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PECULIARITIES OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP IN RELATIONS BETWEEN UKRAINE AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

ОСОБЛИВОСТІ СТРАТЕГІЧНОГО ПАРТНЕРСТВА У ВІДНОСИНАХ МІЖ УКРАЇНОЮ ТА КИТАЙСЬКОЮ НАРОДНОЮ РЕСПУБЛІКОЮ

ОСОБЕННОСТИ СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКОГО ПАРТНЕРСТВА В ОТНОШЕНИЯХ МЕЖДУ УКРАИНОЙ И КИТАЙСКОЙ НАРОДНОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКОЙ

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Annotation. *The article is devoted to the analysis of relations between Ukraine and the People's Republic of China on the conformity of bilateral relations to the declared status of strategic partnership. The author notes that both states actively use the instrument of strategic partnership in foreign policy activities, while the Chinese practice is characterized by a more balanced approach. Key criteria for the analysis of interstate relations for its conformity to the strategic partnership are highlighted. The features of bilateral interaction in political, economic, military-technical and humanitarian spheres are shown. The author notes that the mutual recognition of the strategic nature of Ukrainian-Chinese interaction at the highest level, the existence of a normative-legal base and the mechanism of cooperation, the positive upward dynamics of bilateral contacts fully meet the criteria of strategic partnership. True, the political sphere, despite its impartial character and official declaration of support for territorial integrity by the parties to each other, is marked by the lack of coordination of positions among partners on international issues, which is of great importance in the context of Russian aggression against Ukraine. The economic aspect, despite the presence of mutual interest, is marked by a significant untapped potential, which is due to the structural weakness of Ukraine and its low position in the priorities of China's foreign policy in the post-Soviet space and CEE, in particular, given the great importance for China of relations with Russia, the absence of a comprehensive strategy in Ukrainian side for developing relations with the Middle Kingdom. The humanitarian direction is also characterized by a significant untapped potential. As a result, the author offers a number of recommendations on increasing the effectiveness of the implementation of the concept of strategic partnership in relations between Ukraine and China.*

Keywords: *Ukraine, China, Ukrainian-Chinese relations, strategic partnership, foreign policy, New Silk Road.*

Анотація. *Стаття присвячена аналізу відносин між Україною та Китайською Народною Республікою на предмет відповідності двосторонніх взаємин задекларованому статусу стратегічного партнерства. Автор відмічає, що обидві держави активно застосовують інструмент стратегічного партнерства у зовнішньополітичній діяльності, при цьому китайська практика характеризується більш виваженим підходом. Висвітлено ключові критерії для аналізу міждержавних стосунків у ключі стратегічного партнерства. Показано особливості двосторонньої взаємодії у політичній, економічній, військово-технічній та гуманітарній сферах. Автор зазначає, що взаємне визнання стратегічного характеру українсько-китайської взаємодії на найвищому рівні, наявність нормативно-правової бази та механізму співробітництва, позитивна висхідна динаміка двосторонніх контактів цілком відповідають критеріям стратегічного партнерства. Щоправда, політична сфера, попри неупереджений характер та офіційного декларування підтримки територіальної цілісності сторонами один одного, відмічається відсутністю координації між партнерами щодо міжнародних проблем, що має велике значення в умовах російської агресії щодо України. Економічний аспект, попри наявність взаємною зацікавленості, відмічається значним невикористаним потенціалом, що зумовлено структурною слабкістю України та її низькою позицією в пріоритетах зовнішньої політики Китаю на пострадянському просторі та ЦСЄ, зокрема, з огляду на більшу значущість відносин для КНР з Росією, а також відсутності в українській стороні комплексної стратегії щодо розбудови взаємин з Піднебесною. Гуманітарний напрям також характеризується значним невикористаним потенціалом. У підсумку автор пропонує низку рекомендацій щодо підвищення ефективності реалізації концепції стратегічного партнерства у відносинах між Україною та Китаєм.*

Ключові слова: *Україна, КНР, українсько-китайські відносини, стратегічне партнерство, зовнішня політика, Новий Шовковий шлях.*

