	31.5
2021	74		49		26	60	12	18	28				13		44	29	41.2

Correlation analysis (see table 2) shows that static variable Op is usually associated with static values of factors, while dynamic ΔOp is likely to depend on changes in independent variables. The highest positive correlation is with economic growth and gross savings, negative – with unemployment. The positive correlation with current account is significant but lower. Inflation, income inequality and economic development level do not correlate with subjective views of economic situation.

Table 2

Correlation between positive views of economic situation and macroeconomic indicators

Variables	Op	ΔOp
Op _{t-1}	0.86*	0.19*
ΔOp_{t-1}	-0.27	-0.15
EG	0.61*	0.40*
ΔEG	-0.11	0.42*

Pr	-0.05	-0.12
Δ Pr	-0.10	-0.02
Un	-0.68*	-0.02
Δ Un	-0.20*	-0.42*
GS	0.71*	0.02
Δ GS	-0.12	0.25*
CA	0.37*	0.11
Δ CA	-0.19*	-0.09
GINI	-0.03	-0.16
Δ GINI	-0.04	0.08
GNIpc	-0.08	0.07

Note. * - significant correlations at $p < 0,05$.

The first static model for the entire period S1 using random effects method demonstrates long-term effects of economic growth, unemployment and gross savings on perceived economic well-being (see table 3). The fixed effects model S2 confirms that these 3 factors affect Op with similar regression coefficients. The models S3 and S4 for the subperiods prove that the effect of GDP per capita growth and gross savings has not changed substantially, but the negative impact of unemployment became twice as stronger in the last period (2013-2021) than in the first one (2002-2012). I.e. opinion of the public nowadays depends more on unemployment than at the very beginning of the XXI century.

Table 3

Models of perceived national economic situation Op without interaction effects

Model	S1	S2	S3	S4	S5	S6	S7
Period, years	2002-2021	2002-2021	2002-2012	2012-2021	2002-2021	2002-2012	2012-2021
Y-intercept	23.3*** (3.47)	27.9*** (3.74)	16.9*** (4.73)	28.1*** (4.73)	10.0*** (2.03)	6.55*** (1.90)	12.0*** (2.89)
Op _{t-1}					0.792*** (0.034)	0.839*** (0.059)	0.769*** (0.046)
EG	1.34*** (0.28)	1.44*** (0.30)	1.59*** (0.38)	1.27*** (0.38)	0.644*** (0.213)	0.628* (0.319)	0.635*** (0.294)
UN	-0.888*** (0.179)	-0.978*** (0.187)	-0.496* (0.286)	-1.08*** (0.224)	-0.314** (0.135)		-0.400** (0.167)
GS	0.928*** (0.122)	0.758*** (0.135)	0.831*** (0.168)	0.946*** (0.167)			
R ²	0.36	0.41/0.33	0.36	0.39	0.76	0.77	0.74
p	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	379	379	142	237	269	94	175

Note. In tables 3-6 standard errors are in brackets; significance of regression coefficients is marked by * at $p < 0,1$, ** at $p < 0,05$, *** at $p < 0,01$, according to t-test.

The advantage of these 4 models is estimation of the long-term effects. The disadvantage is existence of high serial correlation of residuals (about 0.70). As for cross sectional data analysis at each particular year, correlation between Op and economic growth varied between -0.10 in 2021 and 0.70 in 2011 (on average 0.39), with unemployment – between -0.61 in 2016 and -0.04 in 2008 (-0.35), with gross savings – between 0.25 in 2002 and 0.68 in 2014 (0.52), which proves the effect of these factors anyway.

The models without serial correlation S5, S6 and S7 demonstrate existence of short-term effect of gross savings and high inertia of public opinion considering importance of Op_{t-1} (the value of the dependent variable in a previous year). And unemployment had no significant short-term effect in 2002-2012.

Static random effects (S8) and fixed effects (S9) models for the entire period with interaction of factors show significant dependence of Op on economic growth, unemployment and gross savings in the long run (see table 4). Their effects are stronger in countries with high income inequality. Gross savings are more important also in advanced economies. The models S10 and S11 for the subperiods prove robustness of the results in general. But the impact of unemployment is stronger and more reliable in the second period. Again these long-term effect models have high serial correlation of residuals. But in any case including interaction effects enabled to increase coefficients of determination.

Table 4

Models of perceived national economic situation Op with interaction effects

Model	S8	S9	S10	S11	S12	S13	S14	S15
Period, years	2002-2021	2002-2021	2002-2012	2002-2012	2012-2021	2002-2021	2002-2012	2012-2021
Y-intercept	15.0*** (4.42)	19.3*** (4.51)	8.28* (4.29)	21.29*** (5.05)	14.8** (6.20)	7.78*** (2.96)	9.26*** (2.56)	2.95 (4.28)
Op_{t-1}						0.765*** (0.043)	0.760*** (0.083)	0.780*** (0.057)
EG*GINI	0.050*** (0.011)	0.057*** (0.011)	0.056*** (0.012)	0.043*** (0.012)	0.055*** (0.020)		0.026* (0.013)	
UN*GINI	-0.028*** (0.0056)	-0.028*** (0.0059)		-0.018** (0.0084)	-0.035*** (0.0071)	-0.014*** (0.0045)		-0.013** (0.0054)
GS*GINI	0.024*** (0.0039)	0.016*** (0.0043)	0.019*** (0.0050)	0.020*** (0.0050)	0.029*** (0.0059)	0.0077*** (0.028)		0.012*** (0.043)
GS*GNIpc	0.015*** (0.0030)	0.018*** (0.0033)	0.012** (0.0048)		0.016*** (0.0036)			
R ²	0.51	0.63/0.51	0.44	0.43	0.58	0.79	0.76	0.82
p	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	221	221	94	94	127	186	64	106

The models without serial correlation S13, S14 and S15 confirm a short-term effect of economic growth (especially under high income inequality), but only in 2002-2012. Unemployment and gross savings are more important since 2013 (especially under high income inequality). The interaction effect of gross savings and economic development level has not been proved in the short run. Considering coefficient of determination, the model S15 with interaction effects has better

predictive power in the second subperiod than the similar model S7 without interaction effects. But using interaction effect in the model S14 provides no additional advantage in comparison to S6.

The dynamic models D1 and D2 for the entire period demonstrate significance of short-term effects: a negative one of unemployment growth and a positive one of economic growth for improvement of subjective views about current economic situation in a country (see table 5). The third factor may be either acceleration of economic growth or gross savings growth. In the first subperiod (models D3 and D4) acceleration of economic growth was the most important together with economic growth or unemployment growth. In the second period all the 4 factors turned out to be significant. At the same time, the role of unemployment growth has increased, while importance of GDP growth acceleration has abated.

