

ESSAY ON THE VALUE-IDEOLOGICAL ASPECT OF STRATEGIC FOREIGN POLICY PLANNING (Russo-Ukrainian War case)

НАРИС ДО ЦІННІСНО-ІДЕОЛОГІЧНОГО АСПЕКТУ СТРАТЕГІЧНОГО ПЛАНУВАННЯ ЗОВНІШНЬОЇ ПОЛІТИКИ (на прикладі російсько-української війни)

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Abstract. *The article highlighted the problem of value defining in the geopolitical prospects. Geopolitical strategic planning as well as the soft power of the state is based on the value system, which was the object of this analysis. Deep historical contradictions between two nations (Ukraine and Russia) have led to the war, and the next steps in architecting a global security system claim to the new unions and alliances, which should be built on unified values.*

Value backgrounds of the current war are dynamic systems and uncertain conditions, total disinformation and Russian myths, and the battle between autocracies and democracies. The value system could become the core basis of the state's mission and strategy. Values guide the behavior of members of society, the decision-making process, and the choice of strategies, can serve as a powerful tool for transformation in different fields of economy, motivation to work or even to fight.

The article determined the great difference between the two nations (Ukrainian and Russians) and examined Huntington's approach to the Ukrainian future geopolitical position.

Keywords: *Russo-Ukrainian war, strategic planning, values, ideology.*

Анотація. *У статті висвітлено питання визначення цінностей у геополітичній перспективі. Геополітичне стратегічне планування, як і м'яка сила держави, базується на системі цінностей, яка була об'єктом цього аналізу. Глибокі історичні протиріччя між двома народами (Україною та Росією) призвели до війни, а наступні кроки у розбудові глобальної системи безпеки претендують на нові союзи та альянси, які мають будуватися на єдиних цінностях.*

Ціннісним фоном нинішньої війни є динамічні системи та невизначені умови, тотальна дезінформація та російські міфи, боротьба між автократіями та демократіями. Система цінностей може стати основою місії та стратегії держави. Цінності керують поведінкою членів суспільства, процесом прийняття рішень і вибором стратегій, можуть слугувати потужним інструментом трансформації в різних сферах економіки, мотивацією до праці чи навіть боротьби.

У статті визначено велику різницю між двома націями (українською та російською) та розглянуто підхід Хантінгтон до майбутнього геополітичного становища України.

Ключові слова: *російсько-українська війна, стратегічне планування, цінності, ідеологія.*

Introduction. *The history that is being made today is once again turning the world into a confrontation of ideologies. Francis Fukuyama's belief in the three pillars of a unified world ideology - liberalizing democracy, social market economy, and globalization, leading to positive interdependence between countries and national prosperity - was broken by the Russian Federation's*

full-scale invasion of Ukraine[Fukuyama, 1992]. The collapse of the international security system and the world's political-ideological polarization require revision of the state's strategic plans.

Some fitches of the Russo-Ukrainian war:

a. Dynamic systems and uncertain conditions. This thesis was rewritten several times, because of the changes in the agenda. Who could believe that Russia would invade Kyiv? Who could imagine that the German government or NATO would change their mind and narratives concerning Ukraine in a 6 month of full-scale invasion? No European Union, nor the USA didn't expect such resistance against Russia by Ukrainians. And of course, it is hard to predict something when you have to deal with a such leader as Putin. In the field of science of strategic planning, one never says that something will definitely happen one observes the possibilities. Otherwise, linear forecasting in a long-term perspective (taking the times from Bohdan Khmelnytsky, 1648) gives us the possibility to predict Russian Ukrainian war.

b. *Total disinformation and Russian myths.* In the times of war public diplomacy has return to the times of cold war or even worse. If we look to the scale of effect devoted by the Russian state and non-government actors that are inseparable from the government to disinform countries and societies in different parts of the world, one would suggest that these efforts would have limited effect if there were not supported by our own fitches and characteristics of liberalism or postmodernism or simply by historical ignorance. This is particularly case about the population and even experts that are suffering of historical ignorance particularly with regard of Russia. If you look through the recent works of foreign experts or analysts who comment on Russia's relations with NATO or the EU, they were not aware of how Russia influences countries in the periphery and often did not perceive such a country as Ukraine as a subject of international relations.

Disinformation is not about spreading lies; it consists of messages of truth and false that are misleading. All effective disinformation is based on a particle of recognized true, definite false, and Russian mythology. The myths of "brother nations", Russia as the only heir of Kyiv Rus, the creation of Ukraine by Lenin, NATO's promises not to expand to the east, etc. have become known as scientific concepts. And the process of creating such myths began many years ago, in the times of Ekaterina II and Ivan Grozny [Snyder, 2022]. The problem is that many Russians have grown up with this mythology. Many pro-Putin essays, as well as those of Mykola I, Alexander II, and Kateryna II, aimed to distort the memory of the Getmanshchyna, Zaporizhska Sich, the development of the state on Ukrainian lands, its language, culture, and literature. So today's Russians grew up entirely on falsified history, just like most Ukrainians.

