

DYNAMICS OF US-UKRAINIAN DEFENCE COOPERATION (2014-2021): FROM B. OBAMA TO J. BIDEN

ДИНАМІКА СПІВПРАЦІ США ТА УКРАЇНИ В ОБОРОННІЙ СФЕРІ (2014-2021): ВІД ОБАМИ ДО БАЙДЕНА

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Abstract. *The article is devoted to the study of the features of military-technical cooperation between Ukraine and the United States in 2014-2021. In particular, the volumes, nomenclature and goals of American military assistance to Ukraine currently, the main directions of bilateral defense cooperation are described in detail. It is determined that despite certain differences in approaches and emphasis in providing military assistance to Ukraine, the administrations of B. Obama, D. Trump, and J. Biden's administrations demonstrated consistency in logic and goals: Washington provided limited defensive military assistance necessary to deter Russia in the low-intensity conflict in Donbas. At the same time, the biggest qualitative breakthrough in the provision of military assistance occurred during D. Trump's term in office, when in 2017 the United States decided to supply Ukraine with a batch of Javelin ATGMs, thereby lifting the political taboo on supplying Kyiv with lethal weapons.*

Demonstrating continuity in the policy of military assistance to Ukraine, at the same time, to the administrations of B. Obama, D. Trump and J. Biden. Biden had different priorities. In 2014-2016 US military aid was limited to non-lethal means, with the aim of reducing the losses of the Ukrainian army in the conflict in the Donbass and not exacerbating escalation. The administration of D. Trump, along with the provision of lethal weapons, paid special attention to reforming the Ukrainian security sector. Instead, the Biden administration has identified strengthening Ukraine's naval capabilities as a priority in providing military assistance.

Key words: *conflict in Donbas, US-Ukrainian relation, military aid, security sector reforms, lethal weapons, deterrence of Russian aggression.*

Анотація. *Стаття присвячена вивченню особливостей військово-технічного співробітництва України та США у 2014-2021 рр. Зокрема, охарактеризовані обсяги, номенклатура та цілі американської військової допомоги Україні у цей період, основні напрями двостороннього оборонного співробітництва. Визначено, що незважаючи на певні відмінності у підходах та акцентах у наданні військової допомоги Україні, адміністрації Б. Обами, Д. Трампа та адміністрації Дж. Байдена продемонстрували наступність у логіці та цілях: Вашингтон надав обмежену оборонну військовою допомогу, необхідну для стримування Росії у конфлікті низької інтенсивності на Донбасі. При цьому найбільший якісний прорив у наданні військової допомоги стався під час перебування Д. Трампа на посаді, коли у 2017 р. США поставили Україні партію ПТРК «Javelin», тим самим знявши політичне табу на постачання Києву летальної зброї.*

Демонструючи значний рівень наступності у політиці військової допомоги Україні, Б. Обама, Д. Трамп і Дж. Байден мали різні пріоритети у цьому питанні. При Б. Обамі військова допомога обмежувалася нелетальними засобами, маючи на меті зменшити втрати української армії у конфлікті на Донбасі та не посилювати ескалацію. Адміністрація Д. Трампа поряд з наданням летального озброєння особливу увагу приділяла реформуванню українського сектору безпеки. Натомість, адміністрація Дж. Байдена визначила пріоритетом у наданні військової допомоги посилення військово-морських спроможностей України.

Ключові слова: *конфлікт на Донбасі, американсько-українські відносини, військова допомога, реформи сектору безпеки, летальні озброєння, стримування російської агресії.*

Introduction. Following the tragic events of 2014, the annexation of Crimea and Russia's military conflict in the Donbass, the United States has become Ukraine's main security partner. Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014-2015 has forced the United States to face the fact of a sharp change in Moscow's policy in the post-Soviet space, forcing Washington to refocus its attention on Kyiv and rethink the quality of bilateral relations with it. On the one hand, US officials and experts considered the conflict in eastern Ukraine as a European problem that did not affect US strategic interests. At the same time, Russia's military actions threatened to undermine the European security order and destabilise NATO's eastern flank, which required an adequate response from Washington.

One component of the US response to these events was the expansion of Ukrainian-American defence cooperation. The military and technical assistance, training missions, and advisory support for security sector reforms provided by the United States in 2014-2021 made a significant contribution to strengthening Ukraine's defence capabilities and deterring Russian aggression.

