THINK TANKS AND UKRAINIAN INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

THINK TANKS И ИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛЬНЫЕ РЕФОРМЫ В УКРАИНЕ

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Abstract. The purpose of this article is to analyze the particularities of activities of modern “Think Tanks” in the USA as non-governmental scientific research and information analytics organizations, which generate ideas and develop recommendations for national governmental and international institutions providing constructive dialogue on the solution of social, economic and political problems in the “state-business-society” link. They are creative research groups engaged in in-depth investigation of public policy issues and thanks to which it became possible to turn intellectual activity from an individual creative act into a collective effort to create new meanings. In Ukraine, the concept of a “Think Tank” is relatively new for representatives of the scientific community, who still create the majority of significant analytical and forecasting, and political and theoretical concepts. The lack of a full-fledged network of civil society institutions and a sufficient accessibility to media resources and sites for their promotion with the aim of influencing economic decision-making and political processes is associated with the lack of transparency in the activities of state establishment and the rejection of political elites still professing the principle of statism (concentration of economic controls and planning in the hands of a highly centralized government). Nowadays, the use of the symbiosis of the potential of the scientific community and the developments of Think Tanks, as analytical centers, is one of the critical conditions for institutional reforms in Ukraine, an effective domestic economic and foreign political strategy for the country’s development. Unfortunately, the process of realizing that the very modern Think Tanks are the means of social engineering in general and in political counseling in particular, and of the provision of independent political and socio-economic expertise, is slow and contradictory.

Key words: Think Tank,Brains Trust, institution, institutional reform, social engineering.
Анотація. У статті аналізуються особливості діяльності сучасних аналітичних і девелоперських центрів США («Think Tanks») як недержавних науково-дослідних та інформаційно-аналітичних організацій, що генерують ідеї і розробляють рекомендації для національних урядів та міжнародних інститутів, забезпечуючи конструктивний діалог з рішення соціально-економічних проблем у ланцюгу «держава-бізнес-суспільство». Це креативні дослідницькі колективи для поглибленого розгляду питань публічної політики, завдяки яким стало можливим перетворення інтелектуальної діяльності із індивідуального творчого акту у колективну роботу по створенню нових засад. В Україні для представників наукового співтовариства, що створюють основну частину значущих аналітично-прогнозних і політико-теоретичних концепцій, поняття «Think Tank» є відносно новим. Відсутність повноцінної мережі інститутів громадянського суспільства і достатньої доступності до медійних ресурсів та прощадок для їх просування з метою впливу на практику прийняття економічних рішень та політичні процеси пов’язано із непрозорістю діяльності державного істеблешменту та отторженням політичних еліт, що до цього часу додержуються принципу етатизму (верховенство держави). Сьогодні використання симбіозу потенціалу наукового співтовариства і розробок «Think Tank», як аналітичних центрів, є однією із найважливіших умов інституційних реформ в Україні, ефективної внутрішньоекономічної та зовнішньополітичної стратегії розвитку країни. Однак, на жаль, процес усвідомлення того, що саме сучасні «Think Tank» є засобом соціальної інженерії у цілому і політичного консультування зокрема, забезпечення незалежної політичної та соціально-економічної експертизи, відбувається повільно та суперечливо.

Ключові слова: Think Tank, Brains Trust, інститут, інституційна реформа, експертно-аналітичні центри, соціальна інженерія.
The current problem. Today, in Ukraine, which forms part of a complex, interdependent and informationally saturated world, state structures and politicians are facing the problem of attracting expert knowledge to the development of state decisions, since they must take into account the multitude of political interests of various social groups when formulating domestic and foreign policies. Ukrainian politicians and state institutions are increasingly feeling the need for prompt, systematic and objective information about the world and society, on how effective their course is, what are the possible alternatives, the likely costs and consequences. In the leading industrial countries and, especially in the United States, the so-called Think Tanks have been of a great importance in the development of domestic and foreign policies for a long time. The level of their effectiveness depends, firstly, on the level of development of democratic institutions, market relations and civil society, since the nature of their activities implies the possibility of free expression of ideas, scientific approaches, concepts and proposals.

