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тел. 044 481-44-68.

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ПОЛІТИЧНІ ПРОБЛЕМИ МІЖНАРОДНИХ ВІДНОСИН

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POPULISM IN THE UNITED STATES: HOW DEMOCRACY OVERCOMES THE CHALLENGE

ПОПУЛІЗМ У США: ЯК ДЕМОКРАТІЯ ДОЛАЄ ВИКЛИК

Malkina H.

Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor of Political Sciences Department at the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. E-mail: anna-malkina@ukr.net

Burdiuh M.

Postgraduate student of the Political Science Department at the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. Email: maksymburdiuh@gmail.com

Малкіна Г.М.

Доктор політичних наук, професор кафедри політичних наук Київського національного університету імені Тараса Шевченка. E-mail: anna-malkina@ukr.net

Бурдюг М.М.

Аспірант кафедри політичних наук Київського національного університету імені Тараса Шевченка. Email: maksymburdiuh@gmail.com

Abstract. *The article considers populism as a threat to democracy in the USA. It explains the causes and consequences of populism spread. The article describes the economic and cultural factors of the growth of populism, as well as analyzes approaches to the study of modern populism based on examples of political rhetoric in the United States. Left-wing and right-wing populism, as well as its main characteristics, are defined. The article describes how the populist political identity was formed in the United States by the efforts of both the Democratic and Republican parties. The populist political rhetoric of US Presidents F. Roosevelt, R. Reagan, D. Trump and other members of the American establishment is analyzed. The reason for the attractiveness of populism is explained, and its anti-pluralist and anti-liberal approaches are described in detail. In addition, the article notes that populism is part of the strategy of political forces to manipulate the electorate, and explains how democracy in the United States overcomes the populist challenge.*

Keywords: *populism, democracy, USA, liberal democracy, anti-pluralism, anti-elitism, liberalism, right-wing populism, left-wing populism.*

Анотація. *Стаття розглядає популізм як загрозу демократії в США, а також пояснює причини та наслідки поширення популізму. Проаналізовано підходи до вивчення сучасного популізму на основі прикладів політичної риторики в США, описано економічні та культурні чинники зростання популізму. Визначено різновиди популізму: лівого та правого спрямування; проаналізовано основні характеристики. У статті розповідається про те, як зусиллями політиків із Демократичної та Республіканської партій формувалася популістська політична ідентичність у США. Проаналізовано популістську політичну риторичку президентів Ф. Рузвельта, Р. Рейгана, Д. Трампа та інших представників американського істеблішменту. У статті пояснюється причина привабливості популізму, детально описано його антиплюралістичний та антиліберальний підходи. Крім того, у*

статті зазначається, що популізм є складовою стратегії політичних сил щодо маніпулювання електоратом і пояснюється, яким чином демократія у США долає популістський виклик.

Ключові слова: популізм, демократія, США, ліберальна демократія, антиплюралізм, антиелітизм, лібералізм, правий популізм, лівий популізм.

Problem statement. The political process provides different approaches and forms of its implementation, accompanied by the ambiguous rhetoric of modern politicians. Competition for power is often based on slogans and messages that society likes, but there are no fundamental tools for their implementation. The populist worldview is spreading in the political arena, thus increasing extremist sentiment and pressure on the elites trying hard to resist change. The phenomenon of populist rhetoric does not bypass the political struggle in the United States, which is also confirmed by Trump's victory in the 2016 presidential election. Modern populists get the highest government positions by promising to solve the urgent needs of society, as well as mass corruption in the highest echelons of power. That particular rhetoric helps them to achieve electoral success.

The **purpose of the article** is to analyze the dynamics of the growth of populism in the United States of America; describe the varieties of American populism; formulate the principal risks and threats to the development of democracy in the United States.

Literature review. The issue of populism has been the subject of research by many American and European theorists. The scientific work of R. Eatwell and M. Goodwin [Eatwell, Goodwin, 2018], as well as the work of C. Mudde [Mudde, 2007] raised essential questions about the components of populism and its features that distinguish it from radicalism and extremism. F. Hartleb also analyzed the political behaviour of populist parties during election campaigns and their methods of influencing the electorate [Hartleb, 2011]. These same problems are discussed in detail in the works of F. Decker [Decker, 2000]. Modern theorist W. Galston analyzes the causes of populism and its connection with the liberal and democratic ideas in the current understanding of American political actors and society [Galston, 2017; 2018]. Prospects for the development of global populism are revealed in the works of T. Pappas [Pappas, 2019]. From the second half of the twentieth century, populism is gradually becoming an independent object of scientific research. Among Ukrainian scholars, the factors of populism growth became interesting for O. Novakova, V. Burdyak, I. Kiyanka, Y. Makar, and others.

Main results of the research. The US political system is characterized by a diversity of political views and the ideological orientation of the parties. On this basis, populism in the United States has historical roots and has grown significantly. In particular, this confirms the victory of Donald Trump in the presidential election in 2016, which was unexpected for many.

Although populism has different directions in the United States, it can be divided between left and right, depending on how each determines the people's enemy. For left-wing populists, the enemies are economic elites; for right-wing populists, it is a racial or ethnic difference, and since the middle of the twentieth century, it has been the state itself. The left is more related to the events of the 19th century and the People's Party, populist politics in the southern United States in the early twentieth century, and reflected in elements of Roosevelt's New Deal, which represented the Democratic Party.

Populist political identity was also shaped by the efforts of Republican representatives. During the presidential campaign in 1980, Reagan presented himself as an ordinary man who lived like everyone else and was guided by principles accessible to all. He has created an image of a fighter against corruption and excessive government influence [1].

However, populism did not exist comfortably in the Republican Party. On the one hand, D. Bush Sr., Reagan's successor, portrayed a more privileged elite, committed to the central role of the United States in building a cosmopolitan "new world order" and thus helped foster renewed populism outside the party. On the other hand, Bush Jr. was a strong supporter of right-wing populism during his tenure. The September 11, 2001 attacks and Bush's response, as well as his

faith in the executive branch, strengthened his image as a strong leader. However, exhaustion from two wars and economic turmoil reduced its populist appeal.

Over the past decade, right-wing populist parties have made significant strides in the US election. Research shows that cultural and economic problems are the main driving force behind the growth of right-wing populism. These parties are mobilized due to fear of immigration and a sense of economic insecurity arising from globalization and rapid changes in post-industrial societies [2; 3]. According to researchers, the immediate cause of populist voting is a cultural reaction, and its current high level reflects declining economic security and growing economic inequality [4]. Populism manipulates a significant decline in status, which can be described in economic terms (inequality), political terms (dismissal) or social terms (moving to the periphery of society) [5].

Economic and cultural factors are too often seen as competing explanations for the success of right-wing populism when they need to be analyzed together [6]. Some studies have primarily emphasized welfare nativism and chauvinism as the leading economic response of right-wing populist parties. Much research has focused on the cultural dimension of right-wing populist policies, focusing on immigration, national identity and Islam. Meanwhile, in the literature, there is a significant spread of left and right economic views among these parties [8]. Only recently, researchers of right-wing populism have considered the relationship between cultural and economic values more systematically, comparing these parties' economic positions with their agenda and connecting it with populism and authoritarianism [9].

D. Trump's discourses during the 2016 presidential campaign cultivated strong anti-elitist and anti-establishment sentiments, arguing that "Washington is not working." Elites are accused of usurping national wealth produced by virtuous American workers. As D. Trump explained, politicians and representatives of special interests bled America, deprived it of the middle class, and deprived American companies of jobs [8; 10].

The populists' success is associated with voters' distrust of traditional (ie, inscribed in the system of dominant political relations) parties and movements, whose primary function is to connect voters with government institutions. Traditional parties are losing their influence in society for objective reasons (fiscal crises, which take dramatic forms of socio-political conflicts, corruption, migration issues, etc.). However, such shifts or regroupings of socio-political forces that change the political landscape are increasingly associated with a profound crisis of representative government. Scientists define it as the accumulation of social demands within society, which can not adequately respond to the established system of institutions and relations [11].

Populism in the United States is viewed in terms of its instrumental function. Left-wing radical authors view this trend as the antithesis of liberalism established in America through the "new course" of FD Roosevelt. The "new course," according to left-wing critics, has resulted in a "new class" of well-educated, professionally trained, and bureaucratic elites. However, they used the technocratic tools of the interventionist state to their advantage, which most undermined the position of the middle class. In this historical context, populism is seen as a force capable of reviving politics at the very foundations of the social pyramid and ensuring the responsible participation of citizens in the political process. In this approach, populism is seen as a political project that can restore Americans' faith in their capabilities [12].

Left-wing populism in the United States is a particular trend in the Democratic Party, whose socialist direction is actively seeking to remove "moderate" figures (N. Pelosi, J. Biden, H. Clinton, etc.) from the institutions of power. Because they allegedly prevent the "young" from mastering the real tools and mechanisms of control in the party. By the way, B. Sanders, who joined this movement, is also considered one of the representatives of the "youth". Left-wing populists use two tactics to fight the "veterans". On the one hand, there is speculation that the attempt to impeach then-President Trump was intended to provoke an internal crisis in the Democratic Party and to dismiss those who were beginning to burden Democratic voters. However, the ideological platform of the party's internal transformation is a populist program of "comprehensive" social progress for the general population, which is not based on a realistic analysis of the country's economic system.

Assessing the left-wing populist program of the Socialist direction of the Democratic Party, experts suggest that the program's authors will not be able to implement attractive ideas with acceptable methods and forms of their implementation. Left populism, thus being an active and growing force within the Democratic Party, is not yet in mass demand in the US "political market." On the one hand, left-wing ideas are becoming increasingly popular in America among some youth and intellectuals in the context of the political fiasco of the neoliberal-globalist project. On the other hand, these populations are not yet institutionally integrated across American society. It can be assumed that politicians can use their social protest to actualize rhetoric such as the "new course" of F. D. Roosevelt (infrastructure construction, raising wages of workers and employees, etc.) [13].

Populists have broken long-established models of party competition in many modern Western societies. The most notable case is the election of Trump as President of the United States. Many observers find it difficult to understand his victory. After all, Trump was criticized by conservatives (J. Will), Republicans (M. Romney), social liberals (E. Warren), and socialists (B. Sanders). Moreover, Trump has been described as a politician who threatens democracy, a xenophobic and racist demagogue who knows how to bring down the crowd, and a salesman-opportunist who lacks basic principles [14]. Each of these approaches has some basis. Trump can be seen as a leader who uses populist rhetoric to legitimize his governing style. At the same time, he promotes authoritarian values that threaten the institutions and norms of American democracy. However, D. Trump is not unique in this context. Prior to him, similar populist rhetoric was promoted in the United States by H. Long's "Share Wealth" movement, D. McCarthy's Communists, and others. [15]. Trump's speeches, calls against the establishment, and racial language is reminiscent of the rhetoric of many other leaders.

Both wings of the American populists gained political influence from time to time. They arise in response to real grievances: an economic system that favors the rich, the fear of losing a job because of new immigrants, and politicians who care more about their own development than the well-being of the majority. At best, populism offers rhetoric that can strengthen democracy, not threaten it. The People's Party has helped launch many progressive reforms, such as income tax and corporate regulation, that have made the United States a more humane society in the twentieth century.

Democrats who use populist appeals well, from W. D. Brian to F. D. Roosevelt, have done much to create a liberal capitalist order that, despite its shortcomings, most modern Americans want to maintain. Even some populist speakers who opposed immigrants supported laws on the eight-hour day, which helped all workers in the country, regardless of their place of birth or race. Racists and potential authoritarians have taken advantage of the appeal of populism. However, Americans have not found a more powerful way to demand that their political elites adhere to the ideals of equal opportunity and democratic governance that they have expressed during the election campaign. Populism can be dangerous, but it can also be necessary [16].

Populism cultivates an authoritarian tendency and a "negativist" approach. It is "anti-pluralistic" because it is guided by the principle of "silent majority" and "anti-liberal" because it calls into question the rights of individuals and especially the rights of minorities. These negativist positions are linked to the "opposition of the people" against the "corrupt cosmopolitan elite" that persecutes the indigenous population. Authoritarian populists challenge liberal orders. Liberal orders contain commitments on individual rights, the rule of law, democracy and relatively open borders (on discussing the liberal international order). Authoritarian populists are a global phenomenon, and in most electoral democracies, there is at least one authoritarian solid populist party in parliament. Therefore, the rise of the new schism and the authoritarian populists cannot be reduced to one of two well-known competing explanations. The prospect of economic danger explains this by focusing on the distributive effects of economic globalization and post-industrial transformations.

In a cultural aspect, authoritarian populism results from an action against the change of values, indicated by postmaterialism, feminism and multiculturalism. Accordingly, the historical trade-off between labour and capital has triggered a dynamic that has blocked the growth of so-

called non-majority institutions (central banks, constitutional courts, and international liberal policy organizations) in most democracies. As a result, the gap between parliamentarians and voters was widening. Thus, the silent majority is forgotten by the political class that controls parliament and the liberal cosmopolitan experts who control non-majority institutions. Therefore, authoritarian populists oppose the notion of the silent majority against political classes and non-majority institutions.

The dominant approach to the study of modern populism is the ideological approach. From this point of view, populism is defined as a set of ideas that portray society as divided among ordinary people against the "corrupt elite" and argue that politics is absolute respect for the people's sovereignty [19]. Accordingly, the emphasis on anti-elitism and popular sovereignty is a specific set of ideas that differs from, for example, liberalism in that it has a limited program area.

