


PREREQUISITES AND FACTORS OF THE FORMATION OF THE SYSTEM OF SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION



The author defines prerequisites and factors influencing the formation of the system of security and cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. Three levels of analysis - systemic, regional and domestic - are used. Factors at all these levels force the emergence of the system of security and cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. The systemic prerequisite is the dissolution of the bipolar structure of the international system. The systemic factors are the need to engage Russia in the region-building process



and the enlargement of the EU and NATO. The regional-level factor is the existence of common soft-security threats that demand collective-solution strategies, and the domestic-level factor is shared democratic values. The regional-level and domestic factors are interrelated. Regular cooperation can gradually change actors' perceptions of themselves and their relationship with the international system. Emerging collective identity reinforces cooperation.

During the Cold War, the study of international relations was focused on hegemonic systems, and how they were organized. Regional security systems were influenced by great powers, which were able to “move directly into the local [security] complex with the effect of suppressing the indigenous security dynamic” [1]. The evolution of the world system means that a new level of analysis – spatial systems – should be also considered. In such systems, external poles of power are not able to influence the development of systems in a decisive manner. Spatial systems are characterized by the organization and integrity that allows them to neutralize external impulses from poles of power.

Raimo Vдугунen has argued that “with the shrinking of the state, the national level has lost some of its influence, which in turn has fostered new links between the global and regional levels on the one hand and between them and the local level on the other hand. In other words, international relations are in the process of undergoing a vertical reorganization in which the emphasis is shifting both upward and downward from the national level” [2]. Besides, “...we are also seeing a horizontal reorganization taking place in international relations as various subnational and regional units develop networks that cross territorial boundaries”. “Regions are strengthened by the inside-out effects of political, economic, environmental, and cultural processes that move boundaries of regions through spillovers and emulation”. These processes

are characterized by “flexibility and dynamism, but the traditional state-centric security perspective has favored a fixed and static view of the region” [3].

After the dissolution of the bipolar system of international relations, Europe witnessed an emergence of regionalism. The participants of the process were states that had belonged to different power blocks and economic unions during the Cold War. The development and strengthening of regional cooperation resulted in an increase of mutual trust and stabilization of international relations in some regions.

A relatively independent subsystem of international relations is emerging today in the Baltic Sea region. Its autonomy is reflected in the fact that intra-system actions and responses predominate over external influences [4]. The experience of successful cooperation in this region may be useful for other regional systems. For this reason, the analysis of factors that facilitate the strengthening of international ties in the Baltic Sea region has become a matter of scientific and practical importance.

1. Levels of Analysis and Concepts

This study seeks to define prerequisites and factors influencing the formation of the system of security and cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. Three levels of analysis - systemic, regional and domestic - are explored. The systemic level focuses on the impact of broader political structures on regional integration. As G. Modelski put it, “regional subsystems are the result of changing great power configurations and variable regional pressures” [5].

The regional level of analysis considers the factor of regional interdependence that requires international cooperation. Institutions are established and used to resolve common problems. These problems, or local externalities, that produce threats to physical safety of individuals or governments bound the sets of interacting states that constitute regional security systems [6]. Institutions provide information, promote transparency and monitoring, reduce transaction costs, develop convergent expectations and facilitate the productive use of issue-linkage strategies [7]. Importantly, international organizations increase trust among participating states because intensive and increasing communication decreases uncertainty and risk of misperception. Organizations increase trust by establishing norms of behavior and monitoring the mechanisms and sanctions required to enforce these norms. Moreover, organizations may alter the behavior of states by allowing for states to rethink their policies and preferences [8]. From the liberal point of view, “regional integration can be seen as an institutional arrangement through which externalities are internalized by establishing rules, regulations, and policies. The demand for such rules and policies comes from below, that is, from the market and civil society actors who suffer from high opportunity costs under prevailing institutions. These costs, and the promise of benefits under alternative arrangements, create an interest in transforming current rules and policies” [9].

Moreover, regional identity facilitates regionalization. The constructivist approach stresses how regions arise from the redefinition of norms and identities by governments, civic groups, and business firms. Regions are shaped by the collective perception of identities and meanings with blurred and ever shifting boundaries. This view rejects the static conception of regions and considers them changing cognitive structures cemented by common institutional and economic ties [10]. “Identity regions exist in the consciousness of people. They must have historical and contemporary symbols that the people inhabiting the region recognize and share. And such regions must be institutionalized; that is, their territorial and political symbols should have continuity and their behavior should be repeated and standardized” [11].