Аннотация. *Статья посвящена анализу отношений между Украиной и Китайской Народной Республикой на предмет соответствия двусторонних отношений задекларированному статусу стратегического партнерства. Автор отмечает, что оба государства активно применяют инструмент стратегического партнерства во внешнеполитической деятельности, при этом китайская практика характеризуется более взвешенным подходом. Освещены ключевые критерии для анализа межгосударственных отношений в ключе стратегического партнерства. Показаны особенности двустороннего взаимодействия в политической, экономической, военно-технической и гуманитарной сферах. Автор отмечает, что взаимное признание стратегического характера украинско-китайского взаимодействия на высшем уровне, наличие нормативно-правовой базы и механизма сотрудничества, положительная восходящая динамика двусторонних контактов вполне соответствуют критериям стратегического партнерства. Правда, политическая сфера, несмотря на беспристрастный характер и официального декларирования поддержки территориальной целостности сторонами друг друга, отмечается отсутствием координации позиций между партнерами по международным проблемам, что имеет большое значение в условиях российской агрессии в отношении Украины. Экономический аспект, несмотря на наличие взаимной заинтересованности, отмечается значительным неиспользованным потенциалом, что обусловлено структурной слабостью Украины и ее низкой позицией в приоритетах внешней политики Китая на постсоветском пространстве и ЦВЕ, в частности, учитывая большую значимость для КНР отношений с Россией, а также*

отсутствия в украинский стороны комплексной стратегии по развитию взаимоотношений с Поднебесной. Гуманитарное направление также характеризуется значительным неиспользованным потенциалом. В итоге автор предлагает ряд рекомендаций по повышению эффективности реализации концепции стратегического партнерства в отношениях между Украиной и Китаем.

Ключевые слова: *Украина, КНР, украинский-китайские отношения, стратегическое партнерство, внешняя политика, Новый Шелковый путь.*

The current problem. The rapid dynamism of modern international processes, coupled with the tendency to branch out and complicate international contacts, leads to the deepening of the multidimensionality of international life, which is manifested in various spheres of social interaction – from culture to security. The growing interdependence between “actors” of international relations, in turn, leads to the need to find new forms and mechanisms for coordinating the interaction between them.

In this perspective, strategic partnership has become a widespread form of interaction in a world that is increasingly becoming polycentric. It is characteristic of the development of foreign policy when a large number of governments proclaim the establishment of “special relations” with both neighboring and distant states, as well as with some international organizations.

Ukraine and the People's Republic of China (PRC) have officially proclaimed the establishment of a strategic level of bilateral relations. True, the rather widespread of this phenomenon in international relations is characterized by the insufficient reinforcement of the declared state of relations with practical filling.

This necessitates the study of Ukrainian-Chinese relations in the context of identifying the peculiarities of implementing a strategic partnership in bilateral interaction.

The aim of the article. The purpose of the paper is to analyze the peculiarities of the strategic partnership between Ukraine and China in the political, economic and humanitarian spheres, outlining their problems and formulating recommendations for improving bilateral cooperation.

Analysis of the latest publications. The growth of China's strength and international activity could not escape the attention of Ukrainian scientists, especially in the context of the development of Ukrainian-Chinese relations. Among the array of domestic researchers it is possible to note the work of such experts as A. Z. Goncharuk, E. V. Gobov, V. O. Kiktenko, A. A. Koval, S. A. Koshovy, A. V. Litvinenko, V. Perebinyis and Y. Yaroshenko, O.O. Sosyukina, devoted to the analysis of a wide range of issues in bilateral relations, including implementation of the concept of strategic partnership.

As for the Chinese experts who are studying the problems of the Ukrainian-Chinese relations, one should mention the analytical researches of Liu Jun, Zhen Fey, Sun Yihua, Zhang I, Zhang Hong, which covered the issues of coordinating the concept of development of two countries, the risks of Ukraine's participation in the project “One Belt, One Road”, the specifics of trade-economic and educational cooperation.

