

POLICY OF NEW HORIZONS OF UKRAINE IN THE ASIAN DIRECTION

ПОЛІТИКА НОВИХ ГОРИЗОНТІВ УКРАЇНИ НА АЗІЙСЬКОМУ НАПРЯМІ

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«Gutta cavat lapidem»

The saying of the Roman poet Ovid (43-18 BC) in «Letters from Pontus»

Abstract. *The article examines the new horizons policy in relation to the Asian continent, which was announced by the President of Ukraine at the annual Conference of Ambassadors of Ukraine at the end of December 2022. It is stated that the policy of Asian countries regarding Putin's war against Ukraine is the policy of a «toothless tiger». It is assumed that due to the war and collective Western sanctions against countries that bought Russian weapons, Russia lost its position as the number one arms seller to Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and India.*

It was recommended to the specialists of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine to strengthen the coordination of efforts between the member states of ASEAN, Central Asia, India, and China, to expand the International Contact Group for ensuring the defense of Ukraine (the Ramstein coalition) at the expense of these countries in order to defeat the Russian occupier. It is emphasized that the Russian-Ukrainian war has a fundamental impact on the world system of international relations in the security, economic, and trade components and destroys the European security system.

Key words: *ASEAN, Global South, diplomacy, peace, neutrality, the new horizons policy, Southeast Asia (SEA), the United Nations (UN), Ukraine, position, Russian-Ukrainian war, «toothless tiger» policy, war.*

Анотація. *У статті досліджено політику нових горизонтів щодо азійського континенту, яка була озвучена Президентом України на щорічній Конференції послів України в кінці грудня 2022 року. Констатовано, що політика азійських країн щодо Путінської війни проти України є політикою «беззубого тигра». Припущено, що через війну та санкції колективного Заходу проти країн, які купували раніше російську зброю, Росія втратила позицію номер один як продавця зброї до Південно-Східної Азії, Центральної Азії та Індії.*

Рекомендовано фахівцям Міністерства закордонних справ України посилити координацію зусиль між державами-членами АСЕАН, ЦА, Індією, Китаєм, щоб розширити за рахунок цих країн Міжнародну контактну групу із забезпечення оборони України (коаліція «Рамштайн») задля перемоги над російським окупантом. Акцентовано, що російсько-українська війна має фундаментальний вплив на світову систему міжнародних відносин в безпековому, економічному, торговельному складниках та руйнує європейську систему безпеки.

Ключові слова: *АСЕАН, війна, Глобальний Південь, дипломатія, мир, нейтралітет, Організація Об'єднаних Націй (ООН), Південно-Східна Азія (ПСА), позиція, політика нових горизонтів, політика «беззубого тигра», російсько-українська війна, Україна.*

Introduction. *The study begins with the well-known phraseology of the Roman poet Ovid «A drop sharpens a stone not by force, but by frequent falling». This expression best explains the state, problems and prospects of Ukraine's cooperation with the leading countries of Asia. Ukraine is trying, as «a drop sharpens a stone», with frequent reminders of the crimes of the Putin regime, to*

change the neutral status of most Asian countries regarding Putin's war against Ukraine and destroy the stereotype that the Russian Federation, as the successor of the USSR, is supposedly a fighter against world imperialism, a stronghold of national-liberation struggle of the peoples of Asia and Africa for their state independence. Other myths that need debunking are the invincibility of the second army in the world; an irreplaceable supplier of weapons and cheap energy resources; a «great power» with a permanent mandate and support for the interests of Asian countries in the UN Security Council, etc.

Russia's armed invasion into Ukraine on February 24, 2022 caused fair and unanimous international condemnation of all civilized democratic states and led to the gradual introduction of a number of sectoral economic and personal sanctions against the aggressor country and a number of its high-ranking officials by the United States, Canada, Great Britain, the European Union, Australia, Japan and a number of other, mostly Western countries. The reaction was clear and unambiguous: Russia grossly violated international law, undermines European and global security and stability.