A third level (domestic one) focuses on the role of shared domestic attributes (culture, history, language, religion, etc.). Common domestic attributes alone may not necessarily cause region-building processes. They should become also politically relevant and must be included in

political and intellectual discourses in the states concerned. For a region to emerge it is important to have region-builders – politicians and academics – who work out schemes of regional co-operation.

The author defines prerequisite as a favorable environment conducive to the emergence of a system of security and cooperation. A factor is a driving force that forms the system.

Regional system is understood as “a structure that is perceived by its observers to have elements in interaction or relationships and some identifiable boundaries that separate it from its environment” [12]. Besides, this system is “a set of states affected by at least one transborder but local externality that emanates from a particular geographic area” [13]. Shared soft and hard security threats are examples of local externalities. Security dilemma (a hard security threat) causes costly arms racing and hostility, the actions of each party impose costs upon the others creating a negative externality. Regional system of security and cooperation can be defined as cooperation that is characterized by a certain degree of intensity and regularity and aimed at increasing security of regional states. If this cooperation takes place between supposed opponents, it can be also named cooperative security denoting “...a specific, inclusive type of relationship: cooperation on security issues between putative opponents” [14] or “activity among states to lessen the likelihood of war, or its consequences should it occur, that is not directed at any specific state or group of states” [15]. Cooperative security is characterized by the development of regular dialogue and cooperation among regional states; academics and senior governmental officials acting in “personal capacity” when discussing security matters are important participants of this dialogue. These actors represent a “second track”, or unofficial diplomacy [16].

Cooperative security has proved to be the most effective regional security structure in the post-Cold War world. The concept involves a broader definition of security, gives non-state actors a voice in international fora, takes a gradual approach to the development of cooperation while accepting the need for some states to maintain more traditional models of collective defense as insurance against rivals who may not be as committed to the cooperation process as they claim to be [17]. Cooperative security also combines military and non-military aspects of security and the boundary between them becomes blurred. The notion, as D. Dewitt says, “...envisages a more gradual approach to developing multilateral institutions. It is a more flexible approach that allows for the development of informal or ad hoc security policies, including the incorporation of existing bilateral alliances as the basis for developing a more multilateral security structure” [18].

S. Henderson indicates that cooperative security is designed to facilitate linkages across a broad spectrum of political, economic and social issues. It seeks to build confidence among the regional states through discussion, negotiation, cooperation and compromise. The development of cooperative security is an evolutionary process, not guided by a grand design, but arrived at by instituting a series of instruments that individually contribute to the principles of cooperative security [19].

“Transparency” of military forces and confidence- and security-building measures develop reassurance. They can help to reduce the mistrust between states by promoting effective threat assessment by the participant states. Increased transparency is achieved by sharing intelligence reports, exchanging of observers at military exercises and joint inspections of military bases [20].

The achievement of stable peace and regional security is a final goal of the formation of a system of security and cooperation. Stable peace relationships and security communities (the term introduced by Karl Deutsch) rest on such a high level of mutual trust between the actors that military violence or threats thereof will not be used as means of conflict resolution [21]. A “sense of community” is reflected in a “we” feeling, trust, confidence and consideration, a perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs, and respon-

siveness. Community is characterized by shared interests, values, identity and complex interaction. The security community is a type of cognitive region. The existence of a cognitive region does not necessarily require that its members occupy a common space for it can be formed through nonspatial interactions [22].

