ПОЛІТИЧНІ ПРОБЛЕМИ МІЖНАРОДНИХ ВІДНОСИН

УДК 327:355.01(477)

CURRENT FOREIG POLICY OF UKRAINE: A TOUGH WAY TO FORGE PEACE

СУЧАСНА ЗОВНІШНЯ ПОЛІТИКА УКРАЇНИ: ВАЖКИЙ ШЛЯХ ДО МИРУ

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Abstract. This paper examines the fundamentals of Ukrainian foreign policy. It reveals its priority directions, discusses the Ukrainian Peace Formula and President V. Zelensky's Victory Plan. The research highlights the dynamic nature of the country's foreign policy and response to the complex security environment with its outcoming challenges. It identifies the challenges posed by Russia's aggressive actions and analyzes the strategies employed by Ukraine to safeguard its sovereignty and restore territorial integrity.

The paper studies the priority directions of Ukraine's foreign policy, emphasizing its efforts to promote regional stability. In addition, the research delves into the Ukrainian Peace Formula and the Victory Plan exploring the diplomatic initiatives to resolve the conflict with Russia. It analyzes the impact of these peace efforts on Ukraine's foreign policy orientation and its pursuit of a resolution to the ongoing conflict. Furthermore, the current study researches Ukraine's aspirations for Euro-Atlantic integration, examining its strategic alignment with NATO and the European Union amid the Russian aggression.

Thus, the presented paper provides a comprehensive overview of Ukraine's current foreign policy. By analyzing Ukraine's challenges, priorities, and aspirations in the face of Russian aggression, it sheds light on the dynamic nature of Ukraine's foreign relations and its strategic response to regional security concerns.

Keywords: Ukrainian foreign policy, the Ukrainian Peace Formula, Euro-Atlantic integration, the Kyiv security compact, Global South, the Victory Plan.

Анотація. У статті розглядаються засади зовнішньої політики України. Розкриваються її пріоритетні напрями, обговорюється українська формула миру та «План перемоги» президента В. Зеленського. Дослідження висвітляє динамічний характер зовнішньої політики країни, та заходи з реагування на складне безпекове середовище з його його викликами. Визначаються виклики, пов'язані з агресивними діями Росії, та проаналізовано стратегії, які застосовує Україна для захисту свого суверенітету та відновлення територіальної цілісності.

У статті досліджуються пріоритетні напрямки зовнішньої політики України, з акцентом на її зусиллях зі сприяння регіональній стабільності. Крім того, дослідження заглиблюється в українську формулу миру та «План перемоги», досліджуючи дипломатичні ініціативи, спрямовані на врегулювання конфлікту з Росією. Аналізується вплив цих мирних зусиль на зовнішньополітичну орієнтацію України та її прагнення до врегулювання конфлікту. Крім того, в роботі досліджуються прагнення України до євроатлантичної інтеграції, стратегічна орієнтація країни на НАТО та Європейський Союз в умовах російської агресії.

Таким чином, представлене дослідження являє собою всебічний огляд поточної зовнішнішньої політики України. Аналізуючи виклики, пріоритети та прагнення України в умовах російської агресії, проливає світло на динамічний характер зовнішніх зносин нашої держави та її стратегічну відповідь на регіональні безпекові виклики.

Ключові слова: українська зовнішня політика, українська формула миру, євроатлантична інтеграція, Київський безпековий договір, Глобальний Південь, План перемоги.

Introduction. Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine has shaken Europe and the world. This war has far-reaching consequences for the region and the world. Stability in the Euro-Atlantic region depends on the security of Ukraine. Thus, there is a need to review Ukrainian foreign policy since Ukraine is playing a crucial role in the insurance of the stability of the Euro-Atlantic region now.

The principles of Ukrainian foreign policy are reviewed in the following paper. It discusses the Ukrainian peace formula and exposes its top priorities. The study emphasizes the country's dynamic foreign policy and the way it reacts to the challenging security environment. It outlines the difficulties brought on by Russia's aggressive actions and examines the approaches used by Ukraine to protect its territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Additionally, the article looks into the diplomatic efforts made to end the conflict with Russia and looks at the Ukrainian Peace Formula. It overlooks how these peace initiatives have affected Ukraine's approach to foreign policy and its quest for a peaceful end to the ongoing war. Additionally, the current study investigates Ukraine's strategic alignment with NATO and the European Union to better understand its objectives for European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

As a consequence, the paper summarizes the current foreign policy of Ukraine. It sheds light on the dynamic nature of Ukraine's foreign relations and its strategic response to local security concerns by assessing the difficulties, priorities, and goals of that country in the face of Russian aggression.