However, the reaction of most Asian countries to the war unleashed by the Russian political leadership in Europe was much more restrained than in the West and reminds the policy of «toothless tiger». In the conditions of overcoming the existential threat from the official Kremlin and for the sake of operational victory over the occupier, Ukraine is forced to look for support and allies not only in the West, but also in the East. On December 22-26, 2022, at the annual Conference of Ambassadors of Ukraine, which was held under the slogan: «War and new horizons in the world», the President of Ukraine V. Zelenskyi emphasized that Ukrainian diplomacy should pay special attention to the countries of the Global South. At the same time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dmytro Kuleba, emphasized the key priorities of the ambassadors' work in 2023: strengthening international support for Ukraine in resisting Russian aggression; strengthening of stability and defense capability of Ukraine; restoration of the damaged energy infrastructure, as well as provision of effective security mechanisms for Ukraine. Thus, to «sharpen the stone» and change the position in the international arena with the frequency of the «diplomatic word» and the policy of new horizons in the Asian direction [*Міністерство*: 2022].

The purpose of research is to investigate the policy of new horizons of Ukraine for 2023 and to analyze the transformation of the policy of Asian countries towards Ukraine in the context of a full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation.

Recent literature review. The article is based on a number of scientific works of foreign and domestic authors. The analysis of foreign and Ukrainian publications on this subject demonstrates that Ukrainian and foreign researchers from Western countries highlighted Putin's war against Ukraine more often and thoroughly comparatively with Asian researchers. This is largely explained by the fact that most Asian countries have taken a publicly neutral position in relation to the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Among domestic researchers Yevhenii Prypyk first began to highlight this problem and the position of ASEAN member states regarding Russian aggression in Ukraine in his scientific work [*Prypyk, Ye. The position of ASEAN member states regarding Russian aggression in Ukraine and its economic consequences for the countries of the region*, 2022]. In the context of the policy of the ASEAN countries toward Ukraine following Russia's full-scale invasion was briefly described by Iryna Krupenya [*Krupenya, I.*, 2022]. India's position regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war was covered by an expert of the State Institution «Institute of World History of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine» Lukash O. [*Lukash, O.*, 2022], an expert from the same Institute Oliinyk O. described China's position on Russian military aggression against Ukraine [*Oliinyk, O.*, 2022]. Lossovskiy I. First-Class Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine highlighted strategy and prospects of Ukraine's relations with the countries of the East Asian region' [*Lossovskiy, I.*, 2019].

The extreme urgency of this problem attracted the attention of Western scientists, in particular Professor Ann Marie Murphy who is director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, her research interests include international relations in Asia, political development in Southeast Asia etc. [*Murphy, A.*, 2022]; Dr Frederick Kliem who is a Research Fellow and lecturer at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University in Singapore in his research highlighted issue if ASEAN should take a stronger position on the Ukraine war and if it a sign of weakness, or a smart diplomatic move [*Kliem, F.*, 2022]; David Hutt, German journalist in his article rose the rhetoric question what's behind SE Asia's muted Ukraine response [*Hutt, D.*, 2022] etc.

Among Asian researchers should be named Premesha Saha, who described ASEAN's Non-Linear Approach to the Russia-Ukraine War [*Premesha, S., 2022*]; Shoji Tomotaka who wrote about the reactions among 11 countries of Southeast Asia, including East Timor, which were mixed and try to explain these differing [*Shoji, T., 2022*]; Shankari Sundararaman in his research paid the attention at how certain regional mechanisms led by ASEAN, have responded to the crisis. Among the several ASEAN mechanisms such as the ARF, ADMM Plus and the EAS, the latter comes critically into focus [*Sundararaman, S., 2022*]; Ian Storey and William Choong they predicted in their research that the global crisis triggered by the Russia-Ukraine war will likely cause serious economic problems for Southeast Asia: the rising price of energy, food and commodities, worsening supply chain disruptions and stock market volatility could threaten the region's economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. [*Storey, I., Choong, W., 2022*]; Lukas Singarimbun indicated in his article that the widely varying responses to the ongoing invasion of Ukraine among ASEAN countries highlights their varying relationships with – and dependence on – Russia [*Singarimbun, L., 2022*] etc.

Putin's war against Ukraine is under constant monitoring by foreign television and radio corporation BBC, CNN, Al Jazeera, Deutsche Welle; domestic daily all-Ukrainian newspaper «Day», the English-language newspaper «The Ukrainian Weekly»; Asian newspaper «Bangkok Post», «The Star», «The Straits Times», «The Life News», «The Manila Times», «Media Indonesia», «Saigon Times» etc; Ukrainian news agency «RBC Ukraine», Television news service «TCN», an online publication «Radio Svoboda», databases of Human Rights Watch etc.