Anti-liberalism, anti-internationalism, and anti-elitism of authoritarian populism are joining the relevant issues of the new split, preferring closed borders and the will of the majority, as well as rejecting power outside the nation. Authoritarian populism, from this point of view, is not simply an ideology of comparing the establishment with the people but contains the notion of government, which replaces representative democracy with direct representation between the people and the leader. Thus, authoritarian populism contains a particular form of anti-elitism, which is better described as counter-elitism. What seems democratic in the opposition may be authoritarian in power. In authoritarian populism, the *volonté générale* acts as a pre-political and de-proceduralized will, embodied in the leaders of the populist party [17]. Authoritarian populism can be defined as a majority and nationalist political ideology [20]. It is the majority, as it opposes liberal rights, tolerance and pluralism to the homogeneous will of the majority. It is nationalistic, contrasting the importance of borders and national will to an open world society with influential international institutions. These beliefs are united in building a solid antagonism between corrupt and remote cosmopolitan elites and local people.

Conclusions. The populist challenge may threaten liberal democracy. In practice, populism plunges democratic societies into an endless series of conflicts. In turn, this threatens the rights of minorities and allows populist leaders to move confidently towards authoritarianism. Populist rhetoric is quite common in the United States and changes according to historical events and preferences of political leaders who professed this ideology. Despite some features of populism, its tendency to be left or right, ultimately, political leaders used social, racial, and gender issues to gain power. It should be noted that the ability of populists to receive significant support from the electorate indicates the weakness of state institutions and the inability to meet the needs of society sufficiently. However, due to the inability of populists to keep their promises, their ratings are also falling rapidly. At the same time, the needs and expectations of societies continue to grow.

Liberal democracy, particularly in the United States, is not strong enough and constantly needs cementing elements in response to new challenges and threats. However, liberal democracy, more than any other political form, contains the potential for development, synergistic resources and the power of self-correction. Liberal democratic institutions not only protect citizens from the tyrannical concentration of power, they also provide mechanisms for addressing complaints and unmet public needs for effective reform. Of course, the power of self-correction is not always enough to prevent the destruction of liberal democracies.

Finally, today's autocratic regimes do not have as much ideological appeal as fascism and communism once did. Nevertheless, at the same time, the current woes of liberal democracy are deep and pervasive. Overcoming them will require intellectual clarity and political leaders who are willing to take risks, serving the long-term interests of their countries.

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POLITIZATION OF HISTORY AND ITS ROLE ON THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ON EXAMPLE OF POLISH-GERMAN RELATIONS

ПОЛІТИЗАЦІЯ ІСТОРІЇ І ЇЇ РОЛЬ В МІЖНАРОДНИХ ВІДНОСИНАХ: ТЕОРЕТИЧНИЙ ТА ЕМПІРИЧНИЙ АНАЛІЗ НА ПРИКЛАДІ ПОЛЬСЬКО-НІМЕЦЬКИХ ВІДНОСИН

Stetsiuk N. M.

PhD in Historical Sciences, Head of the International Relations Department, Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University. E-mail: stetnataliia@gmail.com

Boichuk O. I.

PhD in Political Sciences, Senior Lecturer at the International Relations Department, Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University. E-mail: orest.boichuk@gmail.com

Strutynska T. Z.

PhD in Political Sciences, Associate Professor at the International Relations Department, Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University. E-mail: Slobodian.tetiana@gmail.com

Стецюк Н.М.

Кандидат історичних наук, завідувач кафедри міжнародних відносин, Прикарпатський національний університет імені Василя Стефаника. E-mail: stetnataliia@gmail.com

Бойчук О.І.

Кандидат політичних наук, старший викладач кафедри міжнародних відносин, Прикарпатський національний університет імені Василя Стефаника. orest.boichuk@gmail.com

Струтинська Т. З.

Кандидат політичних наук, доцент кафедри міжнародних відносин, Прикарпатський національний університет імені Василя Стефаника. Slobodian.tetiana@gmail.com

***Abstract:** Development of bilateral relations between States is a complex and multifaceted process. There are many factors to affect the quality, and sometimes-quantitative characteristics of the relationship. For example: economic feasibility (bilateral patterns of trade, economic interest in partners, and level of investment attractiveness), political expediency (to what extent the partner country is of interest to political elites or the public), image of the country within society, cultural cooperation level. To the above list, which is by no means exhaustive, historical memory should be added. Historical memory of yourself and partner's country, or how this term is articulated within a given society.*

***Keywords:** Historical memory, Historical politics, Bilateral relations, Poland, Germany, Theoretical approaches.*

INTRODUCTION

It is difficult to deny the importance of historical memory in the process of the nation preservation and consolidation. At the same time, there is again a problem of distinction between the terms. We consider the categories 'national memory' and 'historical memory'. For a thorough coverage of the issue, we are going to describe an understanding of these terms and their derivatives. We also address what is a derivative, and what is a common term in the Ukrainian

researchers' papers. Russian scientists have their visions of the implication and use of the term too, but mostly it is similar to ukrainian and polish research approach.

RESEARCH

Some aspects of the memory policy in Ukraine in its various manifestations (taking into account ideological, ethnic, religious and other factors) are actively being studied by such scientists as V. Vyatrovich [Vyatrovich, 2019], M. Gon [Gon, 2012], A. Kurydon [Киридон, 2010, 2011], A. Konik, Yu. Opalko [Opalko, 2009], V. Soldatenko [Soldatenko, 2011]. A common element in the papers is the consideration of historical politics in a Ukrainian context, with some analysis by foreign scholars.

According to L. Nagorna, the leading Ukrainian scholar in historical politics, the way in which a State forms its national identity stereotype determines which mode of evaluation of the past it prefers.

F. Artogh identifies three choices, according to him, an inadequate "regime of historicity": passeism, an excessive focus on the past and its dramatization; presentism, a comprehension of the past in the context of actualized demands of the present, and futurism, searching the connecting links between the past and the future [Artogh, 2002]. F. Artogh has negative opinion about any political interference in historical facts and the use of history for political interests. It is an instrumentalization of history that has a negative impact. However, the focus is concentrated on philosophical reflections on the role of the history and the historian, on its objectivity.

V. Rasevych considers instrumentalization of history to be a negative phenomenon, which can lead to deterioration of relations within society, as well as relations with external partners of Ukraine. According to him, "instrumentalized history is a history selected to serve a specific political agenda"[Baturyn] that is, history is used as a tool for political propaganda. To some extent, we agree that instrumentalization is a negative phenomenon.

Ukrainian researcher Y. Zerniy links historical politics to "the implementation of the Ukrainian national project" [Zerniy, 2008, p. 46). The article is entirely devoted to the argument for historical politics in Ukraine, which should become a foundation for new Ukrainian nation. In defining historical memory, the author notes that "recorded in the forms of knowledge, cultural stereotypes, symbols and myths, historical memory is a unique collection of the national community ideas about its past" [Zerniy, 2008, p. 42]. As we can see, it is about the fact that historical memory is closely related to the concept of "nation" and is linked to nationalization or the usurpation of history through one nation is observed.

V. Soldatenko, a former head of the Institute of National Memory of Ukraine (hereinafter - INMU), also presents historical politics through the prism of historical memory and its national identity, calling it a policy of national memory [Soldatenko, 2011, p. 13].

Following the concept of historical politics, the term "historical memory" is highlighted. It is noted that "historical memory" and "history of memory" should not be confused. We consider the "history of memory" as a category that is not related to the political science and international relations, rather it is related to history and philosophy, or is a part of the of a historical methodology study. As pointed out by L. Nagorna [Nagorna, 2012, p. 114] and V. Stelmakh [Stelmakh, 2006, pp. 10–11], while studying "Theory of possible histories" by R. Kozelleck, the history of memory is the object of this theory and the general characteristic of historical phenomena, considers the problem of the relationship between the modalities of time - past, present and future " [Stelmakh, 2012, p. 114]. Nevertheless, historical memory is a part of political science and international relations, because historical politics is actually aimed at the formation of a vision of history, and thereby the formation of historical memory.

Jorn Rusen, a German scholar, concludes that historical memory, on the one hand, is the mental capacity of a subject to retain memories of the experience lived through, which is the basis for the formation of historical consciousness, and on the other hand, it is a result of certain sense-making operations when memories are produced during the historical consciousness formation as a

result of comprehension of historical experience [Polianskii, 1999, p. 17]. In fact, it confirms our distinction and defines historical memory to be an object of historical politics. According to J. Rusen, sense-making operations are part of vision of history formation. However, this is not always a negative connotation of the concept, as sense-making operation can be a part of a historian's activity, who being an expert, intends to systematize his field studies or archival operations, presenting his opinions and making conclusions.

Exploring the process of constructing national memory in Ukraine, the author A. Volianiuk divides discussions on the relationship of history and politics into two directions. Thus, "the polemic regarding the role and importance of the state, as well as other socio-political actors in the construction of public memory has been reflected in the developed theoretical approaches. [...] they can be conditionally divided into two groups" [Volianiuk, 2012, p. 178]. The author presents two types. The first is a value-based approach, represented by A. Miller and G. Mink, who define memory policy as various social practices and norms, including projection of the past for the sake of the future and taking place in the public space through a dialogue between historians and social forces. He defines another group of approaches to historical politics as an instrumental interpretation. The value approach means the creation of historical politics through a democratic dialogue that allows you «freely present your own visions of the past in public space." [Volianiuk, 2012, p. 178].

As opposed to democratic dialogue, the instrumental approach is based on the statist monologue, which bears the primacy of the state in the creation of historical politics [Volianiuk, 2012, pp. 179–182].

O. Volianiuk believed that the value-based interpretation of historical politics should be used and considers it to be one of the important elements in creating the identity of the Ukrainian people. We believe that the division into value and instrumental types of historical politics is appropriate.

It is noteworthy that an instrumental approach to historical politics was used in Poland and in the former German Democratic Republic (hereafter referred to as the GDR) during the Cold War. In recent years, the examples of the instrumental approach can also be observed in Poland. We can state that the first example of instrumental approach was initiative 2006, in which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland gave instructions to diplomatic offices regarding the "incorrect memory code" to be used in the media and other publications [Polish: Wadliwy kod pamięci, *Interwencje*]. The most recent interference in the media activity (hereinafter referred to as "the media") took place in the United Kingdom [UK □□, Twitter] regarding Mark Santora's article in The New York Times, where the term "Polish Death Camps" [Polish: polskie obozy koncentracyjne] was used [UK □□, 2018T07:34, Twitter].

The latest example of the aforementioned approach to the historical politics was the adoption of the Law "On the Institute of National Remembrance of Poland" [Komisji Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, no date], especially in the case of punishment for misinterpretation of history. In fact, the article is dedicated to that process [Santora].

In his other paper, the author addresses the issue of memory conflict in political processes. Thus, according to O. Volianiuk, "conflict of memories" can become radical and lead to violence [Volianiuk, 2013, p. 46]. "The conflict of memories is a dangerous socio-political phenomenon, as its participants do not try to find out the historical truth, but only seek and select for their own position, which, in time, can have devastating consequences for the social development" [Volianiuk, 2013, p. 46]. Politicians and political forces use the past to get power by using controversial and ambiguous arguments and facts. This, in turn, leads to a conflict between supporters of various political forces. The conflict can go beyond a country in case a ruling political force pursues a policy of historical memory that runs counter to the narrative of historical politics among the political elite of another country.

The conflict of memories can also be observed in the international arena. The situation takes place in Ukraine-Poland and Israel- Poland relations after the last amendments to the Law "On the Institute of National Remembrance of Poland" in early 2018 were adopted.

O. Volianiuk distinguishes between two types of conflicts of memories: real and artificially created. The real ones are the conflicts based on "inherited confrontational memories" [Volianiuk, 2013, p. 48]. The subjects of these memories are real persons with real memories of the past. Artificially created conflicts are usually provoked by political forces [Volianiuk, 2013, p. 48].

There is often no distinction between the terms "memory policy" and "historical politics" in Ukrainian scientific, public and political discourse.

However, professor L. Nagorna believes that there is a difference between these concepts. So "memory policy" is a general notion and "historical politics" is a clarifying denomination for the processes taking place when the State intervened in memory policy" [Nagorna, 2012, p. 113]. It is understood that "memory policy" " determines the process of forming a vision of past in the society. And "historical politics" is a certain branch of the memory policy, which takes into account the interference of the State and the formation of a historical identity through a certain instrument or State body.

However, according to L. Nagorna, to distinguish between these two terms and provide them with an appropriate definition, consensus and agreement in the scientific community is needed. "But agreement in interdisciplinary communication is a rare phenomenon" [Nagorna, 2012, p. 113]. It should be noted that the author pointed out that historical politics is of interdisciplinary nature, which increases challenge for the term definition and characterization and most likely depends on science. Taking into consideration the complexity and the lack of compromise among the scientific community, L. Nagorna notes that determining approaches and terms in the field "one has to focus on those traditions regarding application of the terms that had been developed in individual countries" [Nagorna, 2012, p. 113].

O. Volianiuk emphasizes the interdisciplinarity of the «memory policy" and "historical politics" studies. According to her "[...] interdisciplinary basis of memory studies, which combine history, political science, sociology, anthropology, literature, arts, and social psychology" [Nagorna, 2013, p. 51]. On the other hand, we consider that the theory of international relations should be added to the above list.

In her paper, L. Nagorna has identified two traditions: German and Polish. Thus, according to the author, historical politics is a socio-political conceptual apparatus, which is not only an indicator of change, but also a socio-political factor that shapes the mentality and provide guidance within a society (in relation to its past – Author's note) [Nagorna, 2012, p. 113]. By the way, this definition applies to memory policy in Germany.

Exploring the issue, the contemporary Russian researcher A. Miller, notes that about the memory policy "we speak when referring to practices and rules related to the regulation of collective memory." The scholar proposes to distinguish "the politicization of history as a phenomenon that exists for a long time and in any way is inevitable"[Miller, 2007, p. 6].