The purpose of the article is to provide a comprehensive review of Ukraine's foreign policy principles, its key priorities, and its strategies amid full-scale invasion. The tasks of the article are the following:

- to outline the foundational principles of Ukraine's foreign policy;

- to discuss Ukraine's primary foreign policy goals;

- to delve into the diplomatic initiatives to resolve the conflict with Russia, including the strategies and actions Ukraine is pursuing to achieve peace;

- to research Ukraine's primary foreign policy directions.

Literature review. The use of documents defining the foreign policy of Ukraine, such as the Constitution of Ukraine (28 June 1996) (*Constitution of Ukraine*, 2020), the National Security Strategy of Ukraine (14 September 2020) (*Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy №392/2020*, 2020), and the Foreign Policy Strategy of Ukraine (26 August 2021) (*Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy №448/2021*, 2021) can provide valuable insights and understanding of the country's diplomatic objectives and international engagement. These documents serve as crucial sources of information for this paper. Furthermore, the analysis of inputs by the Foreign Policy Council "Ukrainian Prism" (*Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2022. Analytical study, 2023*), (*Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2023. Analytical study, 2023*), (*Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2023. Analytical study, 2023*), and other analytical reports were involved in the course of the study.

Main results of the research. Fundamentals of the Ukrainian foreign policy. The Constitution of Ukraine sets forward the strategic course of Ukraine. Article 18 stipulates the following: "The foreign political activity of Ukraine is aimed at ensuring its national interests and security by maintaining peaceful and mutually beneficial co-operation with members of the

international community, according to generally acknowledged principles and norms of international law" (*Constitution of Ukraine*, 2020). The strategic course of the state toward Ukraine's full membership in the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is also enshrined in the Constitution of Ukraine (*Constitution of Ukraine*, 2020). Thus, Ukraine sets forward its desire to pursue the policy of peaceful co-existence and cooperation with other members of the international community and to become a member of the so-called "European family".

At the same time, the aim of the foreign political activity of Ukraine is clearly stated in the Strategy of Foreign Policy of Ukraine saying that the state seeks "to establish Ukraine as a strong and reputable European state capable of providing favorable external conditions for sustainable development and realization of its potential, economy and Ukrainian society" (*Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy N* $_{2448/2021}$, 2021).

Priority directions of the Ukrainian foreign policy are also stated in the Strategy and are the following ones: "to ensure the independence and state sovereignty of Ukraine, restoration of its territorial integrity; full membership in the EU and NATO; protection of the rights and interests of Ukrainian citizens abroad; to counter the aggression of the Russian Federation and to make the Russian Federation carry its international legal responsibility; the Ukrainian export promotion and increase in foreign investment in Ukraine; promotion of a positive image of Ukraine in the world" (Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy №448/2021, 2021). To achieve its main goal – the security and prosperity of Ukraine - the following objectives of Ukraine's foreign policy are defined as well "restoration of peace and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized state border; bringing the Russian Federation to international legal responsibility; protecting the rights and interests of Ukrainian citizens abroad; counteracting disinformation attacks from external sources that are detriment of Ukraine's national interests and its image abroad; creating a secure environment through diplomatic means; gaining full membership in NATO; gaining full membership in the EU; facilitating foreign trade and investment; technological and environmental transformation of Ukraine; freedom of movement of Ukrainian citizens in the world; support for Ukrainians abroad, their involvement in state-building, social and economic projects; creating and promoting a positive image of Ukraine in the world" (Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy №448/2021, 2021).

Therefore, the Constitution of Ukraine, along with the Strategy of Foreign Policy, provides a clear framework for Ukraine's strategic course and foreign political activity. Ukraine aims to safeguard its national interests and security through peaceful cooperation with the international community. The country's strategic objective includes full membership in the EU and NATO, emphasizing its aspiration to become a powerful European state. The priorities of Ukrainian foreign policy encompass protecting its independence, territorial integrity, and the rights of its citizens abroad, as well as countering Russian aggression, promoting economic growth, and enhancing its global image. By adhering to the mentioned above objectives and priorities, Ukraine aims to strengthen its position on the international stage and create favorable conditions for its sustainable development and the realization of its full potential as a nation.

Counteraction to Russian aggression. Eight years after the annexation of Crimea, its takeover of Donbas, and the escalation of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, Russia attacked Ukraine once more in February 2022. While committing war crimes and destroying cities, the Russian army attempted to conquer Ukraine's sovereign territory. They made an effort to seize power over the Ukrainian people and bring down democratically elected government.

