

**INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE FACE OF
TRANSFORMATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM**

**МІЖНАРОДНІ БЕЗПЕКОВІ ОРГАНІЗАЦІЇ В УМОВАХ ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЇ
СИСТЕМИ МІЖНАРОДНОЇ БЕЗПЕКИ**

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***Abstract.** This paper examines the activities of international security organisations such as NATO and the OSCE, as well as the cooperation within the EU and NATO to ensure security in Europe. Also, the authors analyse the Strategic Concepts of NATO's 2010 and 2022, and reviews changes in the main objectives of security institutions that have been reflected since Russia's large-scale invasion in Ukraine.*

The review of the activities of international security organizations demonstrates that the issue of their adaptation to current challenges and threats is crucial for the further preserving of the democratic order in the world.

Simultaneously, the article emphasizes that due to the increasing number of military threats, there is a need to develop effective mechanisms for reforming security organizations to further preserve the international security system in general.

Keywords: international security organisations, international security, transformation, threats, defence, Russian invasion.

***Анотація.** У даному дослідженні розкрито діяльність міжнародних безпекових організацій таких як НАТО, ОБСЄ, співпраця в рамках ЄС-НАТО із забезпечення безпеки в Європі, в умовах широкомасштабного військового вторгнення росії на територію України.*

У статті здійснено порівняння ключових завдань Стратегічних концепцій НАТО 2010 та 2022 років. Крім цього, проаналізовано пріоритети міжнародних інституцій у реалізації своїх безпекових обов'язків до та після початку російсько-української війни.

Аналіз діяльності міжнародних безпекових організацій доводить, що питання їх адаптації до сучасних викликів та загроз має важливе значення для подальшого збереження домінування демократичного устрою у світі.

Водночас, зростаюча кількість загроз воєнного характеру зумовлює необхідність розробки дієвих механізмів у реформуванні безпекових організацій з метою посилення системи міжнародної безпеки в цілому.

Ключові слова: міжнародні організації з безпеки, міжнародна безпека, трансформація, загрози, захист, російське вторгнення.

Introduction. Nowadays, the world is facing a crisis of international institutions created and shaped during the Cold War. The Russian war in Ukraine has triggered radical changes in the system of international relations and the international security environment.

The role of international organizations is weakened, and their control over world processes creates conditions for the emergence and spread of new global threats, such as mass migration, the generation of local conflicts, international terrorism, and uncontrolled arms circulation. The world community has yet to find an effective response to the challenges that violate the basic principles of international and European security.

Hence, with the beginning of Russia's large-scale invasion of the territory of Ukraine, the crisis of the international system has reached a qualitatively new level. It has undermined the stability of European and global security systems and has revealed the vulnerability of the existing system of international relations.

The purpose of this article is to explore the activities of key international security organizations, such as NATO, the EU, OSCE in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war as a transformational force for the international security system.

Literature review. Nowadays, research in the field of international security is very relevant and widespread, as there is a need to address several pressing issues. In Ukraine, this issue is analyzed to a certain extent within the framework of international and European security by I. Khraban, O. Senchenko, H. Perepelytsia,

V. Holovko, and V. Horbulin. An exciting assumption is made by O. Kuchyk, according to which international institutions of multilateral cooperation do not comply with the existing international order. The prospect of reforming/adapting international organizations is possible only through bringing the existing international institutions to modern international relations' structure, content and quality (*Kuchyk, O., 2022*).

Ms. Pogorska, in the article, analyzes the conceptual approaches to international security. It is argued that global processes and the scale of security threats give sense to global security discussions. Since alliances are the main actors in the international security system, these are closely related to state or national security (*Pogorska, I., 2012*).

However, the current range of challenges in the international security system is extensive. The prominent role is occupied by Russia's aggression and violation of all possible norms of international law. Therefore, this article is based on the assessment of the activities of major international security organizations in opposing the aggressor — to explore the actions of organizations that form the security architecture at both the regional and global levels.

The research results. Nowadays, the Eurasian continent is the largest theatre of geopolitical struggle for dominance at the regional level. Due to various circumstances, the interests of global centres of influence clash simultaneously, such as the EU, China, Russia, and the United States of America.