It should be emphasized, that the geopolitical changes caused by the annexation of the Crimea by Russia prompted an intensification of interest in the study of Ukrainian-Chinese interaction by a number of Western researchers. In particular, it should be mentioned the researches by I. Ava-Pointon, G. Baggini, N. Peterson, who analyze the peculiarities of bilateral relations in the geopolitical context through the prism of interaction between Ukraine, China, Russia, the USA and the EU.

While paying tribute to the work of domestic and foreign researchers, it should be noted that this problem has not found its final solution in Ukraine, that determines the need for further scientific researches.

The important research results. It is noteworthy that the vast majority of experts believe that strategic partnership as a form of international cooperation has replaced the policy

of building alliances, which was typical of the Cold War era [But: 2015, 22]. In the current situation, the aggravation of global and regional competition, the intensification of the struggle for resources and markets, the actualization of the confrontation with the use of military force, the relationship of strategic partnership fall into the conditions of additional tests [Fesenko: 2015, 24].

The phenomenon of strategic partnership continues to be the object of scientific research. However, there is no consensus on the definition of this term. Among the criteria for analyzing the relevance of the relationship to the level of strategic partnership, can be distinguished:

- balance of interests between the parties, where attention is focused on revealing a certain level of their coincidence and overall compatibility;
- the mutual recognition by the parties of the strategic nature of the relationship between them and its essence, which includes analysis of both formal statements by the political leadership and a hidden understanding of the role of strategic partnership for each of the parties;
- the formation of a contractual framework that documents the main directions and tasks of the strategic partnership, as well as the principles of cooperation and responsibilities of the parties;
- creation of a functional mechanism for the implementation of the strategic partnerships outlined in the contractual framework;
- the dynamics of interaction, which reflects the practical implementation of the cooperation process on the basis of implementation of specific projects in several areas, while demonstrating the effectiveness of the partnership for each of the parties, which in turn is an important aspect of the evaluation of cooperation and allows to determine the level of compliance of the practical component with the aspirations of parties and the goals of strategic partnership. It is also necessary to take into account the presence or absence of foreign policy coordination between the parties regarding global and regional problems of international relations;
- the nature of partner behavior in the process of cooperation, which should take into account the principles of mutual benefit, non-discriminatory measures, the ability to take into account each other's interests and make them correlated, which will be reflected in the coordination of their joint actions and positions [But: 2015, 43-44].

It should be noticed that Ukraine and China actively use the instrument of strategic partnership in foreign policy activities. In particular, the Celestial Empire is a global leader in the number of strategic partners (about 50). In the arsenal of Ukraine there are more than 20 strategic partners. However, the differences in the use of this tool by the parties should be emphasized.

For the domestic foreign policy practice is a characteristic non-system character of proclamation of a country as a strategic partner.

The Chinese approach has a more balanced basis, among the principles of which can be distinguished: 1. non-confrontational relations between the parties; 2. non-alignment and lack of orientation against a third country; 3. low level of political cooperation [Kiktenko: 2012, 56-57].

Strategic partnership in the interstate relations is realized in areas important for the parties, among which the political dimension deserves special attention. In this context, we should note that official diplomatic relations between Ukraine and China were established on January 4, 1992.

Obviously, political relations have a favorable foundation for development, since the parties do not have antagonistic geopolitical contradictions. Moreover, the PRC officially supports the territorial integrity of Ukraine, which, in its turn, considers Taiwan an integral part of China.

At the official documentary level, bilateral relations were identified as the relationship of strategic partnership in the Joint Declaration on the Establishment and Development of Strategic Partnership Relations (2011). In the future, the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation (2013), the Joint Declaration on the deepening of strategic partnership relations and the Program for the development of relations of strategic partnership between Ukraine and the PRC for 2014–2018 were signed between the parties [*Goncharuk, Gobova: 2016, 24*].

It should be emphasized that the deepening of contacts with the Celestial Empire does not counteract other geopolitical players and does not affect the issue of Ukraine's sovereignty, which makes it possible to consider official Beijing as an impartial international partner in the political sphere [*Perebiynis, Yaroshenko: 2015, 16*].