The response was immediate – on 24th February 2022 Ukraine severed diplomatic relations with Russia (*Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2022. Analytical study, 2023*). The Ukrainian authorities adopted 6 packages of sanctions against Russia, its individuals, and companies. All the foreign political efforts were concentrated on the repel Russian aggression and forming an anti-Putin coalition. Positive developments in this regard included the active imposition of economic and political sanctions by Ukraine's partners against Russia, the promotion of a proposal to provide Ukraine with reliable security guarantees, in particular through the creation of the U-24 alliance, the institutionalization of military assistance at the bilateral level and through the launch of meetings of

the Ukraine Defense Consultative Group (*Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2022. Analytical study, 2023*). This resulted in the unification of a large number of states around the issue of assistance to Ukraine, which has become systemic. Ukraine's active engagement in the international environment has led to a significant increase in the level of consolidation of the international community in countering Russia.

In 2023 direct political contacts between the governments of Ukraine and Russia were suspended due to the dramatic incompatibility of the parties' positions. Ukraine's foreign political activities against Russia are aimed at countering aggression, promoting international sanctions against Russia, receiving military and political assistance from allies, and creating an international anti-Putin coalition. The Ukraine-Russia diplomatic confrontation intensified aimed at the reduction of Russia's influence in different international organizations. The President of Ukraine signed 31 decrees imposing sanctions against Russia and its citizens and companies (*Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2023. Analytical study, 2024*).

Also, Ukraine denounced six bilateral agreements and one treaty with Russia. Ukraine has withdrawn from 26 agreements and other arrangements within the CIS, as well as from the Memorandum of cooperation in protecting the state borders of the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine (*Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2023. Analytical study, 2024*).

A couple of years before the beginning of a full-scale war, the National Security Strategy of Ukraine (adopted in September 2020) in Articles 17 and 18 identified the following threats that the Russian Federation posed: "the Russian Federation is engaged in a hybrid war, employing various tactics such as political, economic, information, psychological, cyber, and military means. It is strengthening its armed forces and conducting large-scale military exercises near Ukraine's border, indicating a persistent threat of military invasion. The Russian Federation is also escalating the militarization of the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea and Sevastopol. Additionally, it poses a danger to free navigation in the Black and Azov Seas and the Kerch Strait. The occupation administration and armed forces in these territories are violating human and civil rights, posing a security threat not only to Ukraine but also to other countries in the Baltic-Black Sea region" (*Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy N* $^{2}392/2020$, 2020). Thus, the Ukrainian government saw the danger and possible consequences of today's warfare on its territory and sought ways to deal with the mentioned threats.

Particularly, the Foreign Policy Strategy of Ukraine stipulates the following efforts to restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine: "ensuring that the issue of the Russian Federation's armed aggression against Ukraine and related security, humanitarian, economic, environmental and other threats remain on the international agenda; ensuring that the international community takes into account the long-term negative and destructive impact of the Russian Federation's aggressive policy on international, in particular European, security; expanding the circle of states that actively support the territorial integrity and state sovereignty of Ukraine in its confrontation with the Russian Federation; strengthening the international consensus on the need to maintain and increase political, diplomatic and economic pressure on the Russian Federation (in particular, through the introduction of restrictive measures (sanctions); to provide the international community with the widest possible access to truthful information about the crimes committed and the consequences of the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine" (*Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy №448/2021, 2021*).

Another crucial component of responding to Russian aggression is also set forth by the Strategy of Foreign Policy "bringing the Russian Federation to international legal responsibility for the crime of aggression against Ukraine will be carried out primarily through appeals to international judicial bodies, in particular the International Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, and international arbitration" (*Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy N*2448/2021, 2021).

The fact is that Russia has demonstrated its disdain for international law, particularly the United Nations Charter, through its aggression against Ukraine. The list of international agreements and treaties that Russia has broken is remarkable but the most striking of these violations is Article 2 § 4 of the Charter of the United Nations, which underpins the principles of the inviolability of borders, respect for the territorial integrity of States, and the prohibition of the use of force (*Mauro*,

F., 2023). The international legal order, which has already been significantly shifted since the early 2000s, is being hit by this breach by a member state of the United Nations Security Council, the designated custodian of international order, with China, another permanent member of the Security Council, giving its tacit approval (*Mauro, F., 2023*). Therefore, in the opinion of Frédéric Mauro, an Associate Research Fellow at IRIS, before the legal system that resulted from the Second World War collapses, the case of aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine requires the world community to reconsider the existing legal system especially the function and authority of the UN Security Council. This body is now obviously ineffective. Furthermore, it has global effects and raises a need to rethink the age-old dialectic of force and law between sovereign nations (*Mauro, F., 2023*).