Pursuing somewhat different policy goals, these international actors focus their attention on the security sphere, which has become extremely sensitive to various claims to regional and global leadership. In particular, Russia, which aims to realize imperial ambitions by conquering territory and

reorganizing the world order, reduces the sphere of influence of the West. The presence of the Russian factor is a common feature of several armed conflicts in the states of the former Soviet Union. Usually, it involves direct military involvement and presence.

Therefore, the crisis of international institutions has become global with the beginning of Russia's large-scale invasion of the territory of Ukraine. This, in turn, actualizes the need to analyze the effectiveness of NATO, the OSCE, the UN, and the European Union. These organizations form the European security system in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war.

To begin with, the purpose of the mentioned international organizations is to maintain international peace and security among states, despite the fact that most armed conflicts are not international in nature but internal, eventually growing from a local to a regional scale. Russia's armed conflict against Ukraine is of particular importance. Military aggression and occupation of a part of our country's sovereign territory have revealed the weakness of international organizations in responding to the aggressor.

Of course, it is indisputable that Ukraine has received extensive political, military, technical and international humanitarian assistance. In addition, the UN and the OSCE have adopted several international legal documents condemning Russia's actions. However, these international institutions still need enforcement instruments, which creates the need to find ways to adapt international institutions to modern conditions. After all, it is not easy to imagine a member state of an international organization that is still in the governing bodies of this structure and violates the principles of the organization's activities.

NATO's changing priorities in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war

In the European security system, it is customary to believe that their security is guaranteed by the structures of the North Atlantic Alliance and that European member states are reliably protected by Art. 5 of the NATO Charter. However, with the end of the Cold War, NATO members gradually began to exclude armed threats as a priority from their strategic documents. Russia's war against Ukraine, which in its hybrid manifestation began even before 2014, makes it relevant to compare the Strategic Concepts of NATO's 2010 and 2022 to reveal the critical areas of the organization's activities in these periods.

The fundamental and permanent objective of the Strategic Concept 2010 was to ensure the freedom and security of all its members through political and military means. To achieve these goals, three main tasks, collective security, crisis management, and cooperative security, were formulated (*Strategic Concept, 2010*).

The security approach was defined based on the territory defense of the member states against attack by deterrence by all possible measures (conventional and nuclear weapons). In addition, the need to be prepared for potential threats was also noted. However, it was not strictly defined in the Strategic Concept 2010. "New or relatively new types of threats include international terrorism, extremism, weapons of mass destruction, access of terrorist groups to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and cyber-attacks, the targets of which are modern communication systems. Besides, sabotage activities that disrupt strategic power supply facilities; maritime piracy; the threat of a missile strike; environmental problems and climate change" (*Martyniuk, O., 2020*).

At the same time, the Strategic Concept 2010 highlighted the following four main tasks:

- the Alliance must maintain its ability to deter and defend against any threat or aggression regardless of the place of origin;
- NATO have to contribute to the security of the entire Euro-Atlantic region as a defender of its interests and as a contributor to peacebuilding in all parts of the region, in close cooperation with other international organizations and partners;
- NATO must serve as a transatlantic platform for security consultations and crisis management;
- The Alliance should expand the scale of partnerships by increasing the number of member countries (*Strategic Concept, 2010*).

Regarding the cooperation between NATO and Russia, the Alliance aimed to promote stability and security to develop a common space of peace, even though Russia had already announced its proposals for an alternative security order in Europe, which aimed to limit NATO's activities. As for

the Alliance, they continued to deep bilateral cooperation, the aim of which was to avoid any mutual confrontations to build partnership relations based on the “Fundamental Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization” and the “Rome Declaration”.

In addition, the Strategic Concept 2010 did not revise Ukraine-NATO relations. It was about “to continue and develop the partnership with Ukraine and Georgia within the framework of the Ukraine-NATO and Georgia-NATO Commissions, based on the NATO decision adopted at the Bucharest Summit in 2008 and to take to attention Euro-Atlantic orientation or aspirations of each country” (*Strategic Concept, 2022*).