The official acknowledgment of the leaders of both countries on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations (2017) testifies to the mutual recognition of the strategic importance of bilateral relations. In particular, the President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko emphasized that the friendship of two peoples, support for sovereignty and territorial integrity, equal and mutually beneficial cooperation are the basis for further development of bilateral relations [*Poroshenko: 2017, 4*]. In turn, the Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, emphasized the stable and healthy development of relations between the states, the continuous saturation with the content of the strategic partnership and the desire to further strengthen cooperation in all spheres [*Xi Jinping: 2017, 5*].

True, in the wars of Ukraine with the RF, the position of the PRC is obviously of great importance. As already noted, official Beijing supports the territorial integrity of Ukraine, while it believes that sanctions against Russia will not be an effective instrument. Interestingly, in 2014, the China made a statement regarding a peaceful settlement of the annexation of Crimea through the creation of an effective mechanism involving all interested parties [*Goncharuk, Gobova: 2016, 58*].

During a meeting between President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko and Chinese leader Xi Jinping in 2017 on the World Economic Forum in Davos confirmed the strategic status of bilateral relations, support for Ukraine's sovereignty and the intention to intensify political and economic dialogue. In addition, the Ukrainian president, considering the international importance and role of Ukraine's security guarantor under the Budapest Memorandum, expressed hope that China would contribute to a peaceful settlement of the situation in the Donbass, a cessation of Russian aggression against Ukraine and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, including the Crimea [18].

In this light, it should be emphasized that, in current circumstances, the exchange of statements between the leaders of the countries is more important than before as political declarations serve as a peculiar summary to assess bilateral relations and explain ways of their activation [*Litvinenko: 2017, 44*].

However, despite such statements and expert discussions on the possible involvement of the PRC in the Norman format, no practical steps have been taken. The reasons for this situation can be found in the following points:

- the problem of war between Ukraine and the Russian Federation is considered by China in the context of a large-scale geopolitical game with the United States and its allies. Accordingly, the PRC indirectly supports Russia (the absence of official criticism of Moscow's aggressive policy, support of economic contacts, lending, which confronts official Washington with its resources and turns away attention from China's international activity. It should be added that the PRC coordinates from time to time a position with the RF on international events based on the rejection of the global influence of the United States and the collective West in general;
- the outlined position on Russia's aggressive foreign policy allows China to receive significant economic, military-technical and strategic profits from Moscow, including increased influence in the Far East and Siberia. It should also be noted that, in view of the implementation of the Chinese New Silk Road (NSR) project, which is

realized mainly through the territory of the RF, the pro-Russian position gets additional impetus;

- however, it is obvious that Ukraine and its problems for China are not particularly important, and relations with Russia, at least, given its nuclear status and the role of a permanent member of the UN Security Council, are of greater significance;

- in addition, on the background of Russian aggression, the Ukrainian-Chinese relations in 2014 gained signs of uncertainty due to a number of factors such as the consideration of Ukraine as part of the post-Soviet space, where unfortunately, despite the repeated statements about the recognition of the Ukrainian state as a European country, from the point of view of China, has preferences the RF, also it should be added insufficient explanation of the Chinese expert environment and the establishment of the essence of the Law on decommissioning. At the same time, it should be noted that the Ukrainian political leadership managed to give impetus to bilateral relations, as evidenced of this is the above statements of the Chinese political leadership, the expression of interest of the Ukrainian side in attracting to the project “One Belt, One Road”, holding the third meeting of the Ukrainian-Chinese Intergovernmental Commission on Cooperation, as a result of which a number of new bilateral agreements were signed, events were held on the occasion of the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the parties, as well as the announcement that 2019 could be proclaimed as a year of China in Ukraine [Litvinenko: 2017, 44-45; 22; 24].

- moreover, the PRC traditionally refrains from interfering directly with international conflicts, due to the desire to concentrate on strengthening its global economic power and adhering to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. Such an approach is a characteristic feature of Chinese diplomacy and is using by official Beijing with the aim to counter the geopolitical activity of its rival, the United States, in which the political component occupies a significant place.