European and Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine. It's highlighted in Article 83 of the Foreign Policy Strategy of Ukraine that "the EU is a strategic partner of Ukraine in increasing stability in Europe and consolidating international political and economic pressure on the Russian Federation to stop its aggression against Ukraine and restore Ukraine's territorial integrity within its internationally recognized state border" (*Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy N*2448/2021, 2021). This emphasizes the priority of Ukraine to develop relations with the EU.

The full implementation and continued adaptation of the Association Agreement; the integration of the Ukrainian national economy into the European economic area; Ukraine's compliance with the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership; and the political support of the EU member states for Ukraine's prospects for full membership as well as maintaining the EU member states' solidarity with Ukraine in response to the Russian Federation's aggression are all components of the European integration course (*Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy N* $^{2448/2021}$, 2021).

A historic decision was made by EU members to grant Ukraine candidate status and to formally codify the demand that Ukraine complete seven stages at the European Council summit in June 2022 (*Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2022. Analytical study, 2023*). Following that, work began on implementing the requirements and intensifying the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. A joint statement was signed by the heads of state, government, and parliament, which called for quick integration steps (*Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2022. Analytical study, 2023*). This decision will impact the dynamics and course of integration efforts for years ahead.

However, after receiving the status, Ukraine has shown a lack of internal effort to meet the seven criteria outlined by the European Commission. As a result, there was no EU-Ukraine summit as of the end of 2022, which prevented the partners from announcing the next steps in integration (*Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2022. Analytical study, 2023*).

Simultaneously, Ukraine has made immense progress in its sectoral integration with EU institutions and other EU countries. For instance, in 2022, Ukraine was able to obtain "visa-free travel" with the EU in the areas of energy, commerce, transportation, and customs (*Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2022. Analytical study, 2023*). In March 2022 Ukraine joined the European power grid ENTSO-E, the European network of electricity transmission system operators, a year ahead of schedule. Following that, NPC Ukrenergo was granted ENTSO-E observer member status in April 2022 (*Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2022. Analytical Study, 2023*). Ukraine was able to greatly expand the export of its electricity after it joined the grid. Despite hopeful plans to enhance exports to the EU, these plans had to be postponed in October because of Russian strikes on critical infrastructure in Ukraine.

Since June, for one year, the EU has eliminated all trade restrictions on exports from Ukraine. Additionally, a one-year road freight agreement between the EU and Ukraine was reached in June 2022, eliminating the requirement for Ukrainian drivers to hold a license for transit via the EU. Despite a disastrous loss in the nation's economy during the full-scale war, these actions have significantly improved Ukraine's trade and economic links with the EU. For Ukraine, the terms of the Convention on a Common Transit Procedure went into effect in October, 2022. This made it possible to move products internationally with 35 other member states using a single transit document, considerably simplifying and expediting the customs clearance process. Therefore, exports to the EU increased slightly compared to 2021 and totaled almost €28 billion, making the EU Ukraine's main trading partner (*Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2022. Analytical study, 2023*).

Support for Ukraine's economy and the public sector, in particular, should be mentioned separately. The EU provided and guaranteed support totaled $\notin 11.6$ billion, of which Ukraine received $\notin 10.4$ billion ($\notin 7.2$ billion in macro-financial assistance, $\notin 1.8$ billion in loans, and $\notin 1$ billion in grants). In December, the European Council approved a large-scale package of $\notin 18$ billion of assistance to Ukraine in the form of concessional loans for 2023 (*Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2022. Analytical study, 2023*).

The European Peace Facility, a new extrabudgetary tool, allowed to finance $\in 3.1$ billion in military assistance from EU member states to Ukraine (*Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2022*. *Analytical study, 2023*). Additionally, the EU Military Support Mission for Ukraine was founded in November 2022 and had already trained more than a thousand Ukrainian soldiers.

Since May 2022, the EU, Ukraine, and Moldova have launched the so-called "Solidarity Roads" initiative for the delivery of vital supplies to Ukraine as well as the transportation of grain and other agricultural products from Ukrainian territory. Due to this, Ukrainian farmers were able to export roughly 23 million tonnes of grain and earn about \notin 20 billion in 2022 (*Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2022. Analytical study, 2023*).

In addition, Ukraine has received more than 82,000 tonnes of humanitarian aid from the EU and its partner nations, totaling over €527 million under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism since the beginning of the full-scale invasion (*Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2022. Analytical study, 2023*).