The Strategic Concept 2022 defines that the threats facing the Alliance “are global in nature and are interconnected” (*Strategic Concept, 2022*). According to this Concept, Russia has been identified as a significant and direct threat, aiming to establish spheres of influence and direct control through coercion, sabotage, aggression and annexation. Furthermore, the following threats from Russia are also taken into account: undermining the world order based on the rules of international law; pressure with threats of using nuclear weapons; destabilizing the situation in the Alliance's neighbouring states to the east and south; using the Far North as a no-go/no-access zone (*Strategic Concept, 2022*).

In addition, the Alliance has finally recognized that Russian aggression is not limited to Ukraine. It is directed against democratic, open societies, their way of life and the idea of free existence. Considerable attention is paid to the issue of cyber security, as “the number of devices in the world connected to the global network has increased from approximately 7 billion to 50 billion” (*Izhak, O., 2022*).

Considering that Russia uses the entire range of hybrid warfare tools, which complicates the process of determining the criteria for attacking Western countries, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is supplemented by the fact that threats in cyberspace may, at a certain level, be criteria for activating this article. This means that the Alliance does not limit itself to response tools in the event of a non-direct military attack on member states.

At the same time, it is noticeable that China is defined as a strategic competitor in the Strategic Concept 2022. Moreover, in the US Strategy of the Foreign Policy 2022, China recognizes as “the only state that has the potential to change the international order, and Russia, which is a direct threat to the free and open international system” (*Orlyk, V., Hrytsenko, A., 2022*).

According to Article 4 of the Strategic Concept 2010, “NATO will continue to fulfil its three fundamental tasks”, but they have changed the new concept. “Deterrence and Defense” (Deterrence and Defense), as opposed to collective defense, is defined “as a priority task in the Strategic Concept 2010”. That is, the critical approach of the NATO concept has changed from “deterrence through retaliation” to “deterrence through avoidance” (*Strategic Concept, 2010*).

According to the NATO definition, “Deterrence is convincing a potential aggressor that the consequences of coercion or armed conflict will outweigh the potential benefits. It requires the maintenance of credible military capabilities and a strategy with a clear political will to act” (*NATO Glossary, 2021*).

The focus on deterrence and defense is reflected in the strengthening of European capabilities (*NATO Glossary, 2021*) through the growth of joint military expenditures, the number of combat-ready forces, the organization of joint military exercises, and the strengthening of NATO's eastern flank. This is all about increasing military contingents and developing a new defense strategy.

The Baltic countries play a unique role in strengthening the eastern borders of the Alliance. Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine has forced NATO to reassess the security risks to Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The critical aspects of ensuring the security of the Eastern flank are the following decisions: the increase to the size of brigades of NATO battalion tactical groups located in the territory of Latvia and Lithuania, which are part of the multinational corps “Northern East”, the headquarters of which is located in Poland. In addition, there are four additional multinational battle groups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia.

In addition, it is planned to conduct multinational exercises to practice joint actions of the units of the armed forces of the member countries of the Alliance. For example, “Steadfast Defender-2024” is a multinational exercise that ended on May 30, 2024. More than 90,000 military personnel from 32 NATO countries participated in the exercise: 50 ships, more than 80 aircraft, and more than 1,100 combat vehicles. The exercise was designed to test the readiness of all member countries of the defense alliance to respond to military threats from the strategic to the tactical level.

Considering the above, it can be concluded that NATO's desire to increase its military presence is objective. This is a confirmation of the readiness of the Alliance to respond to a direct threat to the security of the member states of the Alliance and peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. While NATO's Strategic Concept 2022 clearly emphasizes that the Alliance will implement “all elements of strategic risk reduction, including measures to build trust and predictability through dialogue, increased understanding, and effective crisis prevention and management mechanisms” (*Strategic Concept, 2022*), thus combining the three main tasks with one common goal.

Attention must be paid to the activities of an organization like the OSCE before proceeding to the issue of the European system of defense against military threats and cooperation within the NATO-EU framework. This will help us understand the future conclusions.

OSCE activities in the framework of the Russian-Ukrainian war

According to the official website, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (from now on — OSCE) serves as a forum for political dialogue on various security issues and joint activities to improve people's and societies' lives. OSCE is based on the principles recorded in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the trust that all participating countries will fulfil them and resolve disputed issues through dialogue.