The distinguishing feature of Russian imperialism compared with others is including the identities and history of other nations into their own. They believe that Ukraine is a Russian identity, but the problem is that Europeans and even some Ukrainians have believed too [Sherr, 2022].

c. The strategic heart of this war, is indeed a battle between autocracies and democracies, between opposite values of east and west, which is the core idea of this thesis. The deep analysis of this thesis was made in a recent article by Parfinenko A. [Parfinenko A., 2023].

The research results. *Value-based issues in terms of state strategic planning.* Strategic planning and building an effective strategy are based on objective and subjective factors. Objective factors include the presence of basic values and interests, external factors, and national resources. Subjective factors include the views, ideas, stances, and values of the ruling elite at one or another period of time.

Reich considers strategy as a reproduction of beliefs and ideas developed in society[Magaziner et al, 1982, p. 12]. R. Reich's scientific research proves the importance of taking social values into account when developing state-level strategic documents. The goals formulated in state strategic documents should combine economic and social values.

The value system should be the basis of the mission. Values guide the behavior of members of society, decision-making and the choice of strategies, can serve as a powerful tool for transformation in different fields of economy, motivation to work or even fight etc. Large-scale changes cause the destruction of a part of the existing values in the public and individual consciousness, therefore there is a need to replace them with new values, the establishment of which should be aimed at reforms (strategic changes)[Kravchenko, 2014, p.76].

The mission of the state, which is based on values and satisfaction of the national interest, is closely related to the vision. A vision, based on the present situation and predictive research, defines what the future should be like. As a rule, it is considered as a result of the implementation of the strategic plan and helps to formulate goals.

While creating a strategic vision and strategy for the development of the state, it is necessary to define a valuable component that should become the primary basis of the ideological and pragmatic goals of the state. Among the main directions of the influence of values on state strategic planning as a function of state management, the following can be distinguished: the influence of values on the content, nature and direction of strategies.

A. Toynbee noted that in the process of interaction of different cultures, the forms of social organization are assimilated more or less successfully, but the core of culture, the system of values, is much more difficult [Toynbee, 1989, p.289]. This shows that it is possible to create one or another model of the state-political system and the system of state administration corresponding to it, but it is impossible to maintain such a system without its heart. That is why it is important to clearly understand the value orientations of the nation and harmonize state geopolitical strategies accordingly. This is the point where the "people-government" confrontation arises, this is the point where the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine began. This determines the importance of clearly defining the value bases of geopolitical strategic planning, i.e. the legislative consolidation of the list of basic values, which cover everything necessary for the functioning and development of society, the satisfaction of material and spiritual needs of man.

The most important national value orientation is the recognition of a person as the highest social value for the entire society. All other values must be subordinated and related to the value of a person. Based on this, the values in state strategic planning should include the main values on which the European community is based: the rule of law, democracy, freedom and equality, respect for human rights and dignity.

Russo-Ukrainian war: the battle of opposite ideologies.

Scientists identify changes in the international situation as one of the factors affecting changes in the national values [Melnyk, 2017, p.28] In the perspective of the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, changes in the international situation have only strengthened the historically established postulates of the Ukrainian nation, which become a unifying factor in the Ukrainian development, as was evidenced by sociological surveys [Survey results, 2022].

From the historical point of view of Ukraine's geopolitical choice, let's turn to the papers of the prominent philosopher and historian Mykhaylo Hrushevskyyi, who noted that "Ukrainian-Russian relations are complicated by the existence of a deep antithesis between these two peoples who are close in blood but different in spirit. The Ukrainian people are a nation of Western culture, while Russia has never known such pluralism and was distinguished by an all-powerful government and an amorphous, politically passive society. Compared to the people of Great Russia, the Ukrainian people, in terms of their culture and spirit, are a Western people and at the same time a people rich in Eastern influences. The Great Russian people, even though they are Europeanized, are completely under the power of the oriental spirit and elements and cannot play a mediating role between the West and the East due to the presence of character traits that are not only "deeply different" from the European, but also "deeply "disgusting" to him, namely: patriarchy, increased interest in the moral problems of the "cuckold nation", lack of one's own human dignity and contempt the dignity of another person, rejection of cultural and social values and glorification of one's own lack of culture and disorganization, etc." [Shulga, 2006, p.147].

It is from such an embryonic state begins the counterbalance between the national values that precede the geostrategies of Ukraine and the ideological basis of the imperialist efforts of the Russian Federation today, which is based on the doomed Eurasian approach.

