

NATO AND EU ENLARGEMENT TO THE EAST IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERESTS OF UKRAINE IN FORMATION OF A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM



We are witnessing a fundamental transformation of the system of international relations. The future of the mankind does not depend any longer on the balance of the two antagonistic systems, which was typical for the period of opposition between the West and the East during the Cold War times. The present multi-centred system of the world policy is characterized by a whole range of centres of attraction and influence: powerful world state - United

A dark blue book cover with white text. The text reads: "THE SECURITY QUADRANGLE FOR THE XXI CENTURY: NATO, NATO PARTNERS, RUSSIA AND UKRAINE".

States of America; countries of the European Union which comprehensively extend the process of the European integration; Russia. The powerful and influential poles of attraction are being actively established in the Southern and Eastern Asia as well as in the Asian and Pacific region. In the modern world, which is characterized by the accelerated dynamics of the development, one can see the new dominants of economic, social and political, and cultural development of the mankind, which will determine the features of the future. The new states and their groups, which wish to gain a foothold in the geopolitical space of the planet, are now entering the world arena, which causes change in configuration of the international relations.

Dissolution of the powerful quasi-empire of the USSR resulted in the creation of a "grey security zone" delimited by the borders of the "young democracy" countries of the Central and Eastern Europe. The vacuum of force, leads to the battle and to the conflict of interests of the great western states members of NATO and EU, and Russia, which inherited imperialistic ideas of the USSR's domination. Within these states one can observe the tendency of a clash between the ethnic communities. In order to prevent these negative tendencies a Euro-Atlantic civilization is being artificially created. The latter is one of the main constituents of the European Security environment, which, together with challenges to the interests of the states representing it, will stimulate the development of the military and political cooperation of NATO and EU member-states.

Appearance of the new challenges and threats to the security of the European countries, specifically, the domestic ethnic and national conflicts, ecological catastrophes, international terrorism, proliferation of the conventional and nuclear weapons etc. essentially transform the security concept. From the practical point of view, the security concept is being defined of late as the state of security in any country achieved by a possibility to resolve problems and crises by way of the diplomatic dialogue and comprehensive co-operation between the countries having different interests in the security area. Employment of the military force and compulsion

measures will be necessary only in the cases agreed by the world community, by way of entering into the appropriate international legal agreements [1]. A principle, which is vitally important for the formation of the European security system, is deduced from this postulate - the principle of the indivisibility of security. According to the author, its main idea is to take account of interests of all countries of the European continent while establishing a security system, irrespective of their force potential. Then the question arises what the security system is. In structural relation, the measures taken by some institutions and organizations and their interconnected actions would be usually called the European security system [2]. In this context the European Security Environment (ESE) is a practically and geographically filled concept based on the above-mentioned principles and regularities, and representing a clearly geographically outlined territory, where the European regional security system operates and protects the European countries from the domestic and foreign threats, but at the same time allows every member-state to develop politically and economically, which in its turn objectively takes account of the interests of societies within these countries. An effective operation of the ESE as the European regional security system in the clearly defined territory is ensured by the global, transatlantic, regional, sub-regional, inter-state organizations, unions and institutions.