The other key direction of Ukrainian foreign policy is aimed at integration with NATO. Ukraine seeks a clear perspective for its membership in NATO (*Dmytro Kuleba: Try stovpy novoi Yevropy, 2023*). Today the process of Euro-Atlantic integration is impacted by current geopolitical circumstances. Ukraine is virtually demonstrating its ability to become a contributor to the Euro-Atlantic collective security system. Based on the experience of Sweden and Finland, Ukraine applied for accelerated accession to NATO in September 2022.

Primary areas for the development of relations between Ukraine and the Alliance are the following: to intensify joint efforts to address long-term security challenges, primarily Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine by using the assistance provided by the Alliance; to forge a distinctive partnership with NATO in anticipation of Ukraine's full membership in the Alliance as a guarantee of national security. To fully join NATO, Ukraine must: ensure interoperability of the armed forces and other security and defense sector elements with Alliance structures; intensify the reformation process to satisfy NATO membership criteria.

According to the opinion of Benjamin Tallis, who is a senior research fellow at the Alfred von Oppenheim Center for the Future of Europe, Ukrainian membership in the Alliance is by far the opportunity that will most successfully discourage the Putin regime or one of its successors from attacking Ukraine once more. Allies would also have a lot more input in Kyiv's plans, capabilities development, and posture if Ukraine joined NATO. While the battle-tested Ukrainian army would be a significant military asset to NATO, it would also be wise to match it as closely as possible with the medium- and long-term democratic aims, strategies, and vision of NATO members (*Tallis, B., 2023*).

It was articulated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Dmytro Kuleba that "Ukraine's victory in the war, its accession to NATO and the EU, and the verdict of the Special Tribunal will create a new European reality" (*Dmytro Kuleba: Try stovpy novoi Yevropy, 2023*). These, in the opinion of the Minister, can act as the cornerstones of an emerging new European order that would transform Europe into a continent of justice, peace, diverse economic relationships with Asia and Africa, powered entirely by renewable energy, based on strong defense and deterrence (*Dmytro Kuleba: Try stovpy novoi Yevropy, 2023*).

In general, cooperation with NATO can be separated into three components: securing the possibility of membership in the Alliance, acquiring security guarantees and assistance from member states, and implementing internal reforms aligning with NATO standards to improve

interoperability (Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2023. Analytical study, 2024). However, the outcomes of the NATO-Ukraine partnership in 2023 did not entirely meet Ukraine's expectations and the desired level of political interaction. NATO member-states provided comprehensive assistance to Ukraine with the corresponding level of political and security dialogue, but the issue of future membership remains unresolved (Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2023. Analytical study, 2024). At the Vilnius Summit in 2023, NATO agreed an expanded package of practical and political support for Ukraine and established a new cooperative format called the NATO-Ukraine Council (Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2023. Analytical study, 2024).

Another significant part of collaboration between Ukraine, the EU, and NATO is establishing of a coordination framework between Ukrainian producers and EU and NATO enterprises to maximize arms production for Ukrainian needs (*Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2023. Analytical study, 2024*).

Going Global South. Ukraine seeks to establish favorable economic ties with the leading countries of Central and South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and South America. Trade and economic cooperation are the cornerstones of relations with the regional countries. The medium-term goal of Ukraine's foreign policy is to gain broader support from the mentioned regions in countering Russian aggression.

The markets of Asia, the Middle East and Africa offer numerous opportunities for Ukrainian export. Additionally, there is potential for the growth of military-technical cooperation, military training as well as funding. To diversify its international trade, Ukraine as well aims to establish commercial connections with nations in the Caribbean and Latin America.

The strategy of Foreign Policy of Ukraine states the following: "it is important to ensure further development and deepening of political, trade, economic and humanitarian cooperation with the states of Africa and the Middle East, in particular through the tools of establishing pragmatic cooperation with the African Continental Free Trade Area, using the potential of the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, the League of Arab States, the Gulf Cooperation Council, etc." (*Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy №448/2021*, 2021).

In addition, Article 157 of the Strategy highlights that "efforts will be made to ensure support from African and Middle Eastern states for Ukraine's initiatives within international organizations, in particular in countering the aggression of the Russian Federation" (*Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy* $N_{2}448/2021$, 2021).

Before the full-scale invasion, Ukraine's relations with Africa were paid less attention to and maintained at a minimal level, selling agricultural products and participating in UN peacekeeping missions. Africa is likely to become the world's largest continent in terms of population, with a very high potential for investment and cooperation at all levels. However, now there are significant changes. Many of the countries of the region have a serious potential for economic development, and the potential of individual countries is growing significantly every year. This means that new powerful players are emerging on the international stage. Development of relations with these countries poses an opportunity For Ukraine to make its position stronger in the world arena (*Nabi*, *E., & Komar, M., 2022*), (*Nabi, E., & Mahuriak, I., 2023*).