The aim of the article is to analyze the experience and peculiarities of the US Think Tanks activities in the context of possibilities of their use in the practice of institutional reforms in Ukraine.

Analysis of the latest publications. Quite a lot of foreign and domestic scientists investigate Think Tanks. The American school is represented by D. Smith, D. Abelson, R. Haass [Abelson, 2002a], E. Rich, D. Stone, E. Johnson, J. McGann, who have been engaged in this problematics for quite some time. Among the foreign publications of the CIS countries should be mentioned such authors as A. Balayan [Balayan, Sungurov, 2016], L. Bogatyreva [Bogatyreva, Fillipov, 2016], E. Kamshibaev [Kamshibaev, 2012], N. Medushevskiy [Medushevskiy, 2011], A. Sungurov [Sungurov, 2015]. In Ukraine, V. Granovsky, Y. Kolomiiets [Kolomiiets, 2014], I. Petrenko [Petrenko, 2015], L. Chernyavskaya, N. Shernova [Shernova, 2013] and others, analyze the specific aspects of Think Tanks activity. Most researchers analyze the peculiarities of the formation and development of Think Tanks, their typology, the practice of their activities depending on the specifics of national legislation, the features and differences between Think Tanks and other organizations. However, the justification for the special role of Think Tanks in the process of implementing of institutional reforms in new market-oriented countries (in particular, Ukraine) is not sufficiently reflected.

The important research results. In the context of increasing competition in the intellectual services market, Think Tanks create their own specific niche. Thus, the American researcher Richard Haass defines Think Tanks as an independent analytical institute of “objective knowledge”, which operates for the joint research of academic organizations and the sphere of state power [Haass, 2005: 29; 10]. Donald Abelson treats Think Tanks as a non-profit, non-partisan research institute whose goal is to develop mechanisms for influencing public opinion and state policy [Abelson, 2002b: 8; 12].

According to the systematization criteria adopted in the United States (the time of creation, the mission, the specialization of activity and the way of the structural organization, the specific nature of interaction with the government), there are five stages in the formation and development of Think Tanks:

1) analytical structures focused on the military-industrial complex (first half of the 20th century);
2) organizations associated with the research on the problems of the future (60th of the XX century);
3) public institutions of the advocate type, specializing in protecting the interests of civil society;
4) analytical centers of local orientation (institutes of urban studies and regional development);
5) networking virtual communities of highly skilled specialists in social development issues [McGann, 2011].

The latter are considered the Think Tanks of the “fifth” generation, and are virtual expert networks that dynamically review strategic issues in real time, do not have restrictions on the number of experts and areas of activity. The most famous ones are international organizations such as Technet, Volunteers in Technical Assistance and One World.

In the “state-business-civil society” chain, Think Tanks are subdivided into the following forms of positioning: non-governmental, governmental, independent university research centers, commercial, independent non-for-profit organizations of public policy [Ladi, 2005: 22].

The distinctive features of the Think Tanks’ activities are:
• high level of competence of the expert “team” – of scientists and specialists in a certain field of knowledge with their subsequent practical application;
• independent choice of research topics and the possibility of their results’ impact on the political process in the context of parity of interaction with governmental, commercial and non-for-profit structures;
• search for vectors of advanced social development and political technologies (including anti-crisis ones);
• continuous updating and improvement of the methodological arsenal of social sciences.

The spectrum of Think Tanks’ intelligent “products” is quite wide – from contract researches related to the implementation of orders of state and government agencies, commercial and non-for-profit organizations, to “legal” expert assessments of certain conflict issues of public life and ready studies for orders of individual political forces [Lindquist, 1997].

Being public institutions that intentionally set themselves the task of social engineering, Think Tanks advise on state and corporate contracts in the field of assessing the possible socio-economic consequences of political decisions, and their intellectual products are practical economic research, political expertise, and fundamental theoretical works. In fact, Think Tanks act as, on the one hand, generators of ideas, analysts of alternatives and forecasts (which are based on certain ideas about desired socio-economic and political outcomes), on the other hand, moderators of public communication, designers of specific legislative or executive decisions and lobbyists of general publicly expressed interests. Therefore, Think Tanks are considered to be the “fifth power” (after the legislative, executive, judicial and media) [Dunn, 1996].

