

ОСОБЛИВОСТІ РОЗВИТКУ СВІТОВОГО ГОСПОДАРСТВА ТА МЕН

УДК: 339.923

DISINTEGRATION OF UKRAINIAN AND RUSSIAN ECONOMIES AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR MODES OF THE EU-UKRAINE DCFTA IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

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Abstract. *This paper analyses tendencies and mechanisms of Ukrainian and Russian economies' disintegration and influence of such disintegration on modes of full implementation of deep and comprehensive free trade area between Ukraine and the EU. In particular, this paper describes such tendencies and mechanisms as decrease in trade in goods and services, mutual investment shares of countries, migration and capital flows. Key factors that stipulate such disintegration are reduction of trade turnover due to trade war of Russia against Ukraine via discrimination of Ukrainian exporters, Russia's deprivation of privileges of Ukrainian workers, etc. This paper also describes Russian's position against the implementation of EU-Ukraine DCFTA and possible scenarios of future development of Ukrainian economy.*

Key words: *Disintegration, Ukraine, Russia, trade, economic war, investment, integration.*

Problem statement. Interdependence of Ukrainian and Russian economies has deep history, which started much earlier than 1991, when both countries became independent. During more than two decades of their cooperation as sovereign independent countries, they still had synergy in different aspects – trade, production, finance, investment, which reflected their long history of being parts of one country.

General level of technological and market dependence of Ukrainian economy on Russian one demonstrated long-term tendency for further derogation of connections. Such trend was not constant and showed certain fluctuations in terms of political changes in relations between the two countries. For a long period Ukraine has been applying to the bivectoral policy of economic cooperation with both Western and Eastern countries. However, in 2007 this policy changed as Ukraine commenced the negotiations on further integration with the EU. In 2011 Ukraine-Russian relations under the influence of intentions of Ukraine to integrate with the EU became more complicated and the trend of economical disintegration became more distinctive.

Such tendency directly reflected on the amounts of trade between Ukraine and Russia. In 2011, when the amounts of mutual trade were the highest, the share of Russia in Ukrainian export of goods comprised 29%, in 2013 such the share dropped to 23.8%, in 2014 – to 19.1% and in the first quarter of 2015 – to 10%. Allied situation took place in mutual trade in services between the two countries. In 2011 the share of Russia in Ukrainian export of services was 40.9%. Such share decreased to 36.9% in 2013, to 32% in 2014 and to 31% in the first quarter of 2015.

Only in Ukrainian import the share of Russia doesn't demonstrate essential changes: 15.3% in 2011; 15.4% in 2014 and 15% in the first quarter of 2015. It can be explained by modest rate of trade dependence in this sphere comparing to the others.

Aim of article is to analyze main tendencies and mechanisms of disintegrational process between Russia and Ukraine and to lay out the possible of influence of such disintegration on EU-Ukraine DCFTA implementation.

Analysis of last publications and researches. The stated problem has been widely discussed by different Ukrainian, European and Russian economist including Emerson M., Sidenko V., Us I., Popescu N., Selutin A. and others.

Main results of the research. The economic part of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA) has been delayed because of the Russia's opposition. The possible future options of the DCFTA could be revealed upon analysis of the main features of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA:

- deep – up to 400 EU regulations in basic economic policies to be implemented in Ukraine;
- comprehensive – rules for goods, services, capital, IPR movement (labor force only to some extent);
- precision – defined terms for implementation in 2-10 (15) years;
- bindingness – Ukraine takes obligations to implement EU economic regulation, EU takes obligation to open market gradually;
- partial delegation – Ukraine is implementing EU regulation without taking part in its elaboration.
- resource-intensive – annually up to 3% of GNP of Ukraine to be spent for restructuring.

Starting from August 2013 Russia clearly objected to the AA and DCFTA. Russia's concerns could be easily argued (Table 1). The last concern is of great and principal importance for Russia: the DCFTA implementation makes it impossible for Ukraine to join the EuroAsian Economic Union.