In this context, it is relevant and useful to study the dynamics of defence cooperation between Ukraine and the United States. This will not only help to structure and summarise the experience of the new security cooperation between the two countries, but will also contribute to a better understanding of the logic and trends in the development of defence cooperation by the United States.

The purpose of the article is to analyze and characterize the main features, directions and achievements of Ukrainian-American security cooperation in the period 2014-2021.

Literature review. The issues of military-technical cooperation between Ukraine and the United States, despite their practical relevance after 2014, have not been fully covered and understood in the scientific literature. Most of the works of both domestic and foreign researchers either indirectly cover the defence cooperation of the countries within the framework of the consideration of Ukrainian-US relations, or focus on only one period, the cadence of B. Obama or D. Trump, and are descriptive in nature. Among the Ukrainian scientists who developed this topic, it should be noted M. Lymar, O. Ivasechko, P. Lopushanskyi, V. Tsyhaniuk, as well as experts V. Begma, V. Shemayev and D. Radov from The National Institute for Strategic Studies (NISS). In particular, M. Lymar (2017) looks at the dynamics of US military assistance to Ukraine and the internal US debate on the issue during the Obama administration. V. Tsyhaniuk (2021) highlighted the volumes and nomenclature of US military aid to Ukraine under B. Obama and D. Trump. Experts from NISS (2019) analysed the state and prospects of the U.S.-Ukraine bilateral security cooperation in such new areas as the purchase of american weapons, the reform of the defence industry and cybersecurity.

Recent work by american researchers Alexander Lanoszka and Jordan Becker analyses the policy of the United States and European NATO member states in providing military assistance to Ukraine in 2014-2021. They argue that throughout this period, the parameters of US military aid to Ukraine were determined by the desire to keep the military conflict between Ukraine and Russia within the Donbass (*Lanoszka & Becker, 2023*).

In this context, our contribution to the development of this topic will be an attempt to provide a broad aspect analysis of the development of US-Ukrainian defence cooperation during this period.

Main results of the research. Since the beginning of the Russian aggression and up to December 2021, the United States has provided Ukraine with more than \$2.5 billion in security assistance. The United States accounted for 92% of all military assistance Ukraine received from

abroad during this period. At this, there was a tendency to a consistent increase in US military support. The bulk of it was directed through the US Department of Defense: 2014 – \$87 million, 2015 – \$103 million, 2016 – \$229 million, 2017 – \$152 million, 2018 – \$153 million, 2019 – \$253 million, 2020 – \$253 million, 2021 – \$338 million (Lymar & Tykhonenko). In addition, a quarter of the funds provided by other US government agencies were also used for security projects. 80% of US security assistance was directed to the needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, while the remainder was used to support the State Border Guard Service and the National Guard of Ukraine. American aid represented 5-6% of Ukraine's military budget at that time and did not fundamentally change the balance of power in Donbass, but it was important from a geopolitical and technical point of view.




Figure 1. US the security assistance to Ukraine in 2014-2021, in \$ million
Source: Defense Express 2021

During this period, US military assistance was providing to Ukraine through 12 international programmes, but more than $\frac{3}{4}$ of the funds, equipment and machinery were provided through two programmes - \$1.35 billion under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) and \$720 million under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programme.

The 2015 US National Security Strategy defined Russia as an aggressor that had grossly violated Ukraine's territorial integrity and international law, fuelled conflict in a neighbouring country, and therefore needed to be deterred. The document clearly emphasised the need to assist Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova in strengthening their defence capabilities and to increase the US military presence in Central and Eastern Europe to deter further Russian aggression (Tyutyunnik, 2022).

Despite the differences in approach to military assistance between B. Obama and D. Trump, the general philosophy of Washington's actions in this area remained constant. The United States provided Ukraine mainly with weapons and equipment that the Ukrainian government could not produce or purchase in the short term, but which were necessary to deter Russian aggression. In addition, the United States, along with Canada and the United Kingdom, provided training missions for NCOs and officers and expert advice on defence and security sector reform. In the long term, these measures, along with military supplies, were intended to strengthen the army's defensive capabilities to the point where Ukraine could effectively counter Russian aggression.