Table 5

Models of changes in perceived national economic situation ΔOp without interaction effects

Model	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5
Period, years	2002-2021	2002-2021	2002-2012	2002-2012	2012-2021
Y-intercept	1.51** (0.73)	-2.09*** (0.72)	-4.58*** (1.40)	-2.661** (1.29)	-1.24 (0.83)
EG	0.572** (0.246)	1.00*** (0.21)	0.781** (0.391)		0.753** (0.300)
ΔEG	0.702*** (0.188)		0.677** (0.315)	0.900*** (0.281)	0.447* (0.247)
ΔUN	-2.87*** (0.65)	-2.69*** (0.66)		-1.96** (0.99)	-3.58*** (0.83)
ΔGS		0.739** (0.305)			0.760** (0.415)
R ²	0.26	0.23	0.18	0.18	0.30
p	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.000
N	268	270	76	76	192

The dynamic model D6 including interaction with GINI index for the entire period shows significant positive impact of economic growth acceleration and negative effect of inflation (marginally significant) and unemployment (see table 6). But the models D6, D7 and D8 have no advantage in predictive power over the similar models without interaction effects.

Table 6

Models of changes in perceived national economic situation ΔOp without interaction effects with interaction effects

Model	D6	D7	D8	D9	D10	D11
Period, years	2002-2021	2002-2012	2012-2021	2002-2021	2002-2012	2012-2021
Y-intercept	1.29 (1.07)	-0.80 (2.73)	1.28 (0.99)	-0.71 (0.91)	-0.95 (2.00)	-1.53** (0.77)
EG*GINI		0.031** (0.014)				

$\Delta EG * GINI$	0.026*** (0.0093)		0.034** (0.013)			
$Pr * GINI$	-0.010* (0.0056)	-0.028** (0.014)				
$\Delta UN * GINI$	-0.094*** (0.021)	-0.069* (0.036)	-0.080** (0.031)			
$EG * GNIpc$				0.051*** (0.0067)	0.077*** (0.014)	0.044*** (0.0073)
$Pr * GNIpc$				-0.026* (0.010)	-0.054** (0.022)	
$\Delta UN * GNIpc$				-0.055*** (0.018)		-0.066*** (0.022)
R^2	0.20	0.24	0.13	0.32	0.34	0.31
p	0.000	0.004	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	153	52	105	260	73	191

The model D9 including interaction effect with economic development level is better than the similar models D1 and D2 without interaction effects. It shows that economic growth, unemployment and inflation may be more important in advanced economies. The positive effect of GDP growth weakened in recent years, the negative influence of inflation was significant only in 2002-2012, and the one of unemployment – in 2012-2021. In the second period the model D11 with interaction effect has no advantage over D5. But the model D10 for the first period is better than D4.

Thus, the models S10, S11 and S12 (for the entire period, first and second period respectively) have the best predictive power among the static models for long-term effects, although serial correlation is their drawback. S5, S6 and S15 are the best choices among static models for short-term effects (considering also model complexity criterion). D9, D10 and D5 perform better than other dynamic models.

Then time series data analysis is applied to assess country-specific regularities. Table 7 provides information about correlation between Op and independent variables or ΔOp and changes in independent variables in countries with available data at least for 8 years. Economic growth, gross savings and current account affect perceived economic situation either positively or insignificantly almost in all the countries. Insignificance can be partially explained by small number of cases in time series analysis. The effect of unemployment is either negative or insignificant almost everywhere.

The effects of inflation and income inequality are usually insignificant. When these effects are significant, we see that correlations vary by their sign (+ and -). Positive correlation with income inequality exists in core Anglosphere, Mexico and Germany. The negative correlation is more typical for Southern Europe, Israel, Poland and Republic of Korea.

Table 7

Correlation between perceived economic situation and macroeconomic indicators

Country	EG	ΔEG	Pr	ΔPr	Un	ΔUn	GS	ΔGS	CA	ΔCA	GINI	N
Argentina	0.75	0.60			-0.72	0.15	-0.02	-0.14	-0.41	-0.17	-0.47	11
Australia	0.55	0.71	0.69	0.90	-0.80	-0.98	0.17	0.19	-0.16	-0.51	0.86	9
Brazil	0.73	0.53	0.17	-0.56	-0.77	-0.26	0.92	0.43	-0.43	-0.24	-0.06	9
Canada	0.45	0.66	0.39	0.64	-0.75	-0.94	0.65	0.64	0.40	0.38	0.78	11
China	-0.20	-0.03	0.35	-0.24	0.79	0.11	0.70	0.18	-0.03	-0.47	-0.25	11
Egypt	0.78	0.05	0.32	0.11	-0.51	0.76	0.84	0.40	0.77	0.25	0.53	8
France	0.17	0.45	0.43	0.35	-0.40	-0.05	0.68	0.55	0.63	0.37	-0.16	16
Germany	0.43	0.65	0.09	0.67	-0.68	-0.65	0.69	0.72	0.77	0.14	0.79	16
Greece	0.84	-0.04	0.39	0.05	-0.84	-0.45	0.31	-0.16	-0.80	0.58	-0.66	8
Indonesia	-0.17	-0.81	-0.86	-0.69	-0.80	-0.44	0.56	-0.07	-0.53	0.45	0.16	11
Israel	0.37	0.64	-0.45	-0.11	-0.82	0.58	0.63	0.79	0.03	0.28	-0.81	9
Italy	0.30	0.37	0.04	-0.14	-0.47	-0.03	0.38	0.43	-0.24	0.16	-0.32	13
Japan	0.41	0.46	0.59	0.22	-0.73	-0.45	0.38	0.36	0.28	0.30	-0.17	16
Jordan	0.31	-0.48	0.39	0.11	-0.45	-0.46	0.27	-0.03	-0.07	0.11	-0.42	11
Kenya	0.55	0.67	0.08	-0.81	0.04	-0.12	0.40	0.09	-0.38	0.36		12
Korea, Rep.	-0.06	0.04	-0.52	0.21	0.28	-0.43	0.32	-0.37	0.44	-0.48	-0.99	13
Lebanon	0.01	0.48	0.28	0.17	0.06	-0.39	0.00	0.06	0.10	0.18		12
Mexico	-0.12	-0.20	-0.38	-0.39	-0.25	-0.16	-0.03	-0.13	0.16	0.49	0.59	13
Nigeria	-0.09	0.12	-0.29	-0.55	-0.08	-0.62	-0.30	-0.19	-0.39	-0.39	0.26	8
Pakistan	0.12	0.44	-0.35	-0.30	-0.10	0.02	0.48	0.30	-0.14	-0.19	0.52	10
Poland	0.51	0.11	0.01	0.04	-0.88	-0.42	0.65	-0.37	0.34	-0.36	-0.70	14
Russian Federation	0.61	-0.75	-0.45	-0.10	-0.53	-0.62	0.15	0.39	-0.27	0.12	0.31	13
South Africa	-0.39	0.51	-0.42	-0.89	-0.54	-0.29	-0.40	0.29	-0.67	-0.49		9
Spain	0.17	0.42	0.29	0.27	-0.84	-0.70	0.58	0.75	-0.49	-0.26	-0.81	15
Türkiye			-0.54	-0.18	-0.35	-0.52	0.46	-0.13	-0.47	-0.27	0.26	12
United Kingdom	0.44	0.69	-0.36	0.00	-0.73	-0.61	0.60	0.65	-0.13	0.18	0.73	16
United States	0.27	0.51	-0.06	-0.02	-0.83	-0.59	0.71	0.59	0.26	0.20	0.58	16