Ukraine is considered to be one of the world's largest grain exporters (at least until a full-scale invasion). Therefore, Ukraine can guarantee food security for African states and help them to avoid the issue of famine. One of the initiatives presented by Ukraine was the Black Sea Grain Initiative. It was aimed at the supply of Ukrainian agricultural products and the prevention of the development of a food crisis provoked by Russian aggression. The corresponding agreement was signed by the Minister of Infrastructure of Ukraine O. Kubrakov, the Minister of Defence of Turkey H. Akar, and the UN Secretary-General A. Guterres, and Defence Minister of the Russian Federation S. Shoigu in July 2022 (*Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2022. Analytical study, 2023*). As of 15 May 2023, Ukraine sent 129 ships with 3.4 million tonnes of agricultural products to Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Sudan, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Morocco. Shortly, the program will see ships

carrying agricultural products being sent to other countries in need (*Nabi, E., & Komar, M., 2022*), (*Nabi, E., & Mahuriak, I., 2023*).

However, in addition to food, Ukraine can offer African countries cooperation in science, technology, education, trade and business, digitalization, diplomatic experience, and even military expertise. In other words, there are a lot of opportunities for cooperation beneficial for both sides. Cooperation with Africa is an important component necessary for Ukraine to become one of the leaders of the post-war world.

The issue of gaining support from the regional countries is a significant one. Since many African countries are now adhering to a conditional neutral position. Efforts have been made to strengthen ties with African countries, especially in the political sphere, to isolate Russia and gain support in the UN General Assembly. Ukraine recognizes that its experience and support can be valuable to African countries facing issues of neo-colonialism. On the other hand, Russia has invested heavily in propaganda and maintaining ties in Africa, leveraging its Soviet-era reputation (*Nabi, E., & Komar, M., 2022*), (*Nabi, E., & Mahuriak, I., 2023*).

As a success one can consider the fact that for the first time, no African state voted against the UN General Assembly resolution "Territorial integrity of Ukraine: defending the principles of the Charter of the United Nations" (October 2022). In addition, Ukraine received support from several other countries in the region when voting for the General Assembly resolution on Russian aggression (March 2022) (*Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2022. Analytical study, 2023*). As well as some positive signals were achieved in the context of expanding opportunities for the supply of Soviet-style weapons from African countries to Ukraine (*Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2022. Analytical study, 2023*).

In 2023 Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba had two African tours to Morocco, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Mozambique, and Nigeria as well as to Equatorial Guinea and Liberia. M. Subh, Ukraine's Special Representative for the Middle East and Africa, also paid working visits to Mauritania, Egypt, and Ethiopia, and met with the Deputy Chairperson of the African Union Commission to discuss the Peace, Food Security, and Grain Corridor Formula and ways to deepen cooperation between the MFA of Ukraine and the African Union Commission (*Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2023. Analytical study, 2024*).

Thus, Ukraine is still actively working to expand its diplomatic foothold on the continent. However, the continued absence of attention to the region has posed extra impediments to progress, including Russian propaganda and the requirement to build trust with African partners in the long term.

One of the positive results of 2023 was that 29 African countries supported the UN General Assembly Resolution "Principles of the Charter of the United Nations underlying a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine" (adopted in February 2023). Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Ghana, Gambia, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Malawi, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, South Sudan, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Zambia voted in favor of the resolution (*Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2023. Analytical study, 2024*).

Concerning the Latin American countries "the efforts will be aimed at the growth of exports of Ukrainian goods and services, in particular agricultural and engineering products, developing cooperation in the metallurgical, aerospace, military and other sectors, as well as expanding the participation of Ukrainian legal entities in the implementation of large-scale industrial and infrastructure projects in the region" (*Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy №448/2021*, 2021).

The stimulus for the intensification of the Latin American track of foreign policy in 2022 as well as in the case of the Middle Eastern and African countries was the full-scale Russian aggression. Ukraine made significant progress in cooperation with North American and European partners, which means a high degree of support for Ukraine in countering Russian aggression. Attempts to fight for broad support among South American power elites have so far had limited effect. Despite the still-existing reluctance to directly join anti-Russian sanctions or provide military assistance to Ukraine, almost all the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States countries have expressed their support for Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty and condemned Russian aggression (*Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2022. Analytical study, 2023*).

The calls to the region mainly concerned support for the Ukrainian Peace Formula and invitations to the participation in the Global Peace Summit, as well as support for food security and demining. The region was called upon to condemn the deportation of children from the temporarily occupied territories, to join anti-Russian sanctions and UN reform, and to abandon the position of "neutrality" and join the creation of a special tribunal for the crime of Russian aggression against Ukraine (*Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2023. Analytical study, 2024*).