In 2014-2016, the US government allocated \$1.4 billion to Ukraine, of which security assistance amounted to about \$630 million. US military assistance during this period included a wide range of non-lethal military equipment – counter-battery radars, Harris secure communication systems (more than 300 Falcon-III radio communication stations), Humvee multi-purpose army off-road vehicles, mine-clearing equipment, RQ-11 Raven unmanned reconnaissance vehicles, military ammunition (thermal imagers, night vision devices, equipment for divers), cartridges for certain types of small arms, as well as instructional missions and various rehabilitation projects for Ukrainian soldiers. Since 2015, 160 American instructors have begun conducting training missions for Ukrainian servicemen at the Yavoriv military training area. The training missions by the United States and other partners

were designed to train Ukrainian soldiers and junior officers with combat experience in modern tactics and skills. In addition, projects have been implemented to create a simulation centre in Yavoriv (\$22 million) and to build a Ukrainian naval operations control centre in Ochakov (\$25 million).

Table 1. Main types of non-lethal US military assistance to Ukraine in 2014-2016

Year	Name	Quantity
2014	Body armour	2 000
	Armoured off-road vehicles	35
	Camouflage jackets	3 600
	Medical aid kits	1 500
	Anti-mortar radars	20
	Sleeping sets	1 000
	Dry rations	330 000
	Uniforms	3 200
	Covers and helmets	1 000
2015	Armoured off-road vehicles	147
	Military field hospital	1
	Boats	5
2016	Unmanned aerial vehicles	72
	Medical vehicles	40
	Armoured off-road vehicles	13
	Night vision devices	2 500
	Radar systems	14
	Radio stations	more 300

Source: (Tsyhaniuk, 2021)

The Ukrainian government has also involved American think tanks in the process of reforming the defence sector. In particular, in 2015-2016, experts from the Rand Corporation participated in the development of a national security policy document and a strategy for the reform of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence and the Ukrainian Armed Forces based on Western models. In addition to supplying equipment and supplies, the United States facilitated the establishment of military-technical cooperation between Ukraine and a number of Eastern European NATO countries. The problem was that the Ukrainian military-industrial complex was historically dependent on cooperation with Russian companies and could produce no more than 8-10% of the products needed to equip the armed forces on its own. After the outbreak of the conflict in Donbass, military cooperation with Russia was drastically curtailed. International cooperation with Lithuania, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Bulgaria (with US support) allowed Kyiv to obtain components, materials, and technologies for repairing and modernising Soviet- and post-Soviet-made military equipment.

Russia's aggression against Ukraine has also become a catalyst for a significant increase in cooperation on joint military exercises. Traditionally, the two key events in this area have been the Rapid Trident land exercises at the Yavoriv training area and the Sea Breeze naval exercises. In the 2014-2021, their scope has steadily increased. In particular, in 2014, the Rapid Trident exercise brought together nearly 1,200 servicemen from 15 countries, including 600 officers from the Ukrainian Armed Forces and 200 US servicemen. In 2015, these exercises brought together more than 1,800 military personnel from 18 countries, and in 2016 - 1,832 military personnel from 13 countries (Prohovnik, 2020). These annual exercises have become an effective complement to the

large-scale training missions conducted by the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada during this period.

The scale of the Sea Breeze naval exercises has also increased since 2014. For Ukraine, which lost up to 80 per cent of its navy as a result of the annexation of Crimea, they have become an important deterrent to Russia in the Black Sea. In 2014, almost 2,000 servicemen and 13 ships from 10 countries took part in Sea Breeze, in 2015 - 2,500 servicemen and 18 ships from 13 countries, and in 2016 - more than 3,100 servicemen and 26 ships from 16 countries. It is worth noting that all countries of the Black Sea region (except Russia) and leading Western countries participated in the meetings, demonstrating clear international support for Ukraine and concern about Russia's growing influence in the region.

Traditionally, Ukraine, as a co-organiser of the exercises, provided the territory and military infrastructure, while the United States covered the cost of the exercises. The cost of organising a Rapid Trident / Sea Breeze exercise was \$4-4.5 million.

The B. Obama administration's position on the supply of lethal weapons to Kyiv, with the exception of small batches of light small arms, remained generally negative. Although the government of A. Yatsenyuk had already asked Washington to provide weapons and ammunition in April 2014, at the beginning of the Russian aggression in Donbass. In the years that followed, the Ukrainian government made several requests to the United States for lethal weapons, but each time received a diplomatic response that 'this issue is open but not yet urgent'.