The theory of the European Security Environment is able to modify continuously and harmoniously. Today its geographic determinants stretch beyond the European borders, stressing participation of all member-countries of the North Atlantic Alliance and transformation of the idea of atlantism. The idea of the European and transformed atlantism is being presently established on the basis of the proto-idea of Alexis de Tokville and the doctrine of deterrence by G.Kennan. In the political aspect it transforms into a new vision of the role of the main consolidating basis of the concept - North Atlantic cooperation and is implemented in the policy of strengthening the European colony of the North Atlantic Alliance with attraction of processes of enlargement of the EU, NATO to the East in line with vision of J.Solana and G.Robertson [3]. The development of events under this scenario from the very beginning included vital and problematic issues - shadow aggravation and deepening of disputes between the USA, a transatlantic leader from the one side, and France with Germany, political and economic leaders of the EU on the other side, with reference to the future level of the political and military aspects of integration, subordination and interaction within the framework of NATO agreement. This contradiction in views may become a delayed-action mine under the basement of the North Atlantic relations. The only catalyst, which can accelerate and cause a quick explosion is the economic and political competition of the EU and the USA, enforced by the differences of the political stands and interests relating to the support of peace in the region of Central and Eastern Europe and especially on the Balkans. If NATO enlargement is held without a prior serious reform of the Alliance and without introduction of changes into the NATO Treaty, the peaceful expansion may develop from the process of stabilization into the uncontrollable process of the Central and Eastern Europe's split. Partition of zones of geopolitical influence between Russia, EU and USA, for instance the Balkans example, potentially threatens that the main geopolitical assignment of the rarity military block's survival will remain to be the search for NATO's enemy [4]. Attempts to change the role of the Alliance in the New Strategic Concept have caused the violation of the UN Charter and of the main principles of the international law during the last "peacekeeping operation" in the Balkans. Having ruined the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia economically and politically, the Allied Forces did not remove neither the threat of a catastrophe, nor the undemocratic regime of S.Milosevic. Air strikes and support of Albanians only aggravated the ethnic and national hostility, and revealed the new lines of the world division. The demonstrated weakness makes Russia and China look for the ways of creating political and military alliances with the countries which treat the USA and NATO domination as a direct threat to their national security and existence [5]. In the global geopolitical understanding, creation of a Euro-Atlantic

civilization by the countries of Europe and North America, characterized by the Christianity domination will force the Muslim countries of the Middle East to consolidate quickly with the radically-minded countries of the Near East. All these destructive tendencies of the development have nothing in common with the effective and indivisible security system in Europe. The countries of Europe must primarily focus on the prevention of establishment of a security system which has been in existence for 50 years. An opposition factor should not serve to consolidate the Euro-Atlantic system from inside, even if there is a powerful Euro-Atlantic nucleus which is able to protect itself from the outside threats. The approach, which envisages the establishment of the system on the opposition basis is a false one, since it leads to the construction of an awry monolith of the Euro-Atlantic security system. Maximization of the outside threats in order to stimulate the development of cooperation with no resolution of problems of the increasing pressure of ethnic and national crises, will detonate the explosion in the nucleus countries, which wasted all their resources but could not find the effective mechanisms of crisis regulation.

This distribution of the world politics undercurrents is a concealed pre-condition of the fact that Europeans, who see the necessity to resolve these key issues before the crisis appears, are trying to strengthen themselves and are aiming to achieve a far-reaching goal - to become a decisive member of the North Atlantic Alliance. Strategy of creating a powerful European security environment centre out of the developed Western European countries with the satellite spheres of the Central and Eastern European stable and democratic countries surrounding it is cementing the above-mentioned monolith from inside. This allows to ensure the maximum stability of the North Atlantic region while creating the effective security and air defense, and even more - to strengthen and to draw the Central and Eastern Europe out of the economic and political crisis together with the former Soviet republics. Leadership of the EU countries must understand that creation of a homogeneous single security environment requires the geographical and layer stratification of the security system and a gradual "overflow" - harmonious merger of the processes of "enlargement and deepening". In this context it becomes clear why NATO, EU and Russia with its allies are fighting for the influence in the Central and Eastern European countries. The attempt to fill the "security vacuum" made by the Central and Eastern European countries by way of joining NATO has caused the enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance, which in its turn, has caused a sharp counter-action of Russia. Russia was in the opposition because it suffered defeats in the Caucasus and was slowly losing its positions in the Central Asia, so it had to transfer to the policy which will stipulate, firstly, the restoration of its former influence in Europe, and secondly, in the countries of the Eastern Europe - former USSR republics and establish its political and military domination. The most important geopolitical interests of Russia are not connected with Europe, which is a distant goal of integration, but with the "close foreign countries" [6]. These interests, first of all, are relating to the reintegration of the post-Soviet territory. These steps remind us the processes of EU integration development. In case of Russia the centre of reintegration is represented by the union of Ukraine, possibly Baltic states, Belarus and Russia, desirable for the Russian strategists, either in the form of the union of states, or in the form of a single state. The latter two countries have already started the process of reintegration by signing an agreement on creation of an alliance of Belarus and Russia in 1999. Russia would be unable to exercise the former influence in Europe without this first step. Therefore, it is very important for Russia that NATO and USA recognize the Ukraine and Baltic Republics represent a zone, which is vitally important for Russia. Such recognition, given the Alliance agrees, will mean the actual division of spheres of influence in Europe, which for a long time will continue to be one of the key problems of the European security.