According to A. Miller, "if memory policy can be more or less open to the influence or dialogue of different social forces and historians, or generate new conflicts by created images of the past," then historical politics (in the original , A. Miller gives the term - "politicization of history" [Miller, 2007, p. 6) – Author's note) - "is a fundamentally new, much more intensive interfering with history interpretation by the part of the political elite that controls the government at the moment, to fight internal opposition and to achieve certain goals in the nation-building" and also to gain some advantages in international relations" [Kyrydon, 2010, p. 118] . As we can see, there is a division between the terms "historical politics" and "memory policy".

The point is that memory policy is a natural process that takes place in any society. Its purpose is the role of society in the world, the search for its identity and, ultimately, the formation of its own identity.

In continuation of his vision for history and politics, A. Miller points out that the process of politicization of history is a fait accompli [Miller, 2007, p. 6]. The process of politicization of history begins from a historian, because he is always influenced by the situation, whether political or public, when working on the study of history. His conclusions, despite scientific methodology and aiming to objectify any science, have his own subjective basis [Miller, 2007, pp. 6–8].

Presenting his vision for memory policy, A. Miller speaks of a rather interesting process - "forgetting or not remembering" (Russian: забывание). "Forgetting is used when a society does not touch on certain specific, more often not distant (in time – Author's note) events that are especially painful and those that generate or contribute to conflict in a society" [Miller, 2007, p. 6].

Looking through the development of historical politics in West Germany (hereinafter referred to as the WG), we can say that such events took place after 1949 in the WG, and especially during the reign of Chancellor K. Adenauer. It should be noted that A. Miller points to similar processes, which have had place in other countries - in the case of the Vichy government in France and in relation to the Spanish Civil War [Miller, 2007, p. 6]. Typically, the issues the society would like to forget, in the future are of high interest for historians and society [Miller, 2007, pp. 4–8]. Then we are back to WG where in the 1960s and 1970s, there were used new approaches to the past of Germany.

Presenting his vision for history and politics, A. Miller also mentions historical politics. According to him, historical politics is a political phenomenon that must be explored, "first and foremost as a part of politics" [Miller, 2007, p. 8]. Historical politics is different from the politicization of history. A. Miller describes historical politics as "the relationship between politics and history, where politics is the primary and history is the extra" [Miller, 2007, p. 8]. It should be noted that the author has a positive attitude towards historical politics and has a negative vision about the politicization of history, dividing them and presenting the above-mentioned definition of historical politics.

In modern conditions of democratization and pluralization of society, new mechanisms of historical politics are emerging. A. Miller points out that historical politics implementation is not a new phenomenon. It also took place in the past. However, comparing the historical politics of the Soviet Union and the post-Soviet countries at the present stage of development, he notes that they have received or developed new mechanisms to "legitimize" historical truth.

Thus, according to the author, the mechanisms of implementation of "historical politics" can be conditionally divided into two categories: institutional and legislative. The institutional dimension of historical politics is manifested, first, in the creation of special institutions that study and develop historical politics. We are talking about the Institute of National Remembrance of Poland (hereinafter - INR) (Polish: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej) in Poland and Ukraine, in 1999 [Andrychowicz-Skrzeba, 2014, p. 167] and 2006 [Kasyanov, and Miller, 2011, p. 14], respectively. Another manifestation of the historical politics institutionalization is the creation of museums under the direct "patronage of individual political forces" [Kasyanov, and Mille, 2011, p. 11].

The legislative category includes various enacted laws, which makes it an offence for those who «deny such (an official- Author's note) interpretation [Kasyanov, and Mille, 2011, p. 11]". An example of the recent legislative instrumentation of history is the adoption of amendments to the Law "On the Institute of National Remembrance of Poland» in Poland, which at the initiative of A. Duda has been sent to the Polish Constitutional Court. It should be noted that it going on criminal liability in the case of public thoughts, which impute facts about crime against people, which made by Polish populations and Polish state [*O co chodzi z tą ustawą o IPN? Tłumaczymy, kto się cieszy, a kto ma pretensje*, no date]. Also, need pay attention that criminal liability aren't researchers and artists [Komisji Scigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, no date].

Professor G. Kasianov gives an interesting example of instrumentalisation. Exploring the processes of historical politics making in Ukraine, and especially the politicization of the events of the Holodomor famine of 1932-1933, G. Kasianov notes that a standing working group was established at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine in 2005 to draft "position papers and coordinate activities of embassies, aimed at promotion knowledge about the Holodomor. The group and heads of foreign diplomatic missions has worked closely with Ukrainian Diaspora organizations" [Kasianov, 2007, p. 38]. Thus, we can see the transition of historical politics to international relations.

In recent years, there has been a growing interest in memory issues not only among academics but also among politicians. However, referring to politicians, they use historical politics

for their own political purposes. Thus, according to J. Mink, in recent years, " we observed the open use of historical tools in public affairs (for example, when the use of the conflicting past served to Mitterrand / Kohl pairing ; not to improve relations [...], but to mobilize electorate of a particular party or coalition around their intended goals [or, Author's note] symbolic [or - Author's note] militant demands in the domestic arena and in the interaction with the outside world "[Mink and Neimeier, 2007, p. 16]. We are interested in the vision of J. Mink about historical strategies and their role in the bilateral relations, or in other words, in bilateral agreement. We believe that J. Mink sees the historical politics through the strategies of historicizing a conflictogenic legacy [Mink and Neimeier, 2007, p. 16].

Thus according to him, these strategies have three different objectives, depending on the goals set by "leaders". "Strategies are aimed at reaching consensus (the principle of reconciliation of society) or, conversely, they are aimed at opening some aspects of the displacement of history (the principle of distinction, symbolic recognition and integration into a national historical narrative), or to escape from responsibility, "erasing traces of the criminal past" [Mink, 2009, pp. 64–71].

In his paper, Kyrydon presents historical politics as a set of social practices aimed at representing (or modifying) certain images of the past actualized by the contemporary political context. That is, history is becoming an instrument of modern politics. The scientist also presents the basic features of historical politics [Kyrydon, 2016, p. 217]. Thus, according to A. Kyrydon, memory policy:

- concerns primarily the interpretation of the past [Mink, 2016, p. 217). As a result, the history is revised and used in accordance with the purpose set by the policy maker. That is in line with the vision of J. Mink for historization strategies;

- is developed in view of the specific external and internal factors of the functioning of the State and the nature of political power [Kyrydon, 2016, p. 217]. In this case, we can take into account the historical politics that took place in the Polish People's Republic (hereinafter - the PPR). According to the Soviet ideology, there was fear of the German foreign policy concept "Movement to the East" (German: "Drang nach Osten") in Poland during the Cold War. However, it should be noted that this concept was either «mitigated" or "aggravated» in accordance with the external and internal political situation;

- historical politics is an important component of the humanitarian policy [Kyrydon, 2016, p. 217]. The point is that the State has always had some strategy of historical politics, which might not have any official document, but was expressed by support of one or another historical narrative. An illustrative example is Poland and much more Ukraine;

- it is characterized by actualization and selectivity, focused on some events, heroes or places, ignoring others [Kyrydon, 2016, p. 217]. Such situation took place in the historical discourse of West Germany in the early 50s and 60s.

Thus, according to the author, memory policy is a reflection of: the experience of society, the current status of its basic institutions, its socio-political structure, the balance of social forces and beliefs and evaluation of politicians and state leaders [Kyrydon, 2016, p. 218].

N. Yakovenko's opinion is slightly different, she states: "Historical memory is just a beautiful metaphor. Human memory of past experiences usually can reach up to three generations, so it is a fictional image of the past, some kind of "collective experience" that consolidates the community ... In this sense, "historical memory" is identical to the myth, from the chaotic flow of things it chooses only some, necessary to society, and it also allows to overcome the temporality and brevity of a human life" [Yakovenko, 2007, p. 34].

In accordance with the subject matter, it is also necessary to understand the approaches to "historical politics" in German and Polish scientific circles.

For several years, historical politics has been actively used in the debate, both public and scientific. According K. Woycicki [Wóycicki, 2004, p. 12] and J. Andrychowicz-Skszeba [Andrychowicz-Skrzeba, 2014, p. 17], it is difficult to determine the date on which this term began to be used in Polish science. L. Nagorna [Nagorna, 2012, p. 114], R. Traba [Traba, 2004, pp. 871–

873], and A. Miller [Miller, 2007, p. 23] file the year 2004. However, now it is an integral term in the study of both the state of bilateral relations with neighboring countries and the attitude to its past within a country.

The term "historical politics" has caused many interpretative problems for researchers. Although the phenomenon itself is known and recognized, there is no general definition of it in scientific discourse. There are at least a few concepts in scientific discourse that are closely related to it, and two of them are used most often: memory policy [Zaborski, 2011, p. 14] and policy of the past (Meier, 1997, pp. 202–206). Sometimes they also use the term «culture of memory» [Wawrzyniak, 2013, pp. 233–234].

All of them are parallel and are often seen as synonymous. Each science posits its own meanings and differences. Reviewing papers of Polish authors, we can point out to some common aspects. For example, sociologists are more likely to use the term "memory policy", and political scientists are increasingly inclined to use the term "historical politics". In Polish, both terms are calques from other languages [Miller, 2007, p. 7; Nagorna, 2012, p. 114].

Historical politics comes from German (German: Geschichtspolitik). It is believed that the term became popular in the eighties of the twentieth century, and was first used in the scientific discourse by Ch. Meier, at the Congress of German historians in Trier in the year 1986 [Wolff-Powęska, 2007, pp. 3–4].

The definition was mainly used by the researchers studying the XX century issues and soon gained a negative connotation. It should also be noted that the term had been used in the debate of German historians on the assessment of national socialism, which became the public debate in the 80th of the 20th century in Germany.

This term indicated primarily the deliberate instrumentalization of history for political purposes and for specific achievements. At that time, it was nearly always used in a negative way [Wolff-Powęska, 2007, pp. 7–9].

Polish academia takes into account two concepts: "historical politics" and "policy regarding the past". J. Andrychowicz-Skcheba also connects the use of "historical politics" or "policy regarding the past" with the German terms "Geschichtspolitik" and "Vergangenheitspolitik", respectively [Andrychowicz-Skrzeba, 2014, p. 18]. The concept appeared in the German literature much earlier, immediately after the end of World War II (hereinafter -WW II). According to her scientific searches, the "policy of historical memory" as a term was introduced in Polish science by M. Czichocki [Andrychowicz-Skrzeba, 2014, p. 18]. K. Woycicki in his scientific explorations has the same opinion [Wóycicki, 2004, p. 17].

It should be also noted that according to German journalist and publicist A. Mix (Mix), the term is rarely used nowadays in Germany. "I want to note that at this historical stage, the term "historical politics (German: Geschichtspolitik)" is rarely used in German scientific thought" [...] This is due to its meaning. In the Federal Republic of Germany, which was created after WWII, this term was used to describe events related to the crimes committed by the Nazis, as well as to define their policy, both internal and external, in the context of finding those responsible for the crimes". The introduction of this term in German scientific and public discourse is associated with the government of G. Kohl [Wolff-Powęska, 2007, p. 17]. Chancellor Kohl, being a historian by training, decided to use historical issues to confirm his political success. He appointed M. Sturmer, a professional historian, as his political adviser and started talking about the need for a "moral-political turn" in Germany. A thesis to confirm more positive character of German Patriotism was an important element of the "turn" [Miller, 2007, p. 8]. It meant that patriotism or social identity of the German people should not be based only on pleading guilty for the crimes of the Third Reich. As A. Miller notes, "historical politics" (German: Geschichtspolitik) in this sense was closed [Miller, 2007, p. 8].

The term culture of memory (from German «Erinnerungskultur») or "policy regarding the memory" (from German Erinnerungspolitik) are used in the temporary German science much more often" (Mix, no date).

J. Andrychowicz-Skszeba in his work "Historical politics in Poland and Germany after 1989» uses the term "historical politics" [Andrychowicz-Skrzeba, 2014, p. 14]. According to her, "historical politics is a reflection or interpretation of history in accordance with the current political situation in the country." It should be noted that this concept defines historical politics well enough, and we can use it for our further scientific study. At the same time, J. Andrykhovych-Sksheba gives other concepts of historical politics in her monograph.

According to her, historical politics is also a process or tendency in politics that consists in recognizing the influence of history on current political problems or the processes of existing and future programs, which are concerned to the knowledge of the past [Andrychowicz-Skrzeba, 2014, p. 38]. The point is that this is a conceptual aspect of historical politics. It takes into account the fact historical memory and its functioning have a certain program basis, according to which it is carried out in the society. The other definition, given by the author, relates to the formation of the consciousness of a society in general and its individual elements. It is an individual or a community. According to her, historical politics is a process of creating a historical consciousness of a society, the purpose of which is to unite the society around the proposed political program [Andrychowicz-Skrzeba, 2014, p. 38]/

Her definition may include some elements of advocacy. At the same time, this definition shows the negative aspects of historical politics. To unite society, political parties or political leaders can use history in "the right" context in order to increase their electorate.

The process of forming a "right" knowledge of history sometimes has nothing to do with objective facts. That can often be used by political parties for their own political purposes. A practical example of the use of historical politics is the influence of public authorities on the formation of related to history school curricula. Another example would be selection of historical persons and historical events to naming streets, squares etc.

One of the most recent examples is a direct falsification of history and historical facts or the manipulation of the glorification of historical persons, organizations or events. In Poland, during the period of the People's Republic of Poland, the situation regarding the Warsaw Ghetto uprising in 1945-1946 can be also served as an example. R. Kobylarz writes that in order to consolidate their legitimacy the Soviet authorities had to rebuild the attitudes of the Polish population. To change the attitudes the Soviet authorities used the glorification of the persons they considered to be relevant [Kobylarz, 2009, pp. 178–190].

M. Gavin, Vice-director of the Warsaw Uprising Museum, presents a vision for historical politics as a field related to the foreign policy of the State. In his article in *Zhychie* (Polish: *Życie*) in 2000, M. Gavin sees historical politics as a tool for interpretation of historical facts and events which democratic governments use to achieve their political ends [Nijakowski, 2008, p. 43].