It is worth noting that many leading administration officials, including Vice President J. Biden, Secretary of State J. Kerry, his deputy for European and Eurasian affairs V. Nuland, Secretary of Defence E. Carter and Supreme Allied Commander Europe F. Breedlove, advocated providing Kyiv with lethal weapons. In their view, such a move would send a strong signal of support to Ukraine, raise the cost to Moscow of further escalating the conflict, and act as a deterrent (Lymar 2017). Instead, National Security Adviser S. Rice and B. Obama himself feared that such a decision would push Russia to escalate and reduce the chances of a political settlement.

At the legislative level, the US Congress expressed its position on Ukraine in December 2014 in the Ukraine Freedom Support Act. In addition to postulates supporting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, the document contained recommendations to increase sanctions pressure on Russia, expand non-military assistance and provide Kyiv with anti-tank weapons.

The coming to power of the Trump administration in the United States marked the beginning of a new phase in Ukrainian-American relations. Despite some reduction in security assistance to Ukraine and his controversial statements on Ukraine during his first two years in office, bilateral defence cooperation has grown significantly.

Washington continued to provide expert assistance in implementing security sector reforms. American officials began to place more emphasis on defence industry reform, considering it more important than equipment transfers. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence had a group of US advisers consulting the military leadership on institutional reform of the MoD and the armed forces (strategic planning, military education and medicine, and management structure). The number of US advisers to the MoD doubled in 2017-2020 and at the beginning of 2021 stood at 16 (Orlyk 2021).

In January 2018, a US representative, E. Teter, was appointed to the Supervisory Board of Ukroboronprom under the quota of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to advise the company's management on corporatization and development strategy. He retained his position after President Zelenskyy came to power.

In February 2019, at the request of the Ukrainian leadership, the United States sent a group of experts from the Institute for Defence Analyses. The group was headed by the US Senior Advisor on the Reform of the Ukrainian Defence Industry, former Minister of the Navy D. Winter. His responsibilities included the reform of the military-industrial complex, including the transformation of Ukroboronprom, military assistance and Kyiv's purchases of US weapons. Also in 2017-2018, the Jamestown Foundation developed for the Ukrainian Navy the concept of building a "mosquito fleet" to deter Russian aggression in the Black and Azov Seas, and its representatives became regular guests at the Lviv and Kyiv security forums.

In addition, in September 2016, the Defence Reform Advisory Board (DRAB) was established under the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine as an advisory body. It includes the heads of the MoD, the Armed Forces and high-level strategic advisers from the US, Canada, the UK, Poland, Germany and Lithuania. The United States delegated General (retired) J. Abizaid to the Committee. He headed the group of strategic advisers to the MoD and served on the Committee until November 2018, when he was replaced by Lieutenant General (retired) K. Dayton.

However, the main difference between the Trump administration and its predecessors in this regard was the change in approach to military assistance. The Republicans rejected warnings that providing Ukraine with lethal weapons would provoke Russia to escalate military action in Donbass. 22 December 2017. The White House announced a decision to lift the embargo on the supply of lethal defensive weapons to Ukraine. In March 2018, the US supplied Ukraine with 37 FGM-148 Javelin ATGM launchers and 210 missiles for \$47 million. In total, in 2017-2020, the United States transferred two batches of Javelin ATGMs to the Ukrainian Armed Forces as military aid (\$47 million and \$39 million) and sold one batch under a contract with the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (*Lymar & Tykhonenko, 2022*).

US military assistance in 2017-2020 increased significantly in terms of nomenclature. It included Javelin ATGMs, counter-battery radars, anti-mortar radars, Harris radios, automated troop management systems, Humvee army off-road vehicles, diving and demining equipment, cybersecurity equipment, spare parts for vehicles, ammunition (night vision devices, thermal imagers), and medical equipment.