At the same time, support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine is conditioned by the presence of problems with the separatism of China itself (Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang) and the desire to preserve an additional instrument of manipulation of the RF. In particular, China was among the countries that refrained from voting on the resolution of the UN General Assembly in 2014 to support the territorial integrity of Ukraine (the Ukrainian side considered such an approach in its favor taking into account the whole set of factors) [14]. We also note that there is a consensus between Ukraine and China on the need for reform of the UN Security Council [21].

Despite this, the PRC was in the camp of supporters of the RF during the voting on the resolution “Situation with human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol (Ukraine)” in 2017 [19].

However, the Chinese side provided emergency rescue, engineering and automotive equipment to Ukraine to address the crisis situation on the territory of the Donbas [Kuptsova: 2017]. It is likely that China's assistance to Ukraine will take place in a similar format, without affecting clear political support.

The economic sphere of strategic partnership is more dynamic, but also has problems.

The Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation (1992), which stipulates the most favored regime for collecting customs duties on export and import goods of the two countries, taxes and other internal charges, is the legal basis for the development of economic contacts between Ukraine and China [20]. It is characteristic that the economic dimension of bilateral relations is marked by positive dynamics, which confirms the dynamics of growth of trade and economic commodity turnover. For Ukraine, the PRC becomes an important economic partner. In particular, according to the data of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade in 2017, China has taken the second place in the structure of foreign trade of Ukraine

(8.28% of the total trade turnover) [17]. This leads to the consideration of the China as a strategically important economic partner and the inclusion of this country in the list of 20 most promising markets for Ukrainian products in accordance with the Export Strategy of Ukraine for 2017-2021[17].

The structure of bilateral trade in the year 2017 shows the following trends: 1. a large share of Chinese exports is represented by equipment, electrical and technical equipment, goods with high added value (35.53%); 2. at the same time, Ukraine exports to Celestial raw materials: mineral products (42.57%); vegetable products (23.76%); animal or vegetable fats and oils and products of their processing (23,49%) [20]. True, such an imbalance in favor of China receives a systemic characterization.

As a result, a negative trade balance for the Ukrainian side is another key feature of economic cooperation. In particular, in 2011-2016, Ukrainian exports to the PRC were in the range of \$ 1.9-2.8 billion, while the corresponding volumes of imports amounted to \$ 8 billion [15].

In addition, this situation was one of the key reasons why the Ukrainian side refrained from agreeing on China's proposal to establish a free trade zone between the two states, which was announced in 2016 by the Ambassador of the People's Republic of China, Dui Wei. After all, the introduction of a free trade regime is more beneficial for the party with a positive trade balance, that is, the free trade area with China is extremely unprofitable for Ukraine [*Ustenko*: 2016].

Moreover, the structure of bilateral trade, in particular, the raw material nature of Ukrainian exports, forms a disadvantage for the domestic economy of a situation in which the PRC purchases raw materials, manufactures finished products from it and subsequently sells it on the domestic market or thus strengthens its competitive positions with Ukrainian goods on world market.

At the same time, let's note the positive moments of trade, in particular, concerning the sale of domestic agricultural products to the PRC. The Ukrainian side, which, unfortunately, is currently concentrating on economic transformation exclusively on the “agrarian superpower”, such a trade structure can realize this goal, as well as close the gaps from the loss of the Russian market (Ukraine is one of the largest exporters of these types of products to China). In turn, the Chinese side receives favorable opportunities to ensure its own food security.

The next important issue is the volume of mutual investment. Thus, despite the statements of the Chinese leadership about the intention to increase investment flows to Ukraine, in fact, Chinese investment in the domestic economy remains low (as of 2017, foreign direct investment (FDI) amounted to only 0.04% in the structure of all FDI) [15].

Interestingly, according to experts, an increase in Chinese investment (especially in the southern and eastern regions) is seen as a factor in weakening Russian aggression, as the Chinese side firmly defends its own economic interests. However, this approach has the other side. This is demonstrated by the fact that after the annexation of the Crimea of the PRC quickly re-signed contracts for the delivery of amphibian ships “Zubr” (made in Feodosiya) from Ukraine to Russia [16].