About a third of all Think Tanks existing in the world today are concentrated in the US, which are the largest actors and have a quite long history of formation and development. Over the period from the first “Brains Trust” group of professors advisers that contributed to the victory of F. Roosevelt in the presidential elections of 1932 to this day, there have been formed several generations of Think Tanks. Thus, everything began with the formation of research centers within the largest universities of the country (for example, the Brookings Institution, 1916), which were then gradually transformed into separate institutions of civil society. Historically, many American Think Tanks were created to solve very specific problems, that is, they had a mono-problem nature of activity (RAND Corporation, 1946). However, over time, the range of issues falling under their competence increased, and, at the moment, all major Think Tanks work...
in ten or sometimes even more longer-term strategic directions (CSIS, PIIE, WWICS, Cato Institute, Heritage Foundation, American Enterprise Institute, Reform Institute).

Government Think Tanks are concentrated in the field of security and defense (Institute for National Strategic Studies, Institute for Homeland Security Studies, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, The MITRE Corporation, The Institute for Defense Analyzes). At the same time, the US federal budget finances about 30 large Think Tanks, which operate under the general name of the Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs). However, most Think Tanks in the US usually receive funding from private investors, which gives them the status of independence in discussing controversial issues and non-engagement in relation to government policy guidelines and a general government course [Bubnova, 2017].

In the last decade, the activities of all American Think Tanks have several common development trends. The first one is the shift of their orientation to informational and analytical (it is conducted at the preparatory stage, and the final product is proposals and conclusions for solving problems arising in various spheres of society), and advisory spheres. The latter, usually, has a commercial nature and always has an addressee, and the executed order is considered to be exclusively a scenario of future events or an action program aimed at solving the problem.

Another common trend for the US Think Tanks today is the shift in the orientation of activity from an exclusively analytical work towards a direct assistance in solving a number of problems that often belong to the social policy sphere. This is a new level of ensuring the fairness of American democratic processes, improving the quality and effectiveness of public discussions, continuous and uninterrupted monitoring of socio-economic and political processes in American society, improving the work of scientific research institutions.

Finally, an entirely new trend of intellectual globalization in the 2000s was the participation of the US Think Tanks in non-national think tanks, which act in a form of regional and global networked associations with the following functions:

a) mutual researches;

b) information exchange;

c) creation of collective resources;

d) thematic division of labor;

e) development of ideological and political positions on various issues using the Internet and relevant network platforms for the implementation of strategic programs and the promotion of supranational projects.

The specificity of the European “Brains Trusts” is their focus on the preparation of research materials for regularly held roundtables, since in modern European politics many issues can be solved only through the discussion and subsequent agreement of the representatives of EU states [Akopyan, 2010].

The situation is different in the US. An important component of the US Think Tanks’ activities is their focus on the practical applicability of research results. They, in fact, “form bridges” between science and practice, generate thoughts and ideas not in the form of abstract theorizing, but in the form of project counseling, where the strategic and current management of real state policy receive accompanying consultations within the same project rather than ideological paradigm. And the fundamental nature of developments always has an applied value. It is no accident that the main motto of the Brookings Institution is “Building bridges between academic science and public policy”.

For example, in the US, Think Tanks’ additional influence on real politics is provided by the widespread practice of “revolving doors”: the transition of leading experts from Think Tanks to the government apparatus and back to science. This corresponds to the social constructivist ap-
approach, according to which in the process of constant communication the state and Think Tanks mutually form (constitute) each other’s identities in the political and academic spaces (“civil servant is a representative of the scientific sphere”) [Makarychev, 2015].