The OSCE helps to reduce tensions between conflicting parties by building trust and cooperation between and within states. Where situations are complex, the OSCE is involved in crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. Such situations are resolved by monitoring and controlling the observance of fundamental rights and freedoms, established agreements, signed disarmament documents, etc. To understand the issues related to this organization's activities, it is proposed to consider the OSCE's Special Monitoring Mission (from now on — SMM) activities in Ukraine.

Established before the outbreak of armed hostilities in mid-April 2014, the OSCE SMM in Ukraine is the only group of international observers permanently deployed in the conflict zone in eastern Ukraine. It has exclusive but limited access to areas controlled by the Ukrainian government and separatists (*Pysarenko et al., 2021*). According to the Mission's original mandate, which remained in force until early 2021, the SMM's goal is to “Contribute to... reducing tensions and ensuring peace, stability and security, and to monitor and support the implementation of all OSCE principles and commitments” (*OSCE Deployment, 2017*).

The main objectives defined on March 21, 2014, were to monitor and analyze the situation in the designated areas, report on incidents identified with possible violations of obligations, establish contacts with the local population, authorities, etc. Also, “to coordinate its actions with the OSCE executive structures, including the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the OSCE Representative on the Media. To support them in their work in full respect of their mandates, and to cooperate with the United Nations, the Council of Europe and other actors of the international community”. (*OSCE Deployment, 2017*).

First of all, this mission differs from any other format of OSCE missions because the SMM in Ukraine monitored not a frozen conflict but a high-intensity conflict with a transition to a low-intensity one, with daily shelling, destruction and violations of agreements by the Russian side. Another feature of the SMM's activities was that its staff included representatives of the Russian Federation. On the one hand, this allowed the mission to be present in the occupied territories of eastern Ukraine, as they did not pose a threat in the eyes of the pro-Russian “separatists”.

On the other hand, with a mandate and no military component, the organization was vulnerable and dependent on the external influence of one of the parties to the conflict. This raised the question of why such a large-scale and influential security organization, knowing the parties to the conflict

and understanding the depth of the problem, allows Russia, as a direct participant in the armed conflict, to join the mission.

At the same time, the consensus nature of decision-making in the OSCE did not allow for timely and necessary decisions to resolve the conflict. Hence, the SMM was not present in the Crimean Peninsula, which Russia annexed.

According to the OSCE, the main tasks of the SMM were to “impartially and objectively observe and report on the situation in Ukraine and to facilitate dialogue between all parties to the conflict” (*Pysarenko et al., 2021*). The question arises as to the extent to which the SMM's activities in Ukraine from 2014 to 2022 were objective and impartial.

All of the above suggests only means that the OSCE SMM has been compromised, and the Russian citizens involved in the mission are suspected of espionage and are connected to Russian special services.

In view of the increased attention and to ensure a more broadly informed assessment of the OSCE's activities in the entire Eurasian region, a warning was even issued that “all discussions about OSCE peacekeeping operations should not be considered through the prism of Eastern Ukraine” (*Kemp, W., 2016*).

However, this thesis makes it clear that the crisis of international security institutions has already occurred, and Russia has significantly interfered with the European security system through the internal policies of the organization's member states that have fallen under the aggressor's influence.

This has revealed the vulnerability of the sustainable structure of international relations and the principles underlying it. Due to the weak will to make decisions and the inadequacy of existing norms to the current state of challenges and threats, the OSCE remains captive to the intergovernmental political system and consensus decision-making. This organization's weaknesses were manifested in the Russian-Ukrainian war and Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Georgia.

Given the above, the OSCE, as an integral part of regional European security, needs reform and modernization to continue fulfilling its purpose. Scenarios for reorganizing the OSCE have been discussed at all international and expert levels. At this stage, the following issues in the reorganization are being debated.

First, it should improve decision-making mechanisms by replacing the consensus principle with a qualitatively and quantitatively qualified majority. At the same time, it may be possible to consider restrictions on voting rights for countries affected by the decision or participating in the conflict. Another popular solution is to exclude countries that threaten the democratic world from the Organization. In this case, it would be helpful to determine a certain period after which to audit the situation in the world/region and, accordingly, to make the necessary changes to the membership of the Organization and its further functioning.