M. Chikhotski, former director of the European College of Natolin (Polish: *Centrum Europejski Natolin*) in Warsaw, defines historical politics as a phenomenon in itself. Historical politics is in every country and it is always different. In other words, the State uses historical politics to consolidate society or to create an opinion "friend-or-foe"; to do this the appropriate instruments and facts are needed [Nijakowski, 2008, p. 48]. In the realities of Poland, the term "historical memory" appears to be random and reflects the process of understanding one's past. Accordingly, the existence of "historical politics" as an institution or instrument is more important for existing the society than its definition.

Historical politics is the process of strengthening public discussion or interest about the past within a country and abroad through various institutions, both public and private [Nijakowski, 2008, p. 48].

The historical politics of Poland is a range of actions aimed not only to receive reproaches from the Federation of Expellees (Germ: *Bund der Vertriebenen*) (hereinafter referred to as FE), it is, above all the struggle for historical truth, the struggle for the place of Poland and the Poles in Europe. This understanding of historical politics reflects its pragmatic nature and aims to shape the image of the country abroad. Through the instruments of diplomacy, the State in the international arena and in bilateral relations is trying to build its own scheme of the past and show its past in the

best light [*Rozmowa z Bogusławem Sonikiem: Walka o Polskę, regiony i Europę*]. At the same time, there is a danger in such a statement. Practical manipulation of historical memory creates a precedent for subjective interpretation and its instrumentalization under a separate political power. When falsifying historical past political forces can use a subjective approach to the vision of history. Their views haven't nothing common, in extreme cases, with methodological researches and empirical facts.

L.M. Nijakowski presents his vision of historical politics as a various activities, which may be conscious or not, constant, systematic, or sporadic. In his paper he uses the term "memory policy". This activity is aimed at strengthening the public memory of the Poles or changing it. He believes that all the citizens are involved in implementation of the memory policy by the publication of memoirs of their ancestors, writing various materials on the Internet or participating in celebrations dedicated to significant events in the history of a town, region or country as a whole [Nijakowski, 2008, p. 73].

According to L.M. Nijakowski, the memory policy is politicians' and government officials' activities with formal power to establish, eliminate or revise the content of social memory. He compares the national memory to propaganda activities [Nijakowski, 2008, p. 73]. In order to strengthen its legitimacy the State via its institutions seeks to change public memory of its citizens. Both democratic governments and totalitarian ones carry out propaganda on memory policy. Propaganda can be defined as the process of controlling the flow of information, managing public opinion, or manipulating public beliefs. In this case, public or better write, national, as we mentioned above, memory policy can be seen as a process of controlling information in a society (Nijakowski, 2008, p. 73). An example would be the Polish Government's policy of using the term "Polish concentration camps" in foreign media.

Another practical option for implementation a national memory policy can be seen in the process of school curriculum developing or through school education in general. L.M. Nijakowski gives an example of use the terms "enemy" and "traitor" in school curriculum [Nijakowski, 2008, p. 74]. In this way the opinion about a politician or certain population is formed.

K. Kačka, who tried to deal with the issue of historical politics in Poland, stated that "... after Poland regained its independence, the issue of historical memory was constantly subject to change" [Kačka, 2015, p. 60].

The author believes that there was no question of who and what to remember, it was about a change in approach to the historical politics issues. Historical politics and debates about the past take place in three areas: politics, academic debate, and intellectuals' environments (Kačka, 2015, p. 61). According to the author, intellectual are people who with their works create different debates in society. We are talking about writers, publicist or publicly recognized individuals [Kačka, 2015, pp. 70–75].

Following the breakup of the Soviet Union and collapse of communist ideology, there were some developments concerning historical politics in Poland. As M. Saryusz-Wolska notes, almost all issues related to the past, are in public discussions and are carried out mainly by those who are associated with political parties or politics in general [Saryusz-Wolska, 2009, pp. 15–16]. Regardless of academical discover or of level of research of historical issues, the level of conducting of debate about historical issues usually depends on politicians [Saryusz-Wolska, 2009, pp. 15–16]. Important role in the historical debates plays the media. That's also argues A. Kyrydon. On the other hand, M. Sariusz-Volska gives the media a secondary role and notes that the importance of the discussions is mostly represented in the modern media: 'it is worth stressing that because of the social media explosion the importance of their traditional counterparts: radio, television and press (print media- Author's note) is much less' [Saryusz-Wolska, 2009, p. 18]. She further notes that the Internet is a perfect tool (in the hands of politicians – Author's note) to influence people and their vision of historical events [Saryusz-Wolska, 2009, p. 18].

K. Kačka emphasizes the role of politicians in the processes of discussing the past and points to an "emotional dispute" regarding Y. T. Gros's book. Accordingly, it is an issue of the extermination of the Jews by the polish population in Poland [Kačka, 2015, p. 60]. Thus, K. Kačka

notes, «political arguments have dominated in the debate (concerning the extermination of the Jews by the Polish population – Author’s note)” [Kącka, 2015, p. 60]. According to K. Kącka, the same situation is happening now with the “cursed soldiers” (Polish: żołnierzy wyklęte). In the process of glorification of the “cursed soldiers” and in the public debate on this issue, policy makers play the most important role [Kącka, 2015, p. 71].

Politicians play an important role in the process of historical politics making and we can assume that it is the most important one. However, any politician is intended solely to gain power. Therefore, they often distort historical facts in the debate on historical events. The obvious question here is why experts in history do not act as arbiters or moderators in the process of historical politics making.

In the context of Poland, K. Kącka gives quite interesting vision of that and notes, “there are several reasons for this”. According to her, the first and, most likely, one of the most important in Ukraine and Germany is the professional circles tightness. It should be also noted that this was the case in Germany only in the 1950s. That was the conclusion Anna Wolf-Powięska [Wolf-Powięska, 2011, pp. 75–103], the Polish researcher, and A. Huyssen [Huyssen, 1991, pp. 112–118], the American researcher, have reached. According K. Kącka, “scholars are accustomed to writing (their papers – Author’s note) for themselves, and the debate on historical issues is held in closed environments and is not accessible to an external listener”. The author also points to the reasons, which are the role of the Soviet science system and a lack of willingness on the part of scientists to expose their scientific findings «to the world” [Kącka, 2015, p. 61].

According to K. Kącka, challenges that face the intellectuals’ proactive position include insufficient funding to ensure their participation in historical debate and negative public attitude towards intellectuals’ interventions [Kącka, 2015, pp. 62–64], which might raise painful to society topics and lead to a rejection in the society of their ideas. In the 60s, this has also been an experience in Germany in connection with K. Jaspers’ speech, which caused an indignation in the society or Thüringen Memorandum publication in 1961. Another example might be production of films that was a disappointment to the society. This is about the Holocaust film screened in 1978-1979 of the 20th century in the territory of West Germany. In Poland, they had the similar situation with the film *Aftermath* (Polish: *Pokłosie*), which touches on a subject that many Poles do not accept - cases where Poles were rounding up, and in some cases, killing Jews.

K. Kącka, in our view, presents an interesting thesis about different types of historical politics depending on the role of experts, intellectuals and politicians in the process. According to her, there are two types of historical politics: German and Polish [Kącka, 2015, p. 63]. Others are representation or combination of these policies. We can cautionary accept that thesis as historical politics in USA and France was not taken into account. In addition, that very well may be the fact. To study German-Polish relations it is an argument for a separate presentation of the development of historical politics in Poland and Germany.

Almost all States and most political forces are involved in historical politics. Public memory and policy regarding the past are integral phenomena. K. Kącka notes that the interference of politicians in the process of forming a meaningful and ideologically filled memory space is interpreted as a norm of political life of society [Kącka, 2015, p. 67]. Therefore, it is worth considering the concept of T. Adorno.

Studying the process of historical politics making in Germany, T. Adorno uses the processes connected with role and activity of national-socialism. It should be noted that the author considers such processes negative. In his article, which was published in 1977 under the title “What does the processing of the past mean” (German: Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit) [Adorno], the author refers to the events that took place in the Western Germany in the 50's - 60's of the 20th century and had concerning, as writed these processes E. Wolfrum, N. Frei and A. Wolff-Powięska as «silence»

He is opposed to the K. Adenauer’s policy in the field of historical politics, which he defines as “processing of the past”. He believes that government policy should be minimal in this issue. The scholar considers total forgiveness and oblivion, which took place in the West Ukraine in 50’s 60,’s

to be an ominous trend [Adorno]. He defines that process as “processing of the past” (German: *Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit*) [Adorno].

In his vision of the processes that took place in the past in the West Ukraine and the attitude to these processes, he concludes that "distortion of facts, avoid of self-criticism, oblivion (crimes of National Socialism – Author’s not.) Can be defined as a certain sign of totalitarianism" [Adorno].

To summing up his thesis, the historical politics is an interconnection of a social structure that, through its maturity, works on its past, without avoiding its painful pages (Adorno).

Z. Wilkiewicz, studying the process of historical politics in bilateral Polish-German relations, notes that the concept of "restoring the myth of sacrifice" was created in Eastern Europe countries. The point is that after the Soviet bloc collapsed, they started to develop a different conception of the past – through a struggle against the totalitarian past. It is about the Soviet Union. Contrary to the East European concepts, there was a German conception of the past, which he describes as being one formed based on public discussions [Wilkiewicz, 2011, pp. 15–31].

Yan Assmann and Adelaida Assmann constructed the past on the “group” and “society” basis [Assmann and Czaplicka, 1995, p. 127]. A departure from national usurpation of the past was observed and stated that each group or society had its own vision of the past.

Actually, the historical politics of the past is formed based on discussions of groups and historical units. Various political forces, representing different social groups, are constantly involved in this process [Assmann and Czaplicka, 1995, p. 128].

Taking into account the conception of A. and Y. Assmann, Z. Wilkiewicz uses the concept of "historical politics" (German: *Geschichtspolitik*), which, according to him, is an intervention of the state, parties, unions or individuals in the process of forming a common vision of history. The term "Historical politics" refers to a politically constructed vision of the past that can be described by the “top down” scheme [Wilkiewicz, 2011, p. 23].

The use of "different pasts" by different groups of political forces becomes a part of the struggle for political power. Z. Wilkiewicz uses the term "war for memories" to construct the vision of the past by political parties in order to obtain electoral privileges (among voters- Author’s note) [Wilkiewicz, 2011, p. 23].

As has already been mentioned, the terms “policy regarding the past” (German: *Vergangenheitspolitik*), “culture of memory” (German: *Erinnerungskultur*) and “memory policy” (German: *Erinnerungspolitik*) are increasingly used in German literature whereas “historical politics” (German: *Geschichtspolitik*) is used less frequently.

M. Luczewski and P. Bednarz-Luczewska studied and compared the “cultural memory” and “historical politics” terms. They conclude both terms are comparable and describe the process in reunified Germany, which they call “policy regarding the past”

The above-mentioned authors interpret culture of memory and historical politics as a process and action that form people's understanding of the past [Łuczewski and Bednarz-Łuczewska, 2011, p. 19]. According to the authors, this includes the daily practice of interference from public actors and political units in the process of promotion a certain historical vision. The authors attribute the following features to these processes: special historical facts are selected; other historical facts are ignored; antagonistic relationships between different social units are formed; own conclusions regarding historical events are developed.

Historical politics making takes place in two dimensions: the subject of the process and the transfer of the process to the target audience [Łuczewski and Bednarz-Łuczewska, 2011, p. 19].

The subjects of the processes, according to the authors, are: individuals (micro-level) groups and institutions (meso-level), and the state (macro-level, this is a level of State institutions activities) [Łuczewski and Bednarz-Łuczewska, 2011, p. 120].

Means of communication are the ways in which visions of the past are transmitted. These include: individual transmission (when a certain subject tells the past – internationalization level); discourse (visions about the past are presented in the media and television - externalization level) and cultural artifacts (the image of the past is represented in memorable places, namely, establishment of museums or monuments - objectification level).

In addition, according to the scholars, the difference between historical politics and culture of memory comes from how a vision of one's past is created. Thus, historical politics is a process of developing visions about one's past, which is realized by the state so called «top-down» or «state-led». On the contrary, culture of memory is the process of developing a vision about one's past and is realized by society so called "bottom-up" or society-driven [Łuczewski and Bednarz-Łuczewska, 2011, p. 20].

E. Wolfrum considers historical politics to be a field of activity and politics, in which different political actors unite the past and their different political interests, and subsequently struggle for their acceptance from public opinion [Wolfrum, 1999, p. 120].

In this regard, it should be noted that A. Wolff-Powenska interprets this notion through the development of historical memory. According to her, historical politics is a conscious effort of the political class the purpose of which is to create a pattern of historical memory of society [Wolff-Powieńska, 2011, p. 10]. As it can be seen, both authors working on the development of historical politics in Germany clearly define that as a conscious action of different actors. Both point out that the subjects of historical politics are the elites: politicians, journalists, intellectuals, and scholars.

K. Ziemer in his paper presents a culture of memory as unification of different cultures of different social memories, which are accepted by a large number of people [Ziemer, 2011, p. 35].

The German historian K. Schonhoven points out that history is a weapon in the political war for electorate and legitimization of the power. Historical politics as an instrument is used not only by authoritarian regimes but also by the democratic ones. Memories of the past are confronted and criticized at the boundary between generations, older and younger. The point is that the younger generation memory is no longer overwhelmed by the past; on the contrary, they have their own vision [Nijakowski, 2008, p. 35].

In his paper, O. Olszewski distinguished four models of historical politics: conservative, liberal, critical, and totalitarian [Olszewski, 2013, pp. 67–72]. The influence of the State or political parties on the processes of historical politics making is taken into account.