Since that time, Russia launched a real economic war against Ukraine. Aggression, discrimination, sanctions, blackmailing and blockade are the instruments describing current Russian economic policy towards Ukraine. In 2004-2015 Ukraine has faced more than 40 trade wars and 4 gas wars. Generally 32.4% of Ukrainian exported goods have been discriminated on the level of 10-20%; 41.2% of exported goods – on the level of 20-40% and goods with quota of 13.7% have become the object of market destruction (losses for such goods comprised more than 40%). Generally, 87% of total Ukrainian export to Russia have been more or less discriminated by open or hidden trade limitations on the Russian market and decrease of demand due to the political affairs (Table 2).

Russia's economic hybrid war is characterized by breaking subregional chains with Ukrainian enterprises in industry and agriculture, increasing the banking and financial control over Ukrainian economy, increasing foreign debt of Ukraine through high gas prices and possible inputs into the hryvnia devaluation.

Table 1.
Russia's position against the DCFTA

Concerns	Counter-arguments
1. Russian economy is risked being flooded with goods from the EU.	1. Ignores the rules of origin applied by WTO members.

Concerns	Counter-arguments
2. Russian economy may be flooded by Ukrainian goods uncompetitive with the European ones.	2. Within WTO rules any country facing increase in import threatening national industries may protect them imposing duties, quotas etc. No need to stop the existing FTA.
3. If Ukraine adopts EU technical product standards it would hinder traditional trade flows between Russia and Ukraine.	3. a) These standards should be applied to sales on domestic market or to the EU only. b) Sales to Russia should meet Russian technical standards. c) European standards would be implemented in 3-5 years due to the DCFTA. d) Russia is taking steps to adopt some EU or international standards. e) Agreement for mutual recognition may be a solution for Russian goods exported to Ukraine.
4. DCFTA would mean an erosion of Russia's goods competitiveness at the Ukrainian market.	4. a) At the beginning of 2015 there are about 600 FTA signed by 159 WTO members. b) Russia's export to Ukraine is hardly competing with EU export (less than 5%).
5. Ukraine shall not grant any competences of its competent to EU national or international institution.	5. DCFTA is based upon partial delegation.
6. DCFTA would make it impossible for Ukraine to join FTA, CU (EAEU).	6. a) DCFTA doesn't preclude Ukraine to sign other classical FTA. b) Joining customs union or other developed forms of international integration is possible for Ukraine only on quitting the DCFTA.

Moreover, Russia uses Donbass destruction and occupation as an anchor to stop Ukraine's integration with the EU. Such occupation has resulted in more than 20 000 deaths, stop in 25% and destruction of 10% of industrial enterprises. Ukraine will need to invest at least \$1.5 bln for the renewal of the destroyed objects, which can make a black hole in the Ukraine's economy. Herewith the possibility of military actions renewal at any time blocks national and foreign investment in the economy of this region and in the Ukrainian economy in general. 17% of state budget expenditure is directed to the process of rigid, quick, deep and comprehensive disintegration of Ukraine and Russia alongside with high military daily expenditure necessary to oppose further destruction in Donbass. Such amount of money is highly important to be invested to solve social, infrastructural and other urgent problems in Ukraine [9].

Table 2.
Commodity Items in Ukrainian Export Subjected to the most Significant Losses due to Discriminative Trade Policy of Russia

Decline up to	Share in Ukrainian export to Russia
10-20%	32.40%
20-40%	41.20%
>40%	13.70%
Total	87.30%

Interdependence of Ukrainian and Russian economies has deep history, which started much earlier than 1991, when both countries became independent. During more than two decades of their cooperation as sovereign independent countries, they still had synergy in different aspects – trade, production, finance, investment, which reflected their long history of being parts of one country.

General level of technological and market dependence of Ukrainian economy on Russian one demonstrated long-term tendency for further derogation of connections. Such trend was not constant and showed certain fluctuations in terms of political changes in relations between the two countries. For a long period Ukraine has been applying to the bivectoral policy of economic cooperation with both Western and Eastern countries. However, in 2007 this policy changed as Ukraine commenced the negotiations on further integration with the EU. In 2011 Ukraine-Russian relations under the influence of intentions of Ukraine to integrate with the EU became more complicated and the trend of economical disintegration became more distinctive.