Thus, at the level of political discussion and international collaboration, one may observe favorable trends in relations with Latin American, Middle Eastern, and African states. However, Ukraine is unable to make rapid progress in the Global South due to a lack of long-term, methodical work.

Multilateral cooperation. The UN is the largest, most well-known, most widely represented, and most powerful intergovernmental organization in the world. Active and proactive participation in international organizations, treaties, and multilateral international initiatives is a crucial component of protecting and promoting the national interests of Ukraine. Ukraine's foreign policy priority in this area is the adoption and implementation of decisions aimed at countering Russian aggression (*Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy N*<u>2</u>448/2021, 2021). However, it has demonstrated its limited effectiveness in the event of a war in Ukraine. This increases the urgency of the call for the UN reformation process.

Ukraine participates actively in several UN platforms to raise awareness of the ongoing conflict and put further legal pressure on Russia. During the UN General Assembly voting, Ukraine received historic support for its resolutions. A vote to condemn Russian aggression, the annexation of Ukrainian territories, the need for reparations and the expulsion of Russia from Russia from the Human Rights Council, and other issues was supported by more than 140 governments (*Shelest, H. & Maksak, H., 2023*).

Also, Ukraine utilizes the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which are key regional organizations for informing the international community about Russia's atrocities against Ukraine.

The Ukrainian initiatives to restore peace. There are several initiatives instituting the basis for the restoration of peace on Ukrainian territories. Namely, at the beginning these were the Peace Formula, which President V. Zelensky introduced at a G20 summit meeting in November, 2022, and the Kyiv Security Compact – a plan put forward by former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and the head of Ukraine's Presidential Office A. Yermak.

The Office of the President of Ukraine claims that the suggested Peace Formula is the only comprehensive and fair plan for dealing with both Russian aggression and all of its effects. More than 25 international documents, including statements and declarations by the G7, the European Union, and the Council of Europe have endorsed the Ukrainian Peace Formula (*Volodymyr Zelenskyy: The Ukrainian Formula provides for fair peace, therefore it has universal benefit for the world, 2023*).

The presented formula consists of the following points or so-called challenges: radiation and nuclear safety, food security, energy security, the release of all prisoners and deportees, implementation of the UN Charter and restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity and the world order, withdrawal of Russian troops and cessation of hostilities, justice, ecocide, the prevention of escalation, and confirmation of the end of the war.

Starting from the first challenge – radiation and nuclear safety one should understand that Ukraine the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant was turned virtually into a radioactive bomb by the Russian militants. Ukraine demands the withdrawal of Russian militants from its territory and transfer of control to the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as restoration of power grid connectivity (*Speech by the President of Ukraine at the G20 Summit, 2022*). As it was mentioned previously Ukraine plays a vital role in the insurance of food security and the launch of the "Grain from Ukraine" initiative to export agricultural products is a crucial one within this context (*Speech*

by the President of Ukraine at the G20 Summit, 2022). Russian strikes have severely damaged Ukraine's energy infrastructure, 40% of which was destroyed by the strikes of Russian missiles and Iranian drones, leading to an ongoing energy crisis. Ukraine accuses Russia of intentionally targeting power plants and electricity supply lines to cause a massive energy crisis (Speech by the President of Ukraine at the G20 Summit, 2022). Also, Ukraine demands the release of its citizens who are held captive by Russia, including both military personnel and civilians who are subject to brutal torture. The Ukrainian government emphasizes the importance of adhering to the norms of international law and restoring the territorial integrity of the state, urging Russia to recognize Ukraine's sovereignty in line with UN resolutions and international agreements. Another crucial issue is the complete withdrawal of Russian troops and restoration of control over the Ukrainian-Russian border to achieve a lasting cessation of hostilities (Speech by the President of Ukraine at the G20 Summit, 2022). The majority of the foreign political efforts of Ukraine are aimed at the establishment of a Special Tribunal to address Russia's aggression and an international mechanism for compensating the damages caused by the war. They have already introduced a resolution in the UN General Assembly and urged its implementation. The Ukrainian state highlights the environmental devastation caused by the conflict, including forest fires, land contamination, flooded coal mines, and the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam. That's the reason for an urge for immediate environmental protection measures (Speech by the President of Ukraine at the G20 Summit, 2022).