Analyzing the last transformation of a system of international relations, an outstanding Ukrainian researcher and analyst, Director of the National Institute of the Strategic Studies of

Ukraine, O. Belov, stressed that "in view of the radical changes, which took place over the last decade, it will be more accurate to speak about the multi-polar composition of geopolitical environment, which was created out of the virtually monopolar composition of the world order, I mean the undoubted domination of the USA as the world leader." He underscores that "under these conditions the priority task of Ukraine is to integrate organically into the European and world communities, and enter the multi-dimensional world of the complex international relations. Ukraine must find her own place in this environment, which would correspond to its potential of a great European state [7].

At present the Ukrainian strategists understand that miscalculations in the foreign political course of the country may degrade the country's status and transform it into the "buffer zone" [8]. The loss of initiative, after the nuclear weapons have been transferred out of the country in exchange for doubtful security assurances, will not give the state a possibility to be heard. The result of these factors - is the unattainability of positive results of diplomatic maneuvers during the establishment of a new security system without a strong "strategic partner". This is why the chief principles of the foreign policy of Ukraine, which have been clearly defined and outlined by the basic documents of the state: Declaration of the State Sovereignty of July 16, 1990, The Guidelines of Foreign Policy of Ukraine of July 2, 1993 and the Constitution of Ukraine of June 28, 1996, specifically, consistency, openness, deliberation, predictability and, at the same time, a "multi-polarity" of the foreign policy, need to be revised and updated. One of the chief problems of the country and society's development is the "multi-polarity" interpretation, which is restricted in practice by the two factors - Russia and the West. Presence of the two "strategic partners" - USA and Russia, which have fundamentally different interests, enforces the post-Soviet syndrome of confrontation and search for the new enemy, whoever it might be - NATO or Russia. This, in its turn, aggravates the battle of the chief domestic political forces in the country and directly and or indirectly slows down the development of progressive foreign policy trends of the state - integration with the most democratically and economically developed western European society. In spite of all these negative social tendencies on the way to the democratic and market transformation, recognition of cardinal changes in all spheres of life on the threshold of centuries pre-conditions the review of the "multi-polarity" [9] concept of Ukraine in the post-bipolar world and outlines the only principal "strategic goal" - integration into the European structures. The President Kuchma in his Address to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in 2000 "Ukraine: Stepping into XXI Century. Strategy of Economic and Social Development for 2000-2004" underscored that "the basic foundation for our further development is the European choice..., rapprochement with the European Union..." [10]. Ukraine, in spite of her economic indicators, has good chances to be harmoniously and almost mandatorily involved into the system of the European security by the Western countries. The international community has frequently called it a "key European country" [11] and according to J. Solana it is "a country with an absolutely unique role in the support of the continent's stability" [12]. Today Ukraine is playing and will continue playing a bigger role in the formation of a new system of the collective security. To that end there exist at least four chief geopolitical pre-conditions: Ukraine, as it was already mentioned, is a key state in the completion of process of the post-Soviet territory reintegration conducted by Russia; Ukraine and Romania become missing links of strengthening the southern borders of NATO enlargement [13]; Ukraine supports the establishment of new security structures in the East, especially in the Caucasian and Central Asian regions, since this forms the necessary balance for deterring of some pro-imperialistic forces which still have significant influence on the policy of the great country; Ukraine unites Europe with the newly-independent states of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan from the cultural, political and economic point of views, and in prospect creates a new situation in the area of security as well as ensures establishment of the favourable balance of forces in the region. The future of Europe and