As an impetus for solving the investment problem, the active involvement of Ukraine in the NSR geo-economic project was considered, for which the Asian Bank for Infrastructure Investments (ABII) was created. In particular, it will promote the attraction of Chinese investments to infrastructure projects in Ukraine. A statement on the desire of Chinese banks to invest in infrastructural facilities in Ukraine was announced by Zhang Xiyun, Ambassador of the PRC in Ukraine, in 2015 [13]. In addition, the State Agency of Ukraine's Reserve announced that it would agree on transit trains to Central and Eastern European countries that will pass through the territory of Ukraine [23]. However, despite the fact that at the beginning of 2016 a demonstration flight of a container train from Ukraine to China bypassing the territory of Russia was launched, the Belarusian-Chinese direction plays a key role in the

NSR [23]. The reason for this situation lies, first of all, in the greater importance for China of relations with Russia (because transit through Belarus is through the territory of the RF).

In this context, it should be mentioned the format of cooperation between the PRC and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) “16 + 1”, which consist of the Celestial Empire and the 11 new member states of the EU (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Croatia) and five Balkan candidate countries (Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Macedonia) started in 2012 [*Perebiynis, Yaroshenko: 2015, 12*].

We note that China views this group of countries as a kind of bridge between itself and the European continent. For Ukraine, the problem is that, despite the existence of common borders with this group of states, the official Kyiv was never involved in the format. This causes fears that the Chinese side will not use the geographic potential of Ukraine in the context of the “One Belt, One Road” project. Among the reasons for this situation, can be underlined the insufficient economic interest of the PRC in Ukraine as a partner in general, the structural weakness of Ukraine as a state, high level of bureaucracy, mass corruption, socioeconomic and political instability, outdated infrastructure, low level of interest in economic cooperation, ignoring the Chinese proposals, and sometimes even opposed them by Ukrainian officials and some regional elites.

As a result, inclusion in this format and active participation in the NSR project would allow Ukraine to gain the following benefits: 1. modernize the infrastructure at the expense of Chinese investments; 2. to obtain an additional factor for the implementation of European integration intentions; 3. to strengthen the position of Ukraine in the regional dimension of the CEE; 4. to reduce Russian pressure by developing multilateral cooperation [*Perebiynis, Yaroshenko: 2015, 18*].

It should be noted that considering the presence of a significant number of highly skilled professionals, the prospect for the Ukrainian side is the development of the Chinese IT-market, which, in turn, is marked by the dynamics and huge sizes.

Another important aspect is the space industry, the intensification of bilateral cooperation, which could contribute to the realization of the existing potential in Ukraine. In particular, insufficient financial resources could be offset by Chinese investments. At present, Ukraine is implementing 21 contracts in this area worth \$ 67 million [*Goncharuk: 2015, 27*]. The favorable factor is that China is implementing its own large-scale space program.

The military-technical cooperation (MTC) sphere has significant potential for development. China is one of the largest customers of the Ukrainian military-industrial complex. Ukraine, which has received significant military production capacities, exports warships to China (the first aircraft carrier in the Celestial “Liaoling” is an upgraded version of purchased “Varyag” in Ukraine), as well as spare parts for Chinese machinery [*But: 2015, 94*]. In the face of the loss of the Russian market, the Ukrainian military-industrial complex should focus its efforts on developing new markets, in particular Chinese ones, which is very promising in view of the increase of Chinese defense spending. This, in turn, will create opportunities to achieve a number of goals: a) increase foreign exchange earnings; b) weaken the position of the RF in the world arms market; c) get China's greater commitment in counteracting Russian aggression.

Note that the Ukrainian side can deepen this direction of strategic partnership by using the following aspects:

1. aircraft building – designing of transport and training planes and elements of their designs, development and manufacture of aircraft engines, creation of training complexes for pilots;
2. rocketbuilding – development of documentation, provision of consultations;
3. shipbuilding – designing and building aircraft carriers; development and joint production of ship gas turbine plants; development of means of hydrolocation, hydroacoustics; the acquisition of landing aircrafts;

4. armored vehicles – technologies of tank engine production, transmission, tanks and armored vehicles protection systems;

5. radar equipment and means of air defense – development and joint production of electronic warfare complexes; radar station's development [Litvinenko: 2014, 43].