An example of the cooperation between Think Tanks and government agencies in the United States is the invitation of Think Tanks analysts to the presidential “team” to receive posts in government offices. Thus, Jimmy Carter after winning the presidential election in 1976, offered work in the administration to many employees of the Brookings Institution and the Council for international relations. When Ronald Reagan joined the White House, he attracted more than 150 experts from the Heritage Foundation, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, American Enterprise Institute to public offices. Henry Kissinger, Madeleine Albright, Condoleezza Rice came to the position of the Secretary of State from the scientific circles, Rose Gottemoeller, from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was appointed Deputy Secretary of State for Arms Control, three of the five Assistant Secretaries of State were invited to this a post from Think Tanks and other analytical centers. As for Ukraine, during the administration of five presidents in the country there were practically no rational attempts to build “independent teams” from representatives of Think Tanks with the rights and authority to make nationwide decisions and implement specific macroeconomic programs and projects.

Realizing that quality political analysis is the result of joint intellectual interdisciplinary creativity, as well as the limited and fragmented nature of traditional expert studies for the development of promising solutions, American Think Tanks increasingly use the technology of informal communications (“second track of diplomacy”). This makes it possible to bring ideas, sometimes contradictory to special interest groups and single-issues groups to the broad population strata.

In the US, the public policy sphere could be institutionalized as a stable and basic platform for developing legislative and executive decisions thanks to the very “strategic diversification” of the functional areas of the research portfolios of Think Tanks projects. This diversification also helps Think Tanks to maintain the optimal balance between scientific and practical in the system of making and implementing political decisions.

Today, the genesis of the US Think Tanks has made a change in the very concept of “counseling”, putting its consultations into a separate field of activity. Instead of the narrative content of analytical reports, political populism in the form of “reportage-journalistic” rhetoric, public interpretation of information using the methods of articulation of binding tendencies, Think Tanks offer a fundamentally new concept – scenario forecasting, specific technologies of organizational design, strategic planning, instrumental engineering for operational intervention, image-making and brand building.

The consulting segment forms its own level of relations of complex intersectoral management and interaction as an external communicator to determine the balance of interests between the public (state) and corporate spheres. In the US, Think Tanks widely use classical models of theories of state, information and communication management, theories of systems and transactional costs, theories of behaviorism and public choice for solving individual particular problems. In addition, they use the methods of “issues management”. They develop strategic solutions to specific issues or make preventive forecasting of potential risks associated with them in the legislative field.

In recent years, in the US, Think Tanks are actively introducing a so-called “balance” concept of consulting (symbiosis of information, analytical and communicative functions), instead of a comprehensive one. At the same time, the duration of the stages of the consulting cycle – formulation of the terms of reference, definition of subjects and forms of cooperation, structuring of tasks, making a strategy of activities and definition of tactics – is justified by the foresight
technology. The latter presupposes a preventive definition of the directions of the society
development and the formation of priorities for technological, economic and social growth. In fact,
this is a synthesis of planning, targeting, and forecasting methods, aimed at uniting the efforts
of the state, business, public organizations and the scientific community in the questions of def-
inition of the development priorities.

The consultative content of the analytical summaries offered by US Think Tanks includes
(as opposed to the limitations of traditional expert studies) preliminary study of the audience, its
segmenting as a target, positioning relatively to each segment and generating message content
and optional solutions for each addressee. They use the technologies of the deliberation process
of communication – global consultations in the field of public policy with open and program-
nable content, initiation of “public dialogue projects”, making the ranking of importance of
preferences, programming of research orders for a specific legislative or executive decision. The
work of Think Tanks analysts is based on the form of project recommendations and their specif-
ically targeted character (presentation strategy). They contain the processes of designing the
subject and the practice of their implementation, a conventional communication strategy, and op-
timization of the sources of financing for the recommendations that are being implemented.

In this regard, it should be noted that in many countries of the world, including Ukraine, there
is a significant lack of experience in writing qualitative and effective analytical reports and, as
a result, the weakness of the conclusions and recommendations resulting from them. The lack
of the necessary skills of drawing up consulting texts, and not the presentation of simple ana-
lysts, unfortunately, characterizes many national Think Tanks.