Note. Correlation coefficients are significant at $p < 0,05$ if their absolute value $> 0,7$ if $N=8$, $> 0,6$ if $N=11$, $> 0,5$ if $N=16$.

A typical enough effect of the majority of factors (like in the regression models) exists in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Israel, Kenya, Poland, Spain, United Kingdom and United States. There is a group of countries where perceived well-being depends much less on macroeconomic indicators: Italy, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Lebanon, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan and Türkiye.

Conclusion. Previous literature considered a positive effect of economic growth, relative income and savings on subjective well-being of individuals or their opinion about economic situation in their country, and a negative effect of unemployment, inflation, high interest rates, corruption, problems in energy supply, unsound public finance and immigration. The effects may be

modified by factors' interaction with national GDP per capita, social trust, income inequality or trade globalization.

This paper confirms positive effect of economic growth on perceived national economic situation: each additional GDP per capita growth by 1 pp leads to increase in the share of people who consider that economic situation in their country is good by 0.6-1 pp in the short run and 1.4 pp in the long run. The effect is stronger under high income inequality in the long run and in advanced economies in the short run. Some models suggest that acceleration of economic growth may also be important with similar magnitude of the effect in the short run.

Unemployment influences perceived national economic situation negatively. In 2013-2021 each additional 1 pp of unemployment decreased the share of people who consider that economic situation in their country is good by 0.4 pp in the short run and 1.1 in the long run. But earlier (in 2002-2012) this effect was weaker and existed only in the long run (0.5 pp). It is interesting that increase in unemployment leads to a larger drop in positive views about economic situation (2 pp in the first subperiod and 3.6 pp in the second one). The long-term negative effect of unemployment is stronger in countries with high income inequality.

Gross savings ratio is a positive factor. Each additional 1 pp of the savings relatively GDP improved positive public opinion by 0.8-0.9 pp in the long run, and their change – by 0.75 pp. The long-term effect of savings is stronger in countries with high income inequality, and in 2013-2021 also in advanced economies.

The effect of inflation is negative, but it existed only in advanced economies in the first subperiod (2002-2012). Nevertheless the analyzed period ends before 2022, which was a year when developed economies faced unusually higher inflation. Therefore it is too early to make a final conclusion about the effect of inflation. Correlation between opinion of people and current account is positive, but our regression analysis results show that this factor does not have a separate significant effect.

Income inequality, its change and economic development level do not affect perceived economic situation themselves. But high income inequality increases sensitivity of people to trends in economic growth, unemployment and gross savings. High development level also increases such sensitivity and earlier in XXI century dependence on inflation.

Thus, subjective views about current economic situation mostly depend on economic growth and savings. Unemployment became increasingly important. Fear of inflation in advanced economies abated before 2022.

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УДК 330

PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19 AS A TOOL OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT

ДЕРЖАВНО-ПРИВАТНІ ПАРТНЕРСТВА З РЕАГУВАННЯ НА КОВІД ЯК ІНСТРУМЕНТ АНТИКРИЗОВОГО МЕНЕДЖМЕНТУ

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***Abstract.** The article is devoted to the study of the role of public-private partnership in overcoming the crisis caused by COVID-19. Overcoming such crises is not possible only at the expense of the public sector, but requires the consolidation of efforts of various stakeholders, including business, public organizations, private individuals and international organizations.*

The article notes that a significant number of partnerships were created during the pandemic to minimize its consequences, analyzed the characteristics of the main types of partnerships that arose as part of the response to COVID 19. A wide range of public-private partnerships have been formed during the pandemic and played an important role in the crisis response, further recovery, resilience and sustainability.

***Keywords:** Public-private partnership, PPP, crisis management, COVID-19, crisis-response public-private partnership, recovery and resilience partnership, sustainable partnership, public-private collaboration, multi-sector partnership, cross-sector collaboration*

***Анотація.** Стаття присвячена дослідженню ролі публічно-приватного партнерства в подоланні кризи, викликаній COVID-19. Подолання подібних криз не можливо тільки за рахунок публічного сектору, а потребує консолідацію зусиль різних стейкхолдерів, в тому числі бізнесу, громадських організацій, приватних осіб та міжнародних організацій.*

В статті відзначається, що значна кількість партнерств була створена під час пандемії для мінімізації її наслідків, проаналізовані характерні риси основних типів партнерств, що виникли в рамках реагування на COVID 19

***Ключові слова:** державно-приватне партнерство, ДПП, кризисний менеджмент, COVID-19, антикризисне партнерство, партнерство з відновлення та стійкості, партнерство стійкого розвитку, державно-приватне співробітництво, багатосекторне партнерство, міжсекторне співробітництво.*

Introduction. From time to time, the world faces serious challenges (pandemics, wars, negative natural events, etc.), which have a significant impact on many life spheres of society, lead to crises and require the consolidation of the whole society to minimize the consequences of such crises. COVID-19 has posed the most challenging and complex global health crisis in at least 100 years.

The complexity of proper response to COVID-19 has been characterized by uncertain and rapidly changing information; interdependencies between decisions made by many individuals/organizations with different perspectives and their outcomes across organizational and

sector boundaries; and time lags between policy changes and their effects. The proper response to COVID-19 has required the usage of the leading crisis management practice and the consolidation of the whole society and cross-sector collaboration, when governments, international organizations, the private sector, and civil society have to joint their efforts against COVID-19.