The humanitarian aspect is marked by positive dynamics, as this component of bilateral relations does not have any significant problems. In general, this direction of interaction focuses on the implementation of joint projects between the research institutions of both countries, the exchange of information and delegations, the provision of educational services, organization of art exhibitions and public awareness of the cultural heritage of both countries [Sosyukina: 2012, 28]. However, the Ukrainian side should scale the use of the Chinese resource, in particular by attracting more investments in the framework of joint scientific and cultural projects, receiving financial income from the provision of educational services to a greater number of Chinese students. To do this, we must purposefully promote the positive image of Ukraine among various elements of Chinese society. This, in turn, would also contribute to the development of tourist exchanges between the parties.

Conclusions. The above analysis of the peculiarities of the strategic partnership between Ukraine and the PRC makes it possible to reach the following conclusions. Bilateral strategic partnership is marked by the presence of a legal and regulatory framework, a mechanism for implementation and mutual recognition by the parties of this level of relations among themselves.

The political component is impartial and based on a common interest in maintaining territorial integrity and sovereignty, without conflict settlement of international issues. At the same time, there is a lack of coordination of positions between the parties regarding international issues, including the question of Russian aggression, which is typical of the Chinese concept of strategic partnership in general, which focuses on the development of economic contacts.

The economic dimension of relations, despite the existing joint interest in the agro-industrial sector, military-technical cooperation, space aviation engineering, the implementation of infrastructure projects, IT-sector, investment remains low. The reasons for this are, for the most part, the structural weakness of Ukraine, the lack of a comprehensive and effective approach to the PRC as a partner, on the one hand, the low position of Ukraine in China's foreign policy priorities in the post-Soviet space and the CEE region, as well as greater significance for the PRC relations with Russia, on the other .

The humanitarian dimension is positive, but at the same time is marked by a significant unused potential.

As a result, the strategic partnership relations between Ukraine and the PRC need to be intensified, which necessitates a set of measures for the conversion of the declared level into practical filling:

- agreement of conceptual foreign policy approaches and increase of coordination level of efforts on the international arena between the two countries;
- activating a comprehensive dialogue both the highest and inter-institutional and inter-sectoral levels as well as the involvement of civil society;
- increasing the efficiency of the operation of the Interstate Commission on Cooperation between Ukraine and China, the activities of which should be directed towards systematic monitoring of achievements and problems of the development of strategic partnership, as well as providing effective recommendations to fill it with practical content;
- creation of special platforms with the assistance and direct participation of high-level officials of both countries in order to increase the intensity of contacts between representatives of business circles;
- formation of joint non-governmental organizations, holding of various round tables, symposiums aimed at creating a positive image of each of the parties in the eyes of ordinary citizens and promoting the bringing of bilateral relations for a new qualitative level;

- stimulating attention to deepening cooperation with China from Ukrainian businessmen, state functionaries;
- formulation of a clear strategy of actions on the Chinese direction of foreign policy of Ukraine by the domestic state institutions;
- continuation of the course on development of cooperation in economic and military-technical cooperation segments based on common interests for both sides;
- effective and purposeful engagement of Ukraine in the Chinese project “One Belt, One Road” and the format of cooperation of China-CEE on the basis of clear coordination with the Chinese side and the steady implementation of bilateral agreements;
- promotion of the positive image of Ukraine and the holding of a broad-based explanatory company in China on topical socio-political processes;
- general combating of corruption and preventing the establishment of control over economic cooperation with China from a particular financial-corporate group of influence;
- signing of bilateral agreements, the formation of favorable legal and tax conditions for the attraction of Chinese investments;
- creation of an effective system of state guarantees for foreign investors, including Chinese;
- development of a joint strategy of Ukrainian-Chinese cooperation, taking into account the interests of both parties.

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