The experience accumulated by the US Think Tanks as a unique link in the sphere of inter-
action between the state and civil society can and should be used in Ukraine in the process of
institutional reform of the structure-forming components of the entire vertical of power.

Today, based on modern concepts of institutional development, the stages of structural in-
stitutional reforms in Ukraine can, with a certain historical convention of periodization, be di-
vided as follows: “institutional vacuum” [Domazet, 2010; Yerznkyan, Gassner 2010] of the first
half of the 1990s, “institutional nihilism” [Draskovic, Draskovic, 2012] in the second half of the
90s., and “institutional constructivism” [Petrenko, 2011; Glazev, Naumov, 2012; Naumov, Benua,

The “institutional vacuum” period in Ukraine was characterized, firstly, by the ruling “elites”
lacking motivation to search for mechanisms for selecting alternative and effective institutions
in an undeveloped market environment. Secondly, by the destructivism and mutation of the
“old” institutional structures, which were based on the erroneous principles of potential institu-
tions selection. Thirdly, by the atrophy of forms of institutional “transplantation” in conditions
of low efficiency of the technologies used.

The peculiarities of the period of “institutional nihilism” was that, on one hand, the ruling elite did not accept and blocked real institutional changes (and sometimes acting directly in anti-institutional and anti-constitutional ways), based on a mercenary motivation of the alleged pro-
motion of “quasi-institutional modernization” of the transition economy. On the other hand, the
process of national centralization of the opportunities for unpunished appropriation of rent by
interested groups of people and the informal distribution of executive centers of power (“pyra-
mids” and “schemes” for enriching the state-political elite and financial-industrial groups) in-
tensified. In fact, institutional changes in Ukraine were linked with scenarios of splicing financial
and oligarchic clans with governmental institutions.

The transition to “institutional constructivism” in Ukraine coincided with the tenth an-
iversary of the “long cycle” of the nationwide system of pseudo-market discussions, the col-
lapse of social values and the high ratio of “political fatigue” of society from total discrepancies
between rhetoric and real reforms. In general, as the logic of neo-liberal market and institutional reforms presupposes, the current process of Ukraine’s development should be considered taking into account the laws of the theory of long-wave dynamics. Thus, according to the theory of synchronization and periodization of political cycles (modern political cycles in the United States last for 8 years, in the UK – 10 years), Ukraine today gravitates toward the European political space – the “independence revolution” (1991), the orange revolution” (2004) and the “revolution of dignity” (2014) and have a periodicity of about a decade.

The genesis of bureaucracy in Ukraine is not a historical phenomenon, since this phenomenon is typical for countries that have embarked on a path to market transformation; therefore, the transition from institutional monism to institutional pluralism is extremely painful and mostly unsystematic. An analysis of the dynamics of the institutional state that has developed in Ukraine over the past few years indicates a systemic crisis – the dysfunction of public administration, which lies at the following.

First, the opportunities for accelerated economic development in Ukraine turned up to be largely exhausted under the conditions of uncertain economic policy priorities in the context of the choice between monetary and budgetary (fiscal) instruments. In fact, the entire anti-inflationary policy of the Government during the last decade boils down to the fact that the fight against inflation has turned into a fight... against money by all available means. While most European banks finance business at 0.5% per annum (Japanese companies receive money for 10 years at 0.01%!), Ukrainian businesses have to borrow at a rate of 30-40% per annum. The US Federal Reserve System accelerated the third round of the quantitative easing program (QE3), in which the participants of the financial market sold government and mortgage bonds at $ 85 billion a month, the key goal of which was to reduce unemployment. In Japan, the monetary policy is the basis of “abenomics” (the economic policy of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe), providing the “pumping” of the economy with long and cheap money.

Secondly, the attempts to implement institutional transformations due to the rigidity of state regulation led to a reduction in the “economies of scale” effect for economic incentives, replaced by administrative ones (and this, in turn, leads to the conservation of even existing imperfect specialized and public institutions). It is estimated that an increase in the quality of basic state institutions by only one point (on the 10-point scale of the Vienna Institute of Management IMD rating) ensures an annual increase in GDP growth rates of at least 0.31% (other things being equal). It is a significant effect, given that the gap between Ukraine and developed countries in this indicator is 4-5 points. At the same time, the amount of losses from insufficient level of competition (the potential economic effect of implementing institutional measures aimed at its development) reaches, by some estimates, 2.5% of GDP. [Yasin, Akkindinova, 2013: 32].