The purpose of research is to focus on the role of cross-sector collaboration, in particular public-private partnership to respond COVID-19 and other crises.

Research results.

COVID-19 has had a profound impact on the global economy, with disruptions to supply chains and shrinking demand for products and services. In the context of PPP infrastructure projects, the impact of COVID-19 in a broader context can bring to the following results [Asian Development Bank, 2021]:

- (i) decreasing PPP project value and volume,
- (ii) an increasing PPP project risk allocation and assumptions being taken on the private sector side,
- (iii) a perception on the public sector side that value for money may not currently be realized fully on PPP projects.

It quickly became clear that slowing the pace of COVID-19 and mitigating its impact could not have been the work of governments alone, instead it had required an all-of-society response. The world-wide impacts of COVID-19 have prompted an unprecedented all-sector, rapid response. The COVID-19 pandemic response has demonstrated the interconnectedness of individuals, organizations, and other entities jointly contributing to the production of community health. This response has involved stakeholders from numerous sectors, including governments, international organizations, the private sector, and civil society who have been faced with new decisions, objectives, and constraints. As a result, the international community has mobilized public-private partnerships to accelerate the global response, providing urgent health and socio-economic support, helping communities to live with the pandemic, and working towards post-pandemic recovery.

There can be defined the following key findings about public-private partnerships response to COVID-19.

- A wide range of partnerships have been formed during the pandemic [Fu, 2021]. Examples include collaboration at national and international levels.
- Four main initiators of partnerships are: governments, the private sector, civil society, and the United Nations.
- A business that promotes the creation of a partnership is usually well placed to identify practical solutions and other like-minded organizations that want to collaborate.
- “The private sector has contributed to the COVID-19 response through engagement in COVID-19 surveillance and testing, treatment and management of COVID19 cases, risk communication and health promotion, and maintenance of access to other essential services” [United Nations, 2020].
- Among existing partnerships, private sector initiators appear to be dominated by leading multinational companies that have more resources to focus on their impact within society and seek ways to work with potential partners against the pandemic. Their unique expertise, their capacity to innovate and produce new technologies for adaptation, and their financial leverage enable them to play a key role.
- Multi-sector partnerships, which bring together governments, international organizations, scientists, businesses, civil society, and philanthropists, have been an important driving force in the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic. An example is the ACT Accelerator - a global collaboration to accelerate development, production, and equitable access to COVID-19 tests, treatments, and vaccines.
- The scope for these public-private partnerships has ranged broadly. Partnerships have (i) provided financial support and technical assistance; (ii) supported project implementation and delivery; (iii) facilitated research, data collection and analytics; and (iv) coordinated various response actions [Fu, 2021, p.3].

- Crisis Uncertainty: Dealing with uncertainty, unpredictability and unexpected issues was a significant challenge for many PPPs in combatting COVID-19 (e.g., ANTICOV, IICY, IOM partnership on filter hotel for migrants, COVID-19 Women and Children Safe at Hotels in Mexico, UN COVID-19 Response and Recovery Fund).

Crisis management can be divided into the phases of “responding”, “recovering”, “building resilience” and “building sustainability”. Correspondingly, COVID-19 has brought to quick partnership development and the response to the pandemic has created the following types of public-private partnerships [EurekAlert, 2020; Kabwama et al., 2022; Stibbe & Prescott, 2020].

1. Crisis-response partnerships. This type of partnership has new features compared with conventional PPPs. PPPs are typically thought of in terms of large infrastructure projects. They are understood as long-term (i.e. running for several decades) working arrangements based on a complex contractual commitment “between a public sector organisation with any other organisation outside the public sector” [Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011]. Crisis-response partnerships have mostly not followed the typical model of conventional PPPs. Crisis-response PPPs are context-specific and mostly short- and middle-term.

2. Recovery and resilience partnerships. These partnerships are looking beyond the immediate response. In relation to crisis management, building resilience means improving “the capacity to adopt the existing resources and skills to new situations and operating conditions” [Comfort, 1999, p. 21], which often implies capabilities such as reducing the probability of a shock, buffering an emergency when it takes place, and recovering quickly after a crisis [Jung & Song, 2015]. Public-private partnerships have the advantages of building the resilience of a society because a network of organizations will be more likely to successfully manage the consequences of crises and swiftly deliver products and services in a crisis [Stewart et al., 2009]. Building resilience through private-public partnerships is essential for moving through hardships such as COVID-19 and climate change in both domestic and global settings. It helps communities recover from and mitigate the risk of disasters is the resilience of both the local community and the local economy.

3. Sustainable partnerships. These partnerships are “longer-term multilateral arrangements, involving both local and cross-border flows and linkages that utilize resources and competences from partners, for the joint achievement of collective goals” [Fu, 2021, p. 9].

The United Nations Sustainable Development Group has launched a coherent framework for the UN’s urgent socio-economic support to countries and societies in the face of COVID-19, putting into practice the Secretary-General’s report on “Shared responsibility, global solidarity: Responding to the socio-economic impacts of COVID-19”. Moving beyond the initial response phase, the UN Secretary-General underlines the need for the world to “recover better”, and that any recovery strategy should ensure we collectively remain on track towards the longer-term objectives outlined in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

According to Xiaolan Fu’s analysis of 36 partnerships [Fu, 2021], most partnerships focus on Type 1 (Crisis-response) Partnership, but around a third focus on Types 2 (Recovery and resilience) and 3 (Sustainable), several of the partnerships address more than one type.

Government roles include leadership, conducting strategic communications, convening expert guidance, relaxing regulations, developing national economic priorities, and providing public health supporting resources. This initiating role of governments is particularly significant in delivering an immediate response to COVID-19. However, during a crisis, public-private partnership led by public actors may be ineffective due to many internal characteristics of the bureaucratic system, such as complex accountability [Ryan & Walsh, 2004] and public interest [Ortiz & Buxbaum, 2008]. Government is usually trapped by institutional rigidity, reflected in a hierarchical command structure and stricter accountability requirements, making public-private partnership less flexible and less autonomous to overcome crises [Comfort, 2007].

In the context of the pandemic, civil society driven partnerships provide a safe place where relationships between partners can develop very quickly. Early participation also means that donors can contribute to a proposal’s design to fit with other development interventions, and balance power

relationships among partners. Partnerships led by civil society may include new and existing partners from industry, government, the UN, academia, and other NGOs.