The entire array of messages about Ukraine in mass media of the «ASEAN» since February 24, 2022 should be summarized as follows: the destruction of Ukrainian cities, civilian casualties as a result of shelling by the Russian army; daily addresses of President V. Zelenskyi to the leaders of various countries and international organizations about the issue and provision of weapons for self-defence; migration of Ukrainian refugees to Europe; expulsion of Russian diplomats from the countries of the world; statements of world leaders in support of Ukraine; sanctions pressure on the Russian Federation; the food crisis and concerns about rising food and fuel prices.

Main research results. The Strategy of Ukraine's Foreign Policy Activities developed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and approved by the Decree of the President of Ukraine № 448/2021 of August 26, 2021, in which regional cooperation with the countries of the Indo-Pacific region is one of the directions of Ukraine's foreign policy activities, is part of the course on opening of new horizons for Ukraine [*Стратегія: 2021*]. According to the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this strategy is already bringing concrete results and increasing international support for Ukraine against the background of Russian aggression. As part of the course to open new horizons, Ukrainian diplomats try to be as «a drop sharpens a stone», and they are present wherever there is Ukrainian interest, constantly talking about Russia's crimes both for the military and political leadership of Asian countries and for society through the mass media. Separately, Dmytro Kuleba emphasized that the Asian strategy envisages work not only with the ASEAN subregion, but also with the countries of Central Asia, India, and China, taking into account the publicly neutral position of these countries [*Азійська: 2022*].

The invitation of the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine for the first time in the history of independent state formation to the ASEAN summit in November 2022 demonstrates not only a political signal of support, changes in the previous policy and old stereotypes about Ukraine, but also the opening of new horizons in trade and business, which will help Ukrainian business even under the conditions of war, enter new markets in the PSA, earn money and return it to the economy of Ukraine. Moreover, while in Cambodia, without leaving the capital Phnom Penh, the minister made an «Asian tour», as he met with colleagues from the PSA countries, who admire the successes of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the battlefield and successful counter-offensive operations. Separately, it should be noted that during the ASEAN summit, a document entitled «Instrument on Accession to the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Southeast Asia» was signed on behalf of Ukraine. According to the minister, this document will help Ukraine acquire the status of an ASEAN partner, and thus open a number of new opportunities for Ukrainian business, in particular in the areas of digital transformation, pharmaceuticals, agriculture, engineering [*Дмитро: 2022*].

According to the subjective opinion of the researcher Dmytro Kuleba, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine made the «Asian Tour» in November 2022 to implement the policy of new horizons of Ukraine in the Asian direction, because it was necessary to dispel Russian myths and lies and try to change the perception in relation to of Ukraine. An analysis of the positions of the ASEAN countries regarding the condemnation of the brutal war showed the following data. Asian researchers grouped the reactions of ASEAN countries into three and compared most of states reaction with a toothless tiger. Singapore, Indonesia, and Brunei condemned Russia's move immediately after it commenced the invasion, albeit using varying language. Singapore said it «strongly condemns any unprovoked invasion of a sovereign country under any pretext». In early March, it announced economic sanctions against Russia, banning exports of military-related goods and banking transactions. Indonesia was less direct and condemned «any action that constitutes a violation of the territory and sovereignty of a country»; and Brunei used a formulation similar to Indonesia's.

The second group consist of Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines which evidenced less tough reactions. Vietnam referred to the United Nations Charter, emphasised the need for «self-restraint» and «dialogue», but stopped short of condemning Russia's actions. Malaysia said it hoped for «the best possible peaceful settlement» to the conflict. The Philippines said it was not for Manila to «meddle» in the events in Ukraine. In the last group, Myanmar's State Administration Council stood alone in supporting Russia's actions [*Premesha and Lin: 2022*].