Such tendency directly reflected on the amounts of trade between Ukraine and Russia. In 2011, when the amounts of mutual trade were the highest, the share of Russia in Ukrainian export of goods comprised 29%, in 2013 such the share dropped to 23.8%, in 2014 – to 19.1% and in the first quarter of 2015 – to 10%. Allied situation took place in mutual trade in services between the two countries. In 2011 the share of Russia in Ukrainian export of services was 40,9%. Such share decreased to 36.9% in 2013, to 32% in 2014 and to 31% in the first quarter of 2015. Only in Ukrainian import the share of Russia doesn't demonstrate essential changes: 15.3% in 2011; 15.4% in 2014 and 15% in the first quarter of 2015. It can be explained by modest rate of trade dependence in this sphere comparing to the others [10].

Reduction of Russia's importance in trade partnership with Ukraine is a result of decrease in absolute amounts of trade turnover. In Ukrainian export of goods in 2011-2013 such decrease comprised \$4.8 bln and in 2014 – \$5.2 bln. Export of Ukrainian services dropped \$1.9 bln in 2011-2014. Therefore, total losses of Ukrainian export to Russia in the beginning of 2015 were almost \$12 bln comparing to 2011. Such decrease is almost 45% and it significantly influences general negative dynamics of Ukrainian economy.

Table 3.
Changes in Amount of Trade between Ukraine and Russia (2011-2015)¹

	2011	2013	2014	2015
Share of Russia in Ukrainian part of goods export	29.0%	23.8%	19.1%	10.0%
Share of Russia in Ukrainian part of services export	40.9%	36.9%	32.0%	31.0%
Share of Russia in Ukrainian import	15.3%	15.4%	15.4%	15.0%

Ukrainian import from Russia has also shrunk. In 2011-2014 such shrinking comprised almost \$8 bln. Therefore, Russian losses from reduction of Ukrainian import can also be treated as significant. However, such reduction also reflects the negative tendency for Ukraine as it originates from the essential cut of power supply due to decrease of Russian consignments. That also influences the potential of Ukrainian economy to growth and especially development in net of its energy-consuming enterprises.

Lately, we have also been able to observe the tendency to decrease Russian investment share in Ukraine. Only in 2014 the amount of investment decreased for 31% comparing to the previ-

¹ Calculated upon the data of State Statistics Service of Ukraine. Geographical structure of foreign trade of goods and services – <http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua>.

ous period (from 7.4% to 6.1%). Such tendency depicts both general disintegrational process and consequences from vast devaluation of hryvnia and ruble to US dollar [10].

Limiting measures in Ukrainian-Russian economic relations also expand to the sphere of labour migration. Since January 1, 2015 Russian authorities have deprived Ukrainian workers of privileges they had before and apply to them a general regime of employment based on the obtained labour patents. Together with the intensification of control over maintenance of maximum stay term on the territory of Russia (90 days during any 180 days) such deprivation will substantially influence general Ukrainian labour migration to Russia. Some experts forecast 20-30% decrease of Ukrainian migration flow to Russia. Possible losses of Ukrainian workers from such decrease may comprise \$11-13 bln [7].

Despite partial loss of positions on Ukrainian market, Russia keeps influencing the processes in Ukrainian economy. That is stipulated by considerable positions of Russian capital in Ukrainian financial sector. Lately, Ukrainian market has experienced expansion of Russian banking capital. 4 of 15 banks indicated by the National Bank of Ukraine as banks of the first group have Russian capital and origin. These Russian banks account for 18% of overall capital (ownership capital and obtained funds), almost 21% of authorized capital and over 20% of issued loans by banks of first group. Only in one year the amount of overall capital of these four banks has grown almost 25% and the amount of their issued loans – 31%. This tendency took place within the general decrease of trade and economic relations between Ukraine and Russia. Russian capital also has a significant influence on Ukrainian stock exchange. Thus, two important Ukrainian stock trading floors – PFTS and Ukrainian Exchange are the affiliated structures to Moscow Exchange.

Russia keeps the high level of control over production networks in key sectors of Ukrainian economy, including nuclear power industry (in nuclear fuel fabrication) and in aircraft and rocket engineering.

In the situation when Ukrainian economy is suffering significant difficulties deepened by slow implementation of system reforms Russian policy is directed on stipulating internal destructive processes, which will aggravate economic social and labor conditions, and, therefore, generate mass social protests – the premise for further internal political destabilization. Such selected actions may appear in trade, material production, industrial cooperation, money turnover and currency relations.