A business that promotes the creation of a partnership is usually well placed to identify practical solutions and other like-minded organizations that want to collaborate. Unlike public-private partnership under normal conditions, cooperation during a crisis should have a more specific and consistent goal: to cope with the crisis. Wallace [Wallace et al., 2022] suggests a number of motivating factors behind COVID-19 and other crises for the private business. Some of the contributions, such as the cash and in-kind donations by private companies, might be classified as part of corporate social responsibility toward the pandemic. A second factor motivating the private sector appears to be business survival and revenue protection. Use of hotels to provide quarantine space in Nepal, for example, provided much needed support to the tourism sector [Dhaka Tribune, 2021]. As evidenced by S.Qiu [Qiu et al., 2021] for the hospitality sector, corporate social responsibility during the pandemic may boost firm value with a positive impact on business survival. In other cases, the financial benefits of private sector responses have been a little more speculative although potentially more profitable. COVID-19 has created a high-risk environment, where the private sector has borne entrepreneurial risk in search for returns from public contracts. Supplementing Government of Bangladesh pre-funding to the Serum Institute for the development of vaccines gave the company exclusive rights to distribute a resulting vaccine in the country part of which will be sold to private paying customers [Wallace et al., 2022].

The effectiveness of PPPs in response to COVID-19 still needs to be evaluated. The lack of public information in many countries about the exact characteristics of these PPPs makes it difficult to assess how well they work, how fair the processes were that put them in place, and the value they represent [Kettunen, 2020]. Although evidence of their effectiveness is not yet sufficiently available, many have demonstrated the potential of result-oriented, creative ways of mobilizing skills, funds, and capacities to achieve public health goals. The experience of successful partnerships has enhanced the understanding of the value of sharing knowledge, data, technology and resources. In addition to assessing their immediate effects, follow-up should also assess their long-term sustainability, impact on public sector capacity, and their influence on health inequities and social justice.

In general, the success of the partnerships created to tackle the pandemic can be explained by six factors [Fu, 2021, p.11]:

- i. forward planning around the needs, potential partners, and the steps to put the partnership into action;
- ii. trust among partners which usually is associated with previous collaboration;
- iii. alignment of interests and a shared vision of the needs they will solve, their roles and the creation of value;
- iv. flexibility from partners to be responsive to changes in the environment and the needs of the partnership;
- v. a high level of commitment to collaborate and pursue the collective goals agreed for the partnership; and
- vi. the governance structure and leadership of the partnership to coordinate the relations and activities between partners through time.

Enabling conditions for the emergence and success of crisis-response partnerships include [Tille et al., 2021, p.11]:

1. The emergency conditions created by the pandemic pushed all types of institutions to be flexible, to commit their resources and experience, and to solve problems promptly.
2. The partnership model is an important factor for success, since it is appropriate to combine multiple resources and to use the partners' social capital not only to design a partnership model quickly, but also to make it viable in practice.
3. Technologies, and in particular digital technologies, were a crucial enabler of the partnerships during the pandemic. Given the restrictions imposed to reduce the spread of the pandemic, the communications between partners were mainly digital.

Conclusions. The private sector has been a key player in the COVID-19 response, not only within the health sector but also across multiple sectors impacting on health, prevention and probability. Governments have followed a variety of strategies, including partnerships, to attempt to manage the private sector response. Public–private partnerships have shown their potential to effectively respond to extreme events, like COVID-19. It should be noted that COVID-19 has led to the further development of public-private partnerships and the emergence of new types of PPPs as conventional public–private partnerships led by governmental actors have often encountered significant difficulties in the crisis. The urgency of the pandemic, the fact that it directly affects many people’s lives and the rapid and global spread are unique factors that enable quick action. Overcoming crises requires very effective response measures in a very short period of time, which makes standard strategies for forming and managing conventional public-private partnership inadequate and impractical. Rapid partnership development has enabled positive actions concerning this, as well other pressing global challenges. Despite the above mentioned, the effectiveness of PPPs to respond to COVID-19 still need to be evaluated, many PPPs have demonstrated their potential to respond efficiently to COVID-19 and other challenges.

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УДК 339.9

FORMATION OF THE INNOVATIVE COMPONENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS OF THE WORKFORCE OF UKRAINE IN THE CONDITIONS OF GLOBAL DIGITALIZATION

ФОРМУВАННЯ ІННОВАЦІЙНОГО КОМПОНЕНТУ МІЖНАРОДНОЇ КОНКУРЕНТОСПРОМОЖНОСТІ РОБОЧОЇ СИЛИ УКРАЇНИ В УМОВАХ ГЛОБАЛЬНОЇ ДІДЖИТАЛІЗАЦІЇ

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Abstract. The article is devoted to the consideration of the basic characteristics, the economic focus of the process of formation of the innovative component of the international competitiveness of the workforce of Ukraine in the conditions of global digitalization of the world economy. The innovative component of the international competitiveness of the workforce is defined as the potential professional abilities of employees who are able to optimally use the latest achievements of scientific and technological progress in social production. The main components of the innovative component of the formation of the international competitiveness of the domestic workforce are studied, namely: a) the level of mastery of modern information and communication tools; b) targeting the constant mastery of new digital technologies; c) acquisition of professional competences oriented to the parameters of world standards; d) modernization of the national system of higher education in the direction of training highly qualified specialists in demand on the domestic and global labour markets; e) using the advantages of cooperation with international partners in the field of involvement in training and borrowing new forms and methods of ensuring the professional growth of young specialists. Factors affecting the development of the innovative component of the international competitiveness of national labour resources are analyzed. They include: 1) the consequences of the russian military aggression against Ukraine, which led to a decrease in the national scientific and technical potential; 2) forced migration of specialists within our country and abroad; 3) insufficient development of the IT sector of the domestic labour market; 4) regional disparities in the use of highly qualified labour force; 5) inadequate financing of the system of training of highly qualified personnel. The directions for strengthening the innovative component of the international competitiveness of the domestic workforce are proved, including: a) development of balanced state programs for national and regional development of highly qualified labour resources; b) modernization of higher education standards in the training of specialists of various professions; c) implementation of measures to stimulate the development of the national IT industry, digitization of industries and spheres of domestic production; d) formation of analytical centers for the study of features and trends in the development of world labour markets; e) adoption of an innovative national system of qualifications, oriented to the needs of internal and external business.

Key words: innovative component, international competitiveness of the workforce, digitalization of the IT sector of the labour market of Ukraine, national personnel strategy.