ASEAN as institution which joined ten countries of Southeast Asia issued within two months after the beginning of opened Russian aggression three joint foreign ministerial statements on the situation in Ukraine. The first statement came on February 26, 2022, two days after the invasion. It was only two paragraphs long, expressing concern about the deteriorating situation in Ukraine and calling on all parties concerned to exercise maximum restraint and resolve the conflict peacefully. The statement also called on all parties to uphold the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and equal state-to-state relations. The second statement came on March 3, 2022, after the fighting escalated. The statement expressing only concern about the growing humanitarian crisis and a willingness to mediate among the concerned parties. The third statement was issued on April 8, 2022, which only focused on the humanitarian crisis, expressing strong concern about the killing of civilians, including the massacre at Bucha, and stating support for the UN Secretary-General's call for the creation of an independent commission of inquiry on civilian casualties. An analysis of ASEAN's statements confirms that none of statements directly condemned Russia as an aggressor and violator of international law [*Shoji: 2022*].

The situation in Ukraine and the aggression of the Russian Federation potentially increases the tension in South Asia. India takes a cautious and wait-and-see position in the context of the war in Ukraine and is in no hurry to join the US efforts aimed at actively countering not only the Russian Federation, but also China. Such a position introduces difficulties in relations with Western countries. India's position regarding the war in Ukraine is based on its traditional principles of neutrality. India's neutrality consists in maintaining a strategic balance, balanced relations between major powers, which contributes to its stable development. This is the «strategic autonomy» that underpins Indian foreign policy. The country cannot allow the US or China to monopolize the global influence. Supporting one of the parties would mean undermining the balance of power. Although India has become noticeably closer to the USA in the last decade, it is not ready to give up close relations with the Russian Federation. At the same time, it will not openly support Russia, but it also does not join Western sanctions, as it does not want to destroy «strategic autonomy». Also, Indian Prime Minister Modi quite frankly expressed his position to Putin regarding the war in Ukraine during a bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Samarkand in September 2022: «... today' era is not an era of wars, and I have said more than once with you about it on the phone».

India has a negative attitude towards Putin's policy of nuclear blackmail, as it adheres to a completely different nuclear doctrine, which is based on the principle of no first use of nuclear weapons and excludes the use of such weapons against a non-nuclear state. On December 9, 2022, N. Modi cancelled the traditional face-to-face meeting in December with the President of the Russian Federation, after the latter threatened to use nuclear weapons in the war in Ukraine. India also

maintains a cautious approach to referenda in international affairs and avoids supporting processes that lead to the redrawing of the political map. This is related to the Kashmir issue [Lukash: 2022].

China's position regarding russian military aggression against Ukraine is almost no different from the position of previous Asian countries. The country's political leadership took a position of neutrality. They call the war a «crisis», which consists of «regional security tensions in Europe that have been accumulating for years» [Oliinyk: 2022]. It is very difficult for China to take sides as both countries are «strategic partners» under the Belt and Road initiative. China's neutrality towards Ukraine is not purely commercial, but due to a combination of humanism, pragmatism, and political realism. During a teleconference as part of the EU-China summit on April 1, 2022, between President Xi Jinping and EU leaders Charles Michel and Ursula von der Leyen, the Chinese leader called on all parties to work on a political settlement of the military conflict in Ukraine, avoiding escalation and a larger-scale humanitarian disaster [Yui: 2022]. At the same time, Beijing abstained three times during the voting of two resolutions of the UN General Assembly, which condemn the russian invasion of Ukraine (March 2022), and the third (October 12, 2022), which condemns the holding of illegal «referendums» in the occupied territories and voted against the exclusion of the russian federation from the UN Human Rights Council. Such actions of China directly demonstrate not only its «neutral position» towards the war in Ukraine, but also a position that is very far from outright condemnation of the aggressor [Huetong: 2022].