2. The Cold War Period

It should be mentioned that certain patterns of regular interaction in the security sphere did exist in the Baltic Sea Region even before the end of the Cold War. F. Tassinari and L.-K. Williams were right to note that “region-building in a number of soft-security issues has had a steady and regular development over the past three decades – albeit the epochal geopolitical changes that involved in the region” [23]. The Nordic Council initiated the Helsinki Convention on the protection of the marine environment of the Baltic Sea area in 1974. FRG, GDR, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, USSR, Poland signed the treaty. According to the convention, extended scientific cooperation should be initiated through the exchange of scientific, technological and statistical information among the participating states of the Convention, which would further the promotion of scientific and technological research [24]. Important agreements were reached on shipping safety and early warning of dangerous cargoes and cooperation between the various national authorities in the event of environmentally dangerous accidents. Perestroika stimulated cooperation. It made possible to get data on pollution from the USSR, where previously it had been considered a state secret and its diffusion an act of subversion. In March 1990, the Nordic governments established the Nordic Environmental Finance Corporation (NEFCO) to provide financing for environmental projects in Central and Eastern Europe. The sponsoring governments, Poland, Czechoslovakia, USSR, Byelorussia, Russian Federation, Estonia and representatives of several international organizations held a conference in Helsinki on 28 October 1990 where the first projects of NEFCO were agreed. A financing plan for Kemipol, a Swedish-Polish joint venture, which would produce iron sulphate for sale to water treatment plants in Poland, was announced. The second project involved Danish and Polish companies specializing in power sector environmental problems [25].

3. The New Era of Cooperation

Direct prerequisites and factors of the formation of the system of security and cooperation in the Baltic Sea region include (1) the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the bipolar system of international relations; (2) shared democratic values (democracies do not fight each other) and (3) common soft-security threats and long-term interest of overcoming them. Common identity of all the states of the region, however, is absent.

The facilitating factor of the formation of the system of security and cooperation in the Baltic Sea region is the enlargement of NATO and the EU. New members learn certain democratic norms of inter-state behavior, values and interests and become “internationally socialized”. In this way, they get accustomed to peaceful settlement of inter-state disputes. In 1990s we witnessed how the Baltic states resolved peacefully inter-state border questions. Through enlargement processes various cooperative schemes have been implemented in the Baltic Sea region creating an atmosphere conducive to intensive cooperation and enhancement of trust. Partnership for Peace (PfP) program of NATO has been designed to eliminate old dividing lines between power blocks of the Cold War era and to promote cooperation between NATO members and non-members.

An important factor conducive to closer regional cooperation has been the fact that the three Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania - and Poland considered some of the regional states (especially, Germany and Sweden) as powerful due to their participation in European integration processes [26]. These states are perceived as useful promoters of interests of the new members

of the EU and NATO. As Adler and Barnett note, “power can be a magnet; a community formed around a group of strong powers creates the expectations that weaker states that join the community will be able to enjoy the security and potentially other benefits that are associated with that community” [27].

A cornerstone of cooperative security in the Baltic Sea region is the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. It plays such a role in spite of the fact that some countries of the region are not members of the Treaty – namely, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The CFE Treaty can be considered as the basis of security arrangement in Northern Europe. It sets the limits for some types of conventional forces.

Nowadays, inter-state relations in the Baltic Sea region can be characterized in terms of integrative peace. “Integrative peace relationships do not solely, not even primarily, rest on deterrence and competition between parties, but rather on the identification of mutual interests, dependence, joint problem-solving and norm-governed behaviour. The notion occupies the middle ground between precarious peace and stable peace” [28].

The Case of Russia

The Russian factor also facilitates regional cooperation. In accordance with neorealism approach, regionalism can emerge as an attempt to restrict the free exercise of hegemonic power, through the establishment of regional institutions. The use of institutionalized regionalism as a means of constraining the potentially disruptive efforts of unequal power remains an important factor in the international politics [29]. In the Baltic Sea region, the Nordic countries together with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania intend to engage Russia in mutually beneficial regional cooperation in order to achieve positive interdependence, which will make conflicts (including war) impossible or, at least, costly in the future. Besides, an important role is played by the United States that, while not a regional power, is a strategic guarantor of the new status quo in the region.

Declining hegemony may well press the hegemon towards the establishment of common institutions to pursue its interests, to share burdens, solve common problems and to generate international support and legitimacy for its policies [30]. Russia's participation in such regional projects as the Council of the Baltic Sea States and the Northern Dimension of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU has internationalized some soft security problems emanating from its territory. The settlement of these issues has become a matter of collective efforts of the states in the region. Participating in regional cooperation, Russia has reduced its financial burden during the period of economic crisis and painful transition and used foreign experience in tackling soft security threats.