In 2019, the United States handed over two Island patrol boats to Kyiv. In July 2020, the Trump administration decided to provide Ukraine with 16 Mark VI warships worth \$600 million. Six of them were to be given to Kyiv as military aid, while the Ukrainian government could purchase the rest at its own expense. Ukrainian authorities have also received permits from the US government to purchase batches of Barrett M82 and Barrett M107 sniper rifles and PSRL-1 grenade launchers from US manufacturers. All of this allowed D. Trump to say that 'I am the one who gave Ukraine offensive weapons and anti-tank systems. Obama did not. He sent pillows and blankets' (*Tolstov, 2019*).

During the Trump administration, Ukrainian-American cooperation in the field of joint military exercises developed at a consistently high level. In 2017, 2,500 military personnel from 15 countries took part in the Rapid Trident exercise at the International Peacekeeping and Security Centre at the Yavoriv training range, in 2018 - more than 2,200 military personnel from 14 countries, and in 2019, the exercise brought together about 3,700 military personnel from 14 countries. In 2020, more than 4,000 military personnel from 9 countries took part in the exercise.

In parallel, the Ukrainian-American Sea Breeze exercises were held annually. In particular, in 2017, more than 3,000 servicemen and 31 ships from 16 countries took part in the exercise, in 2018 - 2,700 servicemen and 29 ships from 19 countries, in 2019 - more than 3,000 servicemen and 32 ships from 19 countries. More than 2,000 personnel and 23 ships from 9 countries participated in Sea Breeze 2020, but due to the coronavirus pandemic, the exercise was limited to the maritime phase (*Prohovnik, 2020*).

The United States also increased funding for the training of command (sergeants and senior officers) and managerial personnel for Ukraine under the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET). Under this programme, about 400 Ukrainian military were educated at US military training institutions in 2014-2021. The US government spent \$19.7 million for these purposes. By comparison, Ukraine received \$16 million under IMET in the period 1993-2013.

Cybersecurity has become a new direction of defence cooperation between countries. After 2014, both Ukraine and the United States were regularly subjected to cyber-attacks by the Russian Federation. Russian hackers carried out attacks on information systems of state authorities, critical infrastructure facilities and banking institutions. Therefore, the first US-Ukrainian interagency consultations on cyber security took place in Kyiv in September 2017. As a result, the United States began providing assistance to Ukraine to strengthen the cyber capabilities of government agencies (*Begma, Shemayev & Radov, 2019*). The second and third rounds of consultations were held in 2018 and 2020. In total, in 2017-2020, the US government allocated up to \$20 million to Ukraine for

cybersecurity projects, including training of Ukrainian specialists, advisors, and equipment for the Cyber Threat Response Centre

The Biden administration began its term with a focus on defence cooperation. For 2021, the US Congress approved \$728 million in aid to Ukraine, of which \$250 million was traditionally military assistance under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) program. Of these funds, \$75 million were intended for the supply of lethal weapons. After coming to power, the Biden administration increased the amount of military aid by another \$25 million.

It should be noted that within the planned \$250 million, significant emphasis has been placed on strengthening Ukraine's naval capabilities. 1 March 2021 The US Department of Defense announced \$125 million in military assistance to Ukraine, including two additional Mark IV patrol boats, 10 high-speed boats and more than 150 inflatable boats for the navy, 55 Humvee army off-road vehicles, counter-artillery radars, military medical and tactical equipment (*Ivasechko & Lopushanskyi, 2023*). The US Department of Defense has awarded SAFE Boats International three contracts worth approximately \$130 million for the construction of ten Mark VI combat patrol boats for the Ukrainian Navy. 11 June 2021 The Pentagon announced the provision of the second part of military aid to Ukraine in the amount of \$150 million. It included Javelin anti-tank systems, counter-artillery radars, communications equipment, small arms, counter-UAV systems, military training and consulting support for security reforms. Also under USAI, in November 2021 the United States transferred two Island patrol boats to Ukraine.

Another \$478 million in U.S. aid for 2021 were intended to support reforms and implementation of projects in the field of security, economic development, public administration, energy, medicine, education and humanitarian assistance. Of these funds, \$115 million was provided under the State Department's Foreign Military Financing program and included the supply of special equipment, vehicles, secure communications equipment to strengthen border protection, UAVs, ammunition, medical and tactical equipment. A \$12 million project was launched to build a Maritime Guard Rapid Response Centre in Odessa. In addition, \$10 million was provided under the non-proliferation and counter-terrorism program, and \$20 million for measures to improve nuclear safety in Ukraine.