Today there are about 7 thousand Think Tanks in more than 170 countries, more than 30% of them are in the USA. In Ukraine, about 100 analytical centers have been officially registered, with the first five being the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies named after A. Rozumkov, the NGO “Ukrainian Forum”, the Center for Political and Legal Reforms, the Institute of Global Strategies, the International Center for Advanced Studies. In 2017, according to the Think Tanks World Ranking “The Global Go To Think Tanks Report” held annually by the University of Pennsylvania (USA), the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies named after A. Razumkov took position No. 29 [7].

However, the historical peculiarity of the formation and development of Think Tanks in Ukraine is that they were not created from scratch, but changed, growing from the depths of already existing structures serving the state policy. And although domestic Think Tanks have significant intellectual potential, the main reasons for their inefficient operation today are:
• weak mobility of the structure and simplified market strategy (they are more concerned with commercial interest than with the formation of an appropriate branch of their professional activities);
• lack of project management that would allow to bring analytical studies to the commercially acceptable form of the product, as well as new promising concepts, fundamentally new positions in the intellectual market;
• lack of skills and experience of the implementation of a targeted deliberating process and the formation of a public policy area, preferring to participate in shadow state and corporate orders;
• lack of knowledge to use the latest models and technologies of consulting when preparing analytical texts and formulating recommendations for their projects, which significantly reduces the practicality of their research;
• lack of presentation strategies to promote their intellectual products, monitor the results and the professional level of institutional orders.

In this regard, on the part of the state, their inefficiency is related to the lack of a legislative basis to finance external consultations on a contract basis (the corresponding items of expenditure in the state budget).

From the side of civil society, Think Tanks are perceived as vehicles of a state policy, which society does not trust, and consequently, they do not receive adequate support for the proposed projects.

On the part of corporations, there is a lack of understanding of the ability to solve their current and practical tasks of an intellectual profile through external consulting on a contract with Think Tanks.

The international recognition of Think Tanks as “growth centers” is based on a unique symbiosis of permanent interdisciplinary scientific thinking and mechanisms for improving the policy-making process as a unifying link between authority and knowledge. Today in Ukraine, the interaction between Think Tanks and public authorities is irregular and limited to the involvement of individual experts to participate in the work of advisory bodies and the development of separate documents. Without the necessary potential to influence politicians, Think Tanks and academies mainly use a different segment – corporate and intra-party orders, mechanisms for corporate and party lobbying for the indirect transfer of their developments to the highest echelons of power.

As for the educational institutions and the competent part of the humanitarian scientific community in Ukraine, firstly, the majority of scientific schools have been destroyed, since a significant number of scientists and practitioners emigrated – a “demographic failure” arose in the country’s scientific and pedagogical potential. Secondly, under the conditions of chronic underfunding, the development of most promising areas has been “frozen”, while a significant part of the fundamental research has been eliminated at all. Third, science began to be actively replaced by all sorts of charlatan “academies” and institutions of “extrasensory perception” with pseudoscientific, paranormal and cult popular publications, etc.

Therefore, in today’s Ukraine, the scientific community of economists is divided into two categories. The first is the one that performs the social order of power, “evidentially” predicts the scenario, and then, again “evidentially”, explains why everything occurred the other way around. The second one professionally criticizes the inconsistent, amateur approach to the basic principles of “market fundamentalism”, the illusions of “market institutionalization” (the rhetoric of reforms, instead of real reforms), competently offers market tools and mechanisms, but their proposals regularly stay in the “settler” of presidential administrations, government institutions and organizations.
As for the nearest perspective of Think Tanks’ activities in Ukraine, although the crisis creates conditions and an impetus for their expansion, development will have a sectoral nature. Thus, for example, there is a project of several large inter-bank associations creating two Think Tanks to influence the state’s financial policy. In the sphere of education and strategic studies, there is no reason to speak about serious prospects yet – Ukraine lacks financial resources for this. The danger is different. The trajectory of the development of Ukrainian companies in the field of media indicates what, perhaps, the Ukrainian Think Tanks may face, namely, media companies could not create either independent radio or television, nor effective legislation protecting the independence of editorial policy.