In trade, the abovementioned losses of Ukrainian export to Russia were the result of Russia's implementation of recent limiting trade measures as regards to the most sensitive spheres in Ukrainian export that had high level of dependence on Russian market. In particular, such limiting trade measures were applied to the markets of milk and dairy products (including cheese), pork, vegetable and fish canned food, juices, potatoes, sunflower seeds, confectionary of Roshen, AVK, 'Conti' and beer of 'Obolon' and 'Sun InBev Ukraine'. In addition, Russia has forbidden the transit of Ukrainian airlines via its territory [9].

However, these trade limitations are only the introduction to the new, more extensive ones, which have already obtained the legal base in Russia. This entails regulation of Russian government on withdrawal from the free trade regime of 174 trade lines and positions (including provision, light industry, chemical industry, ferrous metallurgy, machine manufacturing, building materials, etc .) and relative implication of most favoured regime to them (general rates of import tariff provided for the countries-members of the WTO). Such new trade limitations may come into force in case of the Association Agreement implementation upon which deep and comprehensive free trade area between Ukraine and the EU will be created or in case if Russia suspects Ukraine in practical application of the provisions laid in Association Agreement. Such

statement allows implementing trade limitations any time convenient for Russia and therefore making another spillover of destruction in Ukrainian economy. Limiting trade measures may also concern the Ukrainian export in service sector where transport services are dominating. Russia most likely will activate the policy of bypass transport routes for transit of gas and other goods.

Negative consequences from such actions of Russia may be significant and result in further economic destabilization including the shutdown of production on big enterprises, mass dismissals or application of nonpaid vacation practice, considerable external payment complications and finally to default.

In spheres of material production and industrial cooperation, Russia may provide an incentive to further downfall of Ukrainian enterprises of a real sector and decrease of their market value. Such measures may lead to Russian acquisitions of suffering Ukrainian companies or elimination of them as competitors to Russian companies on the market. The aforementioned aim may be completed through:

- implementation of trade limitations that diminish amounts of sales and decrease profitability of economic activity of Ukrainian enterprises;
- policy of import substitution first of all in sectors where the highest level of dependence on Ukraine is observed;
- suspending contracts on cooperation supplies that may lead to breach of continuity of economic processes and additional costs of Ukrainian enterprises for searching of new suppliers;
- control over mechanisms of financial markets and possibility to influence the stock quotations of Ukrainian companies;
- delays in payments under contracts that may worsen financial conditions of Ukrainian enterprises.

Moreover, Russia will organize or stimulate the transfer to its territory of Ukrainian enterprises, which are important for creation of production networks especially in military-industrial and aircraft engineering spheres. Such measures are already being taken on the temporarily occupied territories of Donbass and Crimea.

In spheres of money turnover and currency relations Russia maintains influence on Ukraine. Through its widespread network of commercial presence, functioning of affiliated structures of its certain leading banks and control over financial markets in Ukraine Russia has a possibility to influence capital and currency markets due to stipulation of demand on them, acceleration or moderation of payments under commercial contracts and creation of local deficits. Such actions may result in triggering speculating market demand. The latter may also arise from significant Russian influence on Ukrainian informational space and deformation of adequate information brought by media controlled by Russia to Ukrainian citizens who have already lost confidence in Ukrainian currency. Further devaluation of hryvnia may create pricing disproportions of high volume and lead to the uncontrolled fall of all economic connection system as such fall makes the majority of market operations unprofitable.

Considering the high role of external money transmissions by Ukrainian workers migrants for Ukrainian balance of payments, we may expect implementation of procedures that will make such transmissions from the territory of Russia more complicated.

Conclusions. Obviously, the current deep crisis in relations between Ukraine and Russia is not transitional. Such relations have passed the event horizon: radical changes in political climate have taken place, any remains of trust in relations have been destroyed, drastic discrepancies in mental orientations of two societies have been shaped.