construction of the effective system of the transatlantic security depends on the clear stand of the West on the issue of relation to the countries, which have emerged on the ruins of the USSR. According to Z.Brzezinski, any attempts of the Russian Federation to isolate and to subordinate Ukraine with the help of the Moscow citadel in Crimea (along with invasion into the Baltic states) must be considered to be a motive for the comprehensive assistance of the West [14]. Support of the states from the Baltic and Black Sea zones must become a strategic goal of the West. In the geopolitical dimension it is important for Ukraine to stabilize as a strong independent country of the Central Europe, which in its turn will consolidate the hopes for evolution of the Russian Federation as a democratic European state. Therefore, an important component of the western strategy in the Central Europe today is the support of economic and political consolidation of Ukraine [15]. In this respect, the main strategic mistake of the EU and NATO, during the formation of the European security system, in relations with the "grey zone" countries, is that in this area the western countries employ economic profiles instead of the strategic ones, when they screen applications for participation in their chief security institutions. One can see the fallibility of this approach on the example of Ukraine, with relation to which the policy of the economically weak Russia seems to be more successful than the similar actions of the EU and NATO countries.

Analysis of the economic indicators of Ukraine shows that it has the closest relations with Russia. Ukrainian export to Russia constitutes 24.3%, while the share of Russian import in the general amount of imports to Ukraine reaches 56.1%. For comparison - the share of German import to Ukraine constitutes 5.3%, and of Ukraine's export to Germany - 6.7%. Debt of Ukraine to Russia remains to be one of the most vital problems of the Russian and Ukrainian relations. Ukraine, as one of the chief consumers of the Russian energy sources buys 30% (57.2 billion cubic meters) of the total amount of gas export by Russia, which constitutes 196.5 billion cubic meters [16]. Large dependence on Russia, especially of the Eastern industrially developed regions of Ukraine, increases the pro-Russian geopolitical feelings of population living in these regions. A concealed political reason for signing the Comprehensive Ukrainian-Russian Agreement was represented by Article 6, which restricts actions of the Parties to the Agreement with relation to the arrangements with the Third Party, if they contradict the interests of one of the Parties [17]. Since the Agreement will be valid for 10 years, Ukraine, over this period of time, shall not have the right to conclude the appropriate treaties on rapprochement (joining) NATO without the agreement of the Russian Federation. In its turn, provisions about the "crisis management consultative mechanism" which are present in the Ukraine-NATO Charter undoubtedly irritate Russia, because they do not correlate with Articles 2,3,4 of the Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, which confirms "territorial inviolability of the borders", "respect to the territorial integrity of the Parties", "non-employing of force and threat of force", etc. [18] Really, who needs creation of the "mechanism", if the 1997 Agreement with Romania also confirms similar principles. Signature of the Black Sea Agreements between Ukraine and Russia permitted the Russian troops and weapons to be present on the territory of Ukraine, and created an objective situation when any independent, large-scale use of the Naval Force of Ukraine and the Black Sea Fleet of Russia may take place only under the secret control of Ukraine and Russia accordingly. Given the above facts, Ukraine is facing the major task - she should adjust her policy with reference to Russia, she should not violate the achieved priorities but should gradually spread them in the West, and re-focus on the full integration into the economic, political and stable EU environment [19]. The result of realization of this goal will directly depend on the support of these steps by the EU and NATO countries.

However, it becomes evident, that although Ukraine in her statement on the strategy of integration into the EU of June 11, 1998 mentioned about the necessity of "clear and comprehen-