It should be noted that the formation of an effective system of security and cooperation in the Baltic Sea region will be impossible without engaging Russia in cooperative security dialogue, which has been so far very modest, particularly between Russia, on the one hand, and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, on the other. Only in 1999, the Defence Minister of Estonia visited Moscow for the first time. The cooperation between naval forces of Russia and other Baltic and Nordic states has been most successful. The exchange of visits of warships has become more or less regular. In September 2002, two coastal minesweepers of the Baltic Fleet of Russia called at the port of Klaipeda. Baltic Fleet ships take part in joint military exercises of NATO members in the Baltic Sea, such as, e.g., Baltops. In 2002, the Russian Fleet was represented at the exercise by the Neustrashimyy patrol combatant. Importantly, for the first time ever it participated in all elements of the exercise throughout the duration of the exercise. Furthermore, in 2002, the Fleet's ASW (acoustic surface wave) assets took part in a joint exercise with the Swedish Navy. Considerable experience has been gained in ship and crew rescue at sea. On July 30, 2002, at the meeting between RF Defense Minister S.B. Ivanov and Lithuanian Security Minister L.A.

Linkjavichus an agreement was reached to establish a hot line between the command posts of the Fleet, Air Force and Air Defense Forces of the Russian Federation and command posts of the Lithuanian Armed Forces, including Air Defense Forces; on transit of missile fuel for the Baltic Fleet through Lithuanian territory; on participation (in observer capacity) of representatives of the Lithuanian Armed Forces in a Baltic Fleet exercise and participation by Baltic Fleet representatives in the Amber Hope exercise by the Lithuanian Armed Forces [31]. The need for security dialogue and cooperation has increased since Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became members of NATO. It is also important that on the grass-root level negative risk perceptions and assessments are being successfully overcome; people are not afraid of each other and wish to do business together [32].

Regional Security Communities

Although stable peace has not been yet achieved in the Baltic Sea region as a whole, two sub-regional security communities have emerged.

The Nordic security community consists of Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Finland and Sweden. The factors explaining its creation include common ideology of Scandinavianism, historical inter-state ties and the presence of a core power (Sweden) [33].

The Baltic security community (still in the process of development) covers Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Common external threat (Russia), rather than deep historical ties, caused its formation. Sub-regional core power and common identity are absent as well. The concept of “Baltic” has not been a source of image making. Internal factors as language, religion, historical experiences of cooperation and conflict rather tore the Baltic region apart than united [34]. While the Nordic countries have well-developed civil societies, in the three Baltic countries the third sector only emerges. Also the rise of nationalism during the 20th century in the three countries constrains the development of security community [35].

The three Baltic countries also have different views concerning region-building. Estonia underscores its Nordic image and considers Baltic discourse playing a secondary role. This stance is based on a stress on the country's Northern historical and cultural heritage, and is motivated by a wish to become regarded as a promising cooperation partner with the West. However, the everyday Nordic cooperation is based on the participating countries' similar choice of basic economic policies. Estonia's attempts at becoming 'Nordic' have not been accompanied by efforts to adopt an economic policy reminiscent of the Scandinavian model [36]. Latvia is the most active proponent of close trilateral cooperation and the Baltic subregion. In Lithuania, the Baltic discourse is strong but nevertheless the country perceives itself a Central European one and aims at playing an active role in the geopolitical space between the Baltic and the Black sea.

The factors influencing the existence of the Nordic security community and the Baltic security community are different. As P. Joenniemi notes, Nordicity was based on togetherness outside the ordinary sphere of securitization in the process of identity-building, i.e. there was difference but it did not turn into radical togetherness. Security has been considered as redundant rather than a core argument in the creation of communality. The Nordic countries used their exceptional subjectivity by abstaining from the option of constructing identities through the ordinary depiction of the other Nordic nations as threats. The intra-Nordic sphere became exempt from the logic of security and categorical otherness. As identity-building is always a boundary-drawing process, an attempt to define something, to establish an order of knowledge, the border of togetherness was drawn in a rather broad manner [37].