Ukraine commenced the negotiations with the EU on deep and comprehensive free trade agreement. There are some options for the EU-Ukraine DCFTA future. Namely the possibility of postponing of DCFTA implementation and prolongation of the period of partial de-facto DCFTA implementation, involvement of changes into the content of DCFTA as a compromise to Russia and unilateral or bilateral refusal from the AA and/or DCFTA. Moreover there is a possibility of implementation of paneuropean economic area including the EU, EAEU, Ukraine with or without transformation of the DCFTA. Thus it is important to mention that until territorial integrity, sovereignty, security of Ukraine are guaranteed the AA and DCFTA effective implementation is under doubt.

Herewith there are several possible ways even in current conditions to develop cooperation between Ukraine and Russia. Despite the implementation of different external-economic strategies in Ukraine and Russia, they still could continue their relations through free trade area of CIS countries or partial preferential zones (free trade areas of customs unions) for selected sectors. However, the current level of economical disintegration of countries challenges not only the perspectives of any Eurasian integration of Ukraine but also the possibilities of partnership and any preferential cooperation. Therefore, under the new political conditions economic relations of Ukraine and Russia will most likely derive exclusively on the bases of generally recognized principles of international law and WTO regulations.

In fact, this means that the era of Ukraine's balancing between two vectors – western and eastern is over and scaled geo-economic reorientation has started. Such process is long-lasting and shouldn't be based on measures of economic war and blocking of economic contacts due to political and ideological circumstances. Considering these principal aspects, the main motivation of system changes, which should appear in relations of Ukraine and Russia in economic sphere, should be confined to the following.

First, Ukraine needs to exempt national economy from a number of entities, formed in the past under other circumstances, which do not reflect the structure of comparative advantages of Ukrainian national economy on the foreign markets today. For example, existence of developed network of enterprises producing of power intensive chemical goods could be effective under granted supply of cheap gas from other republics of former Soviet Union (especially Russia), but now this sector is a source of significant economic disbalance.

The abovementioned problem reflects other necessity – notable decrease of Ukraine's dependence on external power supply. Such dependence on resource import have lately become one of the most important factors of national economy competitiveness depression. The solvation of this problem lies in long-term policy of energy effectiveness increase that would be implemented in production, life and principle change in the structure of economy. Providing significant progress in solving this problem is achieved, Ukraine can totally abandon import of expensive Russian gas or at least compel the rational pricing of this natural resource.

Second, Ukrainian economy should be structurally balanced by decrease in influence of elements that create significant risks for national security. Such problem is correlated with the abovementioned one – energy – intensity decrease. However, it becomes even more important due to existing connections of Ukrainian machine-building enterprises to their partners in the framework of cooperation productive chains formed in the era of Soviet Union not for increase of economic effectiveness, but from the military security point of view. Such connection has become the source of danger for Ukraine in conditions when Russia uses the instruments of artificial trade and economic limitations.

However high dependence of Ukrainian production on supplies to Russia is not the only problem. The majority of main technological centers which have exclusive ownership for tech-

nologies that are planned for transboundary production-cooperation systems in machine building is located on the territory of Russia (that especially refers to such strategically important sectors as space-rocket and aircraft, military industrial sector, nuclear power sector). It provides the crucial level of dependence in relative enterprises on the policy of Russia, which can easily block their development by means of technological transfer limitation through prohibition of certain intellectual property objects connected with cooperated production use.

Even if such technologies were not used, further existence of tight cooperation between the majority of Ukrainian and Russian enterprises would still be a problem. Ukraine is now adapting its standards of technical regulation to the EU norms. That is deepening the difference between Russia and Ukraine in the sphere of technical regulation and is leading to the increase of barriers in mutual production connections. Decrease of such barriers is possible in case of implementation of the approach to harmonization of Eurasian technical standards with the EU ones. However there is no such tendency now.

Third, for Ukraine it is strategically important to diversify its trade and economic connections, develop the new ones, especially on non-traditional supply markets, and find new partners for cooperation, which are technological leaders in relative spheres. Due to the premises of Association Agreement, new possibilities for participation of Ukraine in European programs of innovation, cooperation and cluster production networks will be created. Obviously, it can't but negatively influence Ukrainian-Russian economic connections as regards existence of a number of outdated elements in them. However, in the framework of such policy new possibilities for bilateral relations can be created if the adequate way of incorporating them to threelateral or multilateral relations with the EU are found. Such possibilities exist in the sphere of mutual infrastructure development (transport, informational systems) and in the sphere of new knowledge and innovational decisions (particularly in power and environment) production.