sive identification of the foreign political strategy as to the integration of Ukraine into the European political, economic and legal environment" [20], at the present stage and in the medium-term perspective Ukraine finds herself aside from the major areas of the European co-operation. Even now, at the first stage of NATO enlargement and at the preparative EU stage, the reduction of her partnership rating is very conspicuous. The second half of the 90s is a period of transition to the new European architecture. The first practical step in this direction was represented by Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary's accession to NATO, and they will probably be followed by Romania and Slovenia. The zone of political influence of the "Partnership for Peace" programme covers the states of the Central and Eastern Europe and all the CIS countries (45 states altogether). Simultaneously, the EU is enlarging; it has started negotiations about accession with the Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia and Slovenia. Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Malta and Turkey represent the second group of candidates to accession; generally this constitutes 13 countries of the Central and Eastern Europe. As a result, at the beginning of the next millennium Ukraine will face a consolidated Europe consisting of the three groups of states: 19 members of NATO and EU; countries which closely collaborate with these organizations; Russia and Belarus in the opposition. Only two countries of the region differ from such conglomerate of the states: Ukraine and Moldova. Analyzing the above facts, it needs to be mentioned that, a general enlargement of the EU to the East without the involvement of Ukraine may shun it from the rest of the more developed Central European countries, and the new EU border may become a "demarcation line", which will be more insecure (for Ukraine), than for instance, it was expected due to NATO enlargement in 1992-95. The newest EU plan of the Northern and Eastern Europe stabilization stipulates the involvement of the five Balkan states into the European integration process by way of giving them a possibility to establish closer links with the EU, and again places Ukraine and Moldova out of the process of economic integration of Europe. Of course, the western neighbours of Ukraine, which are going to join the EU, will have to establish the new border regulations and introduce a tougher visa policy at the eastern borders. In autumn of 1999 the Czech Republic and Hungary announced that they are introducing a visa regime for the citizens of Ukraine. Such measures may undoubtedly ruin the trade and social contacts, as well as the international cooperation between Ukraine and the rest of the Central European countries, and especially with Poland, the most open "Western" country for Ukraine [21].

The way out of this situation is a maximum concentration of all efforts of the country to deepen cooperation with the EU in all areas, which is presently characterized by the inertia and amorphousness. Realization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in line with the Treaty on European Union, which came into force on November 1, 1993, was a significant step on the way to development of the European cooperation in the security area. The Treaty on European Union and the appropriate Maastricht declarations envisage, that the Western European Union will become an integral part in the development of the European Union construction, while the latter may request the Western European Union (WEU) to elaborate and implement decisions or to take measures within the framework of the joint foreign and security policies, which have defense implications. In order to achieve consistency in the actions of the European Union, WEU and NATO, member-states of the European Union have been invited to accede to the WEU or to become observes, and the other European members of NATO, have been invited to become associated members of the WEU, the so-called "symmetrical membership" [22] in structures.

The Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force on May 1, 1999 envisaged realization of the Common Foreign Policy in the field of security, including the gradual creation of the Common European Defense Policy (CEDP). The Treaty also envisaged a possibility of the WEU integration into the European Union if the EU takes such decision. At the meeting in Cologne on June

3-4, 1999, the EU managed to identify the effective framework of the CEDP development. In December 1999 in Helsinki the essential progress has been achieved in the solution of such important issues as borderlines of relations between the EU and NATO, and a possibility of participation of NATO member-states, which are not the EU members [23]. After these two meetings the WEU accession to EU remains the issue of time only. One of the major tasks of the CEDP is creation of conditions for peace-keeping operations for crisis management under the auspices of the EU, and in particular, creation of a Rapid Reaction Corps consisting of 50,000 - 60,000 military by 2003 [24].

Such tasks are being set at the time when the existing military structure of NATO in Europe includes: the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, Immediate Reaction Forces (Maritime), ACE Mobile Force. The important element of the Alliance adaptation to changes in Europe is the concept of the Multi-National Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) endorsed at the Brussels Summit of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1994. If plans of creating the Rapid Reaction Corps do not envisage participation of the partner-states, the last CJTF concept allows strengthening the CJTF headquarters during some missions with the staff of other NATO headquarters, and also of the partner-states.

So the prospects of the CEDP development do not seem to be very attractive for Ukraine, if she is not invited to participate and does not become an associate partner. It is evident that relations between Ukraine and the EU are not as productive and developed as her relations with NATO. The only way to enhance relations with the Euro-Atlantic organizations in the field of security is to grant Ukraine a status of the WEU associated partner. The value of this status has sharply increased after the unambiguous statement made by J.Solana who said that it is necessary to invite the states-associated members to participate in the CEDP, and that he will exert every effort to achieve this [25].