The Nordic security community was built by using a ‘bottom up’ method. This method, as H. Mouritzen writes, “means that mutual sympathies and transnational ties develop spontaneously over a long time-span at the popular level; for instance, nongovernmental organizations, grassroots organizations and professional bodies establish ties, perhaps even umbrella organi-

zations. In this way, top decision-makers in the states concerned find themselves deprived of the option of mutual war. In other words, the community is created inadvertently. In the Nordic case, intra-Swedish developments during the 19th century made Sweden the generous core power, which, combined with transnational ties and the ideology of Scandinavianism, laid the ground for a security community during the 20th century" [38]. The 'top down' method is implemented from above with the help of common projects and institutions. "The Nordic Council or Council of Ministers... did not cause Scandinavianism and a Nordic security community; instead, it was the other way round. This appears, for one thing, from the temporal sequence: Scandinavianism and the Swedish developments referred to date back to the mid- and late 19th century; the security community emerged about 1905; whereas the institutions were not created until the post-World War II period (1952 and 1971)" [39]. Nordic cooperation has been considerably less concerned with institutions or legal frameworks than the European Community. Its approach has been less spectacular, more prudent, more pragmatic, more informal [40].

The prerequisites conducive to the use of the 'bottom up' approach when developing a security community are absent in case of the three Baltic countries. Thus, the potential for enlarging the Nordic security community to the east is modest. Importantly, the notion of "Norden" emerged already during the first half of the nineteenth century as a regional notion forming a counter model against the idea of a Baltic Sea region [41]. During the inter-war period (1920s-1930s), the Nordic or Scandinavian discourse clearly separated itself from the notion of Baltic cooperation [42]. J. Hackmann notes that "despite indications of at least some comparable social starting points between the "Nordic" and "Baltic" groups of countries, without doubt, the differences between them in economic situation, political culture, and so forth, prevail in everyday perception" [43].

Despite of differences some similarities exist. Since the beginning of their national awakening, the Estonians oriented themselves towards the Finns, for instance in the creation of their national epic *Kalevipoeg* by Friedrich Reinhold Kreutzwald (*Hasselblatt*) [44]. For the Estonian national movement the "Finnish bridge" (*soome sild*) was a well-known metaphor since the 1860s [45]. Hackmann goes on to say that "...it shall be argued, however, that with regard to the – admittedly rather vague – features of mental history ... similarities may be noticed in what might be called a specific mentality or consciousness characteristic of small nations... Cultural achievements, peacefulness, together with autochthony – to name only some aspects of such an attitude – enjoyed higher regard in the values system of small nations, than in the large ones" [46]. Cultural ties existed between the Nordic region and the Baltic at large already in the Middle Ages. During that period, areas which are today parts of Estonia and Latvia belonged to Denmark and Sweden. The Kalmar Union (1389-1523) united a number of Baltic areas in a single state. The presence of Baltic exiles in Sweden formed a human link between the Nordic and the Baltic countries during the Cold War [47]. There were Swedish speakers in inter-war Estonia still. There are over 70 000 Balts in Sweden. Many have become Swedish citizens. These Baltic communities are very politically active [48]. Moreover, during Soviet times the Scandinavians declared their support for the Balts imprisoned on political grounds. The Estonian workers were able to work in Finland on a contract basis. The Finnish language served as a gateway to the West for Estonian intellectuals. The Nordic States, with the exception of Sweden, had all not recognized the Soviet incorporation of the Baltic States in 1960 [49].

Although the Nordic security model has not turned out suitable for the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea, the Nordic countries' role has been in co-binding cooperative schemes of the EU and NATO in the Baltic Sea region. They do not want to leave the field to a united Germany, which could, perhaps almost in spite of herself, turn the Baltic into a German *mare nostrum*. Nor for that matter do the Nordic states want to limit their network of international relations to the European Community [50]. In fact, in 1990s the center of gravity of Nordic Co-operation has

shifted towards the East. An important factor here has been also the economic potentials of post-communist countries. Nordic businesses have been interested in getting access to new markets and economies on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea. In this context, stability and security in the region are considered as *sine qua non* of smooth economic development

Conclusion

The states of the Baltic Sea region are involved in different ways and at different levels in the complexes of European and Transatlantic systems of security. Security struggle is still present in the region. The Baltic Sea regional security system is not complete (formed), unstable and heterogeneous. Before the dual enlargements of NATO and the EU in 2004, the region had remained a network of cooperative security ties that did not involve robust institutions or firm commitments [51].