Fourth, Ukrainian-Russian economic relations should be incorporated in a wider frame of global and regional mechanisms of economic relation regulation. The world has become too globalized and the countries have to apply to global forms of regulation instead of the national ones. In this context, it is important to note that Ukraine still does not effectively use regulatory possibilities of international organizations, where Russia is a member. In particular, Ukraine does not use relative WTO procedures provided for cases of breach of obligations, which a country undertakes before entering this organization. Thus, Russia in its economic policy has been systematically violating a number of key regulations of this organization. Obviously, Ukraine also has to commence negotiations on entering the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development.

Fifth, even in conditions of complication in mutual political relations Ukraine did not initiate artificial decrease of mutual economic outflows. Such decrease does not comply with strategic interests of Ukraine. It is important to apply for a principle of wise sufficiency. Disintegration of Ukrainian and Russian economic relations should lead to creating more productive relations of innovative and developed countries with new premises of independent effective cooperation in future. Ukraine should be ready not only to limit destructive influence of Russia on the economy, but also to return to cooperate with this country if it becomes democratic.

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ДЕЗІНТЕГРАЦІЯ ЕКОНОМІК УКРАЇНИ ТА РОСІЇ ТА ЇЇ НАСЛІДКИ ДЛЯ ІМПЛЕМЕНТАЦІЇ ВСЕОХОПЛЮЮЧОЇ ТА ПОГЛИБЛЕНОЇ ЗОНИ ВІЛЬНОЇ ТОРГІВЛІ УКРАЇНИ ТА ЄС

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Доктор економічних наук, професор, професор Жана Моне, завідувач кафедри світового господарства та міжнародних економічних відносин Інституту міжнародних відносин Київського національного університету імені Тараса Шевченка.

Анотація. В статті проаналізовано тенденції та механізми процесу дезінтеграції економік України та Росії та вплив такої дезінтеграції на імплементацію всеохоплюючої та поглибленої зони вільної торгівлі між Україною та ЄС. Зокрема в статті розглянуто такі тенденції та механізми як скорочення торгівлі товарами та послугами, взаємного інвестування, потоків міграції та капіталу. Ключовими факторами, які спричиняють процес дезінтеграції є скорочення товарообігу через торговельну війну Росії проти України, яку Росія веде шляхом дискримінації українського експорту, умов для українських мігрантів, тощо. В статті також проаналізовано позицію Росії щодо імплементації всеохоплюючої та поглибленої зони вільної торгівлі між Україною та ЄС та майбутні шляхи розвитку української економіки.

Ключові слова: дезінтеграція, Україна, Росія, торгівля, економічна війна, інвестиції, інтеграція.

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ДЕЗИНТЕГРАЦІЯ ЕКОНОМІК УКРАЇНИ І РОСІЇ І ЇЇ ПОСЛЕДСТВИЯ ДЛЯ ІМПЛЕМЕНТАЦІЇ ВСЕСТОРОННЬОЇ І УГЛУБЛЕННЬОЇ ЗОНИ СВОБОДНОЇ ТОРГОВЛІ УКРАЇНИ І ЄС

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Анотація. *В статті проаналізовані тенденції і механізми процесу дезинтеграції економік України і Росії і вплив такої дезинтеграції на імплементацію всепоглинаючої і углубленої зони вільної торгівлі України і ЄС. В тому числі в статті розглянуті такі тенденції і механізми як скорочення торгівлі товарами і послугами, взаємного інвестування, потоків міграції і капіталу. Ключовими факторами, які обумовлюють процес дезинтеграції є скорочення товарооборота через торгову війну Росії проти України, яку Росія веде шляхом дискримінації українського імпорту, умов для українських мігрантів, і т. д. В статті також проаналізована позиція Росії стосовно імплементації всепоглинаючої і углубленої зони вільної торгівлі між Україною і ЄС і шляхи майбутнього розвитку української економіки.*

Ключові слова: *дезинтеграція, Україна, Росія, торгівля, економічна війна, інвестиції, інтеграція.*