The associated partners may participate in the joint military exercises and other operations, exchange information, and hold briefings and consultations on issues of common interest. In any case, if Ukraine becomes an associated member, this will not entail any difficulties for the EU, which it is afraid of, and which will appear if Ukraine becomes a EU member. However, this status could stabilize and strengthen a precarious position of this country in the Western structures of the European security.

However, the economic expediency of selection outweighs the strategic and geopolitical interest in Ukraine. Since the European Agreement on Association is necessary to receive this status, it is impossible for Ukraine to receive it, which incites her to deepen relations with Russia, which automatically damages the relations of special partnership with NATO and bilateral relations with NATO member-states, the majority of which are the EU members. Since "Ukraine participates in construction of the "top ceiling" of a new security architecture, which consists of the existing organizations and structures, particularly, OSCE, NATO, WEU, Council of Europe, in their harmonious evolution" [26], that is since Ukraine is interested in creation of a system with no demarcation lines and since she proceeds from her foreign political security interests, she cannot support simultaneous establishment of the new competing systems of collective security, that is she should choose her "strategic partner".

The way out of this situation lies in establishment of close relations between the chief actors of international relations due to the clash of geopolitical interests of actors of international relations. In our case these are the European Union and the United States of America. The USA is a self-evident ally of Ukraine in questions related to the CEDP, because this country tries to oppose the weakening of trans-Atlantic links by way of "deepening" the core integration of the European Security Environment of the Western European Countries of the EU, and will lobby the process of inviting the NATO programme-members to participate in the appropriate EU institutions and will diversify the single front of EU allies with the strategic partners of America.

Besides, it is easier to accede to NATO in case if the "asymmetric accession" becomes possible, that is without accession to the EU, than to meet all the requirements of integration into the economic union of Europe. In case of the direct interest, Ukraine can rely on cooperation first of all with the USA in the field of the Armed Forces restructuring [27]. Washington is interested to consolidate its positions in the oil region of the Caspian Sea, which makes Ukraine, due to her close GUUAM relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan, an outpost of America in its battle with Russia for the huge oil deposits of the Caspian Sea and for the oil and gas fields of Kazakhstan. These interests, together with the "US strategic partner" status, consolidate the friendly relations of Ukraine with her two most important neighbours - Poland and Turkey. The Ukrainian experts consider the first as a priority partner. Really, Poland is the only consistent advocate of the Ukrainian interests in the Central and Eastern European region, and even in front of the EU. And it was Poland, which publicly declared that it would be ready to postpone the introduction of a visa regime on the eastern border of Ukraine, which is required by its western partners within the context of preparation for the EU membership [28]. Due to the common geopolitical interests and historical fortune, the role, which will be played by Poland for Ukraine, can be defined as "to Europe due to Poland". This scheme is based on the influence of the Ukrainian independence factor on the stability of the Polish eastern borders. Relations with the other country - Turkey, which is a US special strategic partner - are almost similar to the above-mentioned ones. At present the scheme "to NATO with the help of Turkey" is supported by a number of the international agreements among which it will be necessary to mention the Treaty on Cooperation in the Field of Military Training, Technology and Science" of July 27, 1994 and a package of nine agreements in the area of trade, military cooperation, protection of investments and health care signed on May 23, 1998 during the visit of the Turkish President to Kyiv. At the same time, cooperation of Ukraine with Turkey together with NATO keeps the latter in the sphere of the European orientation and simultaneously restrains the Turkish policy from slipping down to the positions of Islamic fundamentalism and expansion.

Among the powerful countries of the Western Europe, Ukraine has only two reliable supporters of her integration to the EU - the Netherlands and the chief initiator of the EU enlargement to the East - Germany. These two countries are the main investors of Ukraine. As of January 1, 1998, direct Dutch investments in Ukraine made USD 213.3 million, and German investments - USD 179.2 million. As of January, 1, 1999, these indicators achieved USD 264.1 million (9.5% of the total foreign investments in Ukraine) and USD 231.8 million (8.3%) [29]. However, the visit of the new Federal Chancellor, G.Schroder, to Ukraine in July 1999 demonstrated that the German party was hardly interested in the discussion of the strategic problems with Ukraine, and of the European integration, in particular. Yet the attention was focused on the local issues. No political documents have been signed.