The US Congress has taken a more active stance on the development of bilateral defense cooperation. In March 2021 a group of senators introduced a bill on partnership with Ukraine in the field of security (Ukraine Security Partnership Act), which determined the main parameters of long-term military and diplomatic support to Kyiv for the period 2022-2026. All six authors of the document, Republicans R. Portman, J. Barrasso, J. Risch and Democrats B. Menendez, C. Murphy, J. Shaheen was a member of the Senate Ukraine Caucus. The bill contained the following proposals:

- appoint a US Special Representative for Ukraine, whose tasks will be to participate in the Normandy format negotiations and promote dialogue between the countries of the Black Sea region;
- to provide Ukraine with military assistance, including lethal weapons, worth \$300 million annually until 2026;
- reporting by the US Secretary of State to Congress on support for Ukraine during the next five years;
- provide annually up to \$4 million for the training of the Ukrainian military under the International Program of Military Education and Training (IMET).

Ukraine Security Partnership Act did not offer fundamentally new approaches or projects. Rather, it was intended to consolidate at the official level the course formed in previous years to strengthen the defense cooperation of countries. At the same time, it was never considered by Congress.

On 31 August - 2 September, President of Ukraine V. Zelenskiy paid a working visit to the United States, where he met with President J. Biden, Secretary of Defense L. Austin, Secretary of Energy J. Grenholm, members of the Ukrainian Caucus in Congress. The visit took place against an extremely unfavorable backdrop - the shameful and hasty withdrawal of the US military from Afghanistan, where the Islamist Taliban movement had seized power. On the eve of the visit, the White House announced the allocation of additional security aid to Ukraine for \$60 million, which

included 30 Javelin anti-tank systems and 180 missiles, small arms, communication equipment, military training.

As part of the visit on 31 August, the Ministers of Defence of Ukraine and the United States A. Taran and L. Austin signed a Framework agreement on the strategic foundations of defense partnership between the ministries. In it, the parties announced their intention to strengthen the partnership in such areas as reforms in the defence sector in accordance with NATO standards, training and exercises, security in the Black Sea region, cyber security and cooperation between intelligence agencies (Armyinform 2021).

Another signal of Kyiv's support became the multinational military exercises "Sea Breeze" and "Rapid Trident" in Ukraine, which took place in July and September 2021. They became the largest in the history of their conduct. The Sea Breeze-2021 exercises in the Black Sea involved 5000 troops and 32 ships from 32 countries. In turn, more than 6,000 soldiers from 15 countries practiced active defence and offensive tactics at the Yavoriv training area in the Lviv region as part of the Rapid Trident-2021 land exercises.

In general, the administration of J. The Biden administration at the end of its first year in office did not seek to increase defense cooperation with Ukraine, considering the level achieved sufficient. For 2022, Congress approved \$756 million in assistance to Ukraine, including \$459 million in security assistance (Report 2021). 300 million was earmarked for the USAI program (including \$75 million for lethal weapons) and \$115 million for Ukraine under the Foreign Military Financing program.

Conclusions

After 2014 the United States has become Ukraine's most important security partner. During 2014-2021 US-Ukrainian defence cooperation has gradually expanded. Had started with non-lethal weapons and equipment, it expanded after the Trump administration came to power, including cooperation in the field of cyber security, security reform and the provision of lethal defensive weapons (Javelin anti-tank systems, combat patrol boats). At this, the general philosophy of providing American military assistance throughout this period remained constant: the United States provided Ukraine with those weapons and equipment that were necessary to deter Russian aggression in the Donbas, but at the same time did not significantly affect the balance of forces in conflict.

US presidential administrations in 2014-2021 prioritized military assistance to Ukraine in different ways. Under B. Obama, only non-lethal military assistance was provided to minimize the losses of Ukrainian forces on the demarcation line in Donbas (anti-mortar and counter-battery radars, protective gear and equipment, communication facilities). Having provided lethal weapons and increased military aid, the Trump administration focused at the strategic level not on the transfer of equipment but on reforming the Ukrainian security sector, particularly the military-industrial complex. In Washington's view, this would enable Ukraine to produce more of its own weapons and strengthen defence capabilities. In turn, at the beginning of its work (2021), the Biden administration focused on strengthening Ukraine's naval capabilities in providing military assistance to Ukraine.

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