Thus, conservatism in historical politics is based on a positive vision of the historical past and the honouring of the heroes of the past [Olszewski, 2013, pp. 67–68]. This model is also characterized by the importance of historical politics in the country's foreign policy [Dudek, 2008, p. 199]. At the same time, the model mainly promotes the "white" past, but the difficult pages of the past are not considered. Accordingly, this model is criticized as one to reject historical pluralism.

The liberal model of historical politics is characterized by the least influence of a State on historical politics, the State acts as kind of observer. Such views of historical politics prevailed during the Kwasniewski presidency, who in his speech before the 1993 parliamentary election stated "today, we, the Democratic Left Alliance, declare that if we are in position to influence governance of Poland we will not be engaged in lustration, we will not destroy monuments (communism – Author's note), we will not rename streets" [Kracęko, 1996, pp. 127–128]. D. Tusk also stand by that policy. In 1991, being a head of the Liberal Democratic Congress party he stated "" We cannot continue to go round in circles, constantly refer to Czestochowa, the eagle in the crown and the barricades during martial law" (Dudek, 2008, p. 195), thus underlining the depoliticization of the past.

The critical model of historical politics is opposite to the conservative one. The conservative model «cleans up» the history and the critical theory suppose the State should take responsibility for the "dark pages" of history.

The totalitarian model of historical politics has been extensively studied by R. Stobacki, who concluded that the totalitarian model was based on a complete change in public memory. In order to implement that, the state uses propaganda in addition to the media [Wiścicki and Wóycicki, p. 15].

The German researchers R. Jessen and K.G. Kracht, who study memory in society issues, and focus on the problem of actors who create the past in bilateral Polish-German relations, emphasize the role of the mass media, defining them as a "daily historian" that create consciousness of citizens regarding the past of their people [Frei, 2003, p. 130]. According to them, mass media,

being a powerful communication instrument influences the creation of a pattern of both peoples, Polish and German.

Having studied the basic definitions and approaches to historical politics, we can determine the following results.

There is no compromise in the scientific environment about the concept of "historical politics". Thus, the term "national memory policy" with national connotation is common among Ukrainian scholars. The term "historical politics" which is a calque German "Geschichtspolitik" is popular in Poland. In Germany, the terms "memory of culture", "policy regarding the past" and "policy of memory" are popular [Hahn, 2013, pp. 146–148].

CONCLUSIONS

Before presenting the definition of historical politics and the role of actors, we can state that there are two approaches: instrumental and value-based. At the same time, the instrumental approach is inherent in historical politics. On the contrary, the value-based approach is applied to the "policy of the past". In the context of the instrumental approach, we can note that the formation of historical politics is done top to down, that is, from the State and its bodies to the social units. The value-based approach is characterized by initiative in this process of society, which means widening initiatives and visions of the past bottom up.

It should be noted that the value-based approach is characteristic for German historical politics and instrumental for the post-Soviet countries, including Poland.

Historical event and vision of its past by various political and social entities is the objects of historical politics.

The actors of historical politics are individuals, social groups and political organizations, the State and its institutions.

Depending on the active use of historical politics in the political life of the State, there are four models: conservative, liberal, totalitarian and critical.

Analyzing Polish, German, Russian and Ukrainian approaches to historical politics understanding, the following should be mentioned:

- there is no single approach to understanding "historical politics" concept in the scientific literature. Moreover, the understanding depends on specific historical-political conditions of the State's development;

- the «historical politics" concept is interdisciplinary. Although its introduction is associated with the postpositive revolution in historical science in the late 60's of the XX century, in the 80-90's of the same century it became the object of study in sociology and political science, and in the XXI century in the theory of international relations;

- historical politics is a source of integration of the nation, however ways of historical politics using depend on the same political and historical development of the country and the nation.

Having considered the abovementioned facts, we are presenting our own interpretation of historical memory policy. Thus, historical memory policy is a sphere of political activities of various social units, from individual to State, which manifest itself in conscious action to form a vision of historical events in a society and to use it to building support among society or its groups. It is characterized by a different degree of its presence in a society, from minimum discourse to the maximum; the latter is equivalent to propaganda. Further in the text we will use the term "historical politics" since that would not bring significant changes to our study. At the same time, when considering issues on the formation of the historical politics of Germany we will also use the terms "policy regarding the past", and "culture of memory". This is due to approaches to the implementation of historical politics which are described above.

It should be noted that the historical politics version that exists in the countries of Eastern Europe, and especially in Poland and Ukraine, is a more likely and more realistic option. It should be noted that historical politics is a part of national identity and therefore an integral part of the

State's activity. Moreover, this element is exacerbated during conflicts or wars on the international area.

Unlike historical politics, the German model of politics regarding the past and culture of memory is, for the most part, an idealistic view of the problem. Even the German policy in this respect has been repeatedly regulated by the State. At the same time, this influence has also taken place in the present, especially in the Centre Against Expulsions issues, which was actively supervised by E. Steinbach. The Federation of Expelled activities as regards compensation for lost property, which from time to time appear in the Polish-German relations, are also active.

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INFLUENCE OF DIFFERENT US POPULATION STRATUM ON 2020 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

ВПЛИВ СТРАТИФІКАЦІЇ НАСЕЛЕННЯ США НА ПРЕЗИДЕНТСЬКІ ВИБОРИ 2020

Nanavov A. S.

PhD (Economics), Associate Professor, Institute of International Relations of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv (Kyiv, Ukraine), e-mail: ananavov@ukr.net

Ruban A. A.

PhD Student, Institute of International Relations of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv (Kyiv, Ukraine), e-mail: 29ruban@gmail.com

Нанавов А. С.

Кандидат економічних наук, доцент, Інститут міжнародних відносин Київського національного університету імені Тараса Шевченка (Київ, Україна), e-mail: ananavov@ukr.net

Рубан А. А.

Аспірант кафедри міжнародної інформації, Інститут міжнародних відносин Київського національного університету імені Тараса Шевченка (Київ, Україна), e-mail: 29ruban@gmail.com

***Abstract.** In today's world, fair and free elections are the key to democracy. They play an integral role in the peaceful transfer of power. By casting their votes, the people elect leaders on whom the future of society depends. That is why the elections give great power to ordinary citizens: voting gives the opportunity to influence the policies of the future government, and hence their future destiny. When the founding fathers of the United States drafted and ratified the country's constitution, they did not give any role to political parties. In fact, through various constitutional mechanisms, such as the separation of powers between the executive, legislature, and judiciary, the federal system, and the indirect election of the president by a electoral college, they sought to protect the new republic from party and factional influence. Despite the Founding Fathers, in 1800 the United States became the first nation to establish permanent political parties organized on a nationwide basis to ensure the transfer of executive power from one faction to another on the basis of elections. the development and expansion of political parties was closely linked to the expansion of suffrage.*

***Keywords:** US presidential election, Joe Biden, Donald Trump, US domestic policy, voters*

***Анотація.** В сучасному світі чесні та вільні вибори – запорука демократії. Вони грають невід'ємну роль передачі влади мирним шляхом. Віддаючи голоси своїх представників, народ обирає лідерів, від яких залежить майбутнє суспільства. Саме тому вибори наділяють великими повноваженнями пересічних громадян: голосування дає можливість впливати на політику майбутнього уряду, а отже, і на свою майбутню долю. Коли батьки-засновники США створювали і ратифікували Конституцію країни, вони не відводили будь-якої ролі політичним партіям. Насправді, завдяки наявності різних конституційних механізмів, таких як поділ повноважень між виконавчою, законодавчою та судовою гілками влади, федеральний устрій країни та непряме обрання президента колегією виборців, вони прагнули захистити нову республіку від впливу партій та фракційності. Попри накреслення батьків-засновників, в 1800 році США стали першою державою, в якій зародилися постійні політичні партії, організовані на загальнонаціональній основі, для того щоб забезпечити передачу виконавчої влади від однієї фракції до іншої на підставі виборів.*

розвиток і розширення політичних партій було тісно пов'язане з розширенням виборчих прав.

Ключові слова: *Президентські вибори в США, Джо Байден, Дональд Трамп, внутрішня політика США, виборці*

Introduction. The President of the United States has enormous international influence. In particular, how the world responds to global crises - wars, pandemics and climate change. On November 3, 2020, 59 US presidential elections took place in the United States. The two main candidates were the 45th President of the Republican Party Donald Trump and former Vice President of the Democratic Party Joe Biden. The Democratic Party, led by Joe Biden, won. Central election issues include the impact of the current COVID-19 pandemic on both social and economic policies, protests in response to the killing of George Floyd and other African Americans, the border wall with Mexico, migration policy, climate change, including the Paris Agreement, which Trump planned to withdraw from, and the future of the Affordable Care Act. Reducing jobs, rapidly changing the vectors of international politics and maintaining the position of world leader has become the basis of the US agenda.

The purpose of research. The purpose of this article is a comparative analysis of the impact of equal groups of voters on voting in the 2020 election in the United States for candidates of both parties, Democratic and Republican.

The latest literature review. In recent years, Ukrainian and international scholars have paid considerable attention to international security, namely the United States as a guarantor of this security. The domestic policies of the country's presidents play a significant role in shaping the international agenda. Recent publications on the proposed topic include US activities in international organizations and structures of multilateral cooperation [A. Sapsai, 2020]. Also E. Makarenko, M. Ryzhkov, I. Pogorskaya and N. Pipchenko in their works consider the foreign and security policy of the United States [E. Makarenko, M. Ryzhkov, I. Pogorskaya, N. Pipchenko, 2016].

Research results. Both the Republican and the Democratic parties need the support of broad segments of the population and seek to attract voters with the most diverse economic status and demographics. With the exception of African-American voters and Jews, the vast majority of whom typically vote for Democratic presidential candidates, both sides receive significant support from almost all socioeconomic groups. Parties usually show flexibility in their political positions and do not adhere too closely to any ideological positions or political goals. Traditionally, they first take care of winning elections and controlling representative bodies.

Given the broad socio-economic base of the electorate, the country largely adheres to centrist ideological views, and therefore both the leading parties themselves are essentially centrist. At the same time, they show considerable political flexibility. Such a free position from doctrinal pressure allows both Republicans and Democrats to put up with the diversity of political views in their ranks, and will be able to assimilate the protesting electorate and potential support groups of third parties. In general, Republicans are considered the Conservative Party, which bases property rights and private capital accumulation, while Democrats lean slightly to the left, preferring more liberal social and economic policies. [Fukuyama, 1989] In fact, after coming to power, both parties tended to be pragmatic.

In addition to ideological flexibility, both major US parties are characterized by decentralization of party structure. Having won the election, the president cannot count on the confidence that members of Congress from his party will steadfastly support his political initiatives, just as the leaders of his party faction in Congress cannot count on the constant vote of congressmen from his party solely in line his party. Despite long-lasting and impressive evidence of the harmony

of party life within the American political system, US civil society is characterized by increasing distrust of political parties. [[The Daily Telegraph](#), 2012]

The adoption and development of the primary electoral system as a means of nominating candidates for Congress and public administration is a tribute to populist and even anti-party public sentiment. Most Americans are skeptical of the leaders of their party organizations, which can have a huge impact on government. Opinion polls consistently indicate that a large part of the population believes that parties sometimes only confuse issues rather than explain their attitudes, and that it would be better if the ballots did not indicate party affiliation at all. Accordingly, parties are forced to accept a situation in which party affiliation as such plays a smaller role for a large number of voters.

One example is "voting for both parties". A voter may, for example, vote for a presidential candidate from his or her own party and vote for a candidate from another party in his or her constituency in a congressional election. This is what happens in our time, when both parties are represented in the government, that the president often has to run the country in a situation where the presidential party does not have a majority in one or even both houses of Congress. [Нестерович, 2011] The division of control over the executive and legislative branches of government has become common practice both at the national level and in the governments of 50 states. Some observers believe that voters even prefer this situation, as it often leads to the defeat of some major government initiatives that run counter to the interests of a number of groups of voters.

Any analysis of Donald Trump's political weakness in 2020 must also acknowledge his political strength. However, he was defeated, becoming one of four actors in the modern era, who did not receive another four years of government. He also became the first president to lose popular votes in successive elections. [Page , 2020]

Donald Trump won the presidency in 2016 in part because he was a political violator who was willing to say that it was previously impossible. But he also lost the presidency in 2020, partly because of that.

In the 2020 presidential election, highly educated Republicans, some of whom voted for Trump four years ago, were willing to give him a chance, thinking his presidency was too non-presidential. Although they understood that it would be unconventional, many believed that the way he challenged so many customs and behaviors was unacceptable and often offensive and had devastating consequences for international relations.

The main reasons why Donald Trump lost the 2020 election was the message that prevailed in all constituencies, people wanted to see normal life in the country, they wanted to see political literacy and decency that the 45th president could not provide. The political problem for Trump was that he was unable to expand his support beyond his core voter base.

Instead, the politician continued to inflame racial tensions. He intensified the use of racist sentiment in his tweets, further despising colored people and demonstrating an inability to adequately condemn the superiority of whites.

During the third attempt in his life to become president, Joe Biden and his team managed to overcome political obstacles and win. The main reason why Biden won the presidency did not really depend on him. A poll conducted by Pew Research in October 2020 found that Joe Biden had a 17 percent advantage over Donald Trump when it came to their response to the coronavirus outbreak. [Research, 2020] The pandemic and subsequent economic downturn undermined Donald Trump's campaign statements about growth and prosperity. They also expressed concern among many Americans about his presidency, due to a lack of attention, a tendency to question science, chaotic problem-solving, and so on.

The pandemic was the main reason for the fall in Donald Trump's approval ratings, which, according to Gallup, fell to 38% in the summer - and this is what Joe Biden used in his campaign. [Research, 2021] Another factor was that the nation's attention was focused on more important topics - the coronavirus pandemic, the protests after the death of George Floyd and economic problems. But it also has the benefits of Joe Biden's coherent campaign strategy to limit the candidate's publicity by maintaining a measured campaign pace and minimizing the chances of new

challenges. Perhaps in a regular election, when most Americans did not worry about limiting their contact through the virus, this strategy would backfire.