The neutrality of the countries of Central Asia is explained by the deeply historical traditional, political, economic, and military dependence of the countries of the region on the russian federation. The vote on the Resolution of the UN General Assembly condemning russia, «Aggression against Ukraine» on March 2, 2022 (141 countries – for, 5 – against, 35 – abstained) was indicative. The countries of the region were afraid to openly oppose russia, although each of them does not hide their fears that after Ukraine, russian aggression may reach them as well. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan abstained during the vote, and Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan did not take part in it. When voting on March 24, 2022, for the Resolution of the UN General Assembly «Humanitarian Consequences of Aggression against Ukraine», 140 countries supported it, 5 opposed it, while 4 Central Asian countries abstained, and Turkmenistan did not vote. On the question of suspending russia's membership in the UN Human Rights Committee, 4 CA countries voted against, and Turkmenistan did not vote [Yarmolenko: 2022]. The video of the St. Petersburg Economic Forum on 17 June 2022, which «circulated» around the world, is illustrative, where the Kazakh leader, in the presence of the russian dictator, declared that his country would not recognize the quasi-state entities «DPR» and «LPR» in the east of Ukraine [Portnikov: 2022]. The resolution of the war in Ukraine undermined the confidence of the leadership of Kazakhstan in the russian federation as a guarantor of security in accordance with the Budapest Memorandum of 1994. In Kazakhstan, the growing criticism among representatives of political circles and the russian mass media regarding the «persecution» of the russian language in the Republic of Kazakhstan, the rights to «historical territories» is a cause for concern in the north of the country. Putin's narrative about «historical justice», which became one of the «justifications» for the war against Ukraine, can also be used against Kazakhstan [Alimava: 2022].

It appears the logical question why most Asian countries took the neutral position toward Putin's war against Ukraine? Research of this issue show us that russia was important partner as militarily as economically for Asian countries. It is the largest supplier of defense equipment to Southeast Asia, especially Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia, which have procured large amounts of equipment from russia over the past two decades, including Sukhoi fighter jets. The Philippines, at the initiative of former President Rodrigo Duterte, is developing its military cooperation with russia and is currently in the process of procuring russia-made transport helicopters.

Thailand is also pursuing cooperation with russia, and the two countries have discussed cooperation between their defense industries, including the procurement of helicopters and tanks, the joint development of equipment, and the construction of maintenance facilities. For Thailand, where the military has held real political power since a 2014 coup, cooperation with russia is not merely military in nature. Strengthening relations with russia and China brings some political support to Thailand's own authoritarian regime.

Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam place particular importance on their military and political relations with Russia. Political support from Russia is critical for Myanmar's military junta, which has faced international criticism since replacing a civilian government in a February 2021 coup. Moreover, Russia continues to supply the weapons the regime uses to suppress citizen protestors and to fight armed ethnic minorities. Since the Lao People's Revolutionary Party took power in 1975, Laos has maintained friendly relations with the Soviet Union, and then Russia after the Cold War. Vietnam is a «repeat customer» for the Russian arms industry, ranking fifth globally and first in Southeast Asia as a destination for Russian arms exports [Shoji: 2022].

The table below shows Russia's top five arms buyers, 2015-2019 (US \$) to explain the position of India and China [Storey: 2021].

Table 1.

Ranking	Country	Value of Arms Exports
1	India	\$7.53 billion
2	China	\$4.76 billion
3	Algeria	\$4.13 billion
4	Egypt	\$2.87 billion
5	Vietnam	\$2.39 billion

Source: Data compiled from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [24]

Next table shows major defence exporters to Southeast Asia, 2000-2019 (US \$).

Table 2.

Ranking	Country	Value of Arms Exports
1	Russia	\$10.70 billion
2	United States	\$7.86 billion
3	France	\$3.57 billion
4	Germany	\$2.82 billion
5	China	\$2.60 billion
6	South Korea	\$2.15 billion
7	United Kingdom	\$1.28 billion

Source: Data compiled from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [24]

The table below shows Russia's defence exports to Southeast Asia countries, 2000-2019 (US \$ million).

Table 3.

	2000-04	2005-09	2010-14	2015-19	Total	As a % of total arms imports
Vietnam	446	404	3,278	2,387	6,515	84%
Malaysia	63	1,221	14	156	1,454	31%
Myanmar	341	443	651	-	1,435	39%
Indonesia	267	206	675	-	1,148	16%
Laos	8	4	14	76	102	44%
Thailand	-	3	20	27	73	2%
Total	1,125	2,281	4,652	2,646	10,704	-

Source: Data compiled from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [24]

At the same time Russia has been an ASEAN Dialogue Partner since 1996. It participates in all the ASEAN-led forums, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), and the East Asia Summit (EAS). In 2018, ASEAN-Russia relations were elevated to a Strategic Partnership. Russia's current efforts at expanding its influence in Southeast Asia include adopting a five-year roadmap with the 10 ASEAN members focused on trade and investment cooperation, the digital economy, and sustainable development. This framework

is referred to as the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) to Implement the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Russian Federation Strategic Partnership (2021–2025). Meanwhile, at the Sixth Eastern Economic Forum held in October 2022 in Vladivostok, Vietnam expressed willingness to bridge ASEAN and Russia, and the Eurasian Economic Union. Overall, Russia's foreign direct investment flows into ASEAN were pegged at US\$45 million in 2019, making Russia the 9th largest investor in ASEAN.