Of course, expert groups should be created/involved in reorganizing such an institution, which will be formed from elected representatives from among the participating countries in the relevant areas. At the same time, it is necessary to focus initially on resolving regional and ethnic conflicts. The goal should be not mediation, but conflict resolution/overcoming as a necessary element in ensuring stability in the international security system. Identify threats such as cybersecurity, counterterrorism, environmental, energy and technological security, and overcoming the consequences of armed conflicts as among the most pressing challenges of our time.

Therefore, the scale of dissatisfaction has indeed increased with the activities of both the OSCE and some other security organizations. At the same time, the issue of ensuring the European security system remains relevant and unresolved. In this context, it is essential to consider another area of cooperation, such as NATO-EU. Namely, the following two questions: why are these relations important? What are these relations based on?

NATO-EU Partnership in the framework of ensuring the security of the Western World

To begin with, the EU has focused on soft security issues in implementing its defense system and policy in general. Such issues include social problems, migration, environmental disasters, terrorism, etc. Besides, an essential component is ensuring economic stability on the borders, which

is vital for the EU. The EU has often relied on various UN and OSCE security missions to resolve armed conflicts. Only Russia's military aggression has forced the European world to reconsider its priorities and principles in implementing its security policy. After all, with such an enemy as Russia, soft power and security can no longer guarantee success in ensuring further independent existence.

“Unarmed or lightly armed missions with limited mandates have little or no effect on peacekeeping” (*NATO Glossary, 2021*). The situation in Georgia, Transnistria, and Ukraine confirms this. In turn, this makes it clear that the EU-based system of European security has not been formed against military threats yet. Therefore, the most correct suggestion today is that the NATO remains not the primary, but rather the only security guarantor in all of Europe for the EU.

Nowadays, their cooperation is parallel. This is most evident in resisting Russia as an aggressor in the democratic world. The EU has an advantage in terms of civilian capabilities, which include economic sanctions, resilience in areas such as energy and cybersecurity, countering disinformation, humanitarian aid, and transport infrastructure (*Papaioannou, A., 2019*). Meanwhile, NATO deals with military deterrence and defense. It is undoubtedly true that the EU has relied primarily on intergovernmental cooperation in its policy, as only 4 EU countries are not NATO members.

However, the current situation has revealed a difference of opinion within the EU on how to secure its own interests. This has significantly affected the countries of Eastern Europe, where the threat of invasion is the greatest and the vulnerability the highest. Obviously, the EU has launched a number of initiatives aimed at maintaining and ensuring its own security since Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine. For example, such initiatives include the revitalization of PESCO or the creation of coalitions for the manufacture and supply of weapons and military equipment.

Nevertheless, the question of whether this will help to protect Europe in the event of a military invasion from NATO's eastern flank is crucial. Consequently, the issue of developing and ensuring the European security system requires further research.

Conclusions. In the face of a large-scale war, a broad-based struggle for the values of the entire democratic world and its national identity, Ukraine appreciates and supports all the assistance provided by Western countries. However, these days it is about the need for real action.

The actions that should be of a military nature and, accordingly, the instruments for their implementation. Obviously, the existing international organizations responsible for ensuring security in the world are not able to deal with this. Meanwhile, the question of attacking a NATO country already does not seem so unrealistic.

A common tactic of action in response to military threats has to include, first and foremost, the establishment of interoperability in the use and deployment of weapons. Ukraine's experience in this regard is an invaluable one. Because, for example, it was able to use different air defense systems simultaneously and complementarily in the face of continuous attacks and hostilities.

There is no more space for soft power and the policy to exist as a stand-alone element. There is no place for condemnation and expressions of concern. Modern international security organizations must develop the instruments that will protect them in the event of an actual military invasion by an enemy.

It is necessary to accept that the stage of the arms race is being transformed into the stage of the possibility of their use. This threat is fundamental in the war for the redistribution of spheres of influence in the world. Democratic countries should prepare their security organizations to respond to the current challenges.

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