What advantages can Ukraine get from the possibility of using the positive experience of the US Think Tanks?

Firstly, Think Tanks do not pretend to be a power structure, but the extensive research activity reveals broad horizons for understanding the underlying nature of political processes, the direct communication of which to the interested and thinking part of society is often necessary. Meanwhile, in the process of severing public policy in Ukraine from the state administrative, party and corporate ones, a separate area of “expert knowledge” of Think Tanks, based on the “mission statement”, is being formed. At the same time, on one hand, the link “politician – expert consultant” turns into an effective and absolutely necessary component of a successful public policy, and therefore, of the state policy as a whole. On the other hand, in the sphere of development and application of intelligence to private structures of civil society (corporations), Think Tanks act as the main instrument of public activity (legislative and executive decisions, public-private partnerships, corporate projects).

Secondly, Think Tanks are not the subject of reforms, changes or transformations in society, but their agent, along with other participants. Their role of a generator of ideas, a presenter of research results, a moderator of communication in public policy and an adviser to institutional policy does not give them the right to manipulation of public consciousness or any preferential influence on certain segments of the audience. The main audience of Think Tanks are state officials – high-ranking politicians, and not the people as a whole, and therefore their active political activity (through independent implementation of proposed projects) does not “outweigh” the internal research activities of Think Tanks.

Thirdly, Think Tanks’ activities are based on the concept of “key to success”, which consists in the ability to find a balance between scientific activity and an active public position. The point is that Think Tanks do not work with the mass consciousness, using the state as an instrument for promoting some ideology, but with the communicative process in the state, seriously and largely-deploying and supporting a particular sphere – public policy.

Fourth, the advantage of Think Tanks’ activities is the transformation of any analytical material into a final advisory product that can not only be delivered directly to the customer, but also deserves to be published in open sources or presented during meetings with representatives of parliament (Verkhovna Rada) – depending on research topics.

Fifth, the results of Think Tanks’ research can be transformed into independent journalistic works, which in the future can become part of their own presentation strategy with great public resonance and criticism. The latter in turn helps to adjust certain aspects of Think Tanks’ activities, to effectively monitor the attitude towards their activities in the media, and this, in turn, allows for more efficient planning of the directions of work and its further improvement.

**Conclusions.** Modern Ukrainian capitalism requires a careful special scientific research – as a unique phenomenon, which has no analogues in economic history. Looking retrospectively today at the process of restoration of capitalism in Ukraine during 27 years of independence, we can state that Ukraine has always been a “project” state and the peculiarity of the current Ukrainian-
ian situation is the fact that only the future will confirm how Ukrainian elites are ready to seek consensus with the social community on the basis of long-term mutual interests. Economy of the XXI century requires multi-aspectual and multi-vector interactions of a multitude of subjects in the conditions of their independence, responsibility and civil self-organization. The latter should be based on changing the model “the state takes a tribute from society” (the second model of M. Olson) to the model “the state serves society” (the first model of M. Olson).

The level of perception of institutional reforms is measured by the behavior of people, and not by simple facts of state changing the “game rules” and laws. Therefore, the realization that the practical efficiency of Think Tanks’ activities in the US is based primarily on the concept of close relationship of intellectual resources with the quality of the state policy in the research (and especially academic) sector, the recognition the state needs a free search for ideas by the university community at the individual scientific centers and private experts level, will be extremely useful for the Ukrainian authorities. It is thanks to two factors – a consistent state policy and a private initiative stimulated by the state – that the US has formed a well-developed Think Tanks network that allows the government, by accumulating scientific and intellectual resources, to successfully meet the challenges of a long-term domestic and foreign policy.

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