During his campaign, Joe Biden tried to stay away and allow Donald Trump to be the one to be hurt by his own statements - and in the end it worked. One week before election day, Joe Biden's campaign staff released the latest commercials with calls very similar to those he launched in 2019, making it a chance for the nation to leave behind the divisions and chaos of the past four years. [Axelrod , 2020] Biden relied on the assertion that Trump divides society and incites hostility, and that the American people want a calmer and more consistent leader. Democrats managed to make this election a referendum on Donald Trump, not a choice between two candidates. So Joe Biden's winning slogan was that he wasn't Trump.

Despite pressure from the Liberals, Joe Biden pursued a centrist strategy, refusing to support a universal public health system, free college education, or a wealth tax. This allowed him to maximally attract moderate and dissatisfied Republicans during the general election campaign. This strategy was reflected in the election of presidential candidate Kamala Harris, rather than someone with stronger support from the party's left wing. The only thing Joe Biden's position was close to Bernie Sanders's was the environment and climate change. [Grandoni, 2019] Perhaps that is why the benefits of attracting young voters, for whom this issue is important, prevented the risk of alienating voters in unstable states. However, this was an exception that proved the rule. At the beginning of 2020, the pre-election treasury of the candidate from the Republican Party was almost empty. [Caputo, Bland , 2019] He started his election campaign at a disadvantage compared to the Republican candidate, who spent virtually his entire presidency accumulating campaign capital.

However, since April, Joe Biden's campaign has been very successful in raising funds, and - in part due to the waste of Donald Trump's campaign - he has ended up in a much better financial position than his opponent. In early October 2020, Joe Biden's campaign buried Republicans in a stream of television commercials in almost every key state. Six years ago, Hillary Clinton's campaign had a significant monetary advantage over Donald Trump's campaign. But in 2020, when personal campaigning was curtailed by coronavirus and Americans across the country paid much more attention to the media while sitting at home, the money helped Joe Biden deliver his message to voters. They allowed him to expand his electoral map by investing in campaigns in states that would previously be considered unpromising, such as Texas, Georgia, Ohio and Iowa. [Smith, 2020] Most of these bets were not played, but this forced Donald Trump to defend himself by changing the balance of power in once conservative Arizona, as well as gaining a competitive position in Georgia. Due to this, Biden successfully used his advantage.

On November 12, 2020, the Brookings Institution published a report entitled "Exit Polls Show Familiar and New Electoral Blocks Consolidate Biden's Victory." In it, author William H. Frey points out that Obama's victory in 2008 depended entirely on youth, people of color, and college-educated populations. He also claims that Trump won in 2016 thanks to an older generation of white people without college degrees. [Review, 2020] Frey says the same coalitions mostly existed in 2008 and 2016, although in key states on the battlefield, Biden increased his voice among some of Trump's 2016 groups, especially white and elderly Americans. [Review, 2020] Democrats won the vote of Latinos by 32%, the lowest gap since 2004, and they won the vote of Asian Americans by 27%, the lowest figure since 2008. [Review, 2020] Biden reduced the Republican preference for white men without higher education from 48% to 42%, and Democrats increased slightly by 2% among white women with higher education. People between the ages of 18 and 29 saw an increase in support for Democrats between 2016 and 2020, with the percentage of Democrats winning among this demographic group rising from 19% to 24%. [Review, 2020]

According to Edison Research, Biden received 65% of the votes of Latin Americans and 63% according to the Associated Press. Voto Latino said the Latino vote was crucial to Biden's victory in Arizona. 40% of Latin American voters who voted in 2020 did not vote in 2016, and 73% of those who voted voted for Biden. [Cohn , 2021] Florida and Texas, which have large Latin American populations, were moved by Trump. In Florida, Trump won the majority of Cuban

American voters in Miami-Dade County, Florida. [Gorden, 2020] However, the Latin American vote was still crucial so that Biden could lead states such as Nevada. [Aguilera, 2020]

One of the main indicators in the electorate during the 2020 elections was the picture of jobs affected by the economic turmoil caused by the coronavirus pandemic. Because unemployment is sky-high compared to last year, according to political intelligence Morning Consult, Biden has had a lead over unemployed voters since May 2020. [Research, 2020] Biden's advantage over unemployed voters makes some sense, given the rhetoric between the two campaigns: Biden focused his economic message on helping low-income people, in contrast to Trump, who sought to help only the richest Americans. But this perceived advantage may be largely a function of demographics: the Democratic Party has a larger share of black voters than the Republican Party, which has a higher unemployment rate than white voters. In other words, unemployed voters may prefer Biden simply because his supporters are likely to be unemployed now, rather than unemployment, which affects how someone votes.

In 2020, President Biden gained about 60 percent of voters with higher education, including the vast majority of white college graduates, which helped him improve in affluent suburbs and put him at the top in key states. This was a significant turnout: in total, according to census estimates, 41 percent of those who voted in the 2020 presidential election were graduates of four-year colleges. [Research, 2020] The 2020 election was probably the first in which a Democratic candidate performed better among colored voters who graduated from college than among those without a degree. Trump has made significant strides among color voters without degrees, especially Hispanics, and for some Republicans, Mr. Trump's accomplishments have increased the likelihood that it will be easier to engage working-class color voters. Biden's superiority among voters with higher education remains in all six key states. In Arizona, Biden was in the lead over Trump among those with secondary or lower education. But this advantage reached 51% -37% among those with a bachelor's degree and 54% -39% with a post-bachelor's degree. [Research, 2020] In Florida, Biden led Trump with a 46% -45% lead among those with a high school education or less, but his lead rose to 50% -35% among those with a college education and 57% -31% among those with a college education. who has a higher education. Biden's advantage over Trump in Michigan was among those with a high school education or less. Among those with higher education, Biden's profit was 50-36%. And among those with a bachelor's degree, Biden was 46 percentage points ahead. Biden lost in North Carolina to Trump among registered voters with secondary or lower education. But among college-educated voters, Biden led Trump, and among those with higher education, Biden was 65% -25% ahead. In Pennsylvania, Trump had an advantage over Biden among those with a high school education or less. Biden was in the lead over Trump among those with higher education and graduate school. Among those with a high school education or less in Wisconsin, Trump was 47-39% ahead of Biden, but among those with a bachelor's degree, Biden was 61-28% ahead. Voters with higher education preferred Biden to Trump almost 3-1.

Thus, college graduates are now a strong democratic bloc, and they are shaping the party's future. Those without diplomas, on the other hand, joined the Republican electorate. What can be said is that the share of the population with higher education - and the electorate - will continue to grow in the foreseeable future. In 2016, Massachusetts became the first state where four-year college graduates represented the majority of voters in the presidential election. In 2020, the state was joined by New York, Colorado and Maryland, not far behind Vermont, New Jersey, Connecticut and others. [Research, 2020] Four-year college graduates across the country could represent the majority of intermediate voters over the next decade.

As for the influx of the economy, it is usually a big problem during election battles, and this 2020 election season was marked by both historically low unemployment before the pandemic and the worst job loss since the Great Depression. Current unemployment rates are the worst job losses any American president has faced in World War II election year. [Research, 2021] Since the beginning of his presidency, Trump has advertised the US economy in various speeches and tweets, and during the election campaign he continued to talk about a V-shaped economic recovery.

Instead, as a Democratic candidate, Joe Biden has consistently talked about the impact of unemployment on poor Americans and focused on increasing existing social programs as his solution to the economic slowdown. His strategy to improve the economy if he becomes president is to build a better New Agenda-focused plan that promises to create cleaner jobs through infrastructure and improve clean energy.

Evidence shows that many of the fastest-growing Latin American voters are not a solid part of the democratic base. Instead, they are convincing voters, representing a potential opportunity for both Democrats and Republicans. This is especially true for voters who are not hyper-partisan: new and rare voters, as well as people who changed their votes in 2020.

Thus, based on this, the study identified the main 5 groups of voters who most influenced the voting for candidates of both parties, Democratic and Republican, such as Hispanic population, unemployed population, population with a bachelor's degree, population without a diploma and population with a diploma / with a professional degree (Table 1 and Table 2).

Table 1. The percentage of population stratum voted for D. Trump by state

<u>States</u>	vote for Trump, %	hispanic population, %	unemployment, %	bachelor's degree, %	no diploma, %	professional degree, %
Idaho	63,8	13	4,8	18,6	5,9	9
Iowa	53,1	6,8	4,2	19,3	4,9	9,3
Alabama	62	5,3	4,7	15,9	9,5	9,5
Alaska	52,8	6,8	5,2	18,3	4,6	11,2
Arizona	49,1	30,7	6,8	18,4	7,4	11,1
Arkansas	62,4	8,5	5,6	14,8	8,6	8,3
Wyoming	69,9	10,2	5,4	17,5	5	9,9
Washington	38,8	13,7	7	22,4	5	13,6
Vermont	30,7	4,2	4	22,5	5,1	15,5
Virginia	44	10,5	6,1	22	6,2	16,8
Wisconsin	48,8	7,6	4,8	19,7	5,1	10,4
Hawaii	34,3	9,5	14	21,7	4,3	11,2
Delaware	39,8	10,5	4,7	18,6	6,4	13,4
Georgia	49,2	10,5	5,9	19,2	8,2	12,1
WestVirginia	68,6	1,9	7,4	12,4	8,8	8,2
Illinois	40,6	18,2	8,1	21,1	6	13,6
Indiana	57	8,2	5,6	16,9	7,5	9,5
California	34,3	39,4	9,8	21,2	7,5	12,8
Kansas	56,1	13	4,7	21,1	5,5	12,3
Kentucky	62,1	4,6	5,5	14,2	8,2	10
Colorado	41,9	21,9	6,9	25,6	4,9	15,3
Connecticut	39,2	17,3	8,2	21,8	5,3	17,5
Louisiana	58,5	6,2	7,9	15,7	9,9	8,4
Massachusetts	32,1	12,6	8,5	24,1	4,9	19,6
Maine	44	2	5,3	20	4,8	11,8
Maryland	32,2	11,8	6,8	21,5	5,8	18,6
Minnesota	45,3	6,1	5,3	23,7	4	12,4
Mississippi	57,5	4,2	6,9	13,7	10,4	8,4
Missouri	56,8	4,9	5	18	6,9	11,2
Michigan	47,8	5,6	8,1	17,7	6,3	11,4
Montana	56,9	4,2	4,7	21,5	4,5	10,6
Nebraska	58,2	12	3,6	21	4,8	10,9

Nevada	47,7	28,7	12	16,2	7,8	8,6
NewYork	37,7	19,5	8,7	20,5	7	16
NewHampshire	45,4	4,3	4,7	22,7	4,8	14,3
NewJersey	41,3	21,6	3,6	24,2	5,3	15,5
NewMexico	43,5	47,7	8,5	15,4	8,4	12
Ohio	53,3	4,4	4,9	17,6	6,8	10,7
Oklahoma	65,4	11,9	5,2	16,8	7,9	8,7
Oregon	40,4	13,9	7	20,8	5,7	12,9
Pennsylvania	48,8	8,1	7	19	6,3	12,4
SouthDakota	61,8	4,4	3,7	19,9	5,3	8,9
SouthCarolina	55,1	6,9	5,4	17,8	8,4	10,3
NorthDakota	65,1	4,3	5,9	21,8	4,3	8,2
NorthCarolina	49,9	10,7	6,8	20	7,7	13,8
RhodeIsland	38,6	16,6	7,3	24	6,1	13,8
Tennessee	60,7	6,9	7,8	17,2	7,9	10,1
Texas	52,1	39,3	7,3	19,5	8,1	10,4
Florida	51,2	26,5	5,8	18,9	7	11
Utah	58,1	15,1	3,8	22,5	5	11,5

Source: Author's calculations

Table 2. The percentage of population stratum voted for J. Biden by state

States	vote for Baiden, %	hispanic population, %	unemployment, %	bachelor's degree, %	no diploma, %	professional degree, %
Idaho	33,07	13	4,8	18,6	5,9	9
Iowa	44,89	6,8	4,2	19,3	4,9	9,3
Alabama	36,57	5,3	4,7	15,9	9,5	9,5
Alaska	42,77	6,8	5,2	18,3	4,6	11,2
Arizona	49,36	30,7	6,8	18,4	7,4	11,1
Arkansas	34,78	8,5	5,6	14,8	8,6	8,3
Wyoming	26,55	10,2	5,4	17,5	5	9,9
Washington	57,97	13,7	7	22,4	5	13,6
Vermont	66,09	4,2	4	22,5	5,1	15,5
Virginia	54,11	10,5	6,1	22	6,2	16,8
Wisconsin	49,45	7,6	4,8	19,7	5,1	10,4
Hawaii	63,73	9,5	14	21,7	4,3	11,2
Delaware	58,74	10,5	4,7	18,6	6,4	13,4
Georgia	49,47	10,5	5,9	19,2	8,2	12,1
West Virginia	29,69	1,9	7,4	12,4	8,8	8,2
Illinois	57,74	18,2	8,1	21,1	6	13,6
Indiana	40,96	8,2	5,6	16,9	7,5	9,5
California	63,48	39,4	9,8	21,2	7,5	12,8
Kansas	41,56	13	4,7	21,1	5,5	12,3
Kentucky	36,15	4,6	5,5	14,2	8,2	10
Colorado	55,4	21,9	6,9	25,6	4,9	15,3
Connecticut	59,26	17,3	8,2	21,8	5,3	17,5

Louisiana	39,85	6,2	7,9	15,7	9,9	8,4
Massachusetts	65,6	12,6	8,5	24,1	4,9	19,6
Maine	53,09	2	5,3	20	4,8	11,8
Maryland	65,36	11,8	6,8	21,5	5,8	18,6
Minnesota	52,4	6,1	5,3	23,7	4	12,4
Mississippi	41,06	4,2	6,9	13,7	10,4	8,4
Missouri	41,41	4,9	5	18	6,9	11,2
Michigan	50,62	5,6	8,1	17,7	6,3	11,4
Montana	40,55	4,2	4,7	21,5	4,5	10,6
Nebraska	39,17	12	3,6	21	4,8	10,9
Nevada	50,06	28,7	12	16,2	7,8	8,6
New York	60,86	19,5	8,7	20,5	7	16
New Hampshire	52,71	4,3	4,7	22,7	4,8	14,3
New Jersey	57,33	21,6	3,6	24,2	5,3	15,5
New Mexico	54,29	47,7	8,5	15,4	8,4	12
Ohio	45,24	4,4	4,9	17,6	6,8	10,7
Oklahoma	32,29	11,9	5,2	16,8	7,9	8,7
Oregon	56,45	13,9	7	20,8	5,7	12,9
Pennsylvania	50,01	8,1	7	19	6,3	12,4
South Dakota	35,61	4,4	3,7	19,9	5,3	8,9
South Carolina	43,43	6,9	5,4	17,8	8,4	10,3
North Dakota	31,76	4,3	5,9	21,8	4,3	8,2
North Carolina	48,59	10,7	6,8	20	7,7	13,8
Rhode Island	59,39	16,6	7,3	24	6,1	13,8
Tennessee	37,45	6,9	7,8	17,2	7,9	10,1
Texas	47,48	39,3	7,3	19,5	8,1	10,4
Florida	47,86	26,5	5,8	18,9	7	11
Utah	37,65	15,1	3,8	22,5	5	11,5

Source: Author's calculations

Based on the analysis of statistical data (Table 1 and Table 2), point histograms of the distribution of the studied data were constructed (fig. 1 and fig. 2), which allowed to accept the hypothesis about the suitability of the selected data set for the study using correlation-regression analysis.