In addition, Ukraine calls for effective security guarantees and proposes the Kyiv Security Compact, a draft agreement aimed at establishing a post-war security architecture in the Euro-Atlantic region and providing those guarantees for Ukraine. It is stated that "these guarantees should enable Ukraine's self-defense both to deter an armed attack or act of aggression (deterrence by denial), and - in case an attack occurs - to protect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security of Ukraine (deterrence by punishment)" (The Kyiv Security Compact, 2022). Thus, it is aimed at mobilizing the necessary political, financial, military, and diplomatic resources for Ukraine's self-defense. It is envisaged that the Kyiv Security Compact is a joint strategic partnership treaty, which should contain the security guarantees signed by a core group of partners who will support Ukraine's right to self-defense. Among these partners, one can find the US, UK, Canada, Poland, Italy, Germany, France, Australia, Turkey, and the Nordic, Baltic, and Central European nations. Ukraine and a few guarantor governments may also sign bilateral agreements covering specific issues related to security guarantees between Ukraine and the guarantor states (The Kyiv Security Compact, 2022). For meeting the objective of self-defense Ukraine will need large defense forces, robust capabilities, and strong, reformed defense industry. This needs to be supported by sustained investments in its defense industrial base, extensive weapons transfers and intelligence support from allies, and well-trained and exercised forces (The Kyiv Security Compact, 2022).

The final step is a confirmation of the end of the war. Once all anti-war measures are implemented, Ukraine proposes signing a document confirming the end of the war. Ukraine considers the restoration of territorial integrity and accountability of Russian criminals as victory, while Western support includes Ukraine's accession to the EU and NATO for long-term stability, peace, and justice in Europe (*The Kyiv Security Compact*, 2022).

Another crucial announcement was made in October, 2024 when Prsident Volodymyr Zelenskyy presented the Victory Plan. The Victory Plan consists of five points – geopolitical, two military, economic, and security-related along with three secret annexes. **The first point** is an invitation for Ukraine to join NATO as a fundamental for peace and a signal to the Russian political leader that his geopolitical calculations have failed. **The second point** deals with the matter of defense. The implementation of this point envisages further operations by the Defense Forces in designated areas of Russia, strengthening Ukrainian positions, and destroying Russia's offensive potential in the occupied territories. **The third point** is deterrence. Ukraine suggests to deploy a comprehensive non-nuclear strategic deterrence package on its territory, sufficient to protect the country from any military threat posed by Russia. **The fourth point** is strategic economic potential. Ukraine offers its strategic partners a special agreement for the joint protection of the country's

critical resources, as well as joint investment and use of this economic potential. **The fifth point** is envisaged for the post-war period and involves the replacement of certain U.S. military contingents stationed in Europe with Ukrainian units that have gained real experience in modern warfare, the use of Western weapons, and cooperation with NATO troops (*Victory Plan Consists of Five Points and Three Secret Annexes*, 2024).

According to the expert, the first and most disputed point of the Victory Plan is the call to grant Ukraine membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. This is unlikely to happen while Ukraine is still fighting Russia since it would draw NATO into a conflict with a nuclear-armed state. The United States and Germany, the two crucial member-states of NATO, have been reluctant to follow the example of the majority of NATO members, particularly in Eastern Europe, which has reassured their strong support for Ukrainian membership, perceiving it as too irritative (*Boot, M., 2024*).

In conclusion, the Ukrainian Victory Plan consists of several important suggestions for strengthening Ukrainian defense capacity. Its implementation can positively influence the war period by shortening it and potentially forcing the Russian Federation into a negotiation process. The main issue with the implementation of the Victory Plan, according to Max Boot, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies, is that the Ukrainian Western partners are unlikely to make the increased aid commitments that they have been asked for (*Boot M., 2024*).

Conclusions. The goal of Ukrainian foreign policy is to develop Ukraine as a powerful European nation that creates favorable conditions for long-term growth and realizes its potential for the country's economy and society.

The Ukrainian Constitution outlines the country's strategic course toward full membership in both NATO and the European Union. Today, Ukraine is virtually proving its capacity to contribute to the Euro-Atlantic collective security framework. However, the state requires security assurances right away. The most effective security guarantees for Ukraine, given its unique geopolitical situation, come from its ability to defend itself. Ukraine's self-defense must be supported by legally binding commitments from foreign partners to mobilize the required military and non-military resources to be sufficiently strong and credible.

All foreign political efforts are centered on restoring the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders as a result of the Russian Federation's armed aggression. The Ukrainian Peace Formula and the Victory Plan, which will renew the security architecture and restore global stability, are a crucial tool to end it.

Ukraine also aims to diversify its foreign policy by expanding and deepening its political, economic, and humanitarian ties with countries in the Global South.

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