This study finds that the prerequisites and factors at different levels force the emergence of the system of security and cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. Geopolitical changes, power re-configurations and cognitive factors have all proved important in the formation of the security system. The systemic prerequisites and factors are the dissolution of a bipolar structure of the international system, the need to engage Russia in the region-building process and the enlargement of the EU and NATO. As I. Neumann notes, “the case of Northern Europe does indeed show that it was only when the need to react to upheaval on the international and European levels confronted local actors, that a new bout of region-building really took off” [52]. “With the end of the Cold War... the triangular pattern of rivalry between Russia, Germany and the Atlantic Powers reappeared as the basic determinant of Nordic regional dynamics” [53].

The regional-level factor is the existence of common soft-security threats that demand collective-solution strategies, and the domestic-level factor is shared democratic values.

The regional-level and domestic factors are interrelated. According to social constructivism, international institutions are the embodiment of shared social knowledge and experience and they can change states’ identities. Regular cooperation can gradually change actors’ perceptions of themselves and their relationship with the international system. In such a way, state and non-state actors can form a collective identity. Emerging collective identity reinforces cooperation [54]. The two dimensions of identity and cooperation may be also mutually reinforcing: a positive image may create openings for increasing interaction, as well as the other way round [55]. Regional institutions in the Baltic Sea region have so far successfully promoted democratization processes in some regional states and contributed to the emergence of a regional structure of shared democratic values and regional awareness.

In order to determine driving forces of the formation of the system of security and cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region we can use a phased approach, as suggested by Andrew Hurrell. The early phases of regional cooperation were the result of systemic geopolitical reconfigurations. Later on, as the cooperation developed the functional logic of problem-solving and the idea of cognitive community became prominent [56].

Notes

1. Barry Buzan: *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. 2nd edition. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf 1991, cited in Raimo Vdurynen: "Regionalism: Old and New". In: *International Studies Review* 5 (2003), pp. 25-51, here: p. 28.
2. Vdurynen: "Regionalism: Old and New", p. 44.
3. Ibid.

4. William R. Thompson: "The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory". In: *International Studies Quarterly* 17 (1973: 1), pp. 89-117, here: p. 93.
5. George Modelski: *International Relations and Area Studies: the Case of South-East Asia*. "In: *International Relations*" II (1961: 3), pp. 143-155, here: p. 150.
6. David A. Lake: "Regional Security Complexes: A Systems Approach". In: David A. Lake / Patrick M. Morgan (eds.): *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*. State College: Pennsylvania State University Press 1997, pp. 45-67, here: p. 49.
7. Andrew Hurrell: "Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics". In: *Review of International Studies* 21 (1995), pp. 331-358, here: p. 350.
8. Rikard Bengtsson: "Towards a Stable Peace in the Baltic Sea Region?" In: *Cooperation and Conflict* 35 (2000: 4), pp. 355-388, here: p. 369.
9. Вдурґунен: "Regionalism: Old and New", p. 35 and see also Walter Mattli: *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*. New York: Cambridge University Press 1999, pp. 44-50.
10. Ibid., pp. 26-27.
11. Ibid., p. 37.
12. Charles A. McClelland: *Theory and the International System*. New York: Collier-Macmillan 1966, p. 20.
13. Lake: 'Regional Security Complexes', p. 48.
14. Olav F. Knudsen: *Cooperative Security in the Baltic Sea Region*. Chaillot Paper 33. Institute for Security Studies of the EU 1998, <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai33e.html> [5 May 2004].
15. Michael Mihalka: "From Theory to Practice". In: Richard Cohen / Michael Mihalka (eds.): *Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order (The Marshall Center Papers III, 2001)*, pp. 29-67, here: p. 35, <http://www.marshallcenter.org> [5 May 2004].
16. Craig A. Snyder: "Regional Security Structures". In: Craig A. Snyder (ed.): *Contemporary Security and Strategy*. New York: Routledge 1999, pp. 102-119, here: p. 116.
17. Ibid., p. 117.
18. Ibid., p. 115
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., p. 114.
21. Bengtsson: "Towards a Stable Peace in the Baltic Sea Region?", p. 359.
22. Вдурґунен: "Regionalism: Old and New", p. 37.
23. Fabrizio Tassinari and Leena-Kaarina Williams: "Soft Security in the Baltic Sea Region: Environmental Co-operation as a Pilot Project for Regional Integration in the Baltic Sea Area". In: Fabrizio Tassinari (ed.): *The Baltic Sea Region in the European Union: Reflections on Identity, Soft-Security and Marginality*. "The Baltic Sea Area Studies: Northern Dimension of Europe" Working Paper. Gdansk-Berlin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdanskiego-Nordeuropa-Institut der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 2003, pp. 27-57, here: p. 28.
24. Kazimierz Musiai: "Education and Research as Cultural Policies". In: Witold Maciejewski (ed.): *The Baltic Sea Region: Cultures, Politics, Societies*. Uppsala: The Baltic University Press 2002, pp. 187-197, here: p. 191.
25. J. Fitzmaurice: *The Baltic: A Regional Future?* New York, 1992, pp. 139, 141-143.
26. Bengtsson: "Towards a Stable Peace"., p. 379.
27. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett: "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities". In: Emanuel Adler / Michael Barnett (eds.): *Security Communities*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998, pp. 39-40.