Trade cooperation between ASEAN and Russia which grew by 34 percent in 2021 and reached US\$20 billion also explained the neutral position toward Putin's war against Ukraine. Moreover, in June 2022, Indonesia's trade minister followed President Joko Widodo's instructions to boost trade with the country's non-traditional partners and visited Russia for bilateral talks as well as a meeting with the Eurasian Economic Union. While Moscow is far from being among Jakarta's largest trading partners, bilateral trade has grown significantly in recent years [Premesha: 2022].

Conclusions. The obvious fact is that Ukraine is a victim, and in the eyes of a non-engaged observer, the policy of Asian countries should not be the policy of a «toothless tiger», but pro-Ukrainian both de jure and de facto. The previous predominant «pro-Russianness» of the countries of this region can also be explained by some objective reasons, first of all, historical reasons and obsessive stereotypes. It should be noted here that Asian countries have traditionally had close long-term ties with the USSR, which is considered the political «predecessor» of today's Russia, and the latter, respectively, a follower and heir of the former. The absence of Ukrainian statehood for several centuries and its subordination to Russia created perceptions and stereotypes of secondary status, inferiority and lesser importance of Ukraine as a partner country. In the conditions of Russia's unprovoked and unjust war with Ukraine, the latter's support from Asian countries is very cautious and moderate. A large number of Asian countries continue to traditionally focus on Russia, although they refrain from supporting its aggressive actions in Ukraine, primarily for fear of falling under secondary sanctions imposed on the aggressor by the countries of the collective West. In such conditions, the need for a policy of new horizons of Ukraine in the Asian direction, which should be aimed at achieving the following goals in 2023, becomes obvious:

1. Take measures to prevent the spread of Russian propaganda and the involvement of humanitarian aid for the needs of Ukraine.
2. Support Volodymyr Zelenskyi's 10-point Peace formula, which was first voiced at the G20 summit, held in Indonesia in November 2022 to restore territorial integrity of Ukraine.
3. Increase the number of Asian countries in the International Contact Group for the Defense of Ukraine («Ramstein» coalition) for the joint victory of the aggressor.
4. Concluding documents on strengthening food security in the world.
5. Recruit demining specialists, including from Cambodia, Vietnam, etc.
6. To create a Ukrainian working group on issues of cooperation with ASEAN, which should include representatives of the military and political leadership of Ukraine, heads of diplomatic missions of Ukraine in ASEAN countries, scientists and entrepreneurs who are interested in the ASEAN market.
7. Identify specific areas of interest for cooperation, as well as analyse the necessary resources and time for project implementation.
8. Encourage academic exchanges, introduce research programs of the ASEAN subregion in Ukrainian institutions of higher education and vice versa in higher education institutions of ASEAN countries; strengthen scientific cooperation in order to inform the scientific circles of ASEAN about the situation in Ukraine and about the consequences of Putin's war.
9. To the heads of foreign diplomatic institutions of Ukraine in ASEAN countries and the Representative of Ukraine to ASEAN to carry out a set of measures of a political and informational nature to systematically acquaint the top military-political leadership with the situation on the battlefield and the quality of Russian weapons, as well as to identify as soon as possible specific areas of cooperation between ASEAN and Ukraine.
10. To establish the ASEAN Committee in Ukraine.
11. Hold consultations of political, business, and scientific circles directly between ASEAN and Ukraine; to create an international Ukraine–ASEAN Working Group on coordination and control of cooperation; to give new impetus to the active work of bilateral trade commissions

between Ukraine and ASEAN members; to initiate the negotiation process regarding the conclusion of FTA agreements.

12. Promote the mutual provision of trade privileges and liberalization of the movement of specialists (workers).

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