The geopolitical concept "Russkiy Mir", which is based on the Eurasian concept is a Russian quasi-ideology aimed at the expansion of influence abroad and uniting the states considered by the Kremlin as its backyard on the basis of Russian language common history in Moscow's perception and Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). As a political concept, it gained some importance in the 2000s, particularly after Vladimir Putin started using it in his public speeches, making an appeal to the "compatriots" abroad. In the initial stages, ROC played a significant role in the development and

promotion of the concept, which supported the Kremlin-designed confrontation between the “Russkiy Mir” and Western democracies that are consistently portrayed as hostile on the civilizational level and as attempting to enforce their “destructive values” on the other states. With “Russkiy Mir” Putin’s Russia attempts to establish itself as a civilization-forming state and as a leading geopolitical actor [Hurak et al, 2023].

Ukraine follows Western values. It is a democratic state. Its democracy is still young, but much progress has already been made. Ukrainian people can vote in fair elections — and in the last 30 years, six different politicians took the presidential seat. Reforms were started in many fields to eradicate corruption, ensure freedom of the press, and increase accountability and transparency of the officials.

Since 1991, two revolutions have taken place in Ukraine. During the Orange Revolution in 2004, Ukrainians were not willing to accept election results rigged by the authorities. Western Revolution – Revolution of Dignity (2014) made the pro-Russian president Yanukovich run away from Ukraine and turn the country towards membership of the EU bloc.

It seems that the core values of Ukrainian society – a love of freedom, democracy, free-thinking and European values – are values that are anathema to Putin; he can neither comprehend, nor tolerate, these values – and so instead he is seeking to destroy them.

At this point, the investigations of Huntington seem not to come true. In his research “The Clash of civilization” Huntington identifies three possible future options for Ukraine [Huntington, 1993, p.166]:

- *Absence of armed conflict with Russia due to civilizational commonality and close ties.* We can’t agree with this thesis as due to civilization differences it hasn’t happened because of different ideologies and views on the future geopolitical strategies.

- *The actual split inside Ukraine.* Huntington believed that in this scenario, the eastern part of Ukraine would become part of Russia, and Crimea should be the beginning of this process. Russia was trying to begin this process but Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians had united around one goal to protect the independence of their native country – Ukraine.

- *Ukraine will remain "united, internally divided and independent",* and will continue to cooperate closely with Russia, due to Huntington. Such interval was in our common history, but now it is time to finish this unequal connection/cooperation. Future scenarios are

The other reality raised, the actual split of civilization has taken place between Russia and Ukraine. So, speaking about strategic planning and developing geopolitical strategy it is extremely important to take into account value-based factors.

Conclusions. This is the lesson to each country: to appreciate its own identity, language, culture, and history in order to save its independence.

Speaking about future security architecture on the value-based ground it is worth admitting the increasing role of Ukraine as the geopolitical center in East Europe. Meeting in Ramstein gives grounds to speak that the development of a new world security model begins.

It should transform in such a way that a large-scale military conflict in the region in the future would not make sense through the absolute parity of the parties. It doesn’t make sense even now, but the Russian government couldn’t realize this deep otherness between Ukrainians and Russians, as it wasn’t realized by most Europeans, due to European liberal views and ignorance of the real history, which is extremely opposite to Russian myths.

This powerful unity is foreseen in the Baltic-Black Sea alliance of Eastern European states, which is being developed by Ukrainian, Polish, and Lithuanians in the region which has a common geo-political history of over 100 years. All the countries located on the Baltic-Black Sea axis are Christian ones and their nations have long European cultural traditions and similar views on the Soviet Union damage. This is not a discussion of today. After the victory, researchers will think about possible military collaboration. After the war the status quo is not an option concerning extending NATO, Ukraine needs effective security guarantees by states that have the will and capacity to help Ukraine to defend itself.

The war in Ukraine has a far-reaching impact, changing not only the security architecture in Europe, but influencing geopolitics almost globally. In this context, it is still too early to talk about

the final contours of the new international system, because it will depend primarily on the results of the Russian-Ukrainian war, as well as on the actions of the China, the EU, the United States, and a number of other factors. Therefore, all future configurations of the international system are possible: monopolar, bipolar or multipolar. One thing is obvious - under any configuration of the international system, Russia will no longer play the role of one of the poles of influence (the NATO extend, reducing the energy dependence by Europe, international isolation of Russia).

And to finish with it is worth to cite Jacqueline Kennedy message to Mikita Khrushchev after the finishing Cuban missile crisis and the death of her husband: "The danger which troubled my husband was that war might be started not so much by the big men as by the little ones. While big men know the needs for self-control and restraint — little men are sometimes moved more by fear and pride".

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