Figure 1. Point bar chart of Trump's support factors




Figure 2. Point bar chart of Biden's support factors

The functional arrangements of the values of the dependent variable on the X-axis and the corresponding five studied factors form a polygon of points in which there are no signs of polynomial or sinusoidal distributions.

Thus, to determine the levels of electoral support for Presidents Biden and Trump, two linear regression equations were obtained. For Trump:

$$Y = -5.81 + 0.08X_1 + 1.58X_2 + 0.69X_3 + 0.23X_4 + 2.33X_5 \quad (1)$$

For Biden:

$$Y = 99.18 - 0.08X_1 - 1.55X_2 - 0.61X_3 + 0.14X_4 - 2.29X_5 \quad (2)$$

Based on this, it should be noted that due to Trump's harsh actions and speeches towards the Spanish-speaking population in this group of voters, he lost his position by 0.08% of this target audience. The unemployed were one of the main groups of voters that helped Trump win the 2016 race, but failed to maintain their commitment. The population with a bachelor's degree voted 0.69% more than the Democratic Party, and Trump lost 0.61%. The population without a degree gave a slight advantage of 0.23% to Biden, but Trump also did not go into the red, his share in this target group was 0.14%. The population with a complete higher education gave their majority to the Democratic candidate, thus losing to Trump.

The obtained regression equations show that the greatest positive impact on the growth of Biden's support was the increase in the level of support among the unemployed and people with higher education - an increase of 1% increased the total number of votes cast for Biden by 1.58% and 2.33% respectively. At the same time, there was a drop in Trump's electoral support in the same groups of voters by 1.55% and 2.29%.

Conclusions

Trump has succeeded among Spanish-speaking voters. Despite the fact that Biden retained the majority of Latin American voters in 2020, Trump has succeeded in this group as a whole. There was a wide gap in education among Spanish-speaking voters: Trump did much better with those who did not have higher education than voters with higher education among Latinos. With the exception of a small shift among Spanish-speaking voters, Joe Biden's electoral coalition was very similar to Hillary Clinton's: black, Hispanic, Asian and other races cast about four out of ten. Among non-student voters, Biden increased the number of votes more than the Democratic Party in the previous election. And voters without higher education were crucial to Trump's victory in 2016, but in 2020, Biden roughly retained the share of Democrats in the group, improving performance.

One of the notable features of the 2020 elections was the large gap in education among Spanish-speaking voters. In 2020, Biden won the Latin American electorate with a higher education. At the same time, Biden's advantage over Trump among Latin American voters who had no higher education was much smaller. An important group in the 2016 election was voters without four years of higher education, which was crucial to Trump's victory. Until 2016, differences in the preferences of candidates for education were generally much smaller than in 2020. In 2020, Trump recruited non-student voters – almost as much as in 2016. At the same time, voters with higher education supported Biden by about the same margin as Clinton in 2016.

Thus, the split in the United States is a constant phenomenon cultivated by racism and determined by clear cultural differences between people on the east and west coasts, on the one hand, and the rest of the country, on the other, and between voters in cities, towns, and rural areas.

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ОСОБЛИВОСТІ РОЗВИТКУ
СВІТОВОГО ГОСПОДАРСТВА ТА МЕН

УДК 330.55:339.564:339.923

SIZE OF ECONOMY EFFECTS FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN THE EU

ЕФЕКТИ ВЕЛИЧИНИ ЕКОНОМІКИ ДЛЯ МІЖНАРОДНОЇ ТОРГІВЛІ В ЄС

Chugaiev O. A.

Doctor of Science (Economics), Professor of the Department of World Economy and International Economic Relations of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. E-mail: chugaiev@knu.ua

Чугаєв О. А.

Кандидат економічних наук, доцент, доцент кафедри світового господарства і міжнародних економічних відносин Інституту міжнародних відносин Київського національного університету імені Тараса Шевченка. E-mail: chugaiev@knu.ua

Abstract. *The difference in export strategies of small and large economies is based on different sensitivity of various industries to the economies of scale effect. The paper aims at analyzing the impact of economy size on the structure of merchandise exports of the EU member states and other advanced economies. Additionally the effects of income level and economic integration are estimated. Correlation, regression and cluster analysis were used as methods of research.*

Specialization in exports of most components of food industry and agriculture is widespread among small and less developed economies outside the EU. Exports of fuels and energy are also more typical to small and less integrated economies. Textile and apparel industry is relatively more important for economies with cheaper labor. Exports of ores and metals and creative products do not depend on home market and income level effects. Competitive advantages in most of these industries determine the export structure of Ukraine as a middle income medium-size economy.

Most advanced economies obviously dominate in exports of chemical and high technology industries. Engineering is a very diverse industry. Its components either do not depend on home market effect (production of most types of vehicles, instruments and apparatus) or depend on existence of large domestic market and / or membership in the economic union (electric and electronic devices, automobiles, industrial equipment). It is also important to have access to large market of economic union for production of furniture, toys and games. The latter two industries as well as medium technology engineering may receive additional impetus for development under scenario of accession of Ukraine to the EU.

Key words: *size of economy, international trade, economic integration, European Union, economies of scale, income level.*

Анотація. *Різниця в експортних стратегіях малих і великих економік базується на різній чутливості галузей до ефекту масштабу. Метою дослідження є аналіз впливу величини економіки на структуру товарного експорту країн ЄС та інших розвинених країн.*

Додатково аналізується вплив рівня доходу та економічної інтеграції. Дослідження проведене методами регресійно-кореляційного та кластерного аналізу.

Спеціалізація на експорті більшості видів продукції агропромислового сектору більше характерна для малих менш заможних економік за межами ЄС. Експорт продукції паливно-енергетичного комплексу також притаманний малим неінтегрованим економікам. А легка промисловість відносно важливіша також для економік з дешевою працею. Експорт продукції металургічного комплексу та креативної індустрії (крім іграшок та ігор) не залежить від ефектів масштабу чи рівня розвитку. Конкурентні переваги у більшості з цих галузей лежать в основі експорту України як економіки середньої величини і з середнім рівнем доходів.

У експорті продукції хімічної промисловості та високотехнологічних галузях явно домінують найбільш високорозвинені економіки. Машинобудування за своєю природою є дуже диференційованою галуззю, окремі компоненти якого або не залежать від ефекту масштабу (транспортні засоби крім автомобілів, прилади) або сильно залежать від наявності ємного внутрішнього ринку та/або входження до економічного союзу (важке, електронне та електричне, автомобільне). Так само важливий доступ до ємного ринку економічного союзу для меблевої промисловості та виробництва іграшок та ігор. Останні дві галузі як і середньотехнологічне машинобудування можуть одержати додатковий поштовх для розвитку у разі інтеграції України в ЄС.

Ключові слова: *величина економіки, міжнародна торгівля, економічна інтеграція, Європейський Союз, ефект масштабу, рівень доходів.*

Introduction. Industrial structure of production and exports of a country depends on availability of natural resources, costs and skills of labor, government policy, economic openness, economies of scale and other factors. Under close economy large size of domestic market is an important precondition for development of industries with economies of scale. But under global or regional trade integration entering foreign markets may offset small size of internal market of a country. Nevertheless incompleteness of integration, especially at the global level, helps large economies to have natural competitive advantages in several industries. Establishment of the single market within the EU economic union has created unique preconditions for convergence of export structures of small and large member states. Analyzing sensitivity of industries to the exporting country size, as well as to the income level in it as a control variable, may be useful for elaboration of export strategies of small and large economies both inside and outside the economic union. The research results may also be useful for Ukraine, which is a middle income and medium-size economy with a growing level of integration with the EU.

The purpose of research is to estimate the effect of economy size on the product structure of exports considering economic integration and income level.

Previous literature review. Most of the studies about country size effects consider one or several dimensions: GDP, population and territory, which are related to three types of resources: human, land and capital. These dimensions are not perfect substitutes of each other. In a sample of 72 countries correlation between population and territory area was 0.58, between GDP and territory size – 0.32, between GDP and population – 0.23 (Panahi, 2010).

Models based on economies of scale envisage that countries with large domestic market are more competitive. This creates a home market effect which is especially strong under situation of monopoly or oligopoly (Hummels, 2006). According to Hanson & Xiang (2002), industries with high transportation costs and low elasticity for substitution (under higher differentiation of products) tend to concentrate in larger countries by GDP.

Lee & Zhang (2019) noted that small economies have a less diversified export structure. Cieřlik & Parteka (2021) also concluded that smaller size of a country in comparison to the rest of the world decreases export diversification.

Perkins & Syrquin (1989) wrote that large countries are more specialized in exports of

products of manufacturing, while mineral products are more important in exports of small countries. Perry (2001) estimated that small states rely more on low technology industries. Tiits (2007) noted that small countries are unlikely to specialize in new industries as they have to buy most of the technologies from abroad.

On the other hand, Braunerhjelm & Thulin (2006) have not found evidence that country size affects exports of high technology products. A possible explanation is that knowledge may be very specialized, which allows its high localization, and economies of scales can exist even in small countries thanks to foreign direct investments and trade liberalization. Small countries can specialize in certain market segments and stages of high technology production. Fagerberg (1995) analyzed OECD countries to find the industries where large home market is important for competitiveness: production of aircrafts, computers, semiconductors, household appliances, energy generating equipment and cars, i.e. industries with high non-tariff barriers. The effect is not observed in the rest of high technology industries. The latter can be suitable for specialization of small countries.

Vujakovic (2009) wrote that countries with smaller territory are more open to services trade and more often rely on international tourism. Brau, Lanza & Pigliaru (2006) estimated that among 14 out of 17 heavily dependent on tourism countries were small and half out of 29 small states substantially depended on tourism. But Lanza & Pigliaru (1999) had noted that availability of natural resources is a more important factor for tourism specialization than small country size. Specialization in financial services could also be advantageous for small states because this sector can generate large value added based on human capital and in this case economies of scales do not depend on the size of a national market (Brandi, 2004).

Thus, the previous studies mostly avoid analysis of the impact of economy size of a detailed structure of a country exports. Instead, they usually focus on monopoly power, exports diversification, technological structure of merchandise exports or the role of specific services.

Methodology. Our sample includes 50 countries with the per capita income similar to the level in the EU member states (above 20 000 dollars by purchasing power parity (PPP) method). Two types of countries were excluded from the sample: very small countries and territories and countries which are heavily dependent on fuel exports (more than 40% of merchandise exports) because here the main factor is availability of fossil fuel reserves). The time period is 2020.

Dependent variables are the shares of the relevant product groups in the total merchandise exports of a country, in % (data from UNCTAD (2022)). The independent variables (data from World Bank (2021)) include:

- GDP in dollars (PPP method) as a measure of home market size – GDP;
- GDP per capita in dollars (PPP method) as a measure of income level – GDPpc;
- total population in number of persons – Pop;
- land area in square kilometres – Area;
- membership in the EU, a Boolean variable (1– yes, 0 – no).

Correlation analysis shows that higher correlations are usually with natural logarithms of independent variables. Therefore all the independent variables (except the Boolean variable) are taken in logs. Country size dimensions are positively correlated. The correlation between GDP and total population is 0.98. Thus, in order to avoid multicollinearity, we excluded total population from our further analysis.

At the next stage cluster analysis (K-means method) is used to classify industries. The data used includes correlations with the relevant factors.

Finally, regression analysis enabled to create several models of export structure. Robustness of results was checked by recalculation of the regression models without outliers.

Results. Table 1 shows the estimated correlations between product export shares and the analyzed factors. There is an obvious exception: correlation of ores and metals share with absolute GDP per capita is higher (0.36) than with logarithm of it (0.27), so the relationship seems to be linear.

The preliminary analysis shows that income level and economy size affect almost half of the

43 product groups; land area – at most 1/6 of the groups; membership in the economic union – about 40% of industries. About 1/7 industries turned out to be independent from these factors.

Table 1

Correlation between product export shares and factors

Product group	lnGDPp c	lnGDP	lnArea	EU	Cluste r
Primary products	-0.30	-0.24	0.25	-0.43	1
Resource-based manufactures: agro-based	-0.41	-0.54	-0.21	-0.07	2
Resource-based manufactures: other	0.03	-0.19	-0.13	-0.15	4
Low technology manufactures: textile, garment and footwear	-0.31	-0.02	-0.10	0.06	5
Low technology manufactures: other products	0.15	0.13	-0.05	0.52	3
Medium technology manufactures: automotive	0.03	0.39	0.26	0.36	6
Medium technology manufactures: process	0.15	0.30	0.05	0.13	3
Medium technology manufactures: engineering	0.15	0.12	-0.12	0.31	3
High technology manufactures: electronic and electrical	0.24	0.25	-0.17	0.05	3
High technology manufactures: other	0.47	0.13	-0.16	0.23	3
Agricultural raw materials	-0.26	-0.21	0.15	-0.08	1
Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes	-0.34	0.04	0.24	-0.20	1
Food and live animals	-0.36	-0.42	-0.07	-0.35	2
Beverages and tobacco	-0.22	-0.21	-0.03	0.16	5
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials	-0.15	-0.31	-0.22	-0.11	2
Electric current	-0.30	-0.42	-0.16	-0.18	2
Ores and metals (except iron and steel)	-0.08	-0.09	0.24	-0.27	1
Manufactured goods	0.36	0.37	-0.11	0.49	6
Iron and steel	0.27	0.06	-0.05	0.26	3
Chemicals and related products, n.e.s.	0.44	0.15	-0.12	0.17	3
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products	0.39	0.05	-0.15	0.26	3
Essential oils for perfume materials and cleaning preparations	0.29	0.30	0.03	0.19	3
Machinery and transport equipment	0.24	0.37	-0.02	0.35	6
Power generating machinery and equipment	0.34	0.49	0.18	0.27	6
Specialized machinery	0.43	0.41	0.05	0.20	6
Metal working machinery	0.31	0.46	0.14	0.13	6
Other industrial machinery and parts	0.34	0.40	0.13	0.53	6
Office machines and automatic data processing machines	0.23	0.34	0.01	0.10	3
Telecommunication and sound recording apparatus	-0.01	0.01	-0.04	0.34	5
Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances, n.e.s.	0.17	0.25	-0.18	0.03	3
Railway vehicles & associated equipment	-0.15	0.02	0.07	0.22	5
Aircraft & associated equipment; spacecraft, etc.	0.16	0.08	-0.10	-0.09	4
Ships, boats & floating structures	-0.07	-0.33	-0.25	-0.03	2

Furniture and parts thereof	-0.15	0.05	0.12	0.43	5
Articles of apparel & clothing accessories	-0.32	-0.05	-0.11	-0.02	5
Professional and scientific instruments, n.e.s.	0.02	0.10	-0.06	-0.13	4
Photo apparatus, optical goods, watches and clocks	0.26	0.15	-0.13	-0.19	4
Cinematograph films, exposed & developed	-0.09	-0.04	0.00	0.07	5
Arms & ammunition	-0.04	0.05	-0.02	-0.17	4
Printed matter	-0.01	-0.19	-0.36	0.24	5
Baby carriages, toys, games & sporting goods	-0.04	-0.10	-0.26	0.38	5
Works of art, collectors' pieces & antiques	0.20	0.24	0.09	-0.23	4
Jewelry & articles of precious materials, n.e.s.	0.05	0.14	-0.05	-0.38	4

Note: correlation $>0,24$ significant at $p<0,10$; $>0,28$ – at $p<0,05$; $>0,36$ – at $p<0,01$.

Results of the cluster analysis are shown in tables 1 and 2. F-test proved significant contribution of all the four factors to grouping industries ($p<0,01$).

Table 2

Average correlations in clusters of industries

Factor / cluster	1	2	3	4	5	6
lnGDPpc	-0.25	-0.26	0.27	0.10	-0.14	0.29
lnGDP	-0.12	-0.41	0.19	0.08	-0.06	0.41
lnArea	0.22	-0.18	-0.08	-0.06	-0.08	0.09
EU	-0.25	-0.15	0.20	-0.19	0.21	0.33

The industries within cluster 1 (mostly primary production) develop more actively in countries with relatively lower income, smaller territory and outside the EU. Industries of cluster 2 (agriculture, energy sector and ship-building) – in smaller countries with lower income. Cluster 3 industries (mostly medium and high technology manufactures, iron and steel industry, chemical industry) – in richer countries and sometimes in larger countries or in economic union member states. Cluster 4 sectors (some high technology industries, jewelry, works of art etc.) tend to be independent from the four analyzed factors. Cluster 5 industries (textile and apparel industry, production of telecommunication equipment, furniture and creative products etc.) also do not significantly depend on income and country size, but sometimes are more concentrated in the EU. Economies of scale based on market size are the most relevant for the cluster 6 sectors (production of industrial equipment and cars). Thus they require substantial efficient demand in domestic economy or at least within an economic union.

Regression analysis results are shown in tables 3 and 4 if they are robust enough. The effect of land area size is insignificant for all the industries. Several effects failed to be proved during robustness check by excluding outliers. E.g. the effect of income level is not robust for low technology production (without outlier – Mauritius), agricultural raw materials (Uruguay), iron and steel (Luxemburg), photo apparatus, optical goods, watches and clocks (Switzerland). The same happened to the effect of the EU membership and land area size for ores and base metals (Chile). Economy size effect is not robust for ships (Cyprus and the Bahamas) and works of arts (United Kingdom). The effect of land area size is not significant for printed matter (Malta).

Table 3

Regression models for technological structure of exports

Product group	b ₀	b ₁ (lnGDP pc)	b ₂ (lnGDP)	b ₃ (EU)	R ²	p-value for F- test
Primary products	22,6*** (3,0)			- 13,4*** (4,1)	0,18	0,002
Resource-based manufactures: agro-based	109,9** * (23,0)	-4,59** (2,23)	-1,88*** (0,51)		0,35	0,000
Low technology manufactures: other products	5,58*** (0,85)			4,81*** (1,15)	0,27	0,000
Medium technology manufactures: automotive	-35,6*** (12,7)		1,49*** (0,48)	4,87*** (1,71)	0,28	0,000
Medium technology manufactures: process	-9,77 (7,48)		0,62** (0,28)		0,09	0,032
Medium technology manufactures: engineering	11,6*** (1,55)			4,69** (2,11)	0,09	0,031
High technology manufactures: electronic and electrical (without Malaysia)	-58,8** (26,8)	6,32** (2,53)			0,12	0,016
High technology manufactures: other	-79,7*** (24,5)	8,27*** (2,31)			0,21	0,001
High technology manufactures: other (without Ireland)	-51,5** (21,3)	5,56*** (2,02)			0,14	0,008

Note: in tables 3-4 significance according to t-test: *** – p<0.01, ** – p<0.05, * – p<0.1. Standard errors are in brackets.

Table 4

Regression models for industrial structure of exports

Product group	b ₀	b ₁ (lnGDP pc)	b ₂ (lnGDP)	b ₃ (EU)	R ²	p-value for F- test
Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes	13,37** * (4,98)	-1,19** (0,47)			0,12	0,015
Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes (without Argentina and Malaysia)	4,88** (1,97)	-0,41** (0,19)			0,10	0,032
Food and live animals (without New Zealand)	178,8** * (45,5)	-7,84* (4,51)	-2,95*** (1,00)	-7,48** (3,53)	0,35	0,000
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials (without Malta)	26,92** (12,24)		-0,79* (0,46)		0,06	0,093

Electric current	16,9*** (5,7)		-0,61*** (0,21)		0,18	0,007
Electric current (without Montenegro)	3,09*** (1,0)		-0,10** (0,04)		0,15	0,015
Manufactured goods	-77,7* (40,1)		4,84*** (1,51)	22,63** * (5,40)	0,37	0,000
Chemicals and related products, n.e.s.	- 109,6** * (36,3)	11,7*** (3,43)			0,20	0,001
Chemicals and related products, n.e.s.(without Ireland)	-59,7** (29,6)	6,89** (2,80)			0,11	0,018
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products	-65,6*** (24,0)	6,74*** (2,26)			0,16	0,005
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products (without Ireland)	-36,1*** (20,8)	3,89*** (1,97)			0,08	0,054
Essential oils for perfume materials and cleaning preparations	-3,14 (2,00)	0,17** (0,076)			0,09	0,033
Machinery and transport equipment	-65,9** (30,4)		3,33*** (1,14)	11,2*** (4,1)	0,25	0,001
Power generating machinery and equipment	-10,9*** (3,0)		0,46*** (0,11)	0,88** (0,41)	0,31	0,000
Specialized machinery	-21,3*** (6,0)	1,48** (0,58)	0,30** (0,13)		0,27	0,001
Metal working machinery	-1,67*** (0,54)		0,073** * (0,020)		0,21	0,001
Other industrial machinery and parts	-10,7*** (3,6)		0,49*** (0,13)	2,33*** (0,48)	0,44	0,000
Office machines and automatic data processing machines	-8,21** (3,96)		0,37** (0,15)		0,12	0,016
Telecommunication and sound recording apparatus	1,23** (0,49)			1,66** (0,67)	0,11	0,016
Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances, n.e.s.	-19,3 (14,8)		0,99* (0,56)		0,06	0,082
Furniture and parts thereof	0,48* (0,26)			1,17*** (0,36)	0,18	0,002
Articles of apparel & clothing accessories	31,0** (12,2)	-2,73** (1,15)			0,11	0,021
Articles of apparel & clothing accessories (without Mauritius)	14,7** (7,3)	-1,23* (0,69)			0,06	0,080
Baby carriages, toys, games & sporting goods	0,23* (0,12)			0,47*** (0,17)	0,14	0,006
Jewelry & articles of precious materials, n.e.s.	0,59*** (0,11)			- 0,42*** (0,15)	0,14	0,008

Thus, no significant effect was found for the effects of income level, economy size and deep economic integration for exports of agricultural raw materials, beverages and tobacco, ores and metals, vehicles (except cars), professional and scientific instruments, photo and optical goods, clocks and watches, cinematograph films, printed matter, arms and ammunition, and works of art and similar products (1st group). In some cases it is counterintuitive (mainly in case of engineering) as it does not fit the theoretical assumptions about economies of scales and influence of highly paid skilled labor. A possible explanation is global economic integration (which decreased importance of a large domestic market) and development of technical education in middle income economies. Orientation towards this product groups can be useful for various types of economies at least among the relatively advanced economies (approximately upper tercile / quartile).

The 2nd group includes industries that are dominant in relatively less developed economies (with cheaper labor): agriculture, food industry, textile and apparel industry.

The 3rd group consists of sectors which are widespread in countries with smaller domestic market and / or are outside an economic union: also agriculture, food industry as well as energy sector and jewelry industry. Economies of scale are less or not important for such industries.

The 4th group includes sectors with competitive advantage in the richest economies: high technology industry in general, chemical industry (including pharmaceutical and perfumery) and production of specialized machinery.

The 5th group consists of industries with importance of market size and includes three subgroups of industries for which:

- large domestic market is important and deep economic integration is unable to offset its absence: production of specialized machinery, metal working machinery, office machines and automatic data processing machines, various other types of electrical appliances and manufacturing in general (other than engineering);
- large domestic market is important but its absence can be compensated with deep economic integration: manufacturing in general, engineering in general, automotive industry, production of power generating and various other industrial machinery;
- large domestic market is not necessary, while barrier-free access to the market of a large economic union is more important: non-agricultural low technology production, medium technology engineering, production of telecommunication and sound recording apparatus, furniture, special products for children, games and sports.

It is possible to extrapolate the results to Ukraine, although with the reservation that it is a middle-income economy unlike more advanced economies in our sample. According to our results, three categories can be distinguished:

1. Currently the most competitive industries for Ukraine may include those from the 1st and the 2nd groups: agriculture, food, textile and apparel, metallurgy, creative industries and production of some types of vehicles and instruments.

2. Under a scenario of accession to the EU several sectors may become more competitive in Ukraine: production of automobiles, some types of industrial and electronic equipment, furniture and toys.

3. Least competitive industries in Ukraine now and in the near decades are (considering insufficient development level and market size): most high technology industries, chemical and pharmaceutical industry, production of some other types of industrial and electronic equipment.

Conclusion. The paper analyzed a sample of countries including the EU member states and other countries with similar development level. Correlation and cluster analysis were used for preliminary selection of factors and grouping of industries. No significant effect of land area on export structure was found. The effect of population size cannot be distinguished from the impact of economy size at least in the sample of relatively developed economies. Some industries depend on three possible factors: domestic market size (GDP), deep economic integration within an economic union (membership in the EU) and the control variable – income level (GDP per capita). The relationships are nonlinear (logarithmic). Nevertheless regression analysis has failed to prove some of the effects after considering control variables or excluding outliers from the sample. The

remaining robust results are mentioned below.

Specialization in exports of most components of food industry and agriculture is widespread among small and less developed economies outside the EU. Exports of fuels and energy are also more typical to small and less integrated economies. Textile and apparel industry is relatively more important for economies with cheaper labor. Exports of ores and metals and creative products (except toys and games) do not depend on home market and income level effects. Competitive advantages in most of these industries determine the export structure of Ukraine as a middle income medium-size economy.

Most advanced economies obviously dominate in exports of chemical and high-technology industries. Engineering is a very diverse industry. Its components either do not depend on home market effect (production of most types of vehicles, instruments and apparatus) or depend on existence of large domestic market and / or membership in the economic union (electric and electronic devices, automobiles, industrial equipment). It is also important to have access to large market of economic union for production of furniture, toys and games. The latter two industries as well as medium-technology engineering may receive additional impetus for development under scenario of accession of Ukraine to the EU.

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Київського національного університету імені Тараса Шевченка
Тел. 044-481-44-68
Сайт: <http://apir.iir.edu.ua/index.php/apmv/>