28. Bengtsson: "Towards a Stable Peace"., p. 361.
29. Hurrell: "Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics", p. 342.
30. Ibid., p. 343.
31. V.P. Valuyev: "Cooperation Between Russia's Baltic Fleet and Navies of the Baltic States". In: *Military Thought* (March-April 2003), <http://www.looksmart.com> [5 April 2004].
32. Arkady Moshes: "Russia and Security- and Confidence-Building Around the Baltic Rim". In: Pertti Joenniemi (ed.): *Confidence-Building and Arms Control: Challenges around the Baltic Rim*. Mariehamn: the Eland Islands Peace Institute 1999, P. 57-76, here: p. 66.
33. Hans Mouritzen: "Security Communities in the Baltic Sea Region: Real and Imagined". In: *Security Dialogue* 32 (2001: 3), pp. 297-310, here: pp. 297-303.
34. Mindaugas Jurkynas: "Mobility of Regionalisms in the Baltic Sea Area: Region-building in Competition". Paper presented at the conference »Challenge of Mobility in the Baltic Sea Region.«, Gdansk October 23-26, 2003, p. 6, <http://www2.rz.hu-berlin.de/BaltSeaNet> [5 April 2004].
35. Mouritzen: "Security Communities in the Baltic Sea Region"., p. 304.
36. M. Lagerspetz: "How Many Nordic Countries?: Possibilities and Limits of Geopolitical Identity Construction". In: *Cooperation and Conflict* 38 (2003: 1), pp. 49-61, <http://www.in-genta.com> [5 May 2004].
37. Pertti Joenniemi: "A Deutschian Security Community? Nordic Peace Reframed". Paper presented at the conference »Norden at Crossroads. An International Conference in Nordic Studies. « Helsinki 30 Oct.–2 Nov. 2002, p. 11-13, <http://www.helsinki.fi/norden/crossroads/Joenniemi.pdf> [10 May 2004].
38. Mouritzen: "Security Communities", p. 304.
39. Ibid.
40. Fitzmaurice: *The Baltic: A Regional Future?*, p. 146.
41. Jürg Hackmann: "From "Object" to "Subject": The Contribution of Small Nations to Region-Building in North Eastern Europe". In: *Journal of Baltic Studies*. XXXIII (2002: 4), pp. 412-430, here: p. 416.
42. Ibid., p. 419.
43. Ibid., pp. 422-423.
44. Ibid., p. 416.
45. Ibid., p. 417.
46. Ibid., p. 423.
47. Iver Neumann: "A Region-Building Approach to Northern Europe". In: *Review of International Studies* 20 (1994), pp. 53-74, here: p. 72.
48. Fitzmaurice: *The Baltic: A Regional Future?*, p. 148.
49. Ibid., p. 147.
50. Ibid., p. 161.
51. Raimo Vдyrynen: "Stable Peace Through Security Communities: Steps Towards Theory-Building". In: Arie M. Kacowicz, Yaacov Bar-Simon-Tov, Ole Elgström, and Magnus Jerneck (eds.): *Stable Peace Among Nations*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2000, pp. 157-193, here: p. 180.
52. Neumann: "A Region-Building Approach to Northern Europe", p. 73.
53. Ibid., p. 63.
54. Paul R. Viotti / Mark V. Kauppi (eds.): *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*. 3rd ed. Needham Heights: Allyn and Bacon 1998, p. 217.
55. Bengtsson: "Towards a Stable Peace"., p. 370.
56. Hurrell: "Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics". p. 358.