Statement of the problem and its connection with important scientific or practical tasks. In modern conditions the issues of effective use of the innovative potential of domestic labour resources are becoming an urgent research. First of all, it seems appropriate to focus attention, firstly, on the characteristics of the existing capabilities of the innovative component of

the domestic workforce, where the level of digitalization qualification acts as its main feature. Secondly, an attention should be focused on new challenges to the training of highly qualified theoretical and practical specialists. They are objectively the patterns of development of the world economy. First of all, it is about deepening the international division of labour, transnationalization, strengthening the positions of regional and integration groups, diversification of world markets for goods, capital, labour, and services. Thirdly, special attention should be paid to the problems of balanced use of the innovative component of the domestic workforce in the modern conditions of the martial law in our country and in the period of the post-war restoration of the domestic scientific and technical potential. Taking into account the mentioned research of the innovative component of the international competitiveness of national labour resources in the direction of revealing its economic essence, structure, features of implementation, prospects for further development, it is one of the priority guidelines for the development of the economy of our state and strengthening its position on the world markets.

Formulation of the goals (purpose) of the article. The purpose of the article is to study the process of formation of the innovative component of the international competitiveness of the workforce of Ukraine and to substantiate measures for its qualitative growth.

The analysis of the latest research and publications, in which the solution to this problem was initiated and on which the author relies. Quite a large number of scientific works by domestic and foreign authors are devoted to the problems of the development of the international competitiveness of labour resources of Ukraine. V. Budkin (Budkin, 2004), K. Wolczuk (Wolczuk, 2013), T. Davydiuk (Davydiuk, 2009), R. Dragneva (Dragneva, 2013) made a significant contribution to the development of theoretical, methodological and practical issues in this direction. I. Zhurba (Zhurba, 2012), M. Jovanovic (Jovanovic, 2006), V. Kopiika (Kopiika, 2015), H. Lukenbach (Lukenbach, 2010), D. Lukianenko (Lukianenko, 2008), I. Marchenko (Marchenko, 2018), V. Moroz (Moroz, 2015), L. Nikolaienko (Nikolaienko, 2010), S. Panchyshyn (Panchyshyn, 2009), O. Sakharska (Sakharska, 2009), O. Pyshchulina (Pyshchulina, 2020), A. Puntigliano (Puntigliano, 2017), M. Porter (Porter, 2000), A. Filipenko (Filipenko, 2004), A. Cherep (Cherep, 2011), O. Cheromukhina (Cheromukhina, 2021), Yu. Chaliuk (Chaliuk, 2021), O. Shnyrkov (Shnyrkov, 2011), M. Hamov (Hamov, 2011), R. Zablotska (Zablotska, 2016), T. Schultz (Schultz, 1975) etc. Their works, in particular, examine labour resources, which are the form of expression of the majority of human resources and are characterized as a part of the country's population, which, having the appropriate psychophysiological, physical and intellectual qualities, is able to produce material and spiritual goods and services; peculiarities of the development of the system of international competitiveness of the Ukrainian economy in the conditions of the European competitive space; factors that form the competitiveness of the work force of Ukraine on the domestic and foreign labour markets; international integration processes and their influence on the optimal use of the total innovation potential of the interested countries.

Highlighting previously unsolved parts of the general problem, to which the article is devoted. Quite a large number of scientific works are devoted to the development of directions of innovation and, in particular, their digitalization component of the labour market of Ukraine. But, taking into account the current realities, related, in particular, to the military invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, this process requires additional scientific research. One of its priority components is the analysis of the prerequisites for the formation of modern basic characteristics, development peculiarities, mechanisms of implementation and increasing the innovative capabilities of the Ukrainian workforce, as a significant factor in strengthening the international competitiveness of the domestic economic potential. The study of this direction of the use of national labour resources is one of the priorities in the economic development strategy of Ukraine, and deserves a scientific analysis of its specifics.

Presentation of the main material of the study with a detailed justification of the obtained scientific results. The development of the innovative component of the international competitiveness of the workforce is one of the priority directions for the implementation of foreign economic strategy of Ukraine, which is capable of providing an impetus for qualitative transformations of the national economy and strengthening its position on world markets. In general, M. Porter (Porter, 2000) clearly stated the importance of the introduction of innovations as the main condition for the competitiveness of the countries of the world and noted that: "The competitiveness of a particular nation depends on the ability of its industry to introduce innovations and be modernized." With regard to the analysis of the process of formation of the innovative component of the competitiveness of the workforce, it is advisable to determine, first of all, its economic essence and planes of manifestation. In our opinion, the generalized content of the competitiveness of the workforce can be considered as the mastery of professional knowledge by employees and the ability to use it in practical activities with higher efficiency, compared to representatives of similar professions.

Regarding the definition of the features of the manifestation of the international competitiveness of the workforce, here it is worth distinguishing the environment of its functioning. Firstly, in general, the competitiveness of the workforce is inherent on the labour market, where it is typical for the assessment of the employee's abilities. In this plane, we are talking, first of all, about the potential competitiveness of the workforce.

Secondly, the competitiveness of the workforce is concretely implemented in the labour market. In this plane, it is appropriate to consider the use of the employee's abilities in his direct production activities, their embodiment in the results of his work - material products, services and the demand for the latter and the volume of their implementation on the market. Herein, in contrast to the potential one, it is necessary to consider the real competitiveness of the workforce, which is ultimately embodied in the results of the employee's activity, and has priority on the market in terms of consumer demand for products manufactured for sale.

Thirdly, based on the abovementioned, the international competitiveness of the workforce, the forms of its manifestation, should be evaluated within the limits of its offer on the world labour market, and in the plane of its application, directly, on the world labour market. Regarding the assessment of the international competitiveness of the workforce on its world market, it is about the level of professional training of employees, the possibility of using their abilities, which is reflected in the terms of the contract that the employer offers to the hired worker. When the contract becomes legally binding, it becomes the first stage of functioning of the global labour market. The next stage is the professional work of the employee, its results, their implementation and compensation for labour costs. A characteristic feature of the international competitiveness of the workforce is that it, as an offer, is inherent and operates in our time in the global economic space.

Fourthly, the international competitiveness of the workforce should be evaluated within the framework of national economies, where it can also find its manifestation on the domestic workforce market and the labour market. In this plane, the international competitiveness of the workforce of a certain state will be manifested in the offer of employees and its comparative assessment of the possibility of employment in foreign companies operating on the territory of their country. In case of involvement of the local workforce to the work in foreign companies, the level of its international competitiveness will be generally reflected in the results of the activities of the relevant foreign business entities. Another way of assessing the international competitiveness of the national workforce is its effective activity at domestic enterprises. This can be evidenced by the overwhelming demand for their products, compared to similar imported ones, on the domestic market of goods and services. In this sense, the offer of the competitive local workforce in the conditions of the formation of the global labour market and the workforce market, an integral component of which are national links, acquires international features.

The specified basic characteristics of the international competitiveness of the workforce are also inherent in the process of forming its domestic innovative component. A specific leading feature of its current level is the existing degree of digitization of the domestic workforce. It is the

mastery of the latest ICT tools that allows employees to demonstrate their competitive potential. It should be noted that digitalization, as was mentioned at the G-20 Summit (15-16 November 2022), is one of the priority forms of transformation of civilizational development, and it includes, among other things, world workforce markets, labour markets and integration and national competitive relations of actors on each of them (Ukrinform).

Digitalization of the domestic labour market is characterized by complex non-linear relationships with the international competitiveness of the workforce of Ukraine (ICWU) due to the lack of a unified approach to defining the concepts of digitalization, digital transformation of a certain industry, competitiveness of the workforce, etc. In this context, the concept of ICWU should be investigated as a competitive characteristic of the country's human capital on the international labour market (education, professionalism, competence in the form of abilities, knowledge, skills, personal qualities, innovation potential, motivational potential) in comparison with the human capital of other countries (Moroz, 2015).

Digital technologies represent a huge market and industry, as well as a platform for the efficiency and competitiveness of the workforce and all other markets and industries. Digital transformation is considered as 1) cultural, organizational and operational change of an organization, industry or ecosystem through intelligent integration of digital technologies, processes and competencies at all levels and functions in a phased and strategic manner; 2) strategic implementation of digital technologies (Cheromukhina, 2021), (Chaliuk, 2021). Thus, digital transformation involves the development of digital competencies and a change in the international competitiveness of the workforce, in particular the emergence of a new characteristic of the country's labour resources on the international labour market, namely digital skills that provide remote interaction between employees and employers, expand the employment potential.

As a result of the integration of digital technologies in various industries, a digital labour market is formed, that is a specific segment of the global labour market, in which the demand and supply of labour digital services is created remotely, while the interaction of its subjects takes place using information and computer technologies (Pyshchulina, 2020). The concept of digitalization of the labour market can be considered as a strategy for automating jobs, search processes, recruitment, labour resource management, training, and technology integration to optimize the functions performed by personnel of various educational and qualification categories. The dynamic digitization of the labour market will have a positive effect on the ICWU, thanks to the improvement of the level of qualification of labour resources, their competence and other personal qualities. The country's emphasis on the development of digital competences will contribute to the formation of a digital labour market at the national level, which will be integrated into the global, international labour market.

The international competitiveness of the workforce of Ukraine is determined by the state policy in stimulating the development of talents, legal norms regulating labour market, which currently limit its development, in particular flexibility. Since independence, there has been no effective policy of managing the competitiveness of the workforce in Ukraine. On 14 April 2022, on the website of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Order No. 286-p of 23 February 2022 "On the Approval of the Strategy for the Development of Higher Education in Ukraine for 2022-2032" (Pro skhvalennia Stratehii rozvytku vyshchoi osvity v Ukraini na 2022-2032 roky) was published, which provides for the implementation of five key goals: ensuring the effectiveness of management of the higher education system; ensuring and building the trust of citizens, the state and business in the educational, scientific, innovative activities of higher education institutions; provision of high-quality educational and scientific activities, competitive higher education, which is accessible to various population groups; internationalization of higher education of Ukraine; attractiveness of higher education institutions for study and academic career.

A number of tasks have been determined within the specified goals, which will affect the improvement of the level of qualification of the workforce and its competitiveness. This process will consist in the modernization of the network, consolidation of higher education institutions, support of research universities; providing conducive conditions for higher education institutions to

conduct research and consult business; creation of conditions for the development of public and private partnership in the field of higher education; providing conducive conditions for the use of innovative technologies and the latest learning tools in the educational process, development of research infrastructures; development of the national system of qualifications; simplification of the procedures for recognition of foreign educational qualifications, etc. The expected result of the implementation of the Strategy involves the creation of an effective system of higher education in accordance with the needs of the economy, citizens and society, which, in turn, will strengthen the level of competitiveness of the workforce on the domestic and global market of educational services.

In the context of the mentioned measures to ensure the innovative component of the ICWU, special attention should be paid to the definition of the main task of domestic higher education, which consists in the formation of the professional and scientific and educational potential of Ukraine through the implementation of high-quality educational programs, research and social projects, integration into the European research and educational space, social responsibility and competitiveness of education, dynamic institutional development of scientific communities (*Stratehichna piramida rozvytku vyshchoi osvity v Ukraini na 2022-2032 roky*). Among the main operational goals within the scope of ensuring the effectiveness of higher education management there is training of in-demand specialists to meet the needs of the economy in qualified labour resources, which involves the introduction of a system for monitoring professional qualifications and employment of graduates of higher education institutions in 2022 and the creation of a new regulatory framework for contracting the first workplace for graduates who studied at the expense of the state or local budget in 2023 (*Stratehichna piramida rozvytku vyshchoi osvity v Ukraini na 2022-2032 roky*). In higher education institutions, educational programs based on the competence approach are approved, in which a list of general, professional (specialist) competences and integral competence (the ability to solve typical specialized tasks and practical problems in the relevant field of activity or in the learning process) are defined.

The formation of the innovative component of the ICWU should contribute to the consistent compliance with the provisions of the National Strategy for the Development of Education in Ukraine for 2012-2021 (*Pro Natsionalnu stratehiiu rozvytku osvity v Ukraini na period do 2021 roku*), in which one of the main tasks is defined as the development of higher education standards oriented on the competence approach, which will be coordinated with the new structure of educational and qualification (educational and scientific) levels of higher education and with the National Qualifications Framework (NQF) (*Pro zatverdzhennia Natsionalnoi ramky qualificatsii*). The formation of special (professional) competences in various fields of knowledge involves the use of an interdisciplinary approach, i.e. the ability to use the provisions and research methods of various disciplines to solve problems in various professional spheres of activity and to use information and communication technologies. Thus, the modernization of the higher education system of Ukraine will contribute to the development of the qualified workforce and strengthen its competitiveness on the international labour market.

In the context of comparison of the parameters of the existing innovation component of the ICWU with similar indicators of the developed countries of the world, in particular the EU, it is necessary to note the slow contribution of domestic specialists to the development of our high-technology exports. This is evidenced by the data in Table 1.

Table 1

Dynamics of exports and shares of exports of ICT services in Ukraine,
2010-2021

Country	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Deviation +/-
Exports of goods and services, % of GDP													
The EU	40,3	43,2	44,8	45,0	45,7	47,1	46,7	48,4	49,2	49,3	46,7	50,7	10,4
Ukraine	46,5	49,4	47,4	42,9	48,6	52,6	49,3	48,1	45,2	41,2	38,8	40,7	-5,7
ICT services exports, % of exports of services													
The EU	10,6	10,8	10,8	10,8	11,1	11,5	12,1	12,3	13,5	14,5	17,9	18,3	7,8
Ukraine	3,9	4,9	6,0	7,9	13,7	16,9	18,6	19,4	21,9	24,8	33,3	38,1	34,2
High-technology exports, % of industrial exports													
The EU	16,7	16,0	16,4	16,4	16,5	17,2	17,5	16,0	15,6	16,2	16,1	16,2	-0,5
Ukraine	4,5	4,5	6,5	6,1	6,9	8,0	6,7	6,2	5,4	5,5	5,9	5,7	1,2

Source: combined by author based on Exports of goods and services Ukraine. World Bank.
Retrieved from <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS?locations=UA>

Source: combined by author based on High-technology exports. World Bank.
Retrieved from <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TX.VAL.TECH.MF.ZS>

Source: combined by author based on service exports.Ukraine. World Bank.
Retrieved from <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.GSR.CCIS.ZS?locations=UA>

The data in Table 1 show the dynamics affecting the international level of economic competitiveness of Ukraine, namely: the exports of goods and services show a negative value of -5.7%, high-technology exports are growing at a slow pace and show a rather low value of 1.2%, at the same time, the ICT services exports show a significant growth of 34.2% during 2010-2021.

Among the factors that affect the improvement of the innovative component of the ICWU there are education, qualifications, ability and readiness for intensive work, etc. According to the calculations of E. Libanova, director of the Ptoukha Institute for Demography and Social Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Ukraine is not inferior to most developed economies in terms of the quantitative parameters of vocational training, but this high level is ensured by middle-aged and older people. As for young people, due to large-scale emigration, despite a significant increase in the training of specialists with higher education, their share in the population aged 25-34 has decreased significantly. With a general increase in the volume of training of specialists with higher education by 1.5 times, there is a noticeable redistribution of them: the role of institutions of the I-II levels of accreditation (with 3-4 years duration of study) is decreasing – both in absolute and relative terms. On the contrary, the role of institutions of the III-IV levels of accreditation (with 5-6 years duration of study) is increasing. Given the reduction, rather than growth, of the total number of jobs truly requiring highly qualified labour, and the preservation of a significant share of budget expenditures in financing training, such shifts are not positive (Panchyshyn, 2009), (Sakharska, 2009).

The main problems of the formation of the innovative component of the ICWU today are those related to the access to financing (Marchenko, 2018), the growth of the discount rate and the cost of lending in the conditions of military aggression of the Russian Federation, devaluation of the national currency, which significantly affects the level of well-being of the population, corruption risks, insufficient efficiency of state administration, lack of competence of territorial bodies of local self-government in developing the potential of labour resources, attracting talents and scientific personnel to regional development. These factors affect the state of the domestic economic potential and slow down the process of forming the innovative component of the ICWU.

In our opinion, institutional, trade, innovation, and demographic factors can be distinguished among the significant global factors of the formation of the innovative component of the ICWU. The latter ones, in the context of the formation of the innovative component of the ICWU, should be considered an important competitive advantage of our country, which is first of all embodied in the degree of development and professionalism of domestic human capital. However, for now, this is a potential competitive advantage that will turn into a real one in the process of innovative activity, transformation and modernization of the system of higher education, development of the framework of qualifications, scientific research potential and stimulation of innovative activity under the condition of a high level of remuneration of scientific workers, which is absent in Ukraine at the current stage of development. Ukraine can increase the level of global competitiveness of the workforce only under the condition of qualitative improvement of the work of state institutions and improvement of the quality of infrastructure; supporting the quality of education in the country, increasing the efficiency of the functioning of commodity markets, the labour market, and the financial market; maximum expansion of the innovative component.

Today the potential strengths of the formation of the innovative component of the ICWU are the following ones: high general education level of the population; large volume of domestic market and foreign trade; high ability to innovate; quality of research institutions; availability of scientists and engineers. During further reformation process of the economy of Ukraine in order to increase its competitiveness, it should be taken into account that these factors should remain the basis for future growth.

An important feature of the modern innovative component of the ICWU is also the fact that it serves as a condition for attracting foreign capital, primarily investment capital, to our country, which contributes to the increase of jobs and the reduction of unemployment. As a certain problematic impact of the innovative component of the ICWU on the employment of domestic labour resources, especially in the conditions of the war with the Russian Federation, and overcoming its consequences, it is worth paying attention to the forced emigration of highly qualified specialists. This, of course, reduces the possibilities of the full use of the innovative component of the ICWU.

Conclusions and prospects for further investigations in this direction.

The process of formation of the innovative component of the ICWU shows that our state has a fairly high level of education. However, the insufficiently effective state policy of the use of labour resources in the most competitive industries, the lack of measures to stimulate innovation and the involvement of qualified workers in production activities through the activation of scientific research and development, leads to a decrease in the quality of life, well-being, and the level of remuneration, which causes an outflow of talents, labour migration of workers of various educational and qualification categories. Among negative factors of influence on the formation of the innovative component of the ICWU, it is necessary to note the insufficient level of international competitiveness of the education system of Ukraine, insufficiently balanced approaches to education, teaching of innovative disciplines and their mastery by future specialists, and measures for the development, attraction and retention of talents.

For the formation of the innovative component of the ICWU, it is advisable to: a) create national and regional programs for the development and maintenance of highly qualified labour resources in accordance with the approved updated framework of qualifications; b) modernize the network of higher education institutions by revising the standards of higher education in the training of specialists of various professions; c) provide financial support to research universities and promote the establishment of research centers within several universities; d) provide conducive conditions for higher education institutions to conduct research and consulting for business, to create analytical centers at higher education institutions that conduct market research based on business requests and the main problems of business structures (for example, entering the international market, researching regional domestic markets, etc.); e) create conditions for the development of public and private partnership in the field of higher education and the implementation of research commissioned by state bodies and local self-government bodies; f) promote the use of innovative technologies and the latest teaching aids in the educational process,

the development of research infrastructures through the establishment of a financing mechanism; g) develop the national system of qualifications taking into account the needs of employers for the skills of employees; h) develop the legal framework for the regulation of remote work in accordance with global requirements in order to protect workers and reduce the level of employment in the informal sector. The expediency of conducting a study of the general legal bases of managing remote forms of employment, determining the standards of workload and productivity of highly qualified specialists on the domestic labour market can be considered a promising direction for the development of the innovative component of the ICWU.

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