Summing up the achievements and errors of the Ukrainian contribution into the construction of a new system of the European security, it needs to be mentioned that Ukraine has one alternative possibility to make the military and political structures of NATO and EU interested in her accession to these organizations. Implementing the programmes of economic and political reforms even only to approach the relevant EU standards, Ukraine must achieve maximum success in the formation of the sub-regional security structures by way of filling the vacuum which will be left before the beginning of the second wave of NATO enlargement and the first wave of the EU one. Although NATO intends to exert its influence on all countries of the Eastern Europe, the mechanism of such an influence so far is not available, with exception of the PFP programme. If the second wave of the Alliance's enlargement does not follow the first one, the better way to strengthen the European security will be to create the outposts of stability in the sub-regions of the Eastern Europe. This may transfer the line of confrontation and instability between NATO and Russia in the Eastern Europe into the arc of stability. To that end it will be nec-

essary to have a country, which will perform the role of an outpost in this sub-region, the policy of which, strengthened by the NATO and EU countries, will be directed to regulate the conflicts, and to strengthen the stability and security in the region. Geopolitical position of Ukraine, as it was mentioned earlier, will give her a possibility to exert the stabilizing influence on the possible conflict areas, such as Moldova, Belarus, Russia, Caucasian and Black Sea region, all the European part of the post-Soviet territory.

If Ukraine chooses the following course, she will have great chances to implement it successfully. A leading role of Ukraine in the two regions - Eastern European and the Black Sea one - will guarantee that the Russian plans of consolidation and reintegration will depend on its policies, and that it will have a potential to influence the correlation of forces formed between the West and Russia. If Ukraine manages to create a strategic chain Brussels-Warsaw-Kyiv in the northern direction and Brussels-Ankara-Kyiv chain in the southern direction, and becomes the last link in the strategic chain of the European security Brussels-Warsaw-Kyiv-Ankara, it will automatically become a key outpost of stability creating the arc which can be later joined by lines Kyiv-Kishinev, and Kyiv-Tbilisi-Baku. The above construction has been reflected in the idea of creating the Baltic and Black Sea Union. Transfer of the development of cooperation within the framework of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization to the qualitatively new level of military and political collaboration assumes important significance in the field of security. GUUAM structure evidently lacks such an aspect.

Summing up the above material, we would like to point out that Ukraine has two ways of entering the European security system. The first one is to implement reforms, achieve economic growth and join the EU harmoniously by way of meeting all the requirements of the European Union. In our view, this way will take several decades. The second way - is to become an outpost of the stability and security, and to realize the latter geopolitical construction. The key states, cooperation with which will bring success, will be, or more precisely, will remain to be Poland, Turkey, Baltic states, Russia and Belarus. That is the countries, the expedience of cooperation with which is proved by the historical, economic and political relations. If Ukraine together with her partners manages to consolidate and to stabilize the "grey zone" of security, she will help the core states of the European Security Environment to unite around them a satellite halo of countries of the Central and Eastern Europe. This will automatically become a condition for accession to the EU or at least to the European Security Environment. The chief element of the process of bringing a country to the point of integration will be represented by acquisition of the status of an "associated WEU member" by way of achieving a lobbyist support from Washington, Berlin and Amsterdam. Ukraine should not lose touch with today's reality; international political situation is changing very quickly. The state must learn not to seek after the illusive, idealistic goals, but should react to changes. The EU is going to meet with various economic and political crises relating to the dilemma of "enlargement" or "deepening". A meeting of the Heads of States of the European Union and the USA, which recently took place in Lisbon, has highlighted the differences in views of Washington and Brussels on the new American air defense system. In other words, one can see the beginning of crisis in the Euro-Atlantic relations. The policy of Russia is gradually becoming more weighed and clear with reference to the countries of the post-Soviet area. In these conditions Ukraine must finally decide on where to move, and proceed from the national interests of the country and not from the illusions